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<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?> -nottingham-how-did-that-get-into-the-repo-02" number="8959" obsoletes="" update
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<front> <front>
<title>The secret-token URI Scheme</title> <title abbrev="&quot;secret-token&quot; URI Scheme">The &quot;secret-token&q
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nottingham-how-did-that-get-i uot; URI Scheme</title>
nto-the-repo-02"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8959"/>
<author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="Mark Nottingham"> <author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="Mark Nottingham">
<organization/> <organization/>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<city>Prahran</city> <city>Prahran</city>
<region>VIC</region> <region>VIC</region>
<country>Australia</country> <country>Australia</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>mnot@mnot.net</email> <email>mnot@mnot.net</email>
<uri>https://www.mnot.net/</uri> <uri>https://www.mnot.net/</uri>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date year="2020"/> <date year="2021" month="January" />
<area>General</area> <area>General</area>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword> <keyword>bearer token</keyword>
<keyword>token scanning</keyword>
<abstract> <abstract>
<t>This document registers the "secret-token" URI scheme, to aid in the id entification <t>This document registers the &quot;secret-token&quot; URI scheme to aid in the identification
of authentication tokens.</t> of authentication tokens.</t>
</abstract> </abstract>
<note>
<name>Note to Readers</name>
<t><em>RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication</em></t>
<t>The issues list for this draft can be found at <eref target="https://gi
thub.com/mnot/I-D/labels/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo">https://github.com/mnot
/I-D/labels/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo</eref>.</t>
<t>The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at <eref target="https://
mnot.github.io/I-D/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo/">https://mnot.github.io/I-D/h
ow-did-that-get-into-the-repo/</eref>.</t>
<t>Recent changes are listed at <eref target="https://github.com/mnot/I-D/
commits/gh-pages/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo">https://github.com/mnot/I-D/com
mits/gh-pages/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo</eref>.</t>
<t>See also the draft's current status in the IETF datatracker, at
<eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-how-did-that-get
-into-the-repo/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-how-did-that-
get-into-the-repo/</eref>.</t>
</note>
</front> </front>
<middle> <middle>
<section anchor="introduction" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Introduction</name> <name>Introduction</name>
<t>It has become increasingly common to use bearer tokens as an authentica tion mechanism in various <t>It has become increasingly common to use bearer tokens as an authentica tion mechanism in various
protocols.</t> protocols.</t>
<t>A bearer token is a security token with the property that any party in
possession of the token (a <t>A bearer token is a security token with the property that any party in
"bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other
can. Using a bearer party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer t
token does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key materia o prove possession of cryptographic key material (proof-of-possession).</t>
l <t>Unfortunately, the number of security incidents involving accidental di
(proof-of-possession).</t> sclosure of these tokens has also increased. For example, we now regularly hear
<t>Unfortunately, the number of security incidents involving accidental di about a developer committing an access token to a public source code repository,
sclosure of these tokens has also increased. For example, we now regularly hear either because they didn't realize it was included in the committed code or bec
about a developer committing an access token to a public source code repository, ause they didn't realize the implications of its disclosure.</t>
either because they didn't realise it was included in the committed code, or be <t>This specification registers the &quot;secret-token&quot; URI scheme to
cause they didn't realise the implications of its disclosure.</t> aid prevention of such accidental disclosures. When tokens are easier to unambi
<t>This specification registers the "secret-token" URI scheme to aid preve guously identify, they can trigger warnings in continuous integration systems or
ntion of such accidental disclosures. When tokens are easier to unambiguously id be used in source code repositories themselves. They can also be scanned for se
entify, they can trigger warnings in Continuous Integration systems, or be used parately.</t>
in source code repositories themselves. They can also be scanned for separately. <t>For example, if cloud.example.net issues access tokens to its clients f
</t> or later use, and it does so by formatting them as &quot;secret-token&quot; URIs
<t>For example, if cloud.example.net issues access tokens to its clients f , tokens that &quot;leak&quot; into places that they don't belong are easier to
or later use, and it does so by formatting them as secret-token URIs, tokens tha identify. This could be through a variety of mechanisms; for example, if repo.ex
t "leak" into places that they don't belong are easier to identify. This could b ample.com can be configured to refuse commits containing &quot;secret-token&quot
e through a variety of mechanisms; for example, if repo.example.com can be confi ; URIs, it helps its customers avoid accidental disclosures.</t>
gured to refuse commits containing secret-token URIs, it helps its customers avo <t>&quot;secret-token&quot; URIs are intended to aid in identification of
id accidental disclosures.</t> generated secrets, like API keys and similar tokens. They are not intended for u
<t>secret-token URIs are intended to aid in identification of generated se se in controlled situations where ephemeral tokens are used, such as things like
crets like API keys and similar tokens. They are not intended for use in control Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) tokens.</t>
led situations where ephemeral tokens are used, such as things like Cross-Site R
equest Forgery (CSRF) tokens.</t>
<section anchor="notational-conventions" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="notational-conventions" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Notational Conventions</name> <name>Notational Conventions</name>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", " <t>
SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQU
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to IRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOUL
be interpreted as D</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>N
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC8 OT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in
174" format="default"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RF
shown here.</t> C2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capita
<t>This document uses ABNF <xref target="RFC5234" format="default"/>. It ls, as shown here.
