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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-20"
ipr="pre5378Trust200902">
<front> <front>
<title abbrev="WebRTC Sec. Arch.">WebRTC Security Architecture</title> <title abbrev="WebRTC Sec. Arch.">WebRTC Security Architecture</title>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8827" stream="IETF"/>
<author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E.K." surname="Rescorla"> <author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
<organization>RTFM, Inc.</organization> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Mozilla</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal>
<street>2064 Edgewood Drive</street>
<city>Palo Alto</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>94303</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 650 678 2350</phone>
<email>ekr@rtfm.com</email> <email>ekr@rtfm.com</email>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date month="01" year="2021"/>
<date/> <abstract pn="section-abstract">
<t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">
<area>ART</area>
<workgroup>RTCWEB</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>
This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol
suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed
in browsers - "real time communication on the Web". in browsers -- "real-time communication on the Web".
</t> </t>
</abstract> </abstract>
<boilerplate>
<section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc=
"exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
<name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name
>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
RFC 7841.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
<eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8827" brackets="non
e"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="excl
ude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
<name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none
"/>) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-3">
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s)
controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not
be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative
works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process,
except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it
into languages other than English.
</t>
</section>
</boilerplate>
<toc>
<section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" p
n="section-toc.1">
<name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-to
c.1-1">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
<t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref der
ivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref
derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">
Introduction</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
<t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref der
ivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref
derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-terminology">T
erminology</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-trust-model">Trust Model</xref></t
>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.3.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1">
<t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1"><
xref derivedContent="3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.
1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-au
thenticated-entities">Authenticated Entities</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent=
"3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.2"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-unauthenticated-entiti
es">Unauthenticated Entities</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-overview">Overview</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.4.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-initial-signaling">Ini
tial Signaling</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent=
"4.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.2"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-media-consent-verifica
tion">Media Consent Verification</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent=
"4.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-dtls-handshake">DTLS H
andshake</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent=
"4.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.4"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-communications-and-con
sent-">Communications and Consent Freshness</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-sdp-identity-attribute">SDP Identi
ty Attribute</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.5.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-offer-answer-considera
tions">Offer/Answer Considerations</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="se
ction-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derived
Content="5.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1.1"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-generating
-the-initial-sdp-">Generating the Initial SDP Offer</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2.1"><xref derived
Content="5.1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1.2"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-generating
-an-sdp-answer">Generating an SDP Answer</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3.1"><xref derived
Content="5.1.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1.3"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-processing
-an-sdp-offer-or-">Processing an SDP Offer or Answer</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4.1"><xref derived
Content="5.1.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1.4"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-modifying-
the-session">Modifying the Session</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-detailed-technical-descript">Detai
led Technical Description</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.6.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"6.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-origin-and-web-securit
y-iss">Origin and Web Security Issues</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent=
"6.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-device-permissions-mod
el">Device Permissions Model</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent=
"6.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.3"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-communications-consent
">Communications Consent</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent=
"6.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.4"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ip-location-privacy">I
P Location Privacy</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent=
"6.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.5"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-communications-securit
y">Communications Security</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="7" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-web-based-peer-authenticati">Web-B
ased Peer Authentication</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.7.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-trust-relationships-id
ps-ap">Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.2"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-overview-of-operation"
>Overview of Operation</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.3"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-items-for-standardizat
ion">Items for Standardization</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.4"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-binding-identity-asser
tions">Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="se
ction-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1.1"><xref derived
Content="7.4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.4.1"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-carrying-i
dentity-assertion">Carrying Identity Assertions</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.5"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-determining-the-idp-ur
i">Determining the IdP URI</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="se
ction-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1.1"><xref derived
Content="7.5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.5.1"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authentica
ting-party">Authenticating Party</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2.1"><xref derived
Content="7.5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.5.2"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-relying-pa
rty">Relying Party</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.6"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requesting-assertions"
>Requesting Assertions</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent=
"7.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.7"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-managing-user-login">M
anaging User Login</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.8">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="8" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-verifying-assertions">Verifying As
sertions</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.8.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"8.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-identity-formats">Iden
tity Formats</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><xref derivedContent="9" form
at="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" f
ormat="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security
Considerations</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.9.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent=
"9.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.1"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-communications-securit
y-2">Communications Security</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent=
"9.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-privacy">Privacy</xref
></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent=
"9.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-denial-of-service">Den
ial of Service</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent=
"9.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4"/>.  <xref derived
Content="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-idp-authentication-mec
hanis">IdP Authentication Mechanism</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="se
ction-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1.1"><xref derived
Content="9.4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4.1"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-peerconnec
tion-origin-check">PeerConnection Origin Check</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2.1"><xref derived
Content="9.4.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4.2"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-idp-well-k
nown-uri">IdP Well-Known URI</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3.1"><xref derived
Content="9.4.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4.3"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-privacy-of
-idp-generated-id">Privacy of IdP-Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</xre
f></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.1"><xref derived
Content="9.4.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4.4"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-o
f-third-party-idp">Security of Third-Party IdPs</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn
="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1.1"><xref
derivedContent="9.4.4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.
4.4.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="nam
e-confusable-characters">Confusable Characters</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.1"><xref derived
Content="9.4.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4.5"/>.  <
xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-web-securi
ty-feature-intera">Web Security Feature Interactions</xref></t>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn
="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1.1"><xref
derivedContent="9.4.5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.
4.5.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="nam
e-popup-blocking">Popup Blocking</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2.1"><xref
derivedContent="9.4.5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.
4.5.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="nam
e-third-party-cookies">Third Party Cookies</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.10">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><xref derivedContent="10" fo
rmat="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10"/>. <xref derivedContent=""
format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Consid
erations</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.11">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><xref derivedContent="11" fo
rmat="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11"/>. <xref derivedContent=""
format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t
>
<ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="sectio
n-toc.1-1.11.2">
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent
="11.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11.1"/>.  <xref deri
vedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-reference
s">Normative References</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent
="11.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11.2"/>.  <xref deri
vedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-referen
ces">Informative References</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.12">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><xref derivedContent="" form
at="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/><xref derivedContent="
" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgeme
nts</xref></t>
</li>
<li pn="section-toc.1-1.13">
<t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><xref derivedContent="" form
at="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="
" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-address">Author's Addre
ss</xref></t>
</li>
</ul>
</section>
</toc>
</front> </front>
<middle> <middle>
<section anchor="sec.introduction" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC
<section title="Introduction" anchor="sec.introduction"> ="false" pn="section-1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTCWEB) working group <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">
The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTCWEB) Working Group
standardized protocols for real-time communications between Web standardized protocols for real-time communications between Web
browsers, generally called "WebRTC" <xref target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overvi ew"/>. browsers, generally called "WebRTC" <xref target="RFC8825" format="defau lt" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8825"/>.
The major use cases for WebRTC technology are real-time audio The major use cases for WebRTC technology are real-time audio
and/or video calls, Web conferencing, and direct data transfer. Unlike and/or video calls, Web conferencing, and direct data transfer. Unlike
most conventional real-time systems, (e.g., SIP-based <xref most conventional real-time systems (e.g., SIP-based <xref target="RFC32
target="RFC3261"></xref> soft phones) WebRTC communications are directly 61" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3261"/> soft phones),
WebRTC communications are directly
controlled by some Web server, via a JavaScript (JS) API as shown in controlled by some Web server, via a JavaScript (JS) API as shown in
<xref target="fig.simple"/>. <xref target="fig.simple" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedCon tent="Figure 1"/>.
</t> </t>
<figure title="A simple WebRTC system" anchor="fig.simple"> <figure anchor="fig.simple" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure
<artwork><![CDATA[ -1">
+----------------+ <name slugifiedName="name-a-simple-webrtc-system">A Simple WebRTC System
| | </name>
| Web Server | <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-1-2.1">
| | +----------------+
+----------------+ | |
^ ^ | Web Server |
/ \ | |
HTTP / \ HTTP +----------------+
/ \ ^ ^
/ \ / \
v v HTTP / \ HTTP
JS API JS API / \
+-----------+ +-----------+ / \
| | Media | | v v
| Browser |<---------->| Browser | JS API JS API
| | | | +-----------+ +-----------+
+-----------+ +-----------+ | | Media | |
]]></artwork> | Browser |&lt;----------&gt;| Browser |
| | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ </artwork>
</figure> </figure>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-3">
A more complicated system might allow for interdomain calling, as shown A more complicated system might allow for inter-domain calling, as shown
in <xref target="fig.multidomain"/>. The protocol to be used between in <xref target="fig.multidomain" format="default" sectionFormat="of" de
rivedContent="Figure 2"/>. The protocol to be used between
the domains is not standardized by WebRTC, but given the installed base the domains is not standardized by WebRTC, but given the installed base
and the form of the WebRTC API is likely to be something SDP-based like and the form of the WebRTC API is likely to be something SDP-based like
SIP or something like Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) SIP or something like the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XM
<xref target="RFC6120"/>. PP)
<xref target="RFC6120" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedConten
t="RFC6120"/>.
</t> </t>
<figure title="A multidomain WebRTC system" anchor="fig.multidomain"> <figure anchor="fig.multidomain" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="f
<artwork><![CDATA[ igure-2">
+--------------+ +--------------+ <name slugifiedName="name-a-multidomain-webrtc-system">A Multidomain Web
| | SIP,XMPP,...| | RTC System</name>
| Web Server |<----------->| Web Server | <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-1-4.1">
| | | | +--------------+ +--------------+
+--------------+ +--------------+ | | SIP, XMPP, ... | |
^ ^ | Web Server |&lt;--------------&gt;| Web Server |
| | | | | |
HTTP | | HTTP +--------------+ +--------------+
| | ^ ^
v v | |
JS API JS API HTTP | | HTTP
+-----------+ +-----------+ | |
| | Media | | v v
| Browser |<---------------->| Browser | JS API JS API
| | | | +-----------+ +-----------+
+-----------+ +-----------+ | | Media | |
]]></artwork> | Browser |&lt;-------------------&gt;| Browser |
| | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ </artwork>
</figure> </figure>
<t indent="0" pn="section-1-5">
<t>
This system presents a number of new security challenges, which are This system presents a number of new security challenges, which are
analyzed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security"/>. This document analyzed in <xref target="RFC8826" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d erivedContent="RFC8826"/>. This document
describes a security architecture for WebRTC which addresses the threats describes a security architecture for WebRTC which addresses the threats
and requirements described in that document. and requirements described in that document.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec-term" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false"
<section anchor="sec-term" title="Terminology"> pn="section-2">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-terminology">Terminology</name>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp1
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", 4>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
<xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
appear in all capitals, as shown here. "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
</t> "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are
to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="defa
ult" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/>
<xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedConten
t="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
as shown here.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.trusthierarchy" numbered="true" toc="include"
<section title="Trust Model" anchor="sec.proposal.trusthierarchy"> removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-trust-model">Trust Model</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">
The basic assumption of this architecture is that network resources The basic assumption of this architecture is that network resources
exist in a hierarchy of trust, rooted in the browser, which serves as exist in a hierarchy of trust, rooted in the browser, which serves as
the user's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Any security property which the the user's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Any security property which the
user wishes to have enforced must be ultimately guaranteed by the user wishes to have enforced must be ultimately guaranteed by the
browser (or transitively by some property the browser browser (or transitively by some property the browser
verifies). Conversely, if the browser is compromised, then no security verifies). Conversely, if the browser is compromised, then no security
guarantees are possible. Note that there are cases (e.g., Internet guarantees are possible. Note that there are cases (e.g., Internet
kiosks) where the user can't really trust the browser that much. In kiosks) where the user can't really trust the browser that much. In
these cases, the level of security provided is limited by how much they these cases, the level of security provided is limited by how much they
trust the browser. trust the browser.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-3-2">
Optimally, we would not rely on trust in any entities other than the Optimally, we would not rely on trust in any entities other than the
browser. However, this is unfortunately not possible if we wish to have browser. However, this is unfortunately not possible if we wish to have
a functional system. Other network elements fall into two categories: a functional system. Other network elements fall into two categories:
those which can be authenticated by the browser and thus can be granted those which can be authenticated by the browser and thus can be granted
permissions to access sensitive resources, and those which cannot be permissions to access sensitive resources, and those which cannot be
authenticated and thus are untrusted. authenticated and thus are untrusted.
</t> </t>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.authenticated" numbered="true" toc="include"
<section title="Authenticated Entities" anchor="sec.proposal.authenticated removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3.1">
"> <name slugifiedName="name-authenticated-entities">Authenticated Entities
<t> </name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-3.1-1">
There are two major classes of authenticated entities in the system: There are two major classes of authenticated entities in the system:
</t> </t>
<t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-3.1-2">
<list style="symbols"> <dt pn="section-3.1-2.1">Calling services:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-3.1-2.2">Web sites whose origin we can verify (optimal
Calling services: Web sites whose origin we can verify (optimally ly
via HTTPS, but in some cases because we are on a topologically via HTTPS, but in some cases because we are on a topologically
restricted network, such as behind a firewall, and can infer restricted network, such as behind a firewall, and can infer
authentication from firewall behavior). authentication from firewall behavior).</dd>
</t> <dt pn="section-3.1-2.3">Other users:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-3.1-2.4">WebRTC peers whose origin we can verify
Other users: WebRTC peers whose origin we can verify cryptographically (optimally via DTLS-SRTP).</dd>
cryptographically (optimally via DTLS-SRTP). </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-3.1-3">
</list>
</t>
<t>
Note that merely being authenticated does not make these entities Note that merely being authenticated does not make these entities
trusted. For instance, just because we can verify that trusted. For instance, just because we can verify that
https://www.example.org/ is owned by Dr. Evil does not mean that we ca n &lt;https://www.example.org/&gt; is owned by Dr. Evil does not mean th at we can
trust Dr. Evil to access our camera and microphone. However, it gives trust Dr. Evil to access our camera and microphone. However, it gives
the user an opportunity to determine whether he wishes to trust the user an opportunity to determine whether they wish to trust
Dr. Evil or not; after all, if he desires to contact Dr. Evil (perhaps Dr. Evil or not; after all, if they desire to contact Dr. Evil (perhap
to arrange for ransom payment), it's safe to temporarily give him s
to arrange for ransom payment), it's safe to temporarily give them
access to the camera and microphone for the purpose of the call, but access to the camera and microphone for the purpose of the call, but
he doesn't want Dr. Evil to be able to access his camera and they don't want Dr. Evil to be able to access their camera and
microphone other than during the call. The point here is that we must microphone other than during the call. The point here is that we must
first identify other elements before we can determine whether and how first identify other elements before we can determine whether and how
much to trust them. Additionally, sometimes we need to identify the much to trust them. Additionally, sometimes we need to identify the
communicating peer before we know what policies to apply. communicating peer before we know what policies to apply.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.unauthenticated" numbered="true" toc="includ
<section title="Unauthenticated Entities" anchor="sec.proposal.unauthentic e" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3.2">
ated"> <name slugifiedName="name-unauthenticated-entities">Unauthenticated Enti
<t> ties</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-3.2-1">
Other than the above entities, we are not generally able to identify Other than the above entities, we are not generally able to identify
other network elements, thus we cannot trust them. This does not mean other network elements; thus, we cannot trust them. This does not mea n
that it is not possible to have any interaction with them, but it that it is not possible to have any interaction with them, but it
means that we must assume that they will behave maliciously and design means that we must assume that they will behave maliciously and design
a system which is secure even if they do so. a system which is secure even if they do so.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<!-- Not layered ? --> <section anchor="sec.proposal.overview" numbered="true" toc="include" remove
InRFC="false" pn="section-4">
<section title="Overview" anchor="sec.proposal.overview"> <name slugifiedName="name-overview">Overview</name>
<!-- TODO: Federated --> <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">
<t>
This section describes a typical WebRTC session and shows how the This section describes a typical WebRTC session and shows how the
various security elements interact and what guarantees are provided to various security elements interact and what guarantees are provided to
the user. The example in this section is a "best case" scenario in which the user. The example in this section is a "best case" scenario in which
we provide the maximal amount of user authentication and media privacy we provide the maximal amount of user authentication and media privacy
with the minimal level of trust in the calling service. Simpler versions with the minimal level of trust in the calling service. Simpler versions
with lower levels of security are also possible and are noted in the with lower levels of security are also possible and are noted in the
text where applicable. It's also important to recognize the tension text where applicable. It's also important to recognize the tension
between security (or performance) and privacy. The example shown here is between security (or performance) and privacy. The example shown here is
aimed towards settings where we are more concerned about secure calling aimed towards settings where we are more concerned about secure calling
than about privacy, but as we shall see, there are settings where one than about privacy, but as we shall see, there are settings where one
might wish to make different tradeoffs--this architecture is still might wish to make different tradeoffs -- this architecture is still
compatible with those settings. compatible with those settings.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4-2">
For the purposes of this example, we assume the topology shown in the For the purposes of this example, we assume the topology shown in the
figures below. This topology is derived from the topology shown in <xref figures below. This topology is derived from the topology shown in <xref
target="fig.simple"/>, but separates Alice and Bob's identities from the target="fig.simple" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure
1"/>, but separates Alice's and Bob's identities from the
process of signaling. Specifically, Alice and Bob have relationships process of signaling. Specifically, Alice and Bob have relationships
with some Identity Provider (IdP) that supports a protocol (such as with some Identity Provider (IdP) that supports a protocol (such as
OpenID Connect) that can be used to demonstrate their identity to OpenID Connect) that can be used to demonstrate their identity to
other parties. For instance, Alice might have an account with a social other parties. For instance, Alice might have an account with a social
network which she can then use to authenticate to other web sites network which she can then use to authenticate to other Web sites
without explicitly having an account with those sites; this is a fairly without explicitly having an account with those sites; this is a fairly
conventional pattern on the Web. <xref conventional pattern on the Web. <xref target="sec.trust-relationships"
target="sec.trust-relationships"/> provides an overview of Identity format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.1"/> provides an o
Providers and the relevant terminology. Alice and Bob might have verview of IdPs
and the relevant terminology. Alice and Bob might have
relationships with different IdPs as well. relationships with different IdPs as well.
Note: The IdP mechanism described here has not seen wide adoption.
See <xref target="sec.generic.idp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d
erivedContent="Section 7"/> for more on the status of
IdP-based authentication.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4-3">
This separation of identity provision and signaling isn't particularly This separation of identity provision and signaling isn't particularly
important in "closed world" cases where Alice and Bob are users on the important in "closed world" cases where Alice and Bob are users on the
same social network and have identities based on that domain (<xref same social network and have identities based on that domain (<xref targ
target="fig.proposal.idp"/>). However, there are important settings wher et="fig.proposal.idp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure
e 3"/>). However, there are important settings where
that is not the case, such as federation (calls from one domain to that is not the case, such as federation (calls from one domain to
another; <xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp"/>) and calling on another; see <xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 4"/>) and calling on
untrusted sites, such as where two users who have a relationship via a untrusted sites, such as where two users who have a relationship via a
given social network want to call each other on another, untrusted, given social network want to call each other on another, untrusted,
site, such as a poker site. site, such as a poker site.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4-4">
Note that the servers themselves are also authenticated by an external Note that the servers themselves are also authenticated by an external
identity service, the SSL/TLS certificate infrastructure (not shown). identity service, the SSL/TLS certificate infrastructure (not shown).
As is conventional in the Web, all identities are ultimately rooted in As is conventional in the Web, all identities are ultimately rooted in
that system. For instance, when an IdP makes an identity assertion, the that system. For instance, when an IdP makes an identity assertion, the
Relying Party consuming that assertion is able to verify because it is Relying Party consuming that assertion is able to verify because it is
able to connect to the IdP via HTTPS. able to connect to the IdP via HTTPS.
