OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server MetadataMicrosoftmbj@microsoft.comhttp://self-issued.info/Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.n-sakimura@nri.co.jphttp://nat.sakimura.org/YubicoRFC8414@ve7jtb.comhttp://www.thread-safe.com/
Security
OAuth Working GroupOAuthDiscoveryMetadataDiscovery MetadataConfiguration InformationAuthorization ServerWebFingerJavaScript Object NotationJSONJSON Web TokenJWT
This specification defines a metadata format that
an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain
the information needed to interact with
an OAuth 2.0 authorization server,
including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.
This specification generalizes the metadata format defined by
"OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0"
in a way that is compatible with OpenID Connect Discovery
while being applicable to a wider set of OAuth 2.0 use cases.
This is intentionally parallel to the way that
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol"
generalized the dynamic client registration mechanisms defined by
"OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0"
in a way that is compatible with it.
The metadata for an authorization server
is retrieved from a well-known location as a JSON document,
which declares its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.
This process is described in .
This metadata can be communicated either in a self-asserted fashion
by the server origin via HTTPS or as
a set of signed metadata values represented as claims
in a JSON Web Token (JWT) .
In the JWT case, the issuer is vouching for
the validity of the data about the authorization server.
This is analogous to the role that the Software Statement
plays in OAuth Dynamic Client Registration .
The means by which the client chooses an authorization server
is out of scope.
In some cases, its issuer identifier may be manually configured into the client.
In other cases, it may be dynamically discovered, for instance,
through the use of WebFinger,
as described in Section 2 of
"OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0".
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS)
and JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
data structures in this specification utilize
the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization;
the JWS JSON Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Code",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret",
"Grant Type", "Protected Resource", "Redirection URI", "Refresh Token",
"Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint"
defined by OAuth 2.0;
the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token (JWT)"
defined by JSON Web Token (JWT);
and the term "Response Mode" defined by
"OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices".
Authorization servers can have metadata describing their configuration.
The following authorization server metadata values
are used by this specification and are registered in the IANA
"OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
established in :
REQUIRED.
The authorization server's issuer identifier, which is a URL that
uses the https scheme and has no query or fragment components.
Authorization server metadata is published at a location that is
.well-known according to RFC 5785
derived from this issuer identifier, as described in .
The issuer identifier is used to prevent authorization server mix-up attacks,
as described in
"OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation".
URL of the authorization server's authorization endpoint .
This is REQUIRED unless no grant types are supported that use the authorization endpoint.
URL of the authorization server's token endpoint .
This is REQUIRED unless only the implicit grant type is supported.
OPTIONAL.
URL of the authorization server's JWK Set document.
The referenced document contains the signing key(s) the client uses to validate signatures from the authorization server.
This URL MUST use the https scheme.
The JWK Set MAY also contain the server's encryption key or keys,
which are used by clients to encrypt requests to the server.
When both signing and encryption keys are made available,
a use (public key use) parameter
value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set
to indicate each key's intended usage.
OPTIONAL.
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration endpoint .
RECOMMENDED.
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0scope values that this authorization server supports.
Servers MAY choose not to advertise some supported scope values
even when this parameter is used.
REQUIRED.
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
response_type values that this
authorization server supports.
The array values used are the same as those used with the
response_types parameter defined by
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol".
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
response_mode values that this
authorization server supports, as specified in
"OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices".
If omitted, the default is
["query", "fragment"].
The response mode value form_post is also defined in
"OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode".
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
grant type values that this
authorization server supports.
The array values used are the same as those used with the
grant_types parameter defined by
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol".
If omitted, the default value is
["authorization_code", "implicit"].
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this token endpoint.
Client authentication method values are used in the
token_endpoint_auth_method
parameter defined in Section 2 of .
If omitted, the default is client_secret_basic --
the HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme specified in
Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
(alg values)
supported by the token endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the token endpoint for the private_key_jwt
and client_secret_jwt authentication methods.