also uses the pchar rule from <xref target="RFC3986" format="default"/>.</t> </t>
<t>This document uses ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"
format="default"/>. It also uses the pchar rule from <xref
target="RFC3986" format="default"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="the-secret-token-uri-scheme" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="the-secret-token-uri-scheme" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>The secret-token URI scheme</name> <name>The &quot;secret-token&quot; URI Scheme</name>
<t>The secret-token URI scheme identifies a token that is intended to be a <t>The &quot;secret-token&quot; URI scheme identifies a token that is inte
secret.</t> nded to be a secret.</t>
<artwork type="abnf" name="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
secret-token-URI = secret-token-scheme ":" token secret-token-URI = secret-token-scheme ":" token
secret-token-scheme = "secret-token" secret-token-scheme = "secret-token"
token = 1*pchar token = 1*pchar
]]></artwork> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>See <xref target="RFC3986" format="default"/>, Section 3.3 for a defini <t>See <xref target="RFC3986" sectionFormat="comma" section="3.3"/> for a
tion of pchar. Disallowed characters - including non-ASCII characters - MUST be definition of pchar. Disallowed characters -- including non-ASCII characters --
encoded into UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629" format="default"/> and then percent-en <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded into UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629" format="default
coded (<xref target="RFC3986" format="default"/>, Section 2.1).</t> "/> and then percent-encoded (<xref target="RFC3986" sectionFormat="comma" secti
<t>When a token is both generated and presented for authentication, the en on="2.1"/>).</t>
tire URI MUST be used, <t>When a token is both generated and presented for authentication, the en
without changes.</t> tire URI <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used, without changes.</t>
<t>For example, given the URI:</t> <t>For example, given the URI:</t>
<artwork type="example" name="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ <sourcecode><![CDATA[
secret-token:E92FB7EB-D882-47A4-A265-A0B6135DC842%20foo secret-token:E92FB7EB-D882-47A4-A265-A0B6135DC842%20foo
]]></artwork> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>This string (character-for-character, case-sensitive) will both be issu <t>This (character-for-character, case-sensitive) string will both be issu
ed by the token authority, and required for later access. Therefore, if the exam ed by the token authority and required for later access. Therefore, if the examp
ple above were used as a bearer token in <xref target="RFC6750" format="default" le above were used as a bearer token in <xref
/>, a client might send:</t> target="RFC6750" format="default"/>, a client might send:</t>
<artwork type="example" name="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
GET /authenticated/stuff HTTP/1.1 GET /authenticated/stuff HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com Host: www.example.com
Authorization: Bearer secret-token:E92FB7EB-D882-47A4-A265-A0B6135DC842%20foo Authorization: Bearer
]]></artwork> secret-token:E92FB7EB-D882-47A4-A265-A0B6135DC842%20foo
]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="iana-considerations" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>IANA Considerations</name> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>This document registers the following value in the URI Scheme registry: <t>This document registers the following value in the
</t> &quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes&quot; registry:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
<li>Scheme name: secret-token</li> <dt>Scheme name:</dt>
<li>Status: provisional</li> <dd>secret-token</dd>
<li>Applications / protocols that use this scheme: none yet</li> <dt>Status:</dt>
<li>Contact: iesg@iesg.org</li> <dd>provisional</dd>
<li>Change Controller: IESG</li> <dt>Applications/protocols that use this scheme:</dt>
<li>References: (this document)</li> <dd>none yet</dd>
</ul> <dt>Contact:</dt>
<dd>iesg@iesg.org</dd>
<dt>Change Controller:</dt>
<dd>IESG</dd>
<dt>References:</dt>
<dd>RFC 8959</dd>
</dl>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="security-considerations" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="security-considerations" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Security Considerations</name> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>The token ABNF rule allows tokens as small as one character. This is no t recommended practice; applications should evaluate their requirements for entr opy and issue tokens correspondingly. <t>The token ABNF rule allows tokens as small as one character. This is no t recommended practice; applications should evaluate their requirements for entr opy and issue tokens correspondingly.
