<?xmlversion="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!-- This template is for creating an Internet Draft using xml2rfc, which is available here: http://xml.resource.org. --> <!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629-xhtml.ent" [ <!-- Not needed, found better option how to do this <!ENTITY rfc8422 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8422.xml'> --> ]> <?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?> <!-- used by XSLT processors --> <!-- For a complete list and description of processing instructions (PIs), please see http://xml.resource.org/authoring/README.html. -->version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" category="std" consensus="true" docName="draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30" indexInclude="true" ipr="trust200902"obsoletes="" updates=""number="8994" prepTime="2021-05-20T23:09:56" scripts="Common,Latin" sortRefs="true" submissionType="IETF"xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" tocDepth="5"symRefs="true"sortRefs="true" consensus="true" version="3"> <!-- REMOVED in version 12: updates="4291,4193" --> <!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** -->tocDepth="5" tocInclude="true" xml:lang="en"> <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30" rel="prev"/> <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc8994" rel="alternate"/> <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/> <front> <title abbrev="An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)">An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)</title> <seriesInfoname="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30"/>name="RFC" value="8994" stream="IETF"/> <author role="editor" fullname="Toerless Eckert" surname="Eckert"> <organization abbrev="FutureweiUSA"> FutureweiUSA" showOnFrontPage="true">Futurewei Technologies Inc. USA</organization> <address> <postal> <street>2330 Central Expy</street> <city>Santa Clara</city> <region>CA</region> <code>95050</code><country>USA</country><country>United States of America</country> </postal> <email>tte+ietf@cs.fau.de</email> </address> </author> <author role="editor" fullname="Michael H. Behringer" initials="M." surname="Behringer"> <address> <email>michael.h.behringer@gmail.com</email> </address> </author> <author fullname="Steinthor Bjarnason" initials="S." surname="Bjarnason"><organization>Arbor<organization showOnFrontPage="true">Arbor Networks</organization> <address> <postal> <street>2727 South State Street, Suite 200</street> <city>Ann Arbor</city><code>MI 48104</code><region>MI</region> <code>48104</code> <country>UnitedStates</country>States of America</country> </postal> <email>sbjarnason@arbor.net</email> </address> </author> <datemonth="Oct" day="30" year="2020"/>month="05" year="2021"/> <area>Operations and Management</area><workgroup>ANIMA WG</workgroup> <abstract> <t><workgroup>ANIMA</workgroup> <keyword>addressing-scheme</keyword> <keyword>ANI</keyword> <keyword>autonomic networking</keyword> <keyword>autonomous operation</keyword> <keyword>BRSKI</keyword> <keyword>certificate</keyword> <keyword>Data-Plane</keyword> <keyword>domain</keyword> <keyword>DTLS</keyword> <keyword>DULL</keyword> <keyword>EST</keyword> <keyword>GRASP</keyword> <keyword>IDevID</keyword> <keyword>inband</keyword> <keyword>IPsec</keyword> <keyword>IPv6</keyword> <keyword>LDevID</keyword> <keyword>loopback-interface</keyword> <keyword>NOC</keyword> <keyword>OAM</keyword> <keyword>out-of-band</keyword> <keyword>registrar</keyword> <keyword>renewal</keyword> <keyword>RPL</keyword> <keyword>secure</keyword> <keyword>self-management</keyword> <keyword>ULA</keyword> <keyword>VPN</keyword> <keyword>VRF</keyword> <keyword/> <abstract pn="section-abstract"> <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1"> Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane should ideally beself-managing,self-managing and be as independent as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual out-of-band channel" for Operations,AdministrationAdministration, and Management (OAM) communications over a network that provides automaticallyconfiguredconfigured, hop-by-hop authenticated and encrypted communications via automatically configured IPv6 even when the network is notconfigured,configured or is misconfigured. </t> </abstract></front> <middle><boilerplate> <sectionanchor="intro" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Introduction (Informative)</name> <t>Autonomic Networkinganchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1"> This is an Internet Standards Track document. </t> <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2"> This document is aconceptproduct ofself-management: Autonomic functions self-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings acrossthenetwork. <xref target="RFC7575" format="default"/> definesInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents thefundamental ideas and design goals of Autonomic Networking. A gap analysisconsensus ofAutonomic Networking is given in <xref target="RFC7576" format="default"/>. The reference architecture for Autonomic Networking inthe IETFis specified in the document <xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>.</t> <t>Autonomic functions need an autonomically built communications infrastructure. This infrastructure needs to be secure, resilientcommunity. It has received public review andre-usablehas been approved for publication byall autonomic functions.the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section52 of<xref target="RFC7575" format="default"/> introduces that infrastructure and calls itRFC 7841. </t> <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3"> Information about theAutonomic Control Plane (ACP). More descriptivelycurrent status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on itwouldmay bethe "Autonomic communications infrastructure for OAMobtained at <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994" brackets="none"/>. </t> </section> <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1"> Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust andControl". For naming consistency with that prior document, this document continues to usethename ACP though.