This metadata entry MUST be present if either of these authentication methods are specified
in the token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported entry.
No default algorithms are implied if this entry is omitted.
Servers SHOULD support RS256.
The value none MUST NOT be used.
OPTIONAL.
URL of a page containing human-readable information that
developers might want or need to know when using the authorization server.
In particular, if the authorization server does not support Dynamic Client Registration,
then information on how to register clients needs to be provided in this documentation.
OPTIONAL.
Languages and scripts supported for the user interface,
represented as a JSON array of
language tag values from BCP 47.
If omitted, the set of supported languages and scripts is unspecified.
OPTIONAL.
URL that the authorization server provides to the person registering
the client to read about the authorization server's requirements on how
the client can use the data provided by the authorization server.
The registration process SHOULD display this
URL to the person registering the client if it is given.
As described in , despite the identifier
op_policy_uri
appearing to be OpenID-specific,
its usage in this specification is actually referring to
a general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
OPTIONAL.
URL that the authorization server provides to the person registering
the client to read about the authorization server's terms of service.
The registration process SHOULD display this
URL to the person registering the client if it is given.
As described in , despite the identifier
op_tos_uri,
appearing to be OpenID-specific,
its usage in this specification is actually referring to
a general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
OPTIONAL.
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 revocation endpoint .
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this revocation endpoint.
The valid client authentication method values are those registered
in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
.
If omitted, the default is client_secret_basic --
the HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme specified in
Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
(alg values)
supported by the revocation endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the revocation endpoint for the private_key_jwt
and client_secret_jwt authentication methods.
This metadata entry MUST be present if either of these authentication methods are specified
in the revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported entry.
No default algorithms are implied if this entry is omitted.
The value none MUST NOT be used.
OPTIONAL.
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint .
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this introspection endpoint.
The valid client authentication method values are those registered
in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
or those registered
in the IANA "OAuth Access Token Types" registry
.
(These values are and will remain distinct,
due to .)
If omitted, the set of supported authentication methods MUST be determined by other means.
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
(alg values)
supported by the introspection endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the introspection endpoint for the private_key_jwt
and client_secret_jwt authentication methods.
This metadata entry MUST be present if either of these authentication methods are specified
in the introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported entry.
No default algorithms are implied if this entry is omitted.
The value none MUST NOT be used.
OPTIONAL.
JSON array containing a list of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
code challenge methods supported by this authorization server.
Code challenge method values are used in the
code_challenge_method
parameter defined in Section 4.3 of .
The valid code challenge method values are those registered
in the IANA "PKCE Code Challenge Methods" registry
.
If omitted, the authorization server does not support PKCE.
Additional authorization server metadata parameters MAY also be used.
Some are defined by other specifications,
such as
OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0.
In addition to JSON elements, metadata values MAY also be provided
as a signed_metadata value,
which is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
that asserts metadata values about the authorization server as a bundle.
A set of claims that can be used in signed metadata
is defined in .
The signed metadata MUST be digitally signed or MACed
using JSON Web Signature (JWS)
and MUST contain an iss (issuer) claim
denoting the party attesting to the claims in the signed metadata.
Consumers of the metadata MAY ignore the signed metadata
if they do not support this feature.
If the consumer of the metadata supports signed metadata,
metadata values conveyed in the signed metadata
MUST take precedence over the corresponding values conveyed using plain JSON elements.
Signed metadata is included in the authorization server metadata JSON object
using this OPTIONAL member:
A JWT containing metadata values about the authorization server as claims.
This is a string value consisting of the entire signed JWT.
A signed_metadata
metadata value SHOULD NOT appear as a claim in the JWT.
Authorization servers supporting metadata
MUST make a JSON document containing metadata as specified in
available at a path formed by
inserting a well-known URI string into the authorization server's issuer identifier
between the host component and the path component, if any.
By default, the well-known URI string used is
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
This path MUST use the https scheme.
The syntax and semantics of .well-known
are defined in RFC 5785.