</t> </t>
<figure title="A call with IdP-based identity" anchor="fig.proposal.idp"> <figure anchor="fig.proposal.idp" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="
<artwork><![CDATA[ figure-3">
<name slugifiedName="name-a-call-with-idp-based-ident">A Call with IdP-B
ased Identity</name>
<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-4-5.1">
+----------------+ +----------------+
| | | |
| Signaling | | Signaling |
| Server | | Server |
| | | |
+----------------+ +----------------+
^ ^ ^ ^
/ \ / \
HTTPS / \ HTTPS HTTPS / \ HTTPS
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
v v v v
JS API JS API JS API JS API
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | Media | | | | Media | |
Alice | Browser |<----------&gt;| Browser | Bob Alice | Browser |<----------&gt;| Browser | Bob
| | (DTLS+SRTP)| | | | (DTLS+SRTP)| |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
^ ^--+ +--^ ^ ^ ^--+ +--^ ^
| | | | | | | |
v | | v v | | v
+-----------+ | | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | +-----------+
| |<--------+ | | | |&lt;--------+ | |
| IdP1 | | | IdP2 | | IdP1 | | | IdP2 |
| | +------->| | | | +-------&gt;| |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ </artwork>
]]></artwork>
</figure> </figure>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4-6">
<xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp"/> shows essentially the same <xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp" format="default" sectionFormat
="of" derivedContent="Figure 4"/> shows essentially the same
calling scenario but with a call between two separate domains (i.e., a calling scenario but with a call between two separate domains (i.e., a
federated case), as in <xref target="fig.multidomain"/>. As mentioned federated case), as in <xref target="fig.multidomain" format="default" s
above, the domains communicate by some unspecified protocol and ectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 2"/>. As mentioned
above, the domains communicate by some unspecified protocol, and
providing separate signaling and identity allows for calls to be providing separate signaling and identity allows for calls to be
authenticated regardless of the details of the inter-domain protocol. authenticated regardless of the details of the inter-domain protocol.
</t> </t>
<figure title="A federated call with IdP-based identity" anchor="fig.propo <figure anchor="fig.proposal-federated.idp" align="left" suppress-title="f
sal-federated.idp"> alse" pn="figure-4">
<artwork><![CDATA[ <name slugifiedName="name-a-federated-call-with-idp-b">A Federated Call
with IdP-Based Identity</name>
<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-4-7.1">
+----------------+ Unspecified +----------------+ +----------------+ Unspecified +----------------+
| | protocol | | | | protocol | |
| Signaling |<-----------------&gt;| Signaling | | Signaling |<-----------------&gt;| Signaling |
| Server | (SIP, XMPP, ...) | Server | | Server | (SIP, XMPP, ...) | Server |
| | | | | | | |
+----------------+ +----------------+ +----------------+ +----------------+
^ ^ ^ ^
| | | |
HTTPS | | HTTPS HTTPS | | HTTPS
| | | |
| | | |
v v v v
JS API JS API JS API JS API
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | Media | | | | Media | |
Alice | Browser |<---------------------------&gt;| Browser | Bob Alice | Browser |<---------------------------&gt;| Browser | Bob
| | DTLS+SRTP | | | | DTLS+SRTP | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
^ ^--+ +--^ ^ ^ ^--+ +--^ ^
| | | | | | | |
v | | v v | | v
+-----------+ | | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | +-----------+
| |<-------------------------+ | | | |&lt;-------------------------+ | |
| IdP1 | | | IdP2 | | IdP1 | | | IdP2 |
| | +------------------------>| | | | +------------------------&gt;| |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ </artwork>
]]></artwork>
</figure> </figure>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4.1
<section title="Initial Signaling"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-initial-signaling">Initial Signaling</name>
For simplicity, assume the topology in <xref <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-1">
target="fig.proposal.idp"/>. Alice and Bob are both users of a common For simplicity, assume the topology in <xref target="fig.proposal.idp"
format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 3"/>. Alice and Bob
are both users of a common
calling service; they both have approved the calling service to make calling service; they both have approved the calling service to make
calls (we defer the discussion of device access permissions until calls (we defer the discussion of device access permissions until
later). They are both connected to the calling service via HTTPS and later). They are both connected to the calling service via HTTPS and
so know the origin with some level of confidence. They also have so know the origin with some level of confidence. They also have
accounts with some identity provider. This sort of identity service accounts with some IdP. This sort of identity service
is becoming increasingly common in the Web environment (with technolog ies is becoming increasingly common in the Web environment (with technolog ies
such as Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth, such as Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth,
OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of
a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show
Alice and Bob using a separate identity service, though the identity Alice and Bob using a separate identity service, though the identity
service may be the same entity as the calling service or there may be service may be the same entity as the calling service or there may be
no identity service at all. no identity service at all.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-2">
Alice is logged onto the calling service and decides to call Bob. She Alice is logged onto the calling service and decides to call Bob. She
can see from the calling service that he is online and the calling can see from the calling service that he is online and the calling
service presents a JS UI in the form of a button next to Bob's name service presents a JS UI in the form of a button next to Bob's name
which says "Call". Alice clicks the button, which initiates a JS which says "Call". Alice clicks the button, which initiates a JS
callback that instantiates a PeerConnection object. This does not callback that instantiates a PeerConnection object. This does not
require a security check: JS from any origin is allowed to get this require a security check: JS from any origin is allowed to get this
far. far.
</t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-3">
<t>
Once the PeerConnection is created, the calling service JS needs to Once the PeerConnection is created, the calling service JS needs to
set up some media. Because this is an audio/video call, it creates a set up some media. Because this is an audio/video call, it creates a
MediaStream with two MediaStreamTracks, one connected to an audio MediaStream with two MediaStreamTracks, one connected to an audio
input and one connected to a video input. At this point the first input and one connected to a video input. At this point, the first
security check is required: untrusted origins are not allowed to security check is required: untrusted origins are not allowed to
access the camera and microphone, so the browser prompts Alice for access the camera and microphone, so the browser prompts Alice for
permission. permission.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-4">
In the current W3C API, once some streams have been added, Alice's In the current W3C API, once some streams have been added, Alice's
browser + JS generates a signaling message <xref browser + JS generates a signaling message <xref target="RFC8829" form
target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-jsep"/> containing: at="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8829"/> containing:
</t> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-4
<list style="symbols"> .1-5">
<t> <li pn="section-4.1-5.1">
Media channel information Media channel information
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-4.1-5.2">
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) <xref Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) <xref target="RFC8445
target="RFC8445"/> candidates " format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8445"/> candidates
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-4.1-5.3">
A fingerprint attribute binding the communication to a key pair A "fingerprint" attribute binding the communication to a key pair
<xref target="RFC5763"/>. Note that this key may simply be <xref target="RFC5763" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derived
Content="RFC5763"/>. Note that this key may simply be
ephemerally generated for this call or specific to this domain, ephemerally generated for this call or specific to this domain,
and Alice may have a large number of such keys. and Alice may have a large number of such keys.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-6">
<t>
Prior to sending out the signaling message, the PeerConnection code Prior to sending out the signaling message, the PeerConnection code
contacts the identity service and obtains an assertion binding Alice's contacts the identity service and obtains an assertion binding Alice's
identity to her fingerprint. The exact details depend on the identity identity to her fingerprint. The exact details depend on the identity
service (though as discussed in <xref target="sec.generic.idp"/> service (though as discussed in <xref target="sec.generic.idp" format= "default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>
PeerConnection can be agnostic to them), but for now it's easiest to PeerConnection can be agnostic to them), but for now it's easiest to
think of as an OAuth token. The assertion may bind other think of as an OAuth token. The assertion may bind other
information to the identity besides the fingerprint, but at minimum it information to the identity besides the fingerprint, but at minimum it
needs to bind the fingerprint. needs to bind the fingerprint.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-7">
This message is sent to the signaling server, e.g., by XMLHttpRequest This message is sent to the signaling server, e.g., by fetch()
<xref target="XmlHttpRequest"/> or by WebSockets <xref <xref target="fetch" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedConten
target="RFC6455"/>, over TLS <xref target="RFC5246"/>. t="fetch"/> or by WebSockets
<xref target="RFC6455" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedCont
ent="RFC6455"/>, over TLS <xref target="RFC8446" format="default" sectionFormat=
"of" derivedContent="RFC8446"/>.
The signaling server processes the message from Alice's browser, The signaling server processes the message from Alice's browser,
determines that this is a call to Bob and sends a signaling message to determines that this is a call to Bob, and sends a signaling message t o
Bob's browser (again, the format is currently undefined). The JS on Bob's browser (again, the format is currently undefined). The JS on
Bob's browser processes it, and alerts Bob to the incoming call and to Bob's browser processes it, and alerts Bob to the incoming call and to
Alice's identity. In this case, Alice has provided an identity Alice's identity. In this case, Alice has provided an identity
assertion and so Bob's browser contacts Alice's identity provider assertion and so Bob's browser contacts Alice's IdP
(again, this is done in a generic way so the browser has no specific (again, this is done in a generic way so the browser has no specific
knowledge of the IdP) to verify the assertion. It is also possible knowledge of the IdP) to verify the assertion. It is also possible
to have IdPs with which the browser has a specific trustrelationship, to have IdPs with which the browser has a specific trust relationship,
as described in <xref target="sec.trust-relationships"/>. as described in <xref target="sec.trust-relationships" format="default
" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.1"/>.
This allows the browser This allows the browser
to display a trusted element in the browser chrome indicating that a to display a trusted element in the browser chrome indicating that a
call is coming in from Alice. If Alice is in Bob's address book, then call is coming in from Alice. If Alice is in Bob's address book, then
this interface might also include her real name, a picture, etc. The this interface might also include her real name, a picture, etc. The
calling site will also provide some user interface element (e.g., a calling site will also provide some user interface element (e.g., a
button) to allow Bob to answer the call, though this is most likely button) to allow Bob to answer the call, though this is most likely
not part of the trusted UI. not part of the trusted UI.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-8">
If Bob agrees a PeerConnection is instantiated with the message from If Bob agrees, a PeerConnection is instantiated with the message from
Alice's side. Then, a similar process occurs as on Alice's browser: Alice's side. Then, a similar process occurs as on Alice's browser:
Bob's browser prompts him for device permission, the media streams are Bob's browser prompts him for device permission, the media streams are
created, and a return signaling message containing media information, created, and a return signaling message containing media information,
ICE candidates, and a fingerprint is sent back to Alice via the ICE candidates, and a fingerprint is sent back to Alice via the
signaling service. If Bob has a relationship with an IdP, the message signaling service. If Bob has a relationship with an IdP, the message
will also come with an identity assertion. will also come with an identity assertion.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-9">
At this point, Alice and Bob each know that the other party wants to At this point, Alice and Bob each know that the other party wants to
have a secure call with them. Based purely on the interface provided have a secure call with them. Based purely on the interface provided
by the signaling server, they know that the signaling server claims by the signaling server, they know that the signaling server claims
that the call is from Alice to Bob. This level of security is provided that the call is from Alice to Bob. This level of security is provided
merely by having the fingerprint in the message and having that merely by having the fingerprint in the message and having that
message received securely from the signaling server. Because the far message received securely from the signaling server. Because the far
end sent an identity assertion along with their message, they know end sent an identity assertion along with their message, they know
that this is verifiable from the IdP as well. Note that if the call is that this is verifiable from the IdP as well. Note that if the call is
federated, as shown in <xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp"/> federated, as shown in <xref target="fig.proposal-federated.idp" forma t="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 4"/>,
then Alice is able to verify Bob's identity in a way that is not then Alice is able to verify Bob's identity in a way that is not
mediated by either her signaling server or Bob's. Rather, she verifies mediated by either her signaling server or Bob's. Rather, she verifies
it directly with Bob's IdP. it directly with Bob's IdP.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-10">
Of course, the call works perfectly well if either Alice or Bob Of course, the call works perfectly well if either Alice or Bob
doesn't have a relationship with an IdP; they just get a lower level doesn't have a relationship with an IdP; they just get a lower level
of assurance. I.e., they simply have whatever information their of assurance. I.e., they simply have whatever information their
calling site claims about the caller/callee's identity. Moreover, calling site claims about the caller/callee's identity. Moreover,
Alice might wish to make an anonymous call through an anonymous Alice might wish to make an anonymous call through an anonymous
calling site, in which case she would of course just not provide any calling site, in which case she would of course just not provide any
identity assertion and the calling site would mask her identity from identity assertion and the calling site would mask her identity from
Bob. Bob.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4.2
<section title="Media Consent Verification"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-media-consent-verification">Media Consent Veri
As described in (<xref target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security"/>; Section fication</name>
4.2) media consent verification is provided via ICE. Thus, Alice and <t indent="0" pn="section-4.2-1">
As described in <xref target="RFC8826" sectionFormat="comma" section="
4.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8826#section-4.
2" derivedContent="RFC8826"/>, media consent verification is provided via ICE.
Thus, Alice and
Bob perform ICE checks with each other. At the completion of these Bob perform ICE checks with each other. At the completion of these
checks, they are ready to send non-ICE data. checks, they are ready to send non-ICE data.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.2-2">
At this point, Alice knows that (a) Bob (assuming he is verified via At this point, Alice knows that (a) Bob (assuming he is verified via
his IdP) or someone else who the signaling service is claiming is Bob his IdP) or someone else who the signaling service is claiming is Bob
is willing to exchange traffic with her and (b) that either Bob is at is willing to exchange traffic with her and (b) either Bob is at
the IP address which she has verified via ICE or there is an attacker the IP address which she has verified via ICE or there is an attacker
who is on-path to that IP address detouring the traffic. Note that it who is on-path to that IP address detouring the traffic. Note that it
is not possible for an attacker who is on-path between Alice and Bob is not possible for an attacker who is on-path between Alice and Bob
but not attached to the signaling service to spoof these checks but not attached to the signaling service to spoof these checks
because they do not have the ICE credentials. Bob has the same because they do not have the ICE credentials. Bob has the same
security guarantees with respect to Alice. security guarantees with respect to Alice.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4.3
<section title="DTLS Handshake"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-dtls-handshake">DTLS Handshake</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-4.3-1">
Once the requisite ICE checks have completed, Alice and Bob can set Once the requisite ICE checks have completed, Alice and Bob can set
up a secure channel or channels. This is performed via DTLS <xref targ up a secure channel or channels. This is performed via DTLS <xref targ
et="RFC6347"/> et="RFC6347" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6347"/>
and DTLS-SRTP <xref target="RFC5763"/> keying for SRTP and DTLS-SRTP <xref target="RFC5763" format="default" sectionFormat="o
<xref target="RFC3711"/> for the media channel and SCTP over DTLS f" derivedContent="RFC5763"/> keying for SRTP
<xref target="RFC8261"/> for data <xref target="RFC3711" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedCont
ent="RFC3711"/> for the media channel and
the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) over DTLS
<xref target="RFC8261" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedCont
ent="RFC8261"/> for data
channels. Specifically, Alice and Bob perform a DTLS handshake on channels. Specifically, Alice and Bob perform a DTLS handshake on
every component which has been established by ICE. The total number of every component which has been established by ICE. The total number of
channels depends on the amount of muxing; in the most likely case we channels depends on the amount of muxing; in the most likely case, we
are using both RTP/RTCP mux and muxing multiple media streams on the are using both RTP/RTCP mux and muxing multiple media streams on the
same channel, in which case there is only one DTLS handshake. Once the same channel, in which case there is only one DTLS handshake. Once the
DTLS handshake has completed, the keys are exported <xref DTLS handshake has completed, the keys are exported <xref target="RFC5
target="RFC5705"/> and used to key SRTP for the media channels. 705" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5705"/> and used to
key SRTP for the media channels.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3-2">
At this point, Alice and Bob know that they share a set of secure data At this point, Alice and Bob know that they share a set of secure data
and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party
attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they
also know that the signaling service is not mounting a also know that the signaling service is not mounting a
man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an
IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not
to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their
communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e., communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e.,
that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the
communications). communications).
skipping to change at line 539 skipping to change at line 703
and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party
attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they
also know that the signaling service is not mounting a also know that the signaling service is not mounting a
man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an
IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not
to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their
communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e., communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e.,
that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the
communications). communications).
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4.4
<section title="Communications and Consent Freshness"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-communications-and-consent-">Communications an
d Consent Freshness</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-4.4-1">
From a security perspective, everything from here on in is a little From a security perspective, everything from here on in is a little
anticlimactic: Alice and Bob exchange data protected by the keys anticlimactic: Alice and Bob exchange data protected by the keys
negotiated by DTLS. Because of the security guarantees discussed in negotiated by DTLS. Because of the security guarantees discussed in
the previous sections, they know that the communications are encrypted the previous sections, they know that the communications are encrypted
and authenticated. and authenticated.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-4.4-2">
The one remaining security property we need to establish is "consent The one remaining security property we need to establish is "consent
freshness", i.e., allowing Alice to verify that Bob is still prepared freshness", i.e., allowing Alice to verify that Bob is still prepared
to receive her communications so that Alice does not continue to send to receive her communications so that Alice does not continue to send
large traffic volumes to entities which went abruptly offline. ICE large traffic volumes to entities which went abruptly offline. ICE
specifies periodic STUN keepalives but only if media is not flowing. specifies periodic Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) keepaliv es but only if media is not flowing.
Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require WebRTC Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require WebRTC
implementations to periodically send keepalives. As described in implementations to periodically send keepalives using the
Section 5.3, these keepalives MUST be based on the consent freshness consent freshness
mechanism specified in <xref target="RFC7675"/>. If a mechanism specified in <xref target="RFC7675" format="default" section
Format="of" derivedContent="RFC7675"/>.
If a
keepalive fails and no new ICE channels can be established, then the keepalive fails and no new ICE channels can be established, then the
session is terminated. session is terminated.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC=
<section title="SDP Identity Attribute" anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr"> "false" pn="section-5">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-sdp-identity-attribute">SDP Identity Attribute</
The SDP 'identity' attribute is a session-level attribute that name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-5-1">
The SDP "identity" attribute is a session-level attribute that
is used by an endpoint to convey its identity assertion to its is used by an endpoint to convey its identity assertion to its
peer. The identity assertion value is encoded as Base-64, as described peer. The identity-assertion value is encoded as base64, as described
in Section 4 of <xref target="RFC4648"/>. in <xref target="RFC4648" sectionFormat="of" section="4" format="default
" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648#section-4" derivedContent="RFC
4648"/>.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-5-2">
The procedures in this section are based on the assumption The procedures in this section are based on the assumption
that the identity assertion of an endpoint is bound to the that the identity assertion of an endpoint is bound to the
fingerprints of the endpoint. This does not preclude the definition of fingerprints of the endpoint. This does not preclude the definition of
alternative means of binding an assertion to the endpoint, but such alternative means of binding an assertion to the endpoint, but such
means are outside the scope of this specification. means are outside the scope of this specification.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-5-3">
The semantics of multiple 'identity' attributes within an The semantics of multiple "identity" attributes within an
offer or answer are undefined. Implementations SHOULD only include a offer or answer are undefined. Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> on
single 'identity' attribute in an offer or answer and relying parties ly include a
MAY elect to ignore all but the first 'identity' attribute. single "identity" attribute in an offer or answer, and Relying Parties
</t> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> elect to ignore all but the first "identity" attribut
<t> e.