See <xref target="RFC4086" format="default"/> for more information.</t> See <xref target="RFC4086" format="default"/> for more information.</t>
<t>This URI scheme is intended to reduce the incidence of accidental discl osure; it cannot prevent intentional disclosure.</t> <t>This URI scheme is intended to reduce the incidence of accidental discl osure; it cannot prevent intentional disclosure.</t>
<t>If it is difficult to correctly handle secret material, or unclear as t <t>If it is difficult to correctly handle secret material, or unclear as t
o what the appropriate handling is, users might choose to obfuscate their secret o what the appropriate handling is, users might choose to obfuscate their secret
tokens in order to evade detection (for example, removing the URI scheme for st tokens in order to evade detection (for example, removing the URI scheme for st
orage). Mitigating this risk is often beyond the reach of orage).
the system using the secret-token URI, but they can caution users against such p
ractices, and Mitigating this risk is often beyond the reach of the system using the &qu
provide tools to help.</t> ot;secret-token&quot; URI; users can be cautioned against such practices and be
provided tools to help.</t>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<references> <references>
<name>References</name> <name>References</name>
<references> <references>
<name>Normative References</name> <name>Normative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2
119"> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.
<front> xml"/>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.
le> xml"/>
<author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5234.
<organization/> xml"/>
</author> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.
<date year="1997" month="March"/> xml"/>
<abstract> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3629.
<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to sig xml"/>
nify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized.
This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF document
s. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet
Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8
174">
<front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti
tle>
<author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2017" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protoco
l specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying tha
t only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5
234">
<front>
<title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="D. Crocker" role="
editor">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="P. Overell">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2008" month="January"/>
<abstract>
<t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal
syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called A
ugmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The c
urrent specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with
reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and AB
NF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value
ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encod
ing for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifica
tions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
986">
<front>
<title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="T. Berners-Lee
">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="R. Fielding">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2005" month="January"/>
<abstract>
<t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of ch
aracters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification d
efines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that mi
ght be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for t
he use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a supe
rset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common component
s of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every p
ossible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for
URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI schem
e. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3629" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3
629">
<front>
<title>UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</title>
<author initials="F." surname="Yergeau" fullname="F. Yergeau">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2003" month="November"/>
<abstract>
<t>ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Univer
sal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems.
The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with
many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of
UTF-8, the object of this memo. UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the
full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and othe
r software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values. Th
is memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="63"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3629"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3629"/>
</reference>
</references> </references>
<references> <references>
<name>Informative References</name> <name>Informative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC6750" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6
750"> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6750.
<front> xml"/>
<title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage</ti <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4086.
tle> xml"/>
<author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Hardt" fullname="D. Hardt">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2012" month="October"/>
<abstract>
<t>This specification describes how to use bearer tokens in HTTP r
equests to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources. Any party in possession of a b
earer token (a "bearer") can use it to get access to the associated resources (w
ithout demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bea
rer tokens need to be protected from disclosure in storage and in transport. [
STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6750"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6750"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4086" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4
086">
<front>
<title>Randomness Requirements for Security</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd" fullname="D. Eastlake 3
rd">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Schiller" fullname="J. Schiller">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Crocker" fullname="S. Crocker">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2005" month="June"/>
<abstract>
<t>Security systems are built on strong cryptographic algorithms t
hat foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security of these systems is d
ependent on generating secret quantities for passwords, cryptographic keys, and
similar quantities. The use of pseudo-random processes to generate secret quant
ities can result in pseudo-security. A sophisticated attacker may find it easier
to reproduce the environment that produced the secret quantities and to search
the resulting small set of possibilities than to locate the quantities in the wh
ole of the potential number space.</t>
<t>Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated
adversary is surprisingly difficult. This document points out many pitfalls in
using poor entropy sources or traditional pseudo-random number generation techni
ques for generating such quantities. It recommends the use of truly random hard
ware techniques and shows that the existing hardware on many systems can be used
for this purpose. It provides suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hard
ware solution is not available, and it gives examples of how large such quantiti
es need to be for some applications. This document specifies an Internet Best C
urrent Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggest
ions for improvements.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="106"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4086"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4086"/>
</reference>
</references> </references>
</references> </references>
<section anchor="acknowledgements" numbered="true" toc="default"> <section anchor="acknowledgements" numbered="false" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgements</name> <name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>The definition of bearer tokens is from <xref target="RFC6750" format=" default"/>.</t> <t>The definition of bearer tokens is from <xref target="RFC6750" format=" default"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
</back> </back>
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