</t> <t>Today,persons identified as theOAM and control plane of IP networks is whatdocument authors. All rights reserved. </t> <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2"> This document istypically called in-band management/signaling: Its managementsubject to BCP 78 andcontrol protocol traffic dependsthe IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on therouting and forwarding tables, security, policy, QoSdate of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights andpotentially other configuration that first hasrestrictions with respect tobe established throughthis document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of thevery same managementTrust Legal Provisions andcontrol protocols. Misconfigurations including unexpected side effects or mutual dependences can disrupt OAMare provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. </t> </section> </boilerplate> <toc> <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1"> <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction-informative">Introduction (Informative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-applicability-and-scope">Applicability andcontrol operationsScope</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2"> <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acronyms-and-terminology-in">Acronyms andespecially disrupt remote management access toTerminology (Informative)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-use-cases-for-an-autonomic-">Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane (Informative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-an-infrastructure-for-auton">An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-secure-bootstrap-over-an-un">Secure Bootstrap over an Unconfigured Network</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-permanent-reachability-inde">Permanent Reachability Independent of theaffected node itself and potentially a much larger numberData Plane</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-informative">Requirements (Informative)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-overview-informative">Overview (Informative)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-self-creation-of-an-autonom">Self-Creation ofnodesan Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-for-the-use-of">Requirements forwhom the affected node is onthenetwork path.</t> <t>For an exampleUse ofinband management failingTransport Layer Security (TLS)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-domain-certificate-and-">ACP Domain, Certificate, and Network</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-certificates">ACP Certificates</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-certificate-acpnodename">ACP Certificate AcpNodeName</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acpnodename-asn1-module">AcpNodeName ASN.1 Module</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-domain-membership-check">ACP Domain Membership Check</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.3.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.3.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.3.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-realtime-clock-and-time-val">Realtime Clock and Time Validation</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-trust-anchors-ta">Trust Anchors (TA)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-certificate-and-trust-ancho">Certificate and Trust Anchor Maintenance</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-grasp-objective-for-est-ser">GRASP Objective for EST Server</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-renewal">Renewal</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-certificate-revocation-list">Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-lifetimes">Lifetimes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-reenrollment">Reenrollment</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.2.5.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6.2.5.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.2.5.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-failing-certificates">Failing Certificates</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-adjacency-table">ACP Adjacency Table</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-neighbor-discovery-with-dul">Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-candidate-acp-neighbor-sele">Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-channel-selection">Channel Selection</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="6.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-candidate-acp-neighbor-veri">Candidate ACP Neighbor Verification</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-association-secure">Security Association (Secure Channel) Protocols</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-general-considerations">General Considerations</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-common-requirements">Common Requirements</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-via-ipsec">ACP via IPsec</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.3.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-native-ipsec">Native IPsec</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.3.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.3.1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rfc-8221-ipsec-esp">RFC 8221 (IPsec/ESP)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.3.1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.3.1.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rfc-8247-ikev2">RFC 8247 (IKEv2)</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.3.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ipsec-with-gre-encapsulatio">IPsec with GRE Encapsulation</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-via-dtls">ACP via DTLS</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.8.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.8.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-secure-channel-profiles">ACP Secure Channel Profiles</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.1"><xref derivedContent="6.9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.9"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-grasp-in-the-acp">GRASP in thefaceACP</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.9.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.9.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-grasp-as-a-core-service-of-">GRASP as a Core Service ofoperator induced misconfiguration, see <xref target="FCC"/>, for example III.B.15 on page 8: "...engineers almost immediately recognized that they had misdiagnosedtheproblem. However, they were unable to resolveACP</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.9.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.9.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-as-the-security-and-tra">ACP as theissue by restoring the link because the network management tools required to do so remotely relied onSecurity and Transport Substrate for GRASP</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.9.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.9.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-discussion">Discussion</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.10"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.10.1"><xref derivedContent="6.10" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.10"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-context-separation">Context Separation</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-addressing-inside-the-acp">Addressing inside thesame paths they had just disabled".</t> <t>Traditionally, physically separate, so-called out-of-band (management) networks have been used to avoid these problemsACP</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-fundamental-concepts-of-aut">Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-acp-addressing-base-sch">The ACP Addressing Base Scheme</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-zone-addressing-sub-sch">ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP-Zone)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-manual-addressing-sub-s">ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP-Manual)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-vlong-addressing-sub-sc">ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP-Vlong-8/ACP-Vlong-16)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-other-acp-addressing-sub-sc">Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-registrars">ACP Registrars</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-use-of-brski-or-other-mecha">Use of BRSKI orat least to allow recovery from such problems. Worst case, personnel are sent on site to access devices through out-of-band management ports (also called craft ports, serial console, management ethernet port). However, both options are expensive.