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Name:">identity</t>
<t hangText="Value:">identity-assertion</t>
<t hangText="Usage Level:">session</t>
<t hangText="Charset Dependent:">no</t>
<t hangText="Default Value:">N/A</t>
<t hangText="Name:">identity</t>
</list>
</t> </t>
<figure> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-5-4">
<artwork type="inline"><![CDATA[ <dt pn="section-5-4.1">Name:</dt>
Syntax: <dd pn="section-5-4.2">identity</dd>
<dt pn="section-5-4.3">Value:</dt>
identity-assertion = identity-assertion-value <dd pn="section-5-4.4">identity-assertion</dd>
*(SP identity-extension) <dt pn="section-5-4.5">Usage Level:</dt>
identity-assertion-value = base64 <dd pn="section-5-4.6">session</dd>
identity-extension = extension-name [ "=" extension-value ] <dt pn="section-5-4.7">Charset Dependent:</dt>
extension-name = token <dd pn="section-5-4.8">no</dd>
extension-value = 1*(%x01-09 / %x0b-0c / %x0e-3a / %x3c-ff) <dt pn="section-5-4.9">Default Value:</dt>
; byte-string from [RFC4566] <dd pn="section-5-4.10">N/A</dd>
</dl>
<ALPHA and DIGIT as defined in [RFC4566]> <t indent="0" pn="section-5-5">Syntax:</t>
<base64 as defined in [RFC4566]> <sourcecode name="abnf-1" type="abnf" markers="false" pn="section-5-6">
identity-assertion = identity-assertion-value
Example: *(SP identity-extension)
identity-assertion-value = base64
a=identity:\ identity-extension = extension-name [ "=" extension-value ]
eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\ extension-name = token
In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\ extension-value = 1*(%x01-09 / %x0b-0c / %x0e-3a / %x3c-ff)
IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\ ; byte-string from [RFC4566]
aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9
Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column &lt;ALPHA and DIGIT as defined in [RFC4566]&gt;
&lt;base64 as defined in [RFC4566]&gt;
</sourcecode>
<t indent="0" pn="section-5-7">Example:</t>
<sourcecode name="sdp-1" type="sdp" markers="false" pn="section-5-8">
a=identity:\
eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\
In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\
IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\
aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9</sourcecode>
<aside pn="section-5-9">
<t indent="0" pn="section-5-9.1">Note that long lines in the example are
folded to meet the column
width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of
a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored. a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.</t>
</aside>
]]></artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-5-10">
</figure>
<t>
This specification does not define any extensions for the attribute. This specification does not define any extensions for the attribute.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-5-11">
The identity-assertion value is a JSON <xref target="RFC8259"/> encoded The identity-assertion value is a JSON encoded string
string. The JSON object <xref target="RFC8259" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedConte
contains two keys: "assertion" and "idp". The <spanx style="verb">asser nt="RFC8259"/>. The JSON object
tion</spanx> key value contains contains two keys: "assertion" and "idp". The "assertion" key value con
an opaque string that is consumed by the IdP. The <spanx style="verb">i tains
dp</spanx> key value contains a an opaque string that is consumed by the IdP. The "idp" key value conta
ins a
dictionary with one or two further values that identify the IdP. See dictionary with one or two further values that identify the IdP. See
<xref target="sec.request-assert"/> for more details. <xref target="sec.request-assert" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d
</t> erivedContent="Section 7.6"/> for more details.
<section title="Offer/Answer Considerations" anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa"> </t>
<t> <section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa" numbered="true" toc="include" removeI
This section defines the SDP Offer/Answer <xref target="RFC3264"/> co nRFC="false" pn="section-5.1">
nsiderations for the SDP <name slugifiedName="name-offer-answer-considerations">Offer/Answer Cons
'identity' attribute. iderations</name>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1-1">
<t> This section defines the SDP offer/answer <xref target="RFC3264" form
at="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3264"/> considerations for th
e SDP
"identity" attribute.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-5.1-2">
Within this section, 'initial offer' refers to the first offer in the Within this section, 'initial offer' refers to the first offer in the
SDP session that contains an SDP <spanx style="verb">identity</spanx> SDP session that contains an SDP "identity" attribute.
attribute. </t>
</t> <section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio" numbered="true" toc="include"
<section title="Generating the Initial SDP Offer" anchor="sec.sdp-id-at removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5.1.1">
tr-oa-inio"> <name slugifiedName="name-generating-the-initial-sdp-">Generating the
<t> Initial SDP Offer</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-5.1.1-1">
When an offerer sends an offer, in order to provide its When an offerer sends an offer, in order to provide its
identity assertion to the peer, it includes an 'identity' attribute i n identity assertion to the peer, it includes an "identity" attribute i n
the offer. In addition, the offerer includes one or more SDP the offer. In addition, the offerer includes one or more SDP
'fingerprint' attributes. The 'identity' attribute MUST be bound to "fingerprint" attributes. The "identity" attribute <bcp14>MUST</bcp1
all the 'fingerprint' attributes in the session 4> be bound to
all the "fingerprint" attributes in the session
description. description.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section title="Generating of SDP Answer" anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-an <section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-ansa" numbered="true" toc="include"
sa"> removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5.1.2">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-generating-an-sdp-answer">Generating an SDP
If the answerer elects to include an 'identity' attribute, it follo Answer</name>
ws <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1.2-1">
the same steps as those in <xref target="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio"/> If the answerer elects to include an "identity" attribute, it follo
. ws
The answerer can choose to include or omit an 'identity' attribute the same steps as those in <xref target="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio" f
independently, ormat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5.1.1"/>.
The answerer can choose to include or omit an "identity" attribute
independently,
regardless of whether the offerer did so. regardless of whether the offerer did so.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section title="Processing an SDP Offer or Answer" anchor="sec.sdp-id-a <section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-offa" numbered="true" toc="include"
ttr-oa-offa"> removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5.1.3">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-">Processing an S
When an endpoint receives an offer or answer that contains an 'iden DP Offer or Answer</name>
tity' <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1.3-1">
attribute, the answerer can use the the attribute information to When an endpoint receives an offer or answer that contains an "iden
tity"
attribute, the answerer can use the attribute information to
contact the IdP and verify the identity of the peer. If the identit y contact the IdP and verify the identity of the peer. If the identit y
requires a third-party IdP as described in <xref target="sec.trust- relationships"/> requires a third-party IdP as described in <xref target="sec.trust- relationships" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.1"/ >,
then that IdP will need to have been specifically configured. then that IdP will need to have been specifically configured.
If the identity verification fails, the answerer MUST discard the If the identity verification fails, the answerer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > discard the
offer or answer as malformed. offer or answer as malformed.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section title="Modifying the Session" anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-modi" <section anchor="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-modi" numbered="true" toc="include"
> removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5.1.4">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-modifying-the-session">Modifying the Session
</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-5.1.4-1">
When modifying a session, if the set of fingerprints is When modifying a session, if the set of fingerprints is
unchanged, then the sender MAY send the same 'identity' attribute. unchanged, then the sender <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send the same "identi
In ty" attribute. In
this case, the established identity MUST be applied to existing DTL this case, the established identity <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be applied
S to existing DTLS
connections as well as new connections established using one of tho se connections as well as new connections established using one of tho se
fingerprints. Note that <xref target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-jsep"/>, Sect fingerprints. Note that <xref target="RFC8829" sectionFormat="comma
ion " section="5.2.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc88
5.2.1 requires that each media section use the same set of 29#section-5.2.1" derivedContent="RFC8829"/> requires that each media section us
fingerprints for every media section. e the same set of fingerprints.
If a new identity attribute is received, then the receiver MUST If a new "identity" attribute is received, then the receiver <bcp14
>MUST</bcp14>
apply that identity to all existing connections. apply that identity to all existing connections.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1.4-2">
If the set of fingerprints changes, then the sender MUST If the set of fingerprints changes, then the sender <bcp14>MUST</bc
either send a new 'identity' attribute or none at all. p14>
either send a new "identity" attribute or none at all.
Because a change in fingerprints also causes a new DTLS Because a change in fingerprints also causes a new DTLS
connection to be established, the receiver MUST discard connection to be established, the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> disc ard
all previously established identities. all previously established identities.
</t> </t>
</section>
</section> </section>
</section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.detailed" numbered="true" toc="include" remove
<section title="Detailed Technical Description" anchor="sec.proposal.detaile InRFC="false" pn="section-6">
d"> <name slugifiedName="name-detailed-technical-descript">Detailed Technical
Description</name>
<section title="Origin and Web Security Issues" anchor="sec.proposal.origi <section anchor="sec.proposal.origin" numbered="true" toc="include" remove
n"> InRFC="false" pn="section-6.1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-origin-and-web-security-iss">Origin and Web Se
The basic unit of permissions for WebRTC is the origin <xref curity Issues</name>
target="RFC6454"/>. Because the security of the origin depends on <t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-1">
The basic unit of permissions for WebRTC is the origin <xref target="R
FC6454" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6454"/>. Because
the security of the origin depends on
being able to authenticate content from that origin, the origin can being able to authenticate content from that origin, the origin can
only be securely established if data is transferred over HTTPS <xref only be securely established if data is transferred over HTTPS <xref t
target="RFC2818"/>. Thus, clients MUST treat HTTP and HTTPS origins as arget="RFC2818" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2818"/>.
different permissions domains. Note: this follows directly from the Thus, clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat HTTP and HTTPS origins as
different permissions domains. Note: This follows directly from the
origin security model and is stated here merely for clarity. origin security model and is stated here merely for clarity.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-2">
Many web browsers currently forbid by default any active mixed content Many Web browsers currently forbid by default any active mixed content
on HTTPS pages. That is, when JavaScript is loaded from an HTTP origin on HTTPS pages. That is, when JavaScript is loaded from an HTTP origin
onto an HTTPS page, an error is displayed and the HTTP content is not onto an HTTPS page, an error is displayed and the HTTP content is not
executed unless the user overrides the error. Any browser which executed unless the user overrides the error. Any browser which
enforces such a policy will also not permit access to WebRTC enforces such a policy will also not permit access to WebRTC
functionality from mixed content pages (because they never display functionality from mixed content pages (because they never display
mixed content). Browsers which allow active mixed content MUST mixed content). Browsers which allow active mixed content <bcp14>MUST </bcp14>
nevertheless disable WebRTC functionality in mixed content settings. nevertheless disable WebRTC functionality in mixed content settings.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-3">
Note that it is possible for a page which was not mixed content to Note that it is possible for a page which was not mixed content to
become mixed content during the duration of the call. The major risk become mixed content during the duration of the call. The major risk
here is that the newly arrived insecure JS might redirect media to a here is that the newly arrived insecure JS might redirect media to a
location controlled by the attacker. Implementations MUST either location controlled by the attacker. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp 14> either
choose to terminate the call or display a warning at that point. choose to terminate the call or display a warning at that point.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-4">
Also note that the security architecture depends on the keying materia l Also note that the security architecture depends on the keying materia l
not being available to move between origins. But, it is assumed that not being available to move between origins. However, it is assumed t hat
the identity assertion can be passed to anyone that the page cares to. the identity assertion can be passed to anyone that the page cares to.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.device.permissions" numbered="true" toc="inc
<section title="Device Permissions Model" anchor="sec.proposal.device.perm lude" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2">
issions"> <name slugifiedName="name-device-permissions-model">Device Permissions M
<t> odel</name>
Implementations MUST obtain explicit user consent prior to providing <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-1">
access to the camera and/or microphone. Implementations MUST at Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> obtain explicit user consent prior
to providing
access to the camera and/or microphone. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</b
cp14> at
minimum support the following two permissions models for HTTPS minimum support the following two permissions models for HTTPS
origins. origins.
</t> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6
<list style="symbols"> .2-2">
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-2.1">
Requests for one-time camera/microphone access. Requests for one-time camera/microphone access.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-2.2">
Requests for permanent access. Requests for permanent access.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-3">
<t>
Because HTTP origins cannot be securely established against network Because HTTP origins cannot be securely established against network
attackers, implementations MUST refuse all permissions grants for attackers, implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse all permissions grants for
HTTP origins. HTTP origins.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-4">
In addition, they SHOULD support requests for access that promise that In addition, they <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support requests for access th
at promise that
media from this grant will be sent to a single communicating peer media from this grant will be sent to a single communicating peer
(obviously there could be other requests for other peers), eE.g., (obviously there could be other requests for other peers), e.g.,
"Call customerservice@example.org". The semantics of this request are "Call customerservice@example.org". The semantics of this request are
that the media stream from the camera and microphone will only be that the media stream from the camera and microphone will only be
routed through a connection which has been cryptographically verified routed through a connection which has been cryptographically verified
(through the IdP mechanism or an X.509 certificate in the DTLS-SRTP (through the IdP mechanism or an X.509 certificate in the DTLS-SRTP
handshake) as being associated with the stated identity. Note that it handshake) as being associated with the stated identity. Note that it
is unlikely that browsers would have X.509 certificates, but servers is unlikely that browsers would have X.509 certificates, but servers
might. Browsers servicing such requests SHOULD clearly indicate that might. Browsers servicing such requests <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> clearly indicate that
identity to the user when asking for permission. The idea behind this identity to the user when asking for permission. The idea behind this
type of permissions is that a user might have a fairly narrow list of type of permissions is that a user might have a fairly narrow list of
peers he is willing to communicate with, e.g., "my mother" rather than peers they are willing to communicate with, e.g., "my mother" rather t han
"anyone on Facebook". Narrow permissions grants allow the browser to "anyone on Facebook". Narrow permissions grants allow the browser to
do that enforcement. do that enforcement.
</t> </t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.2-5">
<t> <dt pn="section-6.2-5.1">API Requirement:</dt>
<list style="hanging"> <dd pn="section-6.2-5.2">
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a mechanism for the requesting
The API MUST provide a mechanism for the requesting JS to JS to
relinquish the ability to see or modify the media (e.g., via relinquish the ability to see or modify the media (e.g., via
MediaStream.record()). Combined with secure authentication of the MediaStream.record()). Combined with secure authentication of the
communicating peer, this allows a user to be sure that the calling communicating peer, this allows a user to be sure that the calling
site is not accessing or modifying their conversion. site is not accessing or modifying their conversion.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.2-6">
<dt pn="section-6.2-6.1">UI Requirement:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.2-6.2">
<list style="hanging"> The UI <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> clearly indicate when the user's camera
<t hangText="UI Requirement:"> and microphone
The UI MUST clearly indicate when the user's camera and microphone are in use. This indication <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be suppressib
are in use. This indication MUST NOT be suppressable by the JS le by the JS
and MUST clearly indicate how to terminate device access, and and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> clearly indicate how to terminate device a
ccess, and
provide a UI means to immediately stop camera/microphone input provide a UI means to immediately stop camera/microphone input
without the JS being able to prevent it. without the JS being able to prevent it.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.2-7">
<dt pn="section-6.2-7.1">UI Requirement:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.2-7.2">
<list style="hanging"> If the UI indication of camera/microphone use is displayed in the
<t hangText="UI Requirement:">
If the UI indication of camera/microphone use are displayed in the
browser such that minimizing the browser window would hide the browser such that minimizing the browser window would hide the
indication, or the JS creating an overlapping window would hide indication, or the JS creating an overlapping window would hide
the indication, then the browser SHOULD stop camera and microphone the indication, then the browser <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> stop camera
input when the indication is hidden. [Note: this may not be and microphone
input when the indication is hidden. (Note: This may not be
necessary in systems that are non-windows-based but that have good necessary in systems that are non-windows-based but that have good
notifications support, such as phones.] notifications support, such as phones.)
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6
.2-8">
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-8.1">
<list style="symbols"> Browsers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> permit permanent screen or applic
<t> ation sharing
Browsers MUST NOT permit permanent screen or application sharing
permissions to be installed as a response to a JS request for permissions to be installed as a response to a JS request for
permissions. Instead, they must require some other user action permissions. Instead, they must require some other user action
such as a permissions setting or an application install experience such as a permissions setting or an application install experience
to grant permission to a site. to grant permission to a site.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-8.2">
Browsers MUST provide a separate dialog request for Browsers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a separate dialog request for
screen/application sharing permissions even if the media request screen/application sharing permissions even if the media request
is made at the same time as camera and microphone. is made at the same time as the request for camera and microphone
</t> permissions.
</li>
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-8.3">
The browser MUST indicate any windows which are currently being The browser <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate any windows which are cur
shared in some unambiguous way. Windows which are not visible MUST rently being
NOT be shared even if the application is being shared. If the shared in some unambiguous way. Windows which are not visible <bcp
screen is being shared, then that MUST be indicated. 14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be shared even if the application is being shared. If the
</t> screen is being shared, then that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be indicated
</list> .
</t> </li>
</ul>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-9">
Browsers MAY permit the formation of data channels without any direct Browsers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> permit the formation of data channels with
out any direct
user approval. Because sites can always tunnel data through the user approval. Because sites can always tunnel data through the
server, further restrictions on the data channel do not provide any server, further restrictions on the data channel do not provide any
additional security. (See <xref additional security. (See <xref target="sec.proposal.communications.c
target="sec.proposal.communications.consent"/> for a related issue). onsent" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.3"/> for a
related issue.)
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-10">
Implementations which support some form of direct user authentication Implementations which support some form of direct user authentication
SHOULD also provide a policy by which a user can authorize calls only <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also provide a policy by which a user can author ize calls only
to specific communicating peers. Specifically, the implementation to specific communicating peers. Specifically, the implementation
SHOULD provide the following interfaces/controls: <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide the following interfaces/controls:
</t> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6
<list style="symbols"> .2-11">
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-11.1">
Allow future calls to this verified user. Allow future calls to this verified user.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-6.2-11.2">
Allow future calls to any verified user who is in my system Allow future calls to any verified user who is in my system
address book (this only works with address book integration, of address book (this only works with address book integration, of
course). course).
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-12">
<t> Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also provide a different user in
Implementations SHOULD also provide a different user interface terface
indication when calls are in progress to users whose identities are indication when calls are in progress to users whose identities are
directly verifiable. <xref target="sec.proposal.comsec"/> provides directly verifiable. <xref target="sec.proposal.comsec" format="defau lt" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.5"/> provides
more on this. more on this.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.communications.consent" numbered="true" toc=
<section title="Communications Consent" anchor="sec.proposal.communication "include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.3">
s.consent"> <name slugifiedName="name-communications-consent">Communications Consent
</name>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-1">
Browser client implementations of WebRTC MUST implement ICE. Server Browser client implementations of WebRTC <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> implement
gateway implementations which operate only at public IP addresses MUST ICE. Server
implement either full ICE or ICE-Lite <xref target="RFC8445"/>. gateway implementations which operate only at public IP addresses <bcp
14>MUST</bcp14>
implement either full ICE or ICE-Lite <xref target="RFC8445" format="d
efault" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8445"/>.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-2">
Browser implementations MUST verify reachability via ICE prior to Browser implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify reachability via IC
E prior to
sending any non-ICE packets to a given destination. Implementations sending any non-ICE packets to a given destination. Implementations
MUST NOT provide the ICE transaction ID to JavaScript during the <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> provide the ICE transaction ID to JavaScript d uring the
lifetime of the transaction (i.e., during the period when the ICE lifetime of the transaction (i.e., during the period when the ICE
stack would accept a new response for that transaction). The JS MUST stack would accept a new response for that transaction). The JS <bcp1
NOT be permitted to control the local ufrag and password, though it of 4>MUST NOT</bcp14> be permitted to control the local ufrag and password, though
it of
course knows it. course knows it.
</t> </t>
<t> <!-- FIXME: phrasing of first sentence still awkward --> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-3">
While continuing consent is required, the ICE <xref While continuing consent is required, the ICE <xref target="RFC8445" s
target="RFC8445"/>; Section 10 keepalives use STUN Binding Indications ectionFormat="comma" section="11" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-edit
which are or.org/rfc/rfc8445#section-11" derivedContent="RFC8445"/> keepalives use STUN Bi
nding Indications, which are
one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to
use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already
requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this
approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the
ICE timers to be used; see <xref target="RFC7675"/>. ICE timers to be used; see <xref target="RFC7675" format="default" sec tionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7675"/>.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.ip.location.privacy" numbered="true" toc="in
<section title="IP Location Privacy" anchor="sec.proposal.ip.location.priv clude" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.4">
acy"> <name slugifiedName="name-ip-location-privacy">IP Location Privacy</name
<t> >
<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-1">
A side effect of the default ICE behavior is that the peer learns A side effect of the default ICE behavior is that the peer learns
one's IP address, which leaks large amounts of location one's IP address, which leaks large amounts of location
information. This has negative privacy consequences in some information. This has negative privacy consequences in some
circumstances. The API requirements in this section are intended to circumstances. The API requirements in this section are intended to
mitigate this issue. Note that these requirements are not intended to mitigate this issue. Note that these requirements are not intended to
protect the user's IP address from a malicious site. In general, the protect the user's IP address from a malicious site. In general, the
site will learn at least a user's server reflexive address from any site will learn at least a user's server-reflexive address from any
HTTP transaction. Rather, these requirements are intended to allow a HTTP transaction. Rather, these requirements are intended to allow a
site to cooperate with the user to hide the user's IP address from the site to cooperate with the user to hide the user's IP address from the
other side of the call. Hiding the user's IP address from the server other side of the call. Hiding the user's IP address from the server
requires some sort of explicit privacy preserving mechanism on the requires some sort of explicit privacy-preserving mechanism on the
client (e.g., Tor Browser [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrow client (e.g., Tor Browser <eref brackets="angle" target="https://www.t
ser.html.en]) and orproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en"/>) and
is out of scope for this specification. is out of scope for this specification.