The well-known URI suffix used MUST be registered in the IANA
"Well-Known URIs" registry .
Different applications utilizing OAuth authorization servers in application-specific ways
may define and register different well-known URI suffixes
used to publish authorization server metadata as used by those applications.
For instance, if the example application uses an OAuth authorization server in an example-specific way,
and there are example-specific metadata values that it needs to publish,
then it might register and use the
example-configuration URI suffix and publish
the metadata document at the path formed by inserting
/.well-known/example-configuration
between the host and path components of the
authorization server's issuer identifier.
Alternatively, many such applications will use the default well-known URI string
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server,
which is the right choice for general-purpose OAuth authorization servers,
and not register an application-specific one.
An OAuth 2.0 application using this specification MUST specify
what well-known URI suffix it will use for this purpose.
The same authorization server MAY choose to publish its metadata at multiple
well-known locations derived from its issuer identifier,
for example, publishing metadata at both
/.well-known/example-configuration and
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
Some OAuth applications will choose to use
the well-known URI suffix
openid-configuration.
As described in , despite the identifier
/.well-known/openid-configuration,
appearing to be OpenID specific,
its usage in this specification is actually referring to
a general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
An authorization server metadata document MUST be queried using an HTTP
GET request at the previously specified path.
The client would make the following request when the
issuer identifier is https://example.com
and the well-known URI suffix is oauth-authorization-server
to obtain the metadata,
since the issuer identifier contains no path component:
If the
issuer identifier value contains a path component, any terminating
/ MUST be removed before inserting
/.well-known/ and the well-known URI suffix
between the host component and the path component.
The client would make the following request when the
issuer identifier is https://example.com/issuer1
and the well-known URI suffix is oauth-authorization-server
to obtain the metadata,
since the issuer identifier contains a path component:
Using path components enables supporting multiple issuers per host.
This is required in some multi-tenant hosting configurations.
This use of .well-known is for supporting
multiple issuers per host; unlike its use in
RFC 5785, it does not provide
general information about the host.
The response is a set of claims about the authorization server's
configuration, including all necessary endpoints and
public key location information.
A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP status code and return
a JSON object using the application/json content type
that contains a set of claims as its members
that are a subset of the metadata values defined in
.
Other claims MAY also be returned.
Claims that return multiple values are represented as JSON arrays.
Claims with zero elements MUST be omitted from the response.
An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.
The issuer value returned MUST be identical to
the authorization server's issuer identifier value into which
the well-known URI string was inserted to create the URL
used to retrieve the metadata.
If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used.
Processing some OAuth 2.0 messages requires comparing
values in the messages to known values. For example, the
member names in the metadata response might be
compared to specific member names such as issuer. Comparing Unicode strings,
however, has significant security implications.
Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode
strings MUST be performed as specified below:
Remove any JSON-applied escaping to produce an array of
Unicode code points.
Unicode Normalization MUST NOT
be applied at any point to either the JSON string or
the string it is to be compared against.
Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code-point-to-code-point equality comparison.
Note that this is the same equality comparison procedure described in
Section 8.3 of .
The identifiers
/.well-known/openid-configuration,
op_policy_uri,
and op_tos_uri
contain strings referring to the
OpenID Connect family of specifications
that were originally defined by
"OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0".
Despite the reuse of these identifiers that appear to be OpenID specific,
their usage in this specification is actually referring to
general OAuth 2.0 features that are not specific to OpenID Connect.
The algorithm for transforming the issuer identifier to an authorization server metadata location
defined in is equivalent to the corresponding transformation defined in
Section 4 of "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0",
provided that the issuer identifier contains no path component.
However, they are different when there is a path component,
because OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 specifies that the well-known URI string is appended to the issuer identifier
(e.g., https://example.com/issuer1/.well&nbhy;known/openid-configuration),
whereas this specification specifies that the well-known URI string is inserted before the path component of the issuer identifier
(e.g., https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration/issuer1).
Going forward, OAuth authorization server metadata locations should use the transformation defined in this specification.
However, when deployed in legacy environments in which the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 transformation is already used,
it may be necessary during a transition period to publish metadata for issuer identifiers containing a path component at both locations.
During this transition period, applications should first apply the transformation defined in this specification
and attempt to retrieve the authorization server metadata from the resulting location;
only if the retrieval from that location fails should they fall back to attempting to retrieve it
from the alternate location obtained using the transformation defined by OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0.
This backwards-compatible behavior should only be necessary when
the well-known URI suffix employed by the application is openid-configuration.
Implementations MUST support TLS.
Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over
time and depend on the widespread deployment and known
security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation.
The authorization server MUST support
TLS version 1.2
and MAY support additional TLS mechanisms meeting its security requirements.
When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check,
per RFC 6125.
Implementation security considerations can be found in
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)".
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS
with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and
integrity protection.
TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the client,
as described in ,
when making an authorization server metadata request.
Checking that the server certificate is valid for the issuer identifier URL
prevents man-in-middle and DNS-based attacks.
These attacks could cause a client to be tricked into using an attacker's
keys and endpoints, which would enable impersonation of the legitimate authorization server.
If an attacker can accomplish this, they can access the resources
that the affected client has access to
using the authorization server that they are impersonating.
An attacker may also attempt to impersonate an authorization server by publishing
a metadata document that contains an issuer claim
using the issuer identifier URL of the authorization server being impersonated,
but with its own endpoints and signing keys.
This would enable it to impersonate that authorization server, if accepted by the client.
To prevent this, the client MUST ensure that the issuer identifier URL it is using
as the prefix for the metadata request exactly matches the value of
the issuer metadata value
in the authorization server metadata document received by the client.
Publishing information about the authorization server in a standard format
makes it easier for both legitimate clients and attackers
to use the authorization server.
Whether an authorization server publishes its metadata in an ad hoc manner
or in the standard format defined by this specification,
the same defenses against attacks that might be mounted
that use this information should be applied.
Secure determination of appropriate protected resources
to use with an authorization server for all use cases
is out of scope of this specification.
This specification assumes that the client has a means of determining
appropriate protected resources to use with an authorization server
and that the client is using the correct metadata
for each authorization server.
Implementers need to be aware that if an inappropriate protected resource
is used by the client, that an attacker may be able to act as
a man-in-the-middle proxy to a valid protected resource without
it being detected by the authorization server or the client.
The ways to determine the appropriate protected resources to use
with an authorization server are, in general, application dependent.
For instance, some authorization servers are used with
a fixed protected resource or set of protected resources,
the locations of which may be well known
or could be published as metadata values by the authorization server.
In other cases, the set of resources that can be used with
an authorization server can be dynamically changed
by administrative actions.
Many other means of determining appropriate associations between
authorization servers and protected resources are also possible.
The following registration procedure is used for the
registry established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required
basis after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied
that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject
(e.g., "Request to register OAuth Authorization Server Metadata: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or
deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA.
Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make
the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,
determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability
or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct
all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to
represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification,
in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions.
In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as
creating a conflict of interest for a particular Designated Expert,
that Designated Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Designated Experts.
This specification establishes the
IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
for OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata names.
The registry records the authorization server metadata member
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
The Designated Experts must either:
(a) require that metadata names and values being registered use only
printable ASCII characters excluding double quote ('"') and backslash ('\')
(the Unicode characters with code points U+0021, U+0023 through U+005B, and
U+005D through U+007E), or
(b) if new metadata members or values are defined that
use other code points, require that their definitions specify the exact
sequences of Unicode code points used to represent them.
Furthermore, proposed registrations that use Unicode code points that can only
be represented in JSON strings as escaped characters must not be accepted.
The name requested (e.g., "issuer").
This name is case-sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner
(one that would cause a match if the Unicode toLowerCase() operation were applied to both strings)
unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason
to allow an exception.
Brief description of the metadata (e.g., "Issuer identifier URL").
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG".
For others, give the name of the responsible party.
Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that
can be used to retrieve copies of the documents.
An indication of the relevant
sections may also be included but is not required.
Metadata Name: issuer
Metadata Description:
Authorization server's issuer identifier URL
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: authorization_endpoint
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's authorization endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: token_endpoint
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's token endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: jwks_uri
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's JWK Set document
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: registration_endpoint
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: scopes_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
scope values that this authorization server supports
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: response_types_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
response_type values that this
authorization server supports
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: response_modes_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
response_mode values that this
authorization server supports
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: grant_types_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
grant type values that this
authorization server supports
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this token endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
supported by the token endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the token endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: service_documentation
Metadata Description:
URL of a page containing human-readable information that
developers might want or need to know when using the authorization server
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: ui_locales_supported
Metadata Description:
Languages and scripts supported for the user interface,
represented as a JSON array of
language tag values from BCP 47
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: op_policy_uri
Metadata Description:
URL that the authorization server provides to the person registering
the client to read about the authorization server's requirements on how
the client can use the data provided by the authorization server
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: op_tos_uri
Metadata Description:
URL that the authorization server provides to the person registering
the client to read about the authorization server's terms of service
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: revocation_endpoint
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 revocation endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this revocation endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
supported by the revocation endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the revocation endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: introspection_endpoint
Metadata Description:
URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
supported by this introspection endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
Metadata Description:
JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
supported by the introspection endpoint for the signature on
the JWT used to authenticate the client
at the introspection endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: code_challenge_methods_supported
Metadata Description:
PKCE code challenge methods supported by this authorization server
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
Metadata Name: signed_metadata
Metadata Description:
Signed JWT containing metadata values about the authorization server as claims
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): of RFC 8414
This specification adds to the instructions for the Designated Experts
of the following IANA registries, both of which are in the
"OAuth Parameters" registry
:
OAuth Access Token Types
OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods
IANA has added a link to this specification in the Reference sections
of these registries.
For these registries, the Designated Experts must reject
registration requests in one registry
for values already occurring in the other registry.
This is necessary because the
introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
parameter allows for the use of values from either registry.
That way, because the values in the two registries will continue to be
mutually exclusive, no ambiguities will arise.
This specification registers the well-known URI defined in
in the IANA
"Well-Known URIs" registry
established by RFC 5785.
URI suffix: oauth-authorization-server
Change controller: IESG
Specification document: of RFC 8414
Related information: (none)
Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)Unicode Normalization FormsJSON Web Token (JWT)JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.JSON Web Signature (JWS)JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.JSON Web Encryption (JWE)JSON Web Key (JWK)A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding PracticesGoogleGoogle FacebookMicrosoftOAuth 2.0 Form Post Response ModeMicrosoftPing IdentityOAuth ParametersIANAThe Unicode StandardThe Unicode ConsortiumOpenID Connect Core 1.0Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.Ping IdentityMicrosoftGoogleSalesforceOpenID Connect Discovery 1.0Nomura Research Institute,
Ltd.Ping IdentityMicrosoftIllumilaOpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.Ping IdentityMicrosoftWell-Known URIsIANAOAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation
This specification is based on the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 specification,
which was produced by the OpenID Connect working group of the OpenID Foundation.
This specification standardizes the de facto usage of the metadata format defined by
OpenID Connect Discovery to publish OAuth authorization server metadata.
The authors would like to thank the following people for their reviews of this specification:
Shwetha Bhandari,
Ben Campbell,
Brian Campbell,
Brian Carpenter,
William Denniss,
Vladimir Dzhuvinov,
Donald Eastlake,
Samuel Erdtman,
George Fletcher,
Dick Hardt,
Phil Hunt,
Alexey Melnikov,
Tony Nadalin,
Mark Nottingham,
Eric Rescorla,
Justin Richer,
Adam Roach,
Hannes Tschofenig,
and
Hans Zandbelt.