</t> <t>In increasingly automated networks either centralized management systemsOther Mechanisms ordistributed autonomic service agentsProtocols</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-unique-address-prefix-alloc">Unique Address/Prefix Allocation</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-addressing-sub-scheme-polic">Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-address-prefix-persistence">Address/Prefix Persistence</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.11.2.7.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.11.7.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.11.7.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-further-details">Further Details</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-routing-in-the-acp">Routing in thenetwork require a control plane which is independentACP</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-rpl-profile">ACP RPL Profile</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-overview">Overview</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-single-instance">Single Instance</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.1.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-reconvergence">Reconvergence</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rpl-instances">RPL Instances</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-storing-vs-non-storing-mode">Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-dao-policy">DAO Policy</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-path-metrics">Path Metrics</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-objective-function">Objective Function</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-dodag-repair">DODAG Repair</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.8.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.8"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-multicast">Multicast</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.9"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.9.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.9"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security">Security</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.10"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.10.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.10" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.10"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-p2p-communications">P2P Communications</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.11"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.11.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.11" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.11"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ipv6-address-configuration">IPv6 Address Configuration</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.12"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.12.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.12" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.12"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-administrative-parameters">Administrative Parameters</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.13"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.13.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.13" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.13"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rpl-packet-information">RPL Packet Information</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.14"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.12.2.1.2.14.1"><xref derivedContent="6.12.1.14" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.12.1.14"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-unknown-destinations">Unknown Destinations</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-general-acp-considerations">General ACP Considerations</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-performance">Performance</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-addressing-of-secure-channe">Addressing ofthe configurationSecure Channels</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-mtu">MTU</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-multiple-links-between-node">Multiple Links between Nodes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-interfaces">ACP Interfaces</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.5.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-loopback-interfaces">ACP Loopback Interfaces</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.5.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-virtual-interfaces">ACP Virtual Interfaces</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.5.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.5.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-point-to-point-virtual-">ACP Point-to-Point Virtual Interfaces</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.13.2.5.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="6.13.5.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6.13.5.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-multi-access-virtual-in">ACP Multi-Access Virtual Interfaces</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-support-on-l2-switches-">ACP Support on L2 Switches/Ports (Normative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="7.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-why-benefits-of-acp-on-l2-s">Why (Benefits ofthe network they manage, to avoid impacting their own operations through the configuration actions they take.</t> <t>This document describes a modular designACP on L2 Switches)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="7.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-how-per-l2-port-dull-grasp">How (per L2 Port DULL GRASP)</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-support-for-non-acp-compone">Support fora self-forming, self-managingNon-ACP Components (Normative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-connect">ACP Connect</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-non-acp-controller-and-or-n">Non-ACP Controller and/or Network Management System (NMS)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-software-components">Software Components</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-autoconfiguration">Autoconfiguration</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-combined-acp-and-data-plane">Combined ACP andself-protecting ACP, which is a virtual out-of-band network designed to be as independent as possibleData Plane Interface (VRF Select)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="8.1.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.1.