</t> </t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.4-2">
<t> <dt pn="section-6.4-2.1">API Requirement:</dt>
<list style="hanging"> <dd pn="section-6.4-2.2">
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a mechanism to allow the JS to
The API MUST provide a mechanism to allow the JS to suppress ICE suppress ICE
negotiation (though perhaps to allow candidate gathering) until negotiation (though perhaps to allow candidate gathering) until
the user has decided to answer the call [note: determining when the user has decided to answer the call. (Note: Determining when
the call has been answered is a question for the JS.] This the call has been answered is a question for the JS.) This
enables a user to prevent a peer from learning their IP address if enables a user to prevent a peer from learning their IP address if
they elect not to answer a call and also from learning whether the they elect not to answer a call and also from learning whether the
user is online. user is online.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.4-3">
<dt pn="section-6.4-3.1">API Requirement:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.4-3.2">
<list style="hanging"> The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a mechanism for the calling ap
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> plication JS to
The API MUST provide a mechanism for the calling application JS to
indicate that only TURN candidates are to be used. This prevents indicate that only TURN candidates are to be used. This prevents
the peer from learning one's IP address at all. This mechanism the peer from learning one's IP address at all. This mechanism
MUST also permit suppression of the related address field, since <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also permit suppression of the related address field, since
that leaks local addresses. that leaks local addresses.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.4-4">
<dt pn="section-6.4-4.1">API Requirement:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.4-4.2">
<list style="hanging"> The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a mechanism for the calling ap
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> plication to
The API MUST provide a mechanism for the calling application to
reconfigure an existing call to add non-TURN candidates. Taken reconfigure an existing call to add non-TURN candidates. Taken
together, this and the previous requirement allow ICE negotiation together, this and the previous requirement allow ICE negotiation
to start immediately on incoming call notification, thus reducing to start immediately on incoming call notification, thus reducing
post-dial delay, but also to avoid disclosing the user's IP post-dial delay, but also to avoid disclosing the user's IP
address until they have decided to answer. They also allow users address until they have decided to answer. They also allow users
to completely hide their IP address for the duration of the to completely hide their IP address for the duration of the
call. Finally, they allow a mechanism for the user to optimize call. Finally, they allow a mechanism for the user to optimize
performance by reconfiguring to allow non-TURN candidates during performance by reconfiguring to allow non-TURN candidates during
an active call if the user decides they no longer need to hide an active call if the user decides they no longer need to hide
their IP address their IP address.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-5">
<t>
Note that some enterprises may operate proxies and/or NATs designed to Note that some enterprises may operate proxies and/or NATs designed to
hide internal IP addresses from the outside world. WebRTC provides no hide internal IP addresses from the outside world. WebRTC provides no
explicit mechanism to allow this function. Either such enterprises explicit mechanism to allow this function. Either such enterprises
need to proxy the HTTP/HTTPS and modify the SDP and/or the JS, or need to proxy the HTTP/HTTPS and modify the SDP and/or the JS, or
there needs to be browser support to set the "TURN-only" policy there needs to be browser support to set the "TURN-only" policy
regardless of the site's preferences. regardless of the site's preferences.
</t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-6">
Note: These requirements are intended to allow sites to conceal the
user's IP address from the peer. For guidance on concealing the
user's IP address from the calling site see <xref target="RFC8828" for
mat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8828"/>.
</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.proposal.comsec" numbered="true" toc="include" remove
<section title="Communications Security" anchor="sec.proposal.comsec"> InRFC="false" pn="section-6.5">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-communications-security">Communications Securi
Implementations MUST support SRTP <xref target="RFC3711"/>. ty</name>
Implementations MUST support DTLS <xref target="RFC6347"/> and <t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-1">
DTLS-SRTP <xref target="RFC5763"/><xref target="RFC5764"/> for SRTP Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support SRTP <xref target="RFC3711
keying. Implementations MUST support SCTP over DTLS <xref " format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3711"/>.
target="RFC8261"/>. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support DTLS <xref target="RFC6347
" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6347"/> and
DTLS-SRTP <xref target="RFC5763" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d
erivedContent="RFC5763"/> <xref target="RFC5764" format="default" sectionFormat=
"of" derivedContent="RFC5764"/> for SRTP
keying. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support SCTP over DTLS <xr
ef target="RFC8261" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8261"
/>.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-2">
All media channels MUST be secured via SRTP and SRTCP. Media traffic All media channels <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be secured via SRTP and the
MUST NOT Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol (SRTCP). Media traffic <b
be sent over plain (unencrypted) RTP or RTCP; that is, implementations cp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
MUST be sent over plain (unencrypted) RTP or RTCP; that is, implementations
NOT negotiate cipher suites with NULL encryption modes. DTLS-SRTP <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> negotiate cipher suites with NULL encryption modes. DT
MUST be offered for every media channel. WebRTC implementations MUST LS-SRTP
NOT <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be offered for every media channel. WebRTC implem
offer SDP Security Descriptions <xref target="RFC4568"/> or select it entations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
if offered. offer SDP security descriptions <xref target="RFC4568" format="default
A SRTP MKI MUST NOT be used. " sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4568"/> or select it if offered.
An SRTP Master Key Identifier (MKI) <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-3">
All data channels MUST be secured via DTLS. All data channels <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be secured via DTLS.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-4">
All Implementations MUST support DTLS 1.2 with the All implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support DTLS 1.2 with the
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the
<xref target="FIPS186">P-256 curve</xref>. <xref target="FIPS186" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedCont ent="FIPS186">P-256 curve</xref>.
Earlier drafts of this specification required Earlier drafts of this specification required
DTLS 1.0 with the cipher suite DTLS 1.0 with the cipher suite
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and at the time of this TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and at the time of this
writing some implementations do not support DTLS 1.2; writing some implementations do not support DTLS 1.2;
endpoints which support only DTLS 1.2 might encounter endpoints which support only DTLS 1.2 might encounter
interoperability issues. interoperability issues.
The DTLS-SRTP protection profile The DTLS-SRTP protection profile
SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 MUST be supported for SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported for
SRTP. SRTP.
Implementations Implementations
MUST favor cipher suites which support (Perfect Forward Secrecy) PFS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> favor cipher suites which support Forward Secrecy
over non-PFS cipher suites and SHOULD favor AEAD over non-AEAD cipher (FS)
suites. over non-FS cipher suites and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> favor
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) over non-AEAD cip
her suites.
Note: the IETF is in the process of standardizing DTLS 1.3
<xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" format="default" sectionFormat="of"
derivedContent="TLS-DTLS13"/>.
</t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-5">
<t> Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> implement DTLS renegotiation a
Implementations MUST NOT implement DTLS renegotiation and MUST reject nd <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
it with a "no_renegotiation" alert if offered.</t> it with a "no_renegotiation" alert if offered.</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-6">
<t> Endpoints <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> implement TLS False Start <xref targ
Endpoints MUST NOT implement TLS False Start <xref target="RFC7918"/>. et="RFC7918" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7918"/>.</t>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.5-7">
<dt pn="section-6.5-7.1">API Requirement:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.5-7.2">
<list style="hanging"> The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a new authentication key pair
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> for every new
The API MUST generate a new authentication key pair for every new
call by default. This is intended to allow for unlinkability. call by default. This is intended to allow for unlinkability.
</t> </dd>
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> <dt pn="section-6.5-7.3">API Requirement:</dt>
The API MUST provide a means to reuse a key pair for calls. This <dd pn="section-6.5-7.4">
The API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a means to reuse a key pair fo
r calls. This
can be used to enable key continuity-based authentication, and can be used to enable key continuity-based authentication, and
could be used to amortize key generation costs. could be used to amortize key generation costs.
</t> </dd>
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> <dt pn="section-6.5-7.5">API Requirement:</dt>
<dd pn="section-6.5-7.6">
Unless Unless
the user specifically configures an external key pair, different the user specifically configures an external key pair, different
key pairs MUST be used for each origin. (This avoids creating a key pairs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used for each origin. (This avoid s creating a
super-cookie.) super-cookie.)
</t> </dd>
<t hangText="API Requirement:"> <dt pn="section-6.5-7.7">API Requirement:</dt>
When DTLS-SRTP is used, the API MUST NOT permit the JS to obtain <dd pn="section-6.5-7.8">
When DTLS-SRTP is used, the API <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> permit the
JS to obtain
the negotiated keying material. This requirement preserves the the negotiated keying material. This requirement preserves the
end-to-end security of the media. end-to-end security of the media.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-6.5-8">
<dt pn="section-6.5-8.1">UI Requirements:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-6.5-8.2">
<list style="hanging"> A user-oriented client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide an "inspector"
<t hangText="UI Requirements: "> interface which
A user-oriented client MUST provide an "inspector" interface which allows the user to determine the "security characteristics" of the
allows the user to determine the security characteristics of the
media. media.
</t> </dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-6.5-8.3"/>
The following properties SHOULD be displayed "up-front" in the <dd pn="section-6.5-8.4">
The following properties <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be displayed "up-fr
ont" in the
browser chrome, i.e., without requiring the user to ask for them: browser chrome, i.e., without requiring the user to ask for them:
</t> </dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-6.5-8.5"/>
<list style="symbols"> <dd pn="section-6.5-8.6">
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="secti
A client MUST provide a user interface through which a user on-6.5-8.6.1">
may determine the security characteristics for <li pn="section-6.5-8.6.1.1">
currently-displayed audio and video stream(s) A client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a user interface through
</t> which a user
may determine the "security characteristics" for
<t> currently displayed audio and video stream(s).
A client MUST provide a user interface through which a user </li>
may determine the security characteristics for transmissions <li pn="section-6.5-8.6.1.2">
A client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide a user interface through
which a user
may determine the "security characteristics" for transmissions
of their microphone audio and camera video. of their microphone audio and camera video.
</t> </li>
<li pn="section-6.5-8.6.1.3">
<t>
If the far endpoint was directly verified, either via a If the far endpoint was directly verified, either via a
third-party verifiable X.509 certificate or via a Web IdP third-party verifiable X.509 certificate or via a Web IdP
mechanism (see <xref target="sec.generic.idp"/>) the "security mechanism (see <xref target="sec.generic.idp" format="default"
characteristics" MUST include the verified information. X.509 sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>), the "security
characteristics" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the verified info
rmation. X.509
identities and Web IdP identities have similar semantics and identities and Web IdP identities have similar semantics and
should be displayed in a similar way. should be displayed in a similar way.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> </dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-6.5-8.7"/>
</t> <dd pn="section-6.5-8.8">
<t>
The following properties are more likely to require some The following properties are more likely to require some
"drill-down" from the user: "drill-down" from the user:
</t> </dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-6.5-8.9"/>
<list style="symbols"> <dd pn="section-6.5-8.10">
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="secti
The "security characteristics" MUST indicate the cryptographic on-6.5-8.10.1">
algorithms in use (For example: "AES-CBC".) <li pn="section-6.5-8.10.1.1">
</t> The "security characteristics" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate th
e cryptographic
<t> algorithms in use (for example, "AES-CBC").
The "security characteristics" MUST indicate whether PFS is </li>
<li pn="section-6.5-8.10.1.2">
The "security characteristics" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate wh
ether FS is
provided. provided.
</t> </li>
<li pn="section-6.5-8.10.1.3">
<t> The "security characteristics" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include som
The "security characteristics" MUST include some mechanism to e mechanism to
allow an out-of-band verification of the peer, such as a allow an out-of-band verification of the peer, such as a
certificate fingerprint or a Short Authentication String (SAS) . certificate fingerprint or a Short Authentication String (SAS) .
These are compared by the peers to authenticate one another. These are compared by the peers to authenticate one another.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.generic.idp" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC=
<section title="Web-Based Peer Authentication" anchor="sec.generic.idp"> "false" pn="section-7">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-web-based-peer-authenticati">Web-Based Peer Auth
entication</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7-1">
NOTE: The mechanism described in this section was designed relatively
early in the RTCWEB process. In retrospect, the WG was too optimistic
about the enthusiasm for this kind of mechanism. At the time of publicat
ion,
it has not been widely adopted or implemented. It appears in this docume
nt
as a description of the state of the art as of this writing.
</t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7-2">
In a number of cases, it is desirable for the endpoint (i.e., the In a number of cases, it is desirable for the endpoint (i.e., the
browser) to be able to directly identify the endpoint on the other browser) to be able to directly identify the endpoint on the other
side without trusting the signaling service to which they are side without trusting the signaling service to which they are
connected. For instance, users may be making a call via a federated connected. For instance, users may be making a call via a federated
system where they wish to get direct authentication of the other system where they wish to get direct authentication of the other
side. Alternately, they may be making a call on a site which they side. Alternately, they may be making a call on a site which they
minimally trust (such as a poker site) but to someone who has an minimally trust (such as a poker site) but to someone who has an
identity on a site they do trust (such as a social network.) identity on a site they do trust (such as a social network).
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7-3">
Recently, a number of Web-based identity technologies (OAuth, Recently, a number of Web-based identity technologies (OAuth,
Facebook Connect etc.) have been developed. While the Facebook Connect, etc.) have been developed. While the
details vary, what these technologies share is that they have a details vary, what these technologies share is that they have a
Web-based (i.e., HTTP/HTTPS) identity provider which attests to Alice' s Web-based (i.e., HTTP/HTTPS) IdP which attests to Alice's
identity. For instance, if Alice has an account at example.org, Alice could identity. For instance, if Alice has an account at example.org, Alice could
use the example.org identity provider to prove to others that Alice is use the example.org IdP to prove to others that Alice is
alice@example.org. The development of these technologies allows us to alice@example.org. The development of these technologies allows us to
separate calling from identity provision: Alice could call you on a separate calling from identity provision: Alice could call you on a
poker site but identify herself as alice@example.org. poker site but identify herself as alice@example.org.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7-4">
Whatever the underlying technology, the general principle is that the Whatever the underlying technology, the general principle is that the
party which is being authenticated is NOT the signaling site but party which is being authenticated is NOT the signaling site but
rather the user (and their browser). Similarly, the relying party is rather the user (and their browser). Similarly, the Relying Party is
the browser and not the signaling site. Thus, the browser MUST the browser and not the signaling site. Thus, the browser <bcp14>MUST
</bcp14>
generate the input to the IdP assertion process and generate the input to the IdP assertion process and
display the results of the verification process to the user display the results of the verification process to the user
in a way which cannot be imitated by the calling site. in a way which cannot be imitated by the calling site.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7-5">
The mechanisms defined in this document do not require the browser to The mechanisms defined in this document do not require the browser to
implement any particular identity protocol or to support any implement any particular identity protocol or to support any
particular IdP. Instead, this document provides a generic interface particular IdP. Instead, this document provides a generic interface
which any IdP can implement. Thus, new IdPs and protocols can be which any IdP can implement. Thus, new IdPs and protocols can be
introduced without change to either the browser or the calling introduced without change to either the browser or the calling
service. This avoids the need to make a commitment to any particular service. This avoids the need to make a commitment to any particular
identity protocol, although browsers may opt to directly implement identity protocol, although browsers may opt to directly implement
some identity protocols in order to provide superior performance or UI some identity protocols in order to provide superior performance or UI
properties. properties.
</t> </t>
<section anchor="sec.trust-relationships" numbered="true" toc="include" re
<section title="Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs" anchor="sec.tru moveInRFC="false" pn="section-7.1">
st-relationships"> <name slugifiedName="name-trust-relationships-idps-ap">Trust Relationshi
<t> ps: IdPs, APs, and RPs</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-1">
Any federated identity protocol has three major participants: Any federated identity protocol has three major participants:
</t> </t>
<t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-7.1-2">
<list style="hanging"> <dt pn="section-7.1-2.1">Authenticating Party (AP):</dt>
<t hangText="Authenticating Party (AP):"> <dd pn="section-7.1-2.2">
The entity which is trying to establish its identity. The entity which is trying to establish its identity.
</t> </dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-7.1-2.3">Identity Provider (IdP):</dt>
</t> <dd pn="section-7.1-2.4">
<t hangText="Identity Provider (IdP):">
The entity which is vouching for the AP's identity. The entity which is vouching for the AP's identity.
</t> </dd>
<dt pn="section-7.1-2.5">Relying Party (RP):</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-7.1-2.6">
</t>
<t hangText="Relying Party (RP):">
The entity which is trying to verify the AP's identity. The entity which is trying to verify the AP's identity.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-3">
<t>
The AP and the IdP have an account relationship of some kind: the AP The AP and the IdP have an account relationship of some kind: the AP
registers with the IdP and is able to subsequently authenticate registers with the IdP and is able to subsequently authenticate
directly to the IdP (e.g., with a password). This means that the directly to the IdP (e.g., with a password). This means that the
browser must somehow know which IdP(s) the user has an account browser must somehow know which IdP(s) the user has an account
relationship with. This can either be something that the user relationship with. This can either be something that the user
configures into the browser or that is configured at the calling configures into the browser or that is configured at the calling
site and then provided to the PeerConnection by the Web application site and then provided to the PeerConnection by the Web application
at the calling site. The use case for having this information at the calling site. The use case for having this information
configured into the browser is that the user may "log into" the configured into the browser is that the user may "log into" the
browser to bind it to some identity. This is becoming common in new browser to bind it to some identity. This is becoming common in new
browsers. However, it should also be possible for the IdP browsers. However, it should also be possible for the IdP
information to simply be provided by the calling application. information to simply be provided by the calling application.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-4">
At a high level there are two kinds of IdPs: At a high level, there are two kinds of IdPs:
</t> </t>
<t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-7.1-5">
<list style="hanging"> <dt pn="section-7.1-5.1">Authoritative:</dt>
<t hangText="Authoritative: "> <dd pn="section-7.1-5.2">
IdPs which have verifiable control of some section of the IdPs which have verifiable control of some section of the
identity space. For instance, in the realm of e-mail, the identity space. For instance, in the realm of email, the
operator of "example.com" has complete control of the namespace operator of "example.com" has complete control of the namespace
ending in "@example.com". Thus, "alice@example.com" is whoever ending in "@example.com". Thus, "alice@example.com" is whoever
the operator says it is. Examples of systems with authoritative the operator says it is. Examples of systems with authoritative
identity providers include DNSSEC, RFC 4474, and Facebook IdPs include DNSSEC, an identity system for SIP
(see <xref target="RFC8224" format="default" sectionFormat="of"
derivedContent="RFC8224"/>), and Facebook
Connect (Facebook identities only make sense within the context Connect (Facebook identities only make sense within the context
of the Facebook system). of the Facebook system).
</t> </dd>
<dt pn="section-7.1-5.3">Third-Party:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-7.1-5.4">
</t>
<t hangText="Third-Party: ">
IdPs which don't have control of their section of the identity IdPs which don't have control of their section of the identity
space but instead verify user's identities via some unspecified space but instead verify users' identities via some unspecified
mechanism and then attest to it. Because the IdP doesn't mechanism and then attest to it. Because the IdP doesn't
actually control the namespace, RPs need to trust that the IdP actually control the namespace, RPs need to trust that the IdP
is correctly verifying AP identities, and there can potentially is correctly verifying AP identities, and there can potentially
be multiple IdPs attesting to the same section of the identity be multiple IdPs attesting to the same section of the identity
space. Probably the best-known example of a third-party identity space. Probably the best-known example of a third-party IdP
provider is SSL/TLS certificates, where there are a large number is SSL/TLS certificates, where there are a large number of
of certificate authorities (CAs) all of whom can attest to any doma
CAs all of whom can attest to any domain name. in name.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-6">
<t>
If an AP is authenticating via an authoritative IdP, then the RP If an AP is authenticating via an authoritative IdP, then the RP
does not need to explicitly configure trust in the IdP at all. The does not need to explicitly configure trust in the IdP at all. The
identity mechanism can directly verify that the IdP indeed made the identity mechanism can directly verify that the IdP indeed made the
relevant identity assertion (a function provided by the mechanisms relevant identity assertion (a function provided by the mechanisms
in this document), and any assertion it makes about an identity for in this document), and any assertion it makes about an identity for
which it is authoritative is directly verifiable. Note that this which it is authoritative is directly verifiable. Note that this
does not mean that the IdP might not lie, but that is a does not mean that the IdP might not lie, but that is a
trustworthiness judgement that the user can make at the time he trustworthiness judgement that the user can make at the time they
looks at the identity. look at the identity.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-7">
By contrast, if an AP is authenticating via a third-party IdP, the By contrast, if an AP is authenticating via a third-party IdP, the
RP needs to explicitly trust that IdP (hence the need for an RP needs to explicitly trust that IdP (hence the need for an
explicit trust anchor list in PKI-based SSL/TLS clients). The list explicit trust anchor list in PKI-based SSL/TLS clients). The list
of trustable IdPs needs to be configured directly into the browser, of trustable IdPs needs to be configured directly into the browser,
either by the user or potentially by the browser manufacturer. This either by the user or potentially by the browser manufacturer. This
is a significant advantage of authoritative IdPs and implies that if is a significant advantage of authoritative IdPs and implies that if
third-party IdPs are to be supported, the potential number needs to third-party IdPs are to be supported, the potential number needs to
be fairly small. be fairly small.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.overview" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="
<section title="Overview of Operation" anchor="sec.overview"> false" pn="section-7.2">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-overview-of-operation">Overview of Operation</
name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-1">
In order to provide security without trusting the calling site, the In order to provide security without trusting the calling site, the
PeerConnection component of the browser must interact directly with PeerConnection component of the browser must interact directly with
the IdP. The details of the mechanism are described in the W3C API the IdP. The details of the mechanism are described in the W3C API
specification, but the general idea is that the PeerConnection specification, but the general idea is that the PeerConnection
component downloads JS from a specific location on the IdP dictated component downloads JS from a specific location on the IdP dictated
by the IdP domain name. That JS (the "IdP proxy") runs in an by the IdP domain name. That JS (the "IdP proxy") runs in an
isolated security context within the browser and the PeerConnection isolated security context within the browser, and the PeerConnection
talks to it via a secure message passing channel. talks to it via a secure message passing channel.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-2">
Note that there are two logically separate functions here: Note that there are two logically separate functions here:
<list style="symbols"> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-7
.2-3">
<li pn="section-7.2-3.1">
Identity assertion generation. Identity assertion generation.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-7.2-3.2">
Identity assertion verification. Identity assertion verification.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-4">
<t> The same IdP JS "endpoint" is used for both functions, but of course
The same IdP JS "endpoint" is used for both functions but of course
a given IdP might behave differently and load new JS to perform one a given IdP might behave differently and load new JS to perform one
function or the other. function or the other.
</t> </t>
<figure> <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-7.2-5">
<artwork><![CDATA[
+--------------------------------------+ +--------------------------------------+
| Browser | | Browser |
| | | |
| +----------------------------------+ | | +----------------------------------+ |
| | https://calling-site.example.com | | | | https://calling-site.example.com | |
| | | | | | | |
| | Calling JS Code | | | | Calling JS Code | |
| | ^ | | | | ^ | |
| +---------------|------------------+ | | +---------------|------------------+ |
| | API Calls | | | API Calls |
| v | | v |
| PeerConnection | | PeerConnection |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | API Calls | | | API Calls |
| +-----------|-------------+ | +---------------+ | +-----------|-------------+ | +---------------+
| | v | | | | | | v | | | |
| | IdP Proxy |<--------&gt;| Identity | | | IdP Proxy |<--------&gt;| Identity |
| | | | | Provider | | | | | | Provider |
| | https://idp.example.org | | | | | | https://idp.example.org | | | |
| +-------------------------+ | +---------------+ | +-------------------------+ | +---------------+
| | | |
+--------------------------------------+ +--------------------------------------+ </artwork>
]]></artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-6">
</figure>
<t>
When the PeerConnection object wants to interact with the IdP, the When the PeerConnection object wants to interact with the IdP, the
sequence of events is as follows: sequence of events is as follows:
<list style="numbers"> </t>
<t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-7.
2-7">
<li pn="section-7.2-7.1" derivedCounter="1.">
The browser (the PeerConnection component) instantiates an IdP The browser (the PeerConnection component) instantiates an IdP
proxy. This allows the IdP to load whatever JS is necessary into proxy. This allows the IdP to load whatever JS is necessary into
the proxy. The resulting code runs in the IdP's security the proxy. The resulting code runs in the IdP's security
context. context.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-7.2-7.2" derivedCounter="2.">
The IdP registers an object with the browser that conforms to The IdP registers an object with the browser that conforms to
the API defined in <xref target="webrtc-api"/>. the API defined in <xref target="webrtc-api" format="default" se
</t> ctionFormat="of" derivedContent="webrtc-api"/>.
<t> </li>
<li pn="section-7.2-7.3" derivedCounter="3.">
The browser invokes methods on the object registered by the IdP The browser invokes methods on the object registered by the IdP
proxy to create or verify identity assertions. proxy to create or verify identity assertions.
</t> </li>
</list> </ol>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-8">
<t>
This approach allows us to decouple the browser from any particular This approach allows us to decouple the browser from any particular
identity provider; the browser need only know how to load the IdP's IdP; the browser need only know how to load the IdP's
JavaScript--the location of which is determined based on the IdP's JavaScript -- the location of which is determined based on the IdP's
identity--and to call the generic API for requesting and verifying identity -- and to call the generic API for requesting and verifying
identity assertions. The IdP provides whatever logic is necessary to identity assertions. The IdP provides whatever logic is necessary to
bridge the generic protocol to the IdP's specific bridge the generic protocol to the IdP's specific
requirements. Thus, a single browser can support any number of requirements. Thus, a single browser can support any number of
identity protocols, including being forward compatible with IdPs identity protocols, including being forward compatible with IdPs
which did not exist at the time the browser was written. which did not exist at the time the browser was written.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.standardized" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInR
<section title="Items for Standardization" anchor="sec.standardized"> FC="false" pn="section-7.3">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-items-for-standardization">Items for Standardi
zation</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-1">
There are two parts to this work: There are two parts to this work:
</t> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-7
<list style="symbols"> .3-2">
<t> <li pn="section-7.3-2.1">
The precise information from the signaling message that must be The precise information from the signaling message that must be
cryptographically bound to the user's identity and a mechanism cryptographically bound to the user's identity and a mechanism
for carrying assertions in JSEP messages. This is specified in for carrying assertions in JavaScript Session Establishment
<xref target="sec.jsep-binding"/>. Protocol (JSEP) messages. This is specified in
</t> <xref target="sec.jsep-binding" format="default" sectionFormat="
of" derivedContent="Section 7.4"/>.
<t> </li>
<li pn="section-7.3-2.2">
The interface to the IdP, which is defined in the companion W3C The interface to the IdP, which is defined in the companion W3C
WebRTC API specification <xref target="webrtc-api"/>. WebRTC API specification <xref target="webrtc-api" format="defau
</t> lt" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="webrtc-api"/>.
</list> </li>
</t> </ul>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-3">
The WebRTC API specification also defines JavaScript interfaces that The WebRTC API specification also defines JavaScript interfaces that
the calling application can use to specify which IdP to use. That the calling application can use to specify which IdP to use. That
API also provides access to the assertion-generation capability and API also provides access to the assertion-generation capability and
the status of the validation process. the status of the validation process.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.jsep-binding" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInR
<section title="Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transac FC="false" pn="section-7.4">
tions" anchor="sec.jsep-binding"> <name slugifiedName="name-binding-identity-assertions">Binding Identity
Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</name>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4-1">
An identity assertion binds the user's identity (as asserted by the An identity assertion binds the user's identity (as asserted by the
IdP) to the SDP offer/answer exchange and specifically to the IdP) to the SDP offer/answer exchange and specifically to the
media. In order to achieve this, the PeerConnection must provide the media. In order to achieve this, the PeerConnection must provide the
DTLS-SRTP fingerprint to be bound to the identity. This is provided DTLS-SRTP fingerprint to be bound to the identity. This is provided
as a JavaScript object (also known as a dictionary or hash) with a as a JavaScript object (also known as a dictionary or hash) with a
single <spanx style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> key, as shown below: single "fingerprint" key, as shown below:
</t> </t>
<figure> <sourcecode name="json-1" type="json" markers="false" pn="section-7.4-2"
<artwork><![CDATA[ >
{ {
"fingerprint": "fingerprint":
[ [
{ "algorithm": "sha-256", { "algorithm": "sha-256",
"digest": "4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:...:E5:7C:AB" }, "digest": "4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:...:E5:7C:AB" },
{ "algorithm": "sha-1", { "algorithm": "sha-1",
"digest": "74:E9:76:C8:19:...:F4:45:6B" } "digest": "74:E9:76:C8:19:...:F4:45:6B" }
] ]
} }</sourcecode>
]]></artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4-3">
</figure> The "fingerprint" value is an array of
<t> objects. Each object in the array contains "algorithm" and "digest"
The <spanx style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> value is an array of values, which correspond directly to
objects. Each object in the array contains <spanx the algorithm and digest values in the "fingerprint" attribute of th
style="verb">algorithm</spanx> and <spanx e SDP <xref target="RFC8122" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent=
style="verb">digest</spanx> values, which correspond directly to "RFC8122"/>.
the algorithm and digest values in the <spanx </t>
style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> attribute of the SDP <xref <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4-4">
target="RFC8122"/>. This object is encoded in a <xref target="RFC8259" format="default"
</t> sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8259">JSON</xref>
<t>
This object is encoded in a <xref target="RFC8259">JSON</xref>
string for passing to the IdP. The identity assertion returned by string for passing to the IdP. The identity assertion returned by
the IdP, which is encoded in the <spanx the IdP, which is encoded in the "identity" attribute, is a JSON obj
style="verb">identity</spanx> attribute, is a JSON object that is ect that is
encoded as described in <xref target="sec.carry-assertion"/>. encoded as described in <xref target="sec.carry-assertion" format="d
</t> efault" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.4.1"/>.
<t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.4-5">
This structure does not need to be interpreted by the IdP or the This structure does not need to be interpreted by the IdP or the
IdP proxy. It is consumed solely by the RP's browser. The IdP IdP proxy. It is consumed solely by the RP's browser. The IdP
merely treats it as an opaque value to be attested to. Thus, new merely treats it as an opaque value to be attested to. Thus, new
parameters can be added to the assertion without modifying the parameters can be added to the assertion without modifying the
IdP. IdP.
</t> </t>
<section anchor="sec.carry-assertion" numbered="true" toc="include" remo
<section title="Carrying Identity Assertions" anchor="sec.carry-assert veInRFC="false" pn="section-7.4.1">
ion"> <name slugifiedName="name-carrying-identity-assertion">Carrying Identi
<t> ty Assertions</name>
Once an IdP has generated an assertion (see <xref <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4.1-1">
target="sec.request-assert"/>), it is attached to the SDP Once an IdP has generated an assertion (see <xref target="sec.requ
offer/answer message. This is done by adding a new 'identity' est-assert" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.6"/>),
it is attached to the SDP
offer/answer message. This is done by adding a new "identity"
attribute to the SDP. The sole contents of this value is the attribute to the SDP. The sole contents of this value is the
identity assertion. The identity assertion produced by the IdP is identity assertion. The identity assertion produced by the IdP is
encoded into a UTF-8 JSON text, then <xref encoded into a UTF-8 JSON text, then <xref target="RFC4648" format
target="RFC4648">Base64-encoded</xref> to produce this string. ="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4648">base64-encoded</xref> to
produce this string.
For example: For example:
</t> </t>
<figure> <sourcecode name="sdp-1" type="sdp" markers="false" pn="section-7.4.1-
<artwork><![CDATA[ 2">
v=0 v=0
o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com
s=example1 s=example1
c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com
a=fingerprint:sha-1 \ a=fingerprint:sha-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=identity:\ a=identity:\
eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\ eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\
In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\ In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\
IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\ IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\
aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9 aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9
a=... a=...
t=0 0 t=0 0
m=audio 6056 RTP/SAVP 0 m=audio 6056 RTP/SAVP 0
a=sendrecv a=sendrecv
... ...</sourcecode>
<aside pn="section-7.4.1-3">
Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4.1-3.1">Note that long lines in the exa
mple are folded to meet the column
width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of
a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored. a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.</t>
</aside>
]]></artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4.1-4">
</figure> The "identity" attribute attests to all "fingerprint" attributes i
<t> n the session
The 'identity' attribute attests to all <spanx
style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> attributes in the session
description. It is therefore a session-level attribute. description. It is therefore a session-level attribute.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4.1-5">
Multiple <spanx style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> values can be Multiple "fingerprint" values can be
used to offer alternative certificates for a peer. The <spanx used to offer alternative certificates for a peer. The "identity"
style="verb">identity</spanx> attribute MUST include all attribute <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include all
fingerprint values that are included in <spanx "fingerprint" values that are included in "fingerprint" attributes
style="verb">fingerprint</spanx> attributes of the session of the session
description. description.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.4.1-6">
The RP browser MUST verify that the in-use certificate for a DTLS The RP browser <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the in-use certific
ate for a DTLS
connection is in the set of fingerprints returned from the IdP connection is in the set of fingerprints returned from the IdP
when verifying an assertion. when verifying an assertion.
</t> </t>
</section>
</section> </section>
</section>
<section title="Determining the IdP URI" anchor="sec.idp-uri"> <section anchor="sec.idp-uri" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="f
<t> alse" pn="section-7.5">
<name slugifiedName="name-determining-the-idp-uri">Determining the IdP U
RI</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-1">
In order to ensure that the IdP is under control of the domain In order to ensure that the IdP is under control of the domain
owner rather than someone who merely has an account on the owner rather than someone who merely has an account on the
domain owner's server (e.g., in shared hosting scenarios), the domain owner's server (e.g., in shared hosting scenarios), the
IdP JavaScript is hosted at a deterministic location based on IdP JavaScript is hosted at a deterministic location based on
the IdP's domain name. Each IdP proxy instance is associated the IdP's domain name. Each IdP proxy instance is associated
with two values: with two values:
</t> </t>
<t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-7.5-2">
<list style="hanging"> <dt pn="section-7.5-2.1">authority:</dt>
<t hangText="Authority:"> <dd pn="section-7.5-2.2">
The <xref target="RFC3986"> authority</xref> at which the The <xref target="RFC3986" format="default" sectionFormat
="of" derivedContent="RFC3986"> authority</xref> at which the
IdP's service is hosted. IdP's service is hosted.
</t> </dd>
<t hangText="protocol:"> <dt pn="section-7.5-2.3">protocol:</dt>
<dd pn="section-7.5-2.4">
The specific IdP protocol which the IdP is using. This is a The specific IdP protocol which the IdP is using. This is a
completely opaque IdP-specific string, but allows an IdP to completely opaque IdP-specific string, but allows an IdP to
implement two protocols in parallel. This value may be the implement two protocols in parallel. This value may be the
empty string. If no value for protocol is provided, a value empty string. If no value for protocol is provided, a value
of "default" is used. of "default" is used.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-3">
<t> Each IdP <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> serve its initial entry page (i.e.,
Each IdP MUST serve its initial entry page (i.e., the one loaded the one loaded
by the IdP proxy) from a <xref target="RFC5785">well-known by the IdP proxy) from a <xref target="RFC8615" format="default"
URI</xref>. The well-known URI for an IdP proxy is formed from sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8615">well-known
URI</xref>.
The well-known URI for an IdP proxy is formed from
the following URI components: the following URI components:
<list style="numbers"> </t>
<t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-7.
The scheme, "https:". An IdP MUST be loaded using <xref 5-4">
target="RFC2818">HTTPS</xref>. <li pn="section-7.5-4.1" derivedCounter="1.">
</t> The scheme, "https:". An IdP <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be loaded
<t> using <xref target="RFC2818" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent=
The <xref target="RFC3986">authority</xref>. As noted above "RFC2818">HTTPS</xref>.
, </li>
the authority MAY contain a non-default port number or <li pn="section-7.5-4.2" derivedCounter="2.">
The <xref target="RFC3986" format="default" sectionFormat="o
f" derivedContent="RFC3986">authority</xref>. As noted above,
the authority <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain a non-default port
number or
userinfo sub-component. Both are removed when determining userinfo sub-component. Both are removed when determining
if an asserted identity matches the name of the IdP. if an asserted identity matches the name of the IdP.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-7.5-4.3" derivedCounter="3.">
The path, starting with "/.well-known/idp-proxy/" and The path, starting with "/.well-known/idp-proxy/" and
appended with the IdP protocol. Note that the separator appended with the IdP protocol. Note that the separator
characters '/' (%2F) and '\' (%5C) MUST NOT be permitted in characters '/' (%2F) and '\' (%5C) <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> b e permitted in
the protocol field, lest an attacker be able to direct the protocol field, lest an attacker be able to direct
requests outside of the controlled "/.well-known/" prefix. requests outside of the controlled "/.well-known/" prefix.
Query and fragment values MAY be used by including '?' or Query and fragment values <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by incl uding '?' or
'#' characters. '#' characters.
</t> </li>
</list> </ol>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-5">
For example, for the IdP "identity.example.com" and the protocol For example, for the IdP "identity.example.com" and the protocol
"example", the URL would be: "example", the URL would be:
</t> </t>
<figure> <artwork align="left" pn="section-7.5-6">https://identity.example.com/.w
<artwork><![CDATA[ ell-known/idp-proxy/example</artwork>
https://identity.example.com/.well-known/idp-proxy/example <t indent="0" pn="section-7.5-7">
]]></artwork> The IdP <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> redirect requests to this URL, but th
</figure> ey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> retain
<t> the "https:" scheme. This changes the effective origin of the
The IdP MAY redirect requests to this URL, but they MUST retain
the "https" scheme. This changes the effective origin of the
IdP, but not the domain of the identities that the IdP is IdP, but not the domain of the identities that the IdP is
permitted to assert and validate. I.e., the IdP is still permitted to assert and validate. I.e., the IdP is still
regarded as authoritative for the original domain. regarded as authoritative for the original domain.
</t> </t>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7
<section title="Authenticating Party"> .5.1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-authenticating-party">Authenticating Party</
name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.5.1-1">
How an AP determines the appropriate IdP domain is out of How an AP determines the appropriate IdP domain is out of
scope of this specification. In general, however, the AP has scope of this specification. In general, however, the AP has
some actual account relationship with the IdP, as this some actual account relationship with the IdP, as this
identity is what the IdP is attesting to. Thus, the AP somehow identity is what the IdP is attesting to. Thus, the AP somehow
supplies the IdP information to the browser. Some potential supplies the IdP information to the browser. Some potential
mechanisms include: mechanisms include:
<list style="symbols"> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section
-7.5.1-2">
<li pn="section-7.5.1-2.1">
Provided by the user directly. Provided by the user directly.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-7.5.1-2.2">
Selected from some set of IdPs known to the calling site. Selected from some set of IdPs known to the calling site
E.g., a button that shows "Authenticate via Facebook (e.g., a button that shows "Authenticate via Facebook
Connect" Connect").
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> </section>
</section> <section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7
.5.2">
<section title="Relying Party"> <name slugifiedName="name-relying-party">Relying Party</name>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.5.2-1">
Unlike the AP, the RP need not have any particular Unlike the AP, the RP need not have any particular
relationship with the IdP. Rather, it needs to be able to relationship with the IdP. Rather, it needs to be able to
process whatever assertion is provided by the AP. As the process whatever assertion is provided by the AP. As the
assertion contains the IdP's identity in the <spanx assertion contains the IdP's identity in the "idp" field of th
style="verb">idp</spanx> field of the JSON-encoded object (see e JSON-encoded object (see
<xref target="sec.request-assert"/>), the URI can be <xref target="sec.request-assert" format="default" sectionForm
at="of" derivedContent="Section 7.6"/>), the URI can be
constructed directly from the assertion, and thus the RP can constructed directly from the assertion, and thus the RP can
directly verify the technical validity of the assertion with directly verify the technical validity of the assertion with
no user interaction. Authoritative assertions need only be no user interaction. Authoritative assertions need only be
verifiable. Third-party assertions also MUST be verified verifiable. Third-party assertions also <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
against local policy, as described in <xref verified
target="sec.id-format"/>. against local policy, as described in <xref target="sec.id-for
</t> mat" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>.
</section> </t>
</section> </section>
</section>
<section title="Requesting Assertions" anchor="sec.request-assert"> <section anchor="sec.request-assert" numbered="true" toc="include" removeI
<t> nRFC="false" pn="section-7.6">
The input to identity assertion is the JSON-encoded object <name slugifiedName="name-requesting-assertions">Requesting Assertions</
described in <xref target="sec.jsep-binding"/> that contains the name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-1">
The input to the identity assertion generation process is the JS
ON-encoded object
described in <xref target="sec.jsep-binding" format="default" se
ctionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.4"/> that contains the
set of certificate fingerprints the browser intends to use. set of certificate fingerprints the browser intends to use.
This string is treated as opaque from the perspective of the This string is treated as opaque from the perspective of the
IdP. IdP.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-2">
The browser also identifies the origin that the PeerConnection The browser also identifies the origin that the PeerConnection
is run in, which allows the IdP to make decisions based on who is run in, which allows the IdP to make decisions based on who
is requesting the assertion. is requesting the assertion.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-3">
An application can optionally provide a user identifier hint An application can optionally provide a user identifier hint
when specifying an IdP. This value is a hint that the IdP can when specifying an IdP. This value is a hint that the IdP can
use to select amongst multiple identities, or to avoid providing use to select amongst multiple identities, or to avoid providing
assertions for unwanted identities. The <spanx assertions for unwanted identities. The "username" is a string
style="verb">username</spanx> is a string that has no meaning to that has no meaning to
any entity other than the IdP, it can contain any data the IdP any entity other than the IdP; it can contain any data the IdP
needs in order to correctly generate an assertion. needs in order to correctly generate an assertion.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-4">
An identity assertion that is successfully provided by the IdP An identity assertion that is successfully provided by the IdP
consists of the following information: consists of the following information:
</t> </t>
<t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-7.6-5">
<list style="hanging"> <dt pn="section-7.6-5.1">idp:</dt>
<t hangText="idp:"> <dd pn="section-7.6-5.2">
The domain name of an IdP and the protocol string. This MAY The domain name of an IdP and the protocol string. This <bc
p14>MAY</bcp14>
identify a different IdP or protocol from the one that identify a different IdP or protocol from the one that
generated the assertion. generated the assertion.
</t> </dd>
<t hangText="assertion:"> <dt pn="section-7.6-5.3">assertion:</dt>
<dd pn="section-7.6-5.4">
An opaque value containing the assertion itself. This is An opaque value containing the assertion itself. This is
only interpretable by the identified IdP or the IdP code only interpretable by the identified IdP or the IdP code
running in the client. running in the client.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-6">
<t> <xref target="fig.assert-ex" format="default" sectionFormat="of"
<xref target="fig.assert-ex"/> shows an example assertion derivedContent="Figure 5"/> shows an example assertion
formatted as JSON. In this case, the message has presumably formatted as JSON. In this case, the message has presumably
been digitally signed/MACed in some way that the IdP can later been digitally signed/MACed in some way that the IdP can later
verify it, but this is an implementation detail and out of scope verify it, but this is an implementation detail and out of scope
of this document. </t> of this document. </t>
<figure anchor="fig.assert-ex" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="f
<figure title="Example assertion" anchor="fig.assert-ex"> igure-5">
<artwork><![CDATA[ <name slugifiedName="name-example-assertion">Example Assertion</name>
<sourcecode name="json-2" type="json" markers="false" pn="section-7.6-
7.1">
{ {
"idp":{ "idp":{
"domain": "example.org", "domain": "example.org",
"protocol": "bogus" "protocol": "bogus"
}, },
"assertion": "{\"identity\":\"bob@example.org\", "assertion": "{\"identity\":\"bob@example.org\",
\"contents\":\"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwyz\", \"contents\":\"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwyz\",
\"signature\":\"010203040506\"}" \"signature\":\"010203040506\"}"
} }</sourcecode>
]]></artwork> </figure>
</figure> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.6-8">
<t>
For use in signaling, the assertion is serialized into JSON, For use in signaling, the assertion is serialized into JSON,
<xref target="RFC4648">Base64-encoded</xref>, and used as the <xref target="RFC4648" format="default" sectionFormat="of" deriv
value of the <spanx style="verb">identity</spanx> attribute. edContent="RFC4648">base64-encoded</xref>, and used as the
IdPs SHOULD ensure that any assertions they value of the "identity" attribute.
IdPs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure that any assertions they
generate cannot be interpreted in a different context. E.g., generate cannot be interpreted in a different context. E.g.,
they should use a distinct format or have separate cryptographic they should use a distinct format or have separate cryptographic
keys for assertion generation and other purposes. keys for assertion generation and other purposes.
Line breaks are inserted solely for Line breaks are inserted solely for
readability. readability.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.user-login" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC
<section title="Managing User Login" anchor="sec.user-login"> ="false" pn="section-7.7">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-managing-user-login">Managing User Login</name
>
<t indent="0" pn="section-7.7-1">
In order to generate an identity assertion, the IdP needs proof of In order to generate an identity assertion, the IdP needs proof of
the user's identity. It is common practice to authenticate user s the user's identity. It is common practice to authenticate user s
(using passwords or multi-factor authentication), then use <xref (using passwords or multi-factor authentication), then use <xref
target="RFC6265">Cookies</xref> or <xref target="RFC7617">HTTP target="RFC6265" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6265">c
ookies</xref> or <xref target="RFC7617" format="default" sectionFormat="of" deri
vedContent="RFC7617">HTTP
authentication</xref> for subsequent exchanges. authentication</xref> for subsequent exchanges.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.7-2">
The IdP proxy is able to access cookies, HTTP authentication or The IdP proxy is able to access cookies, HTTP authentication dat
a, or
other persistent session data because it operates in the securit y other persistent session data because it operates in the securit y
context of the IdP origin. Therefore, if a user is logged in, t he context of the IdP origin. Therefore, if a user is logged in, t he
IdP could have all the information needed to generate an IdP could have all the information needed to generate an
assertion. assertion.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.7-3">
An IdP proxy is unable to generate an assertion if the user is An IdP proxy is unable to generate an assertion if the user is
not logged in, or the IdP wants to interact with the user to not logged in, or the IdP wants to interact with the user to
acquire more information before generating the assertion. If acquire more information before generating the assertion. If
the IdP wants to interact with the user before generating an the IdP wants to interact with the user before generating an
assertion, the IdP proxy can fail to generate an assertion and assertion, the IdP proxy can fail to generate an assertion and
instead indicate a URL where login should proceed. instead indicate a URL where login should proceed.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-7.7-4">
The application can then load the provided URL to enable the The application can then load the provided URL to enable the
user to enter credentials. The communication between the user to enter credentials. The communication between the
application and the IdP is described in <xref application and the IdP is described in <xref target="webrtc-api
target="webrtc-api"/>. " format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="webrtc-api"/>.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.verify-assert" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRF
<section title="Verifying Assertions" anchor="sec.verify-assert"> C="false" pn="section-8">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-verifying-assertions">Verifying Assertions</name
>
<t indent="0" pn="section-8-1">
The input to identity validation is the assertion string taken The input to identity validation is the assertion string taken
from a decoded 'identity' attribute. from a decoded "identity" attribute.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8-2">
The IdP proxy verifies the assertion. Depending on the identity The IdP proxy verifies the assertion. Depending on the identity
protocol, the proxy might contact the IdP server or other protocol, the proxy might contact the IdP server or other
servers. For instance, an OAuth-based protocol will likely servers. For instance, an OAuth-based protocol will likely
require using the IdP as an oracle, whereas with a require using the IdP as an oracle, whereas with a
signature-based scheme might be able to verify the assertion signature-based scheme it might be able to verify the assertion
without contacting the IdP, provided that it has cached the without contacting the IdP, provided that it has cached the
relevant public key. relevant public key.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8-3">
Regardless of the mechanism, if verification succeeds, a Regardless of the mechanism, if verification succeeds, a
successful response from the IdP proxy consists of the following successful response from the IdP proxy consists of the following
information: information:
<list style="hanging"> </t>
<t hangText="identity:"> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-8-4">
<dt pn="section-8-4.1">identity:</dt>
<dd pn="section-8-4.2">
The identity of the AP from the IdP's perspective. Details The identity of the AP from the IdP's perspective. Details
of this are provided in <xref target="sec.id-format"/>. of this are provided in <xref target="sec.id-format" format=
</t> "default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>.
<t hangText="contents:"> </dd>
<dt pn="section-8-4.3">contents:</dt>
<dd pn="section-8-4.4">
The original unmodified string provided by the AP as input The original unmodified string provided by the AP as input
to the assertion generation process. to the assertion generation process.
</t> </dd>
</list> </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8-5">
<t> <xref target="fig.verify-ex" format="default" sectionFormat="of"
<xref target="fig.verify-ex"/> shows an example response, derivedContent="Figure 6"/> shows an example response,
which is JSON-formatted. which is JSON-formatted.
</t> </t>
<figure anchor="fig.verify-ex" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="fig
<figure title="Example verification result" anchor="fig.verify-ex" ure-6">
> <name slugifiedName="name-example-verification-result">Example Verificat
<artwork> ion Result</name>
<![CDATA[ <sourcecode name="json-3" type="json" markers="false" pn="section-8-6.1"
>
{ {
"identity": "bob@example.org", "identity": "bob@example.org",
"contents": "{\"fingerprint\":[ ... ]}" "contents": "{\"fingerprint\":[ ... ]}"
} }</sourcecode>
]]></artwork> </figure>
</figure> <section anchor="sec.id-format" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC=
"false" pn="section-8.1">
<section title="Identity Formats" anchor="sec.id-format"> <name slugifiedName="name-identity-formats">Identity Formats</name>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1-1">
The identity provided from the IdP to the RP browser MUST The identity provided from the IdP to the RP browser <bcp14>MU
ST</bcp14>
consist of a string representing the user's identity. This consist of a string representing the user's identity. This
string is in the form "&lt;user>@&lt;domain>", where <spanx string is in the form "&lt;user&gt;@&lt;domain&gt;", where "us
style="verb">user</spanx> consists of any character, er" consists of any character,
and domain is aninternationalized and domain is an internationalized
domain name <xref target="RFC5890"></xref> encoded as a sequen domain name <xref target="RFC5890" format="default" sectionFor
ce of U-labels. mat="of" derivedContent="RFC5890"/> encoded as a sequence of U-labels.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1-2">
The PeerConnection API MUST check this string as follows: The PeerConnection API <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check this string a
<list style="numbers"> s follows:
<t> </t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-8.
1-3">
<li pn="section-8.1-3.1" derivedCounter="1.">
If the "domain" portion of the string is equal to the doma in If the "domain" portion of the string is equal to the doma in
name of the IdP proxy, then the assertion is valid, as the name of the IdP proxy, then the assertion is valid, as the
IdP is authoritative for this domain. Comparison of IdP is authoritative for this domain. Comparison of
domain names is done using the label equivalence rule domain names is done using the label equivalence rule
defined in Section 2.3.2.4 of <xref target="RFC5890"/>. defined in <xref target="RFC5890" sectionFormat="of" secti
</t> on="2.3.2.4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#se
<t> ction-2.3.2.4" derivedContent="RFC5890"/>.
</li>
<li pn="section-8.1-3.2" derivedCounter="2.">
<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1-3.2.1">
If the "domain" portion of the string is not equal to the If the "domain" portion of the string is not equal to the
domain name of the IdP proxy, then the PeerConnection domain name of the IdP proxy, then the PeerConnection
object MUST reject the assertion unless both: object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the assertion unless bot
<list style="numbers"> h:
<t> </t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="sectio
n-8.1-3.2.2">
<li pn="section-8.1-3.2.2.1" derivedCounter="1.">
the IdP domain is trusted as an acceptable third-party the IdP domain is trusted as an acceptable third-party
IdP; and IdP; and
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-8.1-3.2.2.2" derivedCounter="2.">
local policy is configured to trust this IdP domain local policy is configured to trust this IdP domain
for the domain portion of the identity string. for the domain portion of the identity string.
</t> </li>
</list> </ol>
</t> </li>
</list> </ol>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1-4">
<t> Any '@' or '%' characters in the "user" portion of the
Any "@" or "%" characters in the "user" portion of the identity <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be escaped according to the "perc
identity MUST be escaped according to the "Percent-Encoding" ent-encoding"
rules defined in Section 2.1 of <xref rules defined in <xref target="RFC3986" sectionFormat="of" sec
target="RFC3986"/>. Characters other than "@" and "%" MUST NOT tion="2.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#sect
ion-2.1" derivedContent="RFC3986"/>. Characters other than '@' and '%' <bcp14>MU
ST NOT</bcp14>
be percent-encoded. For example, with a "user" of "user@133" a nd be percent-encoded. For example, with a "user" of "user@133" a nd
a "domain" of "identity.example.com", the resulting string wil l a "domain" of "identity.example.com", the resulting string wil l
be encoded as "user%40133@identity.example.com". be encoded as "user%40133@identity.example.com".
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1-5">
Implementations are cautioned to take care when displaying Implementations are cautioned to take care when displaying
user identities containing escaped "@" characters. If such user identities containing escaped '@' characters. If such
characters are unescaped prior to display, implementations characters are unescaped prior to display, implementations
MUST distinguish between the domain of the IdP proxy and any <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> distinguish between the domain of the IdP proxy and any
domain that might be implied by the portion of the domain that might be implied by the portion of the
"&lt;user&gt;" portion that appears after the escaped "@" "&lt;user&gt;" portion that appears after the escaped "@"
sign. sign.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
</section>
</section> <section anchor="sec.sec-cons" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="fa
lse" pn="section-9">
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="sec.sec-cons"> <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations
<t> </name>
Much of the security analysis of this problem is contained in <xref <t indent="0" pn="section-9-1">
target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security"/> or in the discussion of the Much of the security analysis of RTCWEB is contained in <xref target="
RFC8826" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8826"/> or in th
e discussion of the
particular issues above. In order to avoid repetition, this section particular issues above. In order to avoid repetition, this section
focuses on (a) residual threats that are not addressed by this focuses on (a) residual threats that are not addressed by this
document and (b) threats produced by failure/misbehavior of one of the document and (b) threats produced by failure/misbehavior of one of the
components in the system. components in the system.
</t> </t>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.1
<section title="Communications Security"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-communications-security-2">Communications Secu
IF HTTPS is not used to secure communications to the signaling rity</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-1">
If HTTPS is not used to secure communications to the signaling
server, and the identity mechanism used in server, and the identity mechanism used in
<xref target="sec.generic.idp"/> is not used, <xref target="sec.generic.idp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d erivedContent="Section 7"/> is not used,
then any on-path attacker can replace the DTLS-SRTP fingerprints then any on-path attacker can replace the DTLS-SRTP fingerprints
in the handshake and thus substitute its own identity for that in the handshake and thus substitute its own identity for that
of either endpoint. of either endpoint.
</t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-2">
<t>
Even if HTTPS is used, the signaling server can Even if HTTPS is used, the signaling server can
potentially mount a man-in-the-middle attack unless implementations potentially mount a man-in-the-middle attack unless implementations
have some mechanism for independently verifying keys. The UI have some mechanism for independently verifying keys. The UI
requirements in <xref target="sec.proposal.comsec"/> are designed to requirements in <xref target="sec.proposal.comsec" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.5"/> are designed to
provide such a mechanism for motivated/security conscious users, but provide such a mechanism for motivated/security conscious users, but
are not suitable for general use. The identity service mechanisms are not suitable for general use. The identity service mechanisms
in <xref target="sec.generic.idp"/> are more suitable for general in <xref target="sec.generic.idp" format="default" sectionFormat="of " derivedContent="Section 7"/> are more suitable for general
use. Note, however, that a malicious signaling service can strip off use. Note, however, that a malicious signaling service can strip off
any such identity assertions, though it cannot forge new ones. Note any such identity assertions, though it cannot forge new ones. Note
that all of the third-party security mechanisms available (whether that all of the third-party security mechanisms available (whether
X.509 certificates or a third-party IdP) rely on the security of the X.509 certificates or a third-party IdP) rely on the security of the
third party--this is of course also true of the user's connection to the third party -- this is of course also true of the user's connection to the
Web site itself. Users who wish to assure themselves of security Web site itself. Users who wish to assure themselves of security
against a malicious identity provider can only do so by verifying against a malicious IdP can only do so by verifying
peer credentials directly, e.g., by checking the peer's fingerprint peer credentials directly, e.g., by checking the peer's fingerprint
against a value delivered out of band. against a value delivered out of band.
</t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-3">
<t>
In order to protect against malicious content JavaScript, that In order to protect against malicious content JavaScript, that
JavaScript MUST NOT be allowed to have direct access to---or perform JavaScript <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be allowed to have direct
computations with---DTLS keys. For instance, if content JS were able access to -- or perform
computations with -- DTLS keys. For instance, if content JS were abl
e
to compute digital signatures, then it would be possible for content to compute digital signatures, then it would be possible for content
JS to get an identity assertion for a browser's generated key and JS to get an identity assertion for a browser's generated key and
then use that assertion plus a signature by the key to authenticate then use that assertion plus a signature by the key to authenticate
a call protected under an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key controll ed by the content a call protected under an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key controll ed by the content
JS, thus violating the security guarantees otherwise provided by the JS, thus violating the security guarantees otherwise provided by the
IdP mechanism. Note that it is not sufficient merely to deny the IdP mechanism. Note that it is not sufficient merely to deny the
content JS direct access to the keys, as some have suggested doing content JS direct access to the keys, as some have suggested doing
with the WebCrypto API <xref target="webcrypto"/>. The JS must with the WebCrypto API <xref target="webcrypto" format="default" sec tionFormat="of" derivedContent="webcrypto"/>. The JS must
also not be allowed to perform operations that would be valid for a also not be allowed to perform operations that would be valid for a
DTLS endpoint. By far the safest approach is simply to deny the DTLS endpoint. By far the safest approach is simply to deny the
ability to perform any operations that depend on secret information ability to perform any operations that depend on secret information
associated with the key. Operations that depend on public associated with the key. Operations that depend on public
information, such as exporting the public key are of course safe. information, such as exporting the public key, are of course safe.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2
<section title="Privacy"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-privacy">Privacy</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-1">
The requirements in this document are intended to allow: The requirements in this document are intended to allow:
</t> </t>
<t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9
<list style="symbols"> .2-2">
<t> <li pn="section-9.2-2.1">
Users to participate in calls without revealing their location. Users to participate in calls without revealing their location.
</t> </li>
<t> <li pn="section-9.2-2.2">
Potential callees to avoid revealing their location and even Potential callees to avoid revealing their location and even
presence status prior to agreeing to answer a call. presence status prior to agreeing to answer a call.
</t> </li>
</list> </ul>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-3">
<t>
However, these privacy protections come at a performance cost in However, these privacy protections come at a performance cost in
terms of using TURN relays and, in the latter case, delaying terms of using TURN relays and, in the latter case, delaying
ICE. Sites SHOULD make users aware of these tradeoffs. ICE. Sites <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> make users aware of these tradeoffs
</t> .
<t> </t>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-4">
Note that the protections provided here assume a non-malicious Note that the protections provided here assume a non-malicious
calling service. As the calling service always knows the users calling service. As the calling service always knows the user's
status and (absent the use of a technology like Tor) their IP status and (absent the use of a technology like Tor) their IP
address, they can violate the users privacy at will. Users who wish address, they can violate the user's privacy at will. Users who wis h
privacy against the calling sites they are using must use separate privacy against the calling sites they are using must use separate
privacy enhancing technologies such as Tor. Combined WebRTC/Tor privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor. Combined WebRTC/Tor
implementations SHOULD arrange to route the media as well as the implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> arrange to route the media as
well as the
signaling through Tor. Currently this will produce very suboptimal signaling through Tor. Currently this will produce very suboptimal
performance. performance.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-5">
Additionally, any identifier which persists across multiple calls is Additionally, any identifier which persists across multiple calls is
potentially a problem for privacy, especially for anonymous calling potentially a problem for privacy, especially for anonymous calling
services. Such services SHOULD instruct the browser to use separate services. Such services <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> instruct the browser t o use separate
DTLS keys for each call and also to use TURN throughout the DTLS keys for each call and also to use TURN throughout the
call. Otherwise, the other side will learn linkable information that call. Otherwise, the other side will learn linkable information that
would allow them to correlate the browser across multiple calls. would allow them to correlate the browser across multiple calls.
Additionally, browsers SHOULD implement the privacy-preserving CNAME Additionally, browsers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> implement the privacy-p
generation mode of <xref target="RFC7022"/>. reserving CNAME
</t> generation mode of <xref target="RFC7022" format="default" sectionFo
</section> rmat="of" derivedContent="RFC7022"/>.
</t>
<section title="Denial of Service"> </section>
<t> <section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3
">
<name slugifiedName="name-denial-of-service">Denial of Service</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-1">
The consent mechanisms described in this document are intended to The consent mechanisms described in this document are intended to
mitigate denial of service attacks in which an attacker uses clients mitigate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which an attacker uses c lients
to send large amounts of traffic to a victim without the consent of to send large amounts of traffic to a victim without the consent of
the victim. While these mechanisms are sufficient to protect victims the victim. While these mechanisms are sufficient to protect victims
who have not implemented WebRTC at all, WebRTC implementations need who have not implemented WebRTC at all, WebRTC implementations need
to be more careful. to be more careful.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-2">
Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via
WebRTC. An attacker proxies the call center's front-end and arranges WebRTC. An attacker proxies the call center's front-end and arranges
for multiple clients to initiate calls to the call center. Note that for multiple clients to initiate calls to the call center. Note that
this requires user consent in many cases but because the data this requires user consent in many cases, but because the data
channel does not need consent, he can use that directly. Since ICE channel does not need consent, they can use that directly. Since ICE
will complete, browsers can then be induced to send large amounts of will complete, browsers can then be induced to send large amounts of
data to the victim call center if it supports the data channel at data to the victim call center if it supports the data channel at
all. Preventing this attack requires that automated WebRTC all. Preventing this attack requires that automated WebRTC
implementations implement sensible flow control and have the ability implementations implement sensible flow control and have the ability
to triage out (i.e., stop responding to ICE probes on) calls which to triage out (i.e., stop responding to ICE probes on) calls which
are behaving badly, and especially to be prepared to remotely are behaving badly, and especially to be prepared to remotely
throttle the data channel in the absence of plausible audio and throttle the data channel in the absence of plausible audio and
video (which the attacker cannot control). video (which the attacker cannot control).
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-3">
Another related attack is for the signaling service to swap the ICE Another related attack is for the signaling service to swap the ICE
candidates for the audio and video streams, thus forcing a browser candidates for the audio and video streams, thus forcing a browser
to send video to the sink that the other victim expects will contain to send video to the sink that the other victim expects will contain
audio (perhaps it is only expecting audio!) potentially causing audio (perhaps it is only expecting audio!), potentially causing
overload. Muxing multiple media flows over a single transport makes overload. Muxing multiple media flows over a single transport makes
it harder to individually suppress a single flow by denying ICE it harder to individually suppress a single flow by denying ICE
keepalives. Either media-level (RTCP) mechanisms must be used or the keepalives. Either media-level (RTCP) mechanisms must be used or the
implementation must deny responses entirely, thus terminating the implementation must deny responses entirely, thus terminating the
call. call.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-4">
Yet another attack, suggested by Magnus Westerlund, is for the Yet another attack, suggested by Magnus Westerlund, is for the
attacker to cross-connect offers and answers as follows. It induces attacker to cross-connect offers and answers as follows. It induces
the victim to make a call and then uses its control of other users the victim to make a call and then uses its control of other users'
browsers to get them to attempt a call to someone. It then browsers to get them to attempt a call to someone. It then
translates their offers into apparent answers to the victim, which translates their offers into apparent answers to the victim, which
looks like large-scale parallel forking. The victim still responds looks like large-scale parallel forking. The victim still responds
to ICE responses and now the browsers all try to send media to the to ICE responses, and now the browsers all try to send media to the
victim. Implementations can defend themselves from this attack by victim. Implementations can defend themselves from this attack by
only responding to ICE Binding Requests for a limited number of only responding to ICE Binding Requests for a limited number of
remote ufrags (this is the reason for the requirement that the JS remote ufrags (this is the reason for the requirement that the JS
not be able to control the ufrag and password). not be able to control the ufrag and password).
</t> <xref target="RFC8834" sectionFormat="comma" section="13" format="de
<t> fault" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8834#section-13" derivedConten
<xref target="I-D.ietf-rtcweb-rtp-usage"/> Section 13 documents a nu t="RFC8834"/> documents a number
mber
of potential RTCP-based DoS attacks and countermeasures. of potential RTCP-based DoS attacks and countermeasures.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-5">
Note that attacks based on confusing one end or the other about Note that attacks based on confusing one end or the other about
consent are possible even in the face of the third-party identity consent are possible even in the face of the third-party identity
mechanism as long as major parts of the signaling messages are not mechanism as long as major parts of the signaling messages are not
signed. On the other hand, signing the entire message severely signed. On the other hand, signing the entire message severely
restricts the capabilities of the calling application, so there are restricts the capabilities of the calling application, so there are
difficult tradeoffs here. difficult tradeoffs here.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.4
<section title="IdP Authentication Mechanism"> ">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-idp-authentication-mechanis">IdP Authenticatio
n Mechanism</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-1">
This mechanism relies for its security on the IdP and on the This mechanism relies for its security on the IdP and on the
PeerConnection correctly enforcing the security invariants described PeerConnection correctly enforcing the security invariants described
above. At a high level, the IdP is attesting that the user above. At a high level, the IdP is attesting that the user
identified in the assertion wishes to be associated with the identified in the assertion wishes to be associated with the
assertion. Thus, it must not be possible for arbitrary third parties assertion. Thus, it must not be possible for arbitrary third parties
to get assertions tied to a user or to produce assertions that RPs to get assertions tied to a user or to produce assertions that RPs
will accept. will accept.
</t> </t>
<section anchor="sec.pc-origin" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRF
<section title="PeerConnection Origin Check" anchor="sec.pc-origin"> C="false" pn="section-9.4.1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-peerconnection-origin-check">PeerConnection
Origin Check</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.1-1">
Fundamentally, the IdP proxy is just a piece of HTML and JS loaded Fundamentally, the IdP proxy is just a piece of HTML and JS loaded
by the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker from creating by the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker from creating
their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a
signature over his own keys rather than those generated in signature over their own keys rather than those generated in
the browser. However, that proxy would be in the the browser. However, that proxy would be in the
attacker's origin, not the IdP's origin. Only the attacker's origin, not the IdP's origin. Only the
browser itself can instantiate a context that (a) is in the IdP's browser itself can instantiate a context that (a) is in the IdP's
origin and origin and
(b) exposes the correct API surface. Thus, the IdP proxy on (b) exposes the correct API surface. Thus, the IdP proxy on
the sender's side MUST ensure that it is running in the IdP's orig the sender's side <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that it is running in
in the IdP's origin
prior to issuing assertions. prior to issuing assertions.
</t> </t>
<t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.1-2">
Note that this check only asserts that the browser (or some other Note that this check only asserts that the browser (or some other
entity with access to the user's authentication data) attests to entity with access to the user's authentication data) attests to
the request and hence to the fingerprint. It does not demonstrate the request and hence to the fingerprint. It does not demonstrate
that the browser has access to the associated private that the browser has access to the associated private
key, and therefore an attacker can attach their own identity key, and therefore an attacker can attach their own identity
to another party's keying material, thus making a call which to another party's keying material, thus making a call which
comes from Alice appear to come from the attacker. comes from Alice appear to come from the attacker.
See <xref target="I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks"/> for defenses against this See <xref target="RFC8844" format="default" sectionFormat="of" der ivedContent="RFC8844"/> for defenses against this
form of attack. form of attack.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.sec-idp-uri" numbered="true" toc="include" removeIn
<section title="IdP Well-known URI" anchor="sec.sec-idp-uri"> RFC="false" pn="section-9.4.2">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-idp-well-known-uri">IdP Well-Known URI</name
As described in <xref target="sec.idp-uri"/> the IdP proxy HTML/JS >
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.2-1">
As described in <xref target="sec.idp-uri" format="default" sectio
nFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.5"/>, the IdP proxy HTML/JS
landing page is located at a well-known URI based on the IdP's landing page is located at a well-known URI based on the IdP's
domain name. This requirement prevents an attacker who can write domain name. This requirement prevents an attacker who can write
some resources at the IdP (e.g., on one's Facebook wall) from some resources at the IdP (e.g., on one's Facebook wall) from
being able to impersonate the IdP. being able to impersonate the IdP.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9
<section title="Privacy of IdP-generated identities and the hosting si .4.3">
te"> <name slugifiedName="name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id">Privacy of IdP-
<t> Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.3-1">
Depending on the structure of the IdP's assertions, the calling Depending on the structure of the IdP's assertions, the calling
site may learn the user's identity from the perspective of the site may learn the user's identity from the perspective of the
IdP. In many cases this is not an issue because the user is IdP. In many cases, this is not an issue because the user is
authenticating to the site via the IdP in any case, for instance authenticating to the site via the IdP in any case -- for instance
,
when the user has logged in with Facebook Connect and is then when the user has logged in with Facebook Connect and is then
authenticating their call with a Facebook identity. However, in authenticating their call with a Facebook identity. However, in
other case, the user may not have already revealed their identity other cases, the user may not have already revealed their identity
to the site. In general, IdPs SHOULD either verify that the user to the site. In general, IdPs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> either verify
that the user
is willing to have their identity revealed to the site (e.g., is willing to have their identity revealed to the site (e.g.,
through the usual IdP permissions dialog) or arrange that the through the usual IdP permissions dialog) or arrange that the
identity information is only available to known RPs (e.g., social identity information is only available to known RPs (e.g., social
graph adjacencies) but not to the calling site. The "domain" field graph adjacencies) but not to the calling site. The "domain" field
of the assertion request can be used to check that the user has of the assertion request can be used to check that the user has
agreed to disclose their identity to the calling site; because it agreed to disclose their identity to the calling site; because it
is supplied by the PeerConnection it can be trusted to be correct. is supplied by the PeerConnection it can be trusted to be correct.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.sec-third-party" numbered="true" toc="include" remo
<section title="Security of Third-Party IdPs" anchor="sec.sec-third-pa veInRFC="false" pn="section-9.4.4">
rty"> <name slugifiedName="name-security-of-third-party-idp">Security of Thi
<t> rd-Party IdPs</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.4-1">
As discussed above, each third-party IdP represents a new As discussed above, each third-party IdP represents a new
universal trust point and therefore the number of these IdPs needs universal trust point and therefore the number of these IdPs needs
to be quite limited. Most IdPs, even those which issue unqualified to be quite limited. Most IdPs, even those which issue unqualified
identities such as Facebook, can be recast as authoritative IdPs identities such as Facebook, can be recast as authoritative IdPs
(e.g., 123456@facebook.com). However, in such cases, the user (e.g., 123456@facebook.com). However, in such cases, the user
interface implications are not entirely desirable. One interface implications are not entirely desirable. One
intermediate approach is to have special (potentially user intermediate approach is to have special (potentially user
configurable) UI for large authoritative IdPs, thus allowing the configurable) UI for large authoritative IdPs, thus allowing the
user to instantly grasp that the call is being authenticated by user to instantly grasp that the call is being authenticated by
Facebook, Google, etc. Facebook, Google, etc.
</t> </t>
<section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section
<section title="Confusable Characters"> -9.4.4.1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-confusable-characters">Confusable Characte
rs</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.4.1-1">
Because a broad range of characters are permitted in identity Because a broad range of characters are permitted in identity
strings, it may be possible for attackers to craft identities strings, it may be possible for attackers to craft identities
which are confusable with other identities (see which are confusable with other identities (see
<xref target="RFC6943"/> for more on this topic). This is <xref target="RFC6943" format="default" sectionFormat="of" deriv edContent="RFC6943"/> for more on this topic). This is
a problem with any identifier space of this type a problem with any identifier space of this type
(e.g., e-mail addresses). (e.g., email addresses).
Those minting identifers should avoid mixed scripts and similar Those minting identifiers should avoid mixed scripts and similar
confusable characters. Those presenting these identifiers to a confusable characters. Those presenting these identifiers to a
user should consider highlighting cases of mixed script usage user should consider highlighting cases of mixed script usage
(see <xref target="RFC5890"/>, section 4.4). Other best practice (see <xref target="RFC5890" sectionFormat="comma" section="4.4"
s are still in development. format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#section-4.4" de
</t> rivedContent="RFC5890"/>). Other best practices are still in development.
</section> </t>
</section> </section>
</section>
<section title="Web Security Feature Interactions"> <section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9
<t> .4.5">
<name slugifiedName="name-web-security-feature-intera">Web Security Fe
ature Interactions</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.5-1">
A number of optional Web security features have the potential to A number of optional Web security features have the potential to
cause issues for this mechanism, as discussed below. cause issues for this mechanism, as discussed below.
</t> </t>
<section anchor="sec.popup-blocking" numbered="true" toc="include" rem
<section title="Popup Blocking" anchor="sec.popup-blocking"> oveInRFC="false" pn="section-9.4.5.1">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-popup-blocking">Popup Blocking</name>
When popup blocking is in use, the IdP proxy is unable to genera <t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.5.1-1">
te popup windows, dialogs or When popup blocking is in use, the IdP proxy is unable to genera
te popup windows, dialogs, or
any other form of user interactions. This prevents the IdP any other form of user interactions. This prevents the IdP
proxy from being used to circumvent user interaction. The proxy from being used to circumvent user interaction. The
"LOGINNEEDED" message allows the IdP proxy to inform the calling "LOGINNEEDED" message allows the IdP proxy to inform the calling
site of a need for user login, providing the information site of a need for user login, providing the information
necessary to satisfy this requirement without resorting to necessary to satisfy this requirement without resorting to
direct user interaction from the IdP proxy itself. direct user interaction from the IdP proxy itself.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec.3rd-party-cookies" numbered="true" toc="include"
<section title="Third Party Cookies" anchor="sec.3rd-party-cookies"> removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.4.5.2">
<t> <name slugifiedName="name-third-party-cookies">Third Party Cookies</
name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4.5.2-1">
Some browsers allow users to block third party cookies (cookies Some browsers allow users to block third party cookies (cookies
associated with origins other than the top level page) for associated with origins other than the top-level page) for
privacy reasons. Any IdP which uses cookies to persist logins privacy reasons. Any IdP which uses cookies to persist logins
will be broken by third-party cookie blocking. One option is to will be broken by third-party cookie blocking. One option is to
accept this as a limitation; another is to have the accept this as a limitation; another is to have the
PeerConnection object disable third-party cookie blocking for PeerConnection object disable third-party cookie blocking for
the IdP proxy. the IdP proxy.
</t> </t>
</section>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="sec.iana-cons"> <section anchor="sec.iana-cons" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="f
<t> alse" pn="section-10">
This specification defines the <spanx style="verb">identity</spanx> <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
SDP attribute per the procedures of Section 8.2.4 of <xref <t indent="0" pn="section-10-1">
target="RFC4566"/>. The required information for the registration is This specification defines the "identity"
SDP attribute per the procedures of <xref target="RFC4566" sectionForm
at="of" section="8.2.4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc
/rfc4566#section-8.2.4" derivedContent="RFC4566"/>. The required information fo
r the registration is
included here: included here:
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Contact Name:">IESG (iesg@ietf.org)</t>
<t hangText="Attribute Name:">identity</t>
<t hangText="Long Form:">identity</t>
<t hangText="Type of Attribute:">session-level</t>
<t hangText="Charset Considerations:">This attribute is not subject
to the charset attribute.</t>
<t hangText="Purpose:">This attribute carries an identity assertion,
binding an identity to the transport-level security session.</t>
<t hangText="Appropriate Values:">See <xref
target="sec.sdp-id-attr"/> of RFCXXXX [[Editor Note: This
document.]]</t>
<t hangText="Mux Category:">NORMAL.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
This section reqisters the <spanx style="verb">idp-proxy</spanx> well-
known
URI from <xref target="RFC5785"/>.
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="URI suffix:">idp-proxy</t>
<t hangText="Change controller:">IETF</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>
Bernard Aboba, Harald Alvestrand, Richard Barnes, Dan Druta, Cullen
Jennings, Hadriel Kaplan, Matthew Kaufman, Jim McEachern, Martin
Thomson, Magnus Westerland. Matthew Kaufman provided the UI material in
<xref target="sec.proposal.comsec"/>. Christer Holmberg provided
the initial version of <xref target="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa"/>.
</t> </t>
</section> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-10-2">
<dt pn="section-10-2.1">Contact Name:</dt>
<section title="Changes"> <dd pn="section-10-2.2">IESG (iesg@ietf.org)</dd>
<t> [RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication.]</t> <dt pn="section-10-2.3">Attribute Name:</dt>
<section title="Changes since -15"> <dd pn="section-10-2.4">identity</dd>
<t>Rewrite the Identity section in more conventional offer/answer format <dt pn="section-10-2.5">Long Form:</dt>
.</t> <dd pn="section-10-2.6">identity</dd>
<t>Clarify rules on changing identities.</t> <dt pn="section-10-2.7">Type of Attribute:</dt>
</section> <dd pn="section-10-2.8">session</dd>
<dt pn="section-10-2.9">Charset Considerations:</dt>
<section title="Changes since -11"> <dd pn="section-10-2.10">This attribute is not subject
<t> to the charset attribute.</dd>
Update discussion of IdP security model <dt pn="section-10-2.11">Purpose:</dt>
</t> <dd pn="section-10-2.12">This attribute carries an identity assertion,
binding an identity to the transport-level security session.</dd>
<t> <dt pn="section-10-2.13">Appropriate Values:</dt>
Replace "domain name" with RFC 3986 Authority <dd pn="section-10-2.14">See <xref target="sec.sdp-id-attr" format="defa
</t> ult" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/> of RFC 8827.</dd>
<dt pn="section-10-2.15">Mux Category:</dt>
<t> <dd pn="section-10-2.16">NORMAL</dd>
Clean up discussion of how to generate IdP URI. </dl>
</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-10-3">
This section registers the "idp-proxy" well-known
<t> URI from <xref target="RFC8615" format="default" sectionFormat="of" de
Remove obsolete text about null cipher suites. rivedContent="RFC8615"/>.
</t> </t>
<dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="3" pn="section-10-4">
<t> <dt pn="section-10-4.1">URI suffix:</dt>
Remove obsolete appendixes about older IdP systems <dd pn="section-10-4.2">idp-proxy</dd>
</t> <dt pn="section-10-4.3">Change controller:</dt>
<dd pn="section-10-4.4">IETF</dd>
<t> </dl>
Require support for ECDSA, PFS, and AEAD
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since -10">
<t>
Update cipher suite profiles.
</t>
<t>
Rework IdP interaction based on implementation experience in
Firefox.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since -06">
<t>
Replaced RTCWEB and RTC-Web with WebRTC, except when referring to the
IETF WG
</t>
<t>
Forbade use in mixed content as discussed in Orlando.
</t>
<t>
Added a requirement to surface NULL ciphers to the top-level.
</t>
<t>
Tried to clarify SRTP versus DTLS-SRTP.
</t>
<t>
Added a section on screen sharing permissions.
</t>
<t>
Assorted editorial work.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since -05">
<t>
The following changes have been made since the -05 draft.
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Response to comments from Richard Barnes
</t>
<t>
More explanation of the IdP security properties and the federation
use case.
</t>
<t>
Editorial cleanup.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since -03">
<t>
Version -04 was a version control mistake. Please ignore.
</t>
<t>
The following changes have been made since the -04 draft.
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Move origin check from IdP to RP per discussion in YVR.
</t>
<t>
Clarified treatment of X.509-level identities.
</t>
<t>
Editorial cleanup.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since -03">
</section>
<section title="Changes since -02">
<t>
The following changes have been made since the -02 draft.
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Forbid persistent HTTP permissions.
</t>
<t>
Clarified the text in S 5.4 to clearly refer to requirements on
the API to provide functionality to the site.
</t>
<t>
Fold in the IETF portion of draft-rescorla-rtcweb-generic-idp
</t>
<t>
Retarget the continuing consent section to assume Binding Requests
</t>
<t>
Added some more privacy and linkage text in various places.
</t>
<t>
Editorial improvements
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<displayreference target="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" to="TLS-DTLS13"/>
<references pn="section-11">
<name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name>
<references pn="section-11.1">
<name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</na
me>
<reference anchor="FIPS186" quoteTitle="true" target="https://doi.org/10
.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4" derivedAnchor="FIPS186">
<front>
<title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
<author>
<organization showOnFrontPage="true">National Institute of Standar
ds and Technology (NIST)</organization>
</author>
<date year="2013" month="July"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST PUB" value="186-4"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit
le>
<author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="1997" month="March"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are
used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often ca
pitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IE
TF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for th
e Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.<
/t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2818" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
818" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2818">
<front>
<title>HTTP Over TLS</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2000" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This memo describes how to use Transport Layer Secur
ity (TLS) to secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) connections over the Inte
rnet. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2818"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2818"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3264" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
264" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3264">
<front>
<title>An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)
</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="J. Rosenberg">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Schulzrinne" fullname="H. Schulzrinne
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2002" month="June"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document defines a mechanism by which two entit
ies can make use of the Session Description Protocol (SDP) to arrive at a common
view of a multimedia session between them. In the model, one participant offer
s the other a description of the desired session from their perspective, and the
other participant answers with the desired session from their perspective. Thi
s offer/answer model is most useful in unicast sessions where information from b
oth participants is needed for the complete view of the session. The offer/answ
er model is used by protocols like the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). [STAN
DARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3264"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3264"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3711" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
711" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3711">
<front>
<title>The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Baugher" fullname="M. Baugher">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="McGrew" fullname="D. McGrew">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Naslund" fullname="M. Naslund">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Carrara" fullname="E. Carrara">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="K." surname="Norrman" fullname="K. Norrman">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2004" month="March"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document describes the Secure Real-time Transpo
rt Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which c
an provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the
RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control
Protocol (RTCP). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3711"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3711"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
986" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3986">
<front>
<title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="T. Berners-Lee
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="R. Fielding">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2005" month="January"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact seq
uence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This spec
ification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI referen
ces that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considera
tions for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar tha
t is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the commo
n components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements
of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative
grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of eac
h URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4566" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4
566" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4566">
<front>
<title>SDP: Session Description Protocol</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="V." surname="Jacobson" fullname="V. Jacobson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Perkins" fullname="C. Perkins">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2006" month="July"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This memo defines the Session Description Protocol (
SDP). SDP is intended for describing multimedia sessions for the purposes of se
ssion announcement, session invitation, and other forms of multimedia session in
itiation. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4566"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4566"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4568" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4
568" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4568">
<front>
<title>Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for
Media Streams</title>
<author initials="F." surname="Andreasen" fullname="F. Andreasen">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Baugher" fullname="M. Baugher">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Wing" fullname="D. Wing">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2006" month="July"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document defines a Session Description Protocol
(SDP) cryptographic attribute for unicast media streams. The attribute describ
es a cryptographic key and other parameters that serve to configure security for
a unicast media stream in either a single message or a roundtrip exchange. The
attribute can be used with a variety of SDP media transports, and this document
defines how to use it for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) unicas
t media streams. The SDP crypto attribute requires the services of a data secur
ity protocol to secure the SDP message. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4568"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4568"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4
648" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4648">
<front>
<title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
<author initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2006" month="October"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document describes the commonly used base 64, b
ase 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds i
n encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters i
n encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [
STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5763" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
763" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5763">
<front>
<title>Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Proto
col (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</titl
e>
<author initials="J." surname="Fischl" fullname="J. Fischl">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="H. Tschofenig">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2010" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document specifies how to use the Session Initi
ation Protocol (SIP) to establish a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) s
ecurity context using the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. It
describes a mechanism of transporting a fingerprint attribute in the Session De
scription Protocol (SDP) that identifies the key that will be presented during t
he DTLS handshake. The key exchange travels along the media path as opposed to
the signaling path. The SIP Identity mechanism can be used to protect the integ
rity of the fingerprint attribute from modification by intermediate proxies. [S
TANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5763"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5763"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5764" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
764" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5764">
<front>
<title>Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establi
sh Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)</title>
<author initials="D." surname="McGrew" fullname="D. McGrew">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2010" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document describes a Datagram Transport Layer S
ecurity (DTLS) extension to establish keys for Secure RTP (SRTP) and Secure RTP
Control Protocol (SRTCP) flows. DTLS keying happens on the media path, independ
ent of any out-of-band signalling channel present. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5764"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5764"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5890" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
890" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5890">
<front>
<title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Defin
itions and Document Framework</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Klensin" fullname="J. Klensin">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2010" month="August"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document is one of a collection that, together,
describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Dom
ain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describe
s the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are c
ommon to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6347" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
347" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6347">
<front>
<title>Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2012" month="January"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communicat
ions privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applicat
ions to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tamperin
g, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Securi
ty (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semanti
cs of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This documen
t updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6347"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6347"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6454" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
454" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6454">
<front>
<title>The Web Origin Concept</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Barth" fullname="A. Barth">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2011" month="December"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document defines the concept of an "origin", wh
ich is often used as the scope of authority or privilege by user agents. Typica
lly, user agents isolate content retrieved from different origins to prevent mal
icious web site operators from interfering with the operation of benign web site
s. In addition to outlining the principles that underlie the concept of origin,
this document details how to determine the origin of a URI and how to serialize
an origin into a string. It also defines an HTTP header field, named "Origin",
that indicates which origins are associated with an HTTP request. [STANDARDS-
TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6454"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6454"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7022" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7
022" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7022">
<front>
<title>Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical
Names (CNAMEs)</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Begen" fullname="A. Begen">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Perkins" fullname="C. Perkins">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Wing" fullname="D. Wing">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2013" month="September"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">The RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Name (CNAM
E) is a persistent transport-level identifier for an RTP endpoint. While the Sy
nchronization Source (SSRC) identifier of an RTP endpoint may change if a collis
ion is detected or when the RTP application is restarted, its RTCP CNAME is mean
t to stay unchanged, so that RTP endpoints can be uniquely identified and associ
ated with their RTP media streams.</t>
<t indent="0">For proper functionality, RTCP CNAMEs should be uniq
ue within the participants of an RTP session. However, the existing guidelines
for choosing the RTCP CNAME provided in the RTP standard (RFC 3550) are insuffic
ient to achieve this uniqueness. RFC 6222 was published to update those guideli
nes to allow endpoints to choose unique RTCP CNAMEs. Unfortunately, later inves
tigations showed that some parts of the new algorithms were unnecessarily compli
cated and/or ineffective. This document addresses these concerns and replaces R
FC 6222.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7022"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7022"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7675" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7
675" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7675">
<front>
<title>Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage for Consent
Freshness</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Perumal" fullname="M. Perumal">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Wing" fullname="D. Wing">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Ravindranath" fullname="R. Ravindrana
th">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Reddy" fullname="T. Reddy">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Thomson" fullname="M. Thomson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2015" month="October"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, fr
om launching attacks by sending traffic to unwilling victims, periodic consent t
o send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints.</t>
<t indent="0">This document describes a consent mechanism using a
new Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7675"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7675"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7918" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7
918" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7918">
<front>
<title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Langley" fullname="A. Langley">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="B." surname="Moeller" fullname="B. Moeller">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2016" month="August"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document specifies an optional behavior of Tran
sport Layer Security (TLS) client implementations, dubbed "False Start". It aff
ects only protocol timing, not on-the-wire protocol data, and can be implemented
unilaterally. A TLS False Start reduces handshake latency to one round trip.</
t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7918"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7918"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8122" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
122" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8122">
<front>
<title>Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Lennox" fullname="J. Lennox">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Holmberg" fullname="C. Holmberg">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2017" month="March"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document specifies how to establish secure conn
ection-oriented media transport sessions over the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol using the Session Description Protocol (SDP). It defines the SDP prot
ocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS'. It also defines the syntax and semantics for an SDP
'fingerprint' attribute that identifies the certificate that will be presented
for the TLS session. This mechanism allows media transport over TLS connections
to be established securely, so long as the integrity of session descriptions is
assured.</t>
<t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 4572 by clarifying the u
sage of multiple fingerprints.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8122"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8122"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
<front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti
tle>
<author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2017" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used
in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by cla
rifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special mea
nings.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
259" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8259">
<front>
<title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format
</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Bray" fullname="T. Bray" role="editor
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2017" month="December"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight,
text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from t
he ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of format
ting rules for the portable representation of structured data.</t>
<t indent="0">This document removes inconsistencies with other spe
cifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based i
nteroperability guidance.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8261" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
261" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8261">
<front>
<title>Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Encapsulation of SCT
P Packets</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Tuexen" fullname="M. Tuexen">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Stewart" fullname="R. Stewart">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Jesup" fullname="R. Jesup">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Loreto" fullname="S. Loreto">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2017" month="November"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a
transport protocol originally defined to run on top of the network protocols IP
v4 or IPv6. This document specifies how SCTP can be used on top of the Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. Using the encapsulation method descr
ibed in this document, SCTP is unaware of the protocols being used below DTLS; h
ence, explicit IP addresses cannot be used in the SCTP control chunks. As a con
sequence, the SCTP associations carried over DTLS can only be single-homed.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8261"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8261"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8445" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
445" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8445">
<front>
<title>Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for
Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Keranen" fullname="A. Keranen">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Holmberg" fullname="C. Holmberg">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="J. Rosenberg">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2018" month="July"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document describes a protocol for Network Addre
ss Translator (NAT) traversal for UDP-based communication. This protocol is cal
led Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE). ICE makes use of the Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) protocol and its extension, Traversal Using R
elay NAT (TURN).</t>
<t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 5245.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8445"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8445"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
446" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8446">
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</titl
e>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2018" month="August"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to commun
icate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tamp
ering, and message forgery.</t>
<t indent="0">This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsole
tes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements fo
r TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8615" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
615" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8615">
<front>
<title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="M. Nottingham">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2019" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known loca
tions", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.<
/t>
<t indent="0">In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the U
RI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595
to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8825" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
825" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8825">
<front>
<title>Overview: Real-Time Protocols for Browser-Based Applications<
/title>
<author initials="H." surname="Alvestrand" fullname="Harald T. Alves
trand">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8825"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8825"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8826" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
826" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8826">
<front>
<title>Security Considerations for WebRTC</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8826"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8826"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8829" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
829" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8829">
<front>
<title>JavaScript Session Establishment Protocol (JSEP)</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Uberti" fullname="Justin Uberti">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla" ro
le="editor">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8829"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8829"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8834" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
834" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8834">
<front>
<title>Media Transport and Use of RTP in WebRTC</title>
<author initials="C." surname="Perkins" fullname="Colin Perkins">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Westerlund" fullname="Magnus Westerlu
nd">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Ott" fullname="Jörg Ott">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8834"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8834"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8844" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
844" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8844">
<front>
<title>Unknown Key-Share Attacks on Uses of TLS with the Session Des
cription Protocol (SDP)</title>
<author initials="M" surname="Thomson" fullname="Martin Thomson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E" surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8844"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8844"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="webcrypto" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-Web
CryptoAPI-20170126/" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="webcrypto">
<front>
<title>Web Cryptography API</title>
<author initials="M" surname="Watson" fullname="Mark Watson">
</author>
<date month="January" year="2017" day="26"/>
</front>
<refcontent>W3C Recommendation</refcontent>
</reference>
<reference anchor="webrtc-api" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/" qu
oteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="webrtc-api">
<front>
<title>WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between Browsers</title>
<author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Boström" fullname="Henrik Boström">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="J-I." surname="Bruaroey" fullname="Jan-Ivar Bruaro
ey">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date/>
</front>
<refcontent>W3C Proposed Recommendation</refcontent>
</reference>
</references>
<references pn="section-11.2">
<name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References
</name>
<reference anchor="fetch" target="https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/" quoteT
itle="true" derivedAnchor="fetch">
<front>
<title>Fetch</title>
<author initials="A." surname="van Kesteren">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3261" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
261" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3261">
<front>
<title>SIP: Session Initiation Protocol</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="J. Rosenberg">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Schulzrinne" fullname="H. Schulzrinne
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="G." surname="Camarillo" fullname="G. Camarillo">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="A." surname="Johnston" fullname="A. Johnston">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Peterson" fullname="J. Peterson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Sparks" fullname="R. Sparks">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Schooler" fullname="E. Schooler">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2002" month="June"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document describes Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP), an application-layer control (signaling) protocol for creating, modifying
, and terminating sessions with one or more participants. These sessions includ
e Internet telephone calls, multimedia distribution, and multimedia conferences.
[STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3261"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3261"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5705" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
705" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5705">
<front>
<title>Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)<
/title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2010" month="March"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">A number of protocols wish to leverage Transport Lay
er Security (TLS) to perform key establishment but then use some of the keying m
aterial for their own purposes. This document describes a general mechanism for
allowing that. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5705"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5705"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6120" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
120" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6120">
<front>
<title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</titl
e>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2011" month="March"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP
) is an application profile of the Extensible Markup Language (XML) that enables
the near-real-time exchange of structured yet extensible data between any two o
r more network entities. This document defines XMPP's core protocol methods: se
tup and teardown of XML streams, channel encryption, authentication, error handl
ing, and communication primitives for messaging, network availability ("presence
"), and request-response interactions. This document obsoletes RFC 3920. [STAN
DARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6120"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6120"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6265" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
265" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6265">
<front>
<title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Barth" fullname="A. Barth">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2011" month="April"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie
header fields. These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state (
called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a stateful ses
sion over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol. Although cookies have many histor
ical infelicities that degrade their security and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Co
okie header fields are widely used on the Internet. This document obsoletes RFC
2965. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6265"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6265"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6455" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
455" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6455">
<front>
<title>The WebSocket Protocol</title>
<author initials="I." surname="Fette" fullname="I. Fette">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="A. Melnikov">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2011" month="December"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">The WebSocket Protocol enables two-way communication
between a client running untrusted code in a controlled environment to a remote
host that has opted-in to communications from that code. The security model us
ed for this is the origin-based security model commonly used by web browsers. T
he protocol consists of an opening handshake followed by basic message framing,
layered over TCP. The goal of this technology is to provide a mechanism for bro
wser-based applications that need two-way communication with servers that does n
ot rely on opening multiple HTTP connections (e.g., using XMLHttpRequest or &lt;
iframe&gt;s and long polling). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6455"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6455"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6943" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
943" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6943">
<front>
<title>Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler" role="ed
itor">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2013" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">Identifiers such as hostnames, URIs, IP addresses, a
nd email addresses are often used in security contexts to identify security prin
cipals and resources. In such contexts, an identifier presented via some protoc
ol is often compared using some policy to make security decisions such as whethe
r the security principal may access the resource, what level of authentication o
r encryption is required, etc. If the parties involved in a security decision u
se different algorithms to compare identifiers, then failure scenarios ranging f
rom denial of service to elevation of privilege can result. This document provi
des a discussion of these issues that designers should consider when defining id
entifiers and protocols, and when constructing architectures that use multiple p
rotocols.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6943"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6943"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7617" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7
617" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7617">
<front>
<title>The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Reschke" fullname="J. Reschke">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2015" month="September"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) authentication scheme, which transmits credentials as user-id/
password pairs, encoded using Base64.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7617"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7617"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8224" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
224" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8224">
<front>
<title>Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation P
rotocol (SIP)</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Peterson" fullname="J. Peterson">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="C. Jennings">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="C." surname="Wendt" fullname="C. Wendt">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date year="2018" month="February"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0">The baseline security mechanisms in the Session Init
iation Protocol (SIP) are inadequate for cryptographically assuring the identity
of the end users that originate SIP requests, especially in an interdomain cont
ext. This document defines a mechanism for securely identifying originators of
SIP requests. It does so by defining a SIP header field for conveying a signatu
re used for validating the identity and for conveying a reference to the credent
ials of the signer.</t>
<t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 4474.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8224"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8224"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8828" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
828" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8828">
<front>
<title>WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements</title>
<author initials="J" surname="Uberti" fullname="Justin Uberti">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<author initials="G" surname="Shieh" fullname="Guo-wei Shieh">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8828"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8828"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" quoteTitle="true" target="https:
//tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39" derivedAnchor="TLS-DTLS13">
<front>
<title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true">RTFM, Inc.</organization>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofen
ig">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true">Arm Limited</organization>
</author>
<author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="Nagendra Modadugu
">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true">Google, Inc.</organization>
</author>
<date month="November" day="2" year="2020"/>
<abstract>
<t indent="0"> This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagr
am Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.
<references title="Normative References"> The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
&RFC2119; Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
&RFC2818; guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability.
&RFC3264; Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the
&RFC3711; DTLS protocol.
&RFC3986;
&RFC4566;
&RFC4568;
&RFC4648;
&RFC5246;
&RFC5763;
&RFC5764;
&RFC5785;
&RFC5890;
&RFC6347;
&RFC6454;
&RFC7022;
&RFC7675;
&RFC7918;
&RFC8174;
&RFC8122;
&RFC8259;
&RFC8261;
&RFC8445;
&I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview;
&I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security;
&I-D.ietf-rtcweb-rtp-usage;
&I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks;
&I-D.ietf-rtcweb-jsep;
<reference anchor="webcrypto">
<front>
<title>Web Cryptography API</title>
<author fullname="W3C editors"
surname="Dahl, Sleevi">
<organization>W3C</organization>
</author>
<date day="25" month="June" year="2013" />
</front>
<annotation>Available at
http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/</annotation>
</reference>
<reference anchor="webrtc-api">
<front>
<title>WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between Browsers</title>
<author fullname="W3C editors"
surname="Bergkvist, Burnett, Jennings, Narayanan">
<organization>W3C</organization>
</author>
<date day="4" month="October" year="2011" />
</front>
<annotation>Available at
http://dev.w3.org/2011/webrtc/editor/webrtc.html</annotation>
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPS186">
<front>
<title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
<author >
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)<
/organization>
</author>
<date year="2013" month="July"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST PUB 186-4" value=""/>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
&RFC7617;
&RFC3261;
&RFC5705;
&RFC6455;
&RFC6265;
&RFC6943;
&RFC6120;
<reference anchor="XmlHttpRequest">
<front>
<title>XMLHttpRequest Level 2</title>
<author initials="A." surname="van Kesteren">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date day="17" month="January" year="2012"/>
</front>
<format target="http://www.w3.org/TR/XMLHttpRequest/" type="TXT"/>
</reference>
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39"/>
<format type="TXT" target="https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
ietf-tls-dtls13-39.txt"/>
<refcontent>Work in Progress</refcontent>
</reference>
</references>
</references> </references>
<section numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-appe
ndix.a">
<name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</name>
<t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">
<contact fullname="Bernard Aboba"/>, <contact fullname="Harald A
lvestrand"/>, <contact fullname="Richard Barnes"/>, <contact fullname="Dan Druta
"/>, <contact fullname="Cullen Jennings"/>, <contact fullname="Hadriel K
aplan"/>, <contact fullname="Matthew Kaufman"/>, <contact fullname="Jim McEacher
n"/>,
<contact fullname="Martin Thomson"/>, <contact fullname="Magnus
Westerlund"/>. <contact fullname="Matthew Kaufman"/> provided the UI material i
n
<xref target="sec.proposal.comsec" format="default" sectionFormat="of" d
erivedContent="Section 6.5"/>. <contact fullname="Christer Holmberg"/> provided
the initial version of <xref target="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa" format="default
" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5.1"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc
="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
<name slugifiedName="name-authors-address">Author's Address</name>
<author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
<organization showOnFrontPage="true">Mozilla</organization>
<address>
<email>ekr@rtfm.com</email>
</address>
</author>
</section>
</back> </back>
</rfc> </rfc>
 End of changes. 332 change blocks. 
1520 lines changed or deleted 2818 lines changed or added

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