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-use-of-grasp">Use ofconfiguration, addressingGRASP</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="8.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-connecting-acp-islands-over">Connecting ACP Islands over Non-ACP L3 Networks (Remote ACP Neighbors)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="8.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-configured-remote-acp-neigh">Configured Remote ACP Neighbor</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="8.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-tunneled-remote-acp-neighbo">Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbor</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="8.2.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8.2.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-summary">Summary</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><xref derivedContent="9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-operations-informative">ACP Operations (Informative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-and-brski-diagnostics">ACP (and BRSKI) Diagnostics</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.1.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-secure-channel-peer-diagnos">Secure Channel Peer Diagnostics</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-registrars-2">ACP Registrars</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-registrar-interactions">Registrar Interactions</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-registrar-parameters">Registrar Parameters</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-certificate-renewal-and-lim">Certificate Renewal androuting to avoidLimitations</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-registrars-with-sub-ca">ACP Registrars with Sub-CA</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="9.2.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.2.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-centralized-policy-control">Centralized Policy Control</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-enabling-and-disabling-the-">Enabling and Disabling theself-dependency problems of current IP networks while still operating in-band onACP and/or thesame physical network that it is controllingANI</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-filtering-for-non-acp-ani-p">Filtering for Non-ACP/ANI Packets</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-admin-down-state">"admin down" State</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-2">Security</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-fast-state-propagation-and-">Fast State Propagation andmanaging. TheDiagnostics</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.2.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.2.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-low-level-link-diagnostics">Low-Level Link Diagnostics</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.2.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.2.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.2.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-power-consumption-issues">Power Consumption Issues</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-enabling-interface-level-ac">Enabling Interface-Level ACPdesign is therefore intendedand ANI</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-which-interfaces-to-auto-en">Which Interfaces tocombine as well as possibleAuto-Enable?</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-enabling-node-level-acp-and">Enabling Node-Level ACP and ANI</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.5.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-brownfield-nodes">Brownfield Nodes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.5.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.5.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-greenfield-nodes">Greenfield Nodes</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-undoing-ani-acp-enable">Undoing "ANI/ACP enable"</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="9.3.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.3.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-summary-2">Summary</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="9.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-partial-or-incremental-adop">Partial or Incremental Adoption</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="9.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-configuration-and-the-acp-s">Configuration and theresilience of out-of-band management networks withACP (Summary)</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><xref derivedContent="10" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-summary-benefits-informativ">Summary: Benefits (Informative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="10.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-self-healing-properties">Self-Healing Properties</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="10.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-self-protection-properties">Self-Protection Properties</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="10.2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10.2.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-from-the-outside">From thelow-costOutside</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.2.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="10.2.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10.2.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-from-the-inside">From the Inside</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="10.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-the-administrator-view">The Administrator View</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><xref derivedContent="11" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.12"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><xref derivedContent="12" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-12"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><xref derivedContent="13" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="13.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="13.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-references">Informative References</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix A" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-background-and-future-infor">Background and Future (Informative)</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="A.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-address-space-schemes">ACP Address Space Schemes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="A.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-brski-bootstrap-ani">BRSKI Bootstrap (ANI)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="A.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-neighbor-discovery-prot">ACP Neighbor Discovery Protocol Selection</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="A.3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.3.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-lldp">LLDP</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="A.3.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.3.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-mdns-and-l2-support">mDNS and L2 Support</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.3.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="A.3.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.3.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-why-dull-grasp">Why DULL GRASP?</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="A.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-choice-of-routing-protocol-">Choice oftraditional IP in-band network management. The details how this is achieved are described in <xref target="self-creation" format="default"/>.</t> <t>In a fully autonomic network node without legacy control or management functions/protocols,Routing Protocol (RPL)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="A.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-information-distributio">ACP Information Distribution and Multicast</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="A.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-cas-domains-and-routing-sub">CAs, Domains, and Routing Subdomains</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="A.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-intent-for-the-acp">Intent for theData-Plane would beACP</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.8.1"><xref derivedContent="A.8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.8"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-adopting-acp-concepts-for-o">Adopting ACP Concepts forexample just a forwarding planeOther Environments</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-further-future-options">Further (Future) Options</xref></t> <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2"> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.1"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.1"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-auto-aggregation-of-routes">Auto-Aggregation of Routes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.2"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-more-options-for-avoiding-i">More Options for"Data"Avoiding IPv6packets, aka: packets other than the controlData Plane Dependencies</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.3"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acp-apis-and-operational-mo">ACP APIs andmanagement plane packets that are forwarded by the ACP itself. In such networks/nodes, there would be no non-autonomous control or non-autonomous management plane.</t> <t>Routing protocols for example would be built inside theOperational Models (YANG)</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.4.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.4"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-rpl-enhancements">RPL Enhancements</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.5.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.5"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-role-assignments">Role Assignments</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.6"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.6.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.6"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-autonomic-l3-transit">Autonomic L3 Transit</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.7"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.7.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.7"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-diagnostics">Diagnostics</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.8.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.8"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-avoiding-and-dealing-with-c">Avoiding and Dealing with Compromised ACPas so-called autonomousNodes</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.9"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.2.9.2.9.1"><xref derivedContent="A.9.9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-a.9.9"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-detecting-acp-secure-channe">Detecting ACP Secure Channel Downgrade Attacks</xref></t> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.15"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.15.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.16"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.16.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.c"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-contributors">Contributors</xref></t> </li> <li pn="section-toc.1-1.17"> <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.17.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.d"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</xref></t> </li> </ul> </section> </toc> </front> <middle> <section anchor="intro" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-1"> <name slugifiedName="name-introduction-informative">Introduction (Informative)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">Autonomic Networking is a concept of self-management: autonomic functionsvia autonomous service agents, leveragingself-configure, and negotiate parameters and settings across theACP's functions insteadnetwork. "<xref target="RFC7575" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Autonomic Networking: Definitions and Design Goals"/>" <xref target="RFC7575" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7575"/> defines the fundamental ideas and design goals ofimplementing them separatelyAutonomic Networking. A gap analysis of Autonomic Networking is given in "<xref target="RFC7576" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="General Gap Analysis foreach protocol: discovery, automatically established authenticatedAutonomic Networking"/>" <xref target="RFC7576" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7576"/>. The reference architecture for Autonomic Networking in the IETF is specified in the document "<xref target="RFC8993" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A Reference Model for Autonomic Networking"/>" <xref target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-2">Autonomic functions need an autonomically built communications infrastructure. This infrastructure needs to be secure, resilient, andencrypted localreusable by all autonomic functions. <xref target="RFC7575" sectionFormat="of" section="5" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7575#section-5" derivedContent="RFC7575"/> introduces that infrastructure anddistant peer connectivitycalls it the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP). More descriptively, it could be called the "Autonomic communications infrastructure forcontrol and management traffic,OAM andcommon control/management protocol sessioncontrol". For naming consistency with that prior document, this document continues to use the name ACP.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-3">Today, the OAM andpresentation functions.</t> <t>When ACP functionalitycontrol plane of IP networks isadded to nodes that have non-autonomouswhat is typically called in-band managementplaneand/or signaling: its management and controlplane functions (henceforth called non-autonomous nodes),protocol traffic depends on theACP instead is best abstracted as a special Virtual Routingrouting andForwarding (VRF) instance (or virtual router)forwarding tables, security, policy, QoS, and potentially other configuration that first has to be established through thecomplete pre-existing non-autonomousvery same managementand/orand controlplane is consideredprotocols. Misconfigurations, including unexpected side effects or mutual dependencies, can disrupt OAM and control operations and especially disrupt remote management access tobe part oftheData-Planeaffected node itself and potentially disrupt access toavoid introductiona much larger number ofmore complex, new terminology onlynodes forthis case.</t> <t>Likewhich theforwarding planeaffected node is on the network path.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-4">For an example of in-band management failing in the face of operator-induced misconfiguration, see <xref target="FCC" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="FCC"/>, for"Data" packets,example, Section III.B.15 on page 8:</t> <blockquote pn="section-1-5">...engineers almost immediately recognized that they had misdiagnosed thenon-autonomous control andproblem. However, they were unable to resolve the issue by restoring the link because the network managementplane functions can then be managed/used viatools required to do so remotely relied on theACP. This terminology is consistent with pre-existing documentssame paths they had just disabled.</blockquote> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-6">Traditionally, physically separate, so-called out-of-band (management) networks have been used to avoid these problems or at least to allow recovery from suchas <xref target="RFC8368" format="default"/>.</t> <t>Inproblems. In the worst-case scenario, personnel are sent on site to access devices through out-of-band management ports (also called craft ports, serial consoles, or management Ethernet ports). However, bothinstances (autonomousoptions are expensive.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-7">In increasingly automated networks, both centralized management systems andnon-autonomous nodes),distributed autonomic service agents in theACP is built suchnetwork require a control plane thatitisoperating in the absenceindependent of theData-Plane, and in the caseconfiguration ofexisting non-autonomous (management, control) components in the Data-Plane also inthepresence of any (mis-)configuration thereof.</t> <t>The Autonomic Control Plane serves several purposes atnetwork they manage, to avoid impacting their own operations through thesame time:configuration actions they take.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-8">This document describes a modular design for a self-forming, self-managing, and self-protecting ACP, which is a virtual out-of-band network designed to be as independent as possible of configuration, addressing, and routing to avoid the self-dependency problems of current IP networks while still operating in-band on the same physical network that it is controlling and managing. The ACP design is therefore intended to combine as well as possible the resilience of out-of-band management networks with the low cost of traditional IP in-band network management. The details of how this is achieved are described in <xref target="self-creation" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-9">In a fully Autonomic Network without legacy control or management functions and/or protocols, the data plane would be just a forwarding plane for "data" IPv6 packets, which are packets other than those control and management plane packets forwarded by the ACP itself. In such a network, there would be no non-autonomous control of nodes nor a non-autonomous management plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-10">Routing protocols would be built inside the ACP as autonomous functions via autonomous service agents, leveraging the following ACP functions instead of implementing them separately for each protocol: discovery; automatically established, authenticated, and encrypted local and distant peer connectivity for control and management traffic; and common session and presentation functions of the control and management protocol.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-11">When ACP functionality is added to nodes that do not have autonomous management plane and/or control plane functions (henceforth called non-autonomous nodes), the ACP instead is best abstracted as a special Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) instance (or virtual router), and the complete, preexisting, non-autonomous management and/or control plane is considered to be part of the data plane to avoid introducing more complex terminology only for this case.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-12">Like the forwarding plane for "data" packets, the non-autonomous control and management plane functions can then be managed and/or used via the ACP. This terminology is consistent with preexisting documents such as "<xref target="RFC8368" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)"/>" <xref target="RFC8368" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-13">In both autonomous and non-autonomous instances, the ACP is built such that it operates in the absence of the data plane. The ACP also operates in the presence of any (mis)configured non-autonomous management and/or control components in the data plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1-14">The ACP serves several purposes simultaneously: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li>Autonomicspacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-1-15"> <li pn="section-1-15.1" derivedCounter="1.">Autonomic functions communicate over the ACP. The ACP therefore directly supports Autonomic Networking functions, as described in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>.target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>. For example,GenericGRASP ("<xref target="RFC8990" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol(GRASP -(GRASP)"/>" <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" format="default"/>)target="RFC8990" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8990"/>) runs securely inside the ACP and depends on the ACP as its "security and transport substrate".</li><li>A<li pn="section-1-15.2" derivedCounter="2.">A controller or network management system can useitACP to securely bootstrap network devices in remote locations, even if the(Data-Plane)(data plane) network in between is not yet configured; noData-Plane dependentbootstrap configuration that is dependent on the data plane is required. An example of such a secure bootstrap process is described in "<xref target="RFC8995" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)"/>" <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>.</li> <li>Antarget="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>.</li> <li pn="section-1-15.3" derivedCounter="3.">An operator can useitACP to access remote devices using protocols such as Secure SHell (SSH) or Network Configuration Protocol(NETCONF) running across the ACP,(NETCONF), even if the network is misconfigured ornot configured.</li>unconfigured.</li> </ol><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-1-16">This document describes these purposes as use cases for the ACP in <xref target="usage"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3"/>, and it defines the requirements in <xref target="requirements"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 4"/>. <xref target="overview"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/> gives an overview of how the ACP is constructed.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1-17">The normative part of this document starts with <xref target="self-creation"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/>, where the ACP is specified. <xref target="acp-l2-switches"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/> explains how to support ACP onL2Layer 2 (L2) switches (normative). <xref target="workarounds"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8"/> explains how non-ACP nodes and networks can be integrated (normative).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1-18">The remaining sections arenon-normative:non-normative. <xref target="benefit"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 10"/> reviews the benefits of the ACP (after all the details have beendefined),defined). <xref target="operational"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9"/> provides operationalrecommendations,recommendations. <xref target="further"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A"/> provides additionalexplanationsbackground and describesadditional details or future standard or proprietarypossible extensions that wereconsiderednotto be appropriateapplicable forstandardization inthisdocumentspecification but were considered important to document. There are no dependenciesagainston <xref target="further"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A"/> in order to build a complete working and interoperable ACP according to this document.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1-19">The ACP provides secure IPv6connectivity, thereforeconnectivity; therefore, it can be usednot only as thefor secure connectivity not only for self-management as required for the ACP in <xref target="RFC7575"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7575"/> butit canalsobe used as the secure connectivityfor traditional (centralized) management. The ACP can be implemented and operated without any other components ofautonomic networks,Autonomic Networks, except forthe GRASP protocol.GRASP. ACP relies on per-linkDULLDiscovery Unsolicited Link-Local (DULL) GRASP (see <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>) toautodiscoverauto-discover ACPneighbors,neighbors and includes the ACP GRASP instance to provide service discovery for clients of the ACP (see <xref target="GRASP"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9"/>), including for its own maintenance of ACP certificates.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1-20">The document <xref target="RFC8368"format="default">"Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM"</xref>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368"/> describes how the ACPalonecan be used alone to provide secure and stable connectivity for autonomic and non-autonomic OAM applications, specifically for the case of current non-autonomicnetworks/nodes.networks and/or nodes. That document also explains how existing management solutions can leverage the ACP in parallel with traditional management models, when to use theACPACP, and how to integrate with potentiallyIPv4 onlyIPv4-only OAM backends.</t><t>Combining<t indent="0" pn="section-1-21">Combining ACP with Bootstrapping Remote Secure KeyInfrastructures (BRSKI), seeInfrastructure (BRSKI) (see <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>)target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>) results in the "Autonomic Network Infrastructure" (ANI) as defined in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>,target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>, which provides autonomic connectivity (from ACP) with secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap from BRSKI. The ANI itself does not constitute an Autonomic Network, but it allows the building of more or lessautonomic networksAutonomic Networks on top ofit -it, using eithercentralized, Software Defined Networking- (SDN-)stylecentralized automation in SDN style (see "<xref target="RFC7426" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology"/>" <xref target="RFC7426"format="default"/>) automationformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7426"/>) or distributed automation via Autonomic Service Agents (ASA)/and/or Autonomic Functions(AF) -(AF), or a mixture of both. See <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/> for more information.</t> <section anchor="applicability" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Applicabilitytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-applicability-and-scope">Applicability and Scope</name><t>Please<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-1">Please see the following Terminology section (<xref target="terminology"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 2"/>) for explanations of terms used in this section.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-2">The design of the ACP as defined in this document is considered to be applicable to all types of "professionally managed" networks: Service Provider, Local Area Network (LAN),Metro(politan networks),Metropolitan Area Network (MAN/Metro), Wide Area Network (WAN), Enterprise Information Technology (IT) and <xref target="ot"format="none">->"Operational Technology"</xref>format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Operational Technology</xref> (OT) networks. The ACP can operate equally onlayerLayer 3 (L3) equipment and onlayer 2L2 equipment such as bridges (see <xref target="acp-l2-switches"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>). The hop-by-hop authentication,integrity-protectionintegrity protection, and confidentiality mechanism used by the ACP is defined to benegotiable, thereforenegotiable; therefore, it can be extended to environments with different protocol preferences. The minimum implementation requirements in this document attempt to achieve maximum interoperability by requiring support for multiple options depending on the type of device:IPsec, see <xrefIPsec (see "<xref target="RFC4301"format="default"/>,format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"/>" <xref target="RFC4301" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4301"/>) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS, see <xref target="DTLS"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.4"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-3">The implementation footprint of the ACP consists of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) code for the ACP certificate including"EnrollmentEST (see "<xref target="RFC7030" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Enrollment over SecureTransport (EST, seeTransport"/>" <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/>), the GRASP protocol,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/>), GRASP, UDP,TCPTCP, and Transport Layer Security (TLS, see <xref target="tls"format="default"/>), forformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.1"/>). For more information regarding the security and reliability of GRASP and for EST, the ACP secure channel protocol used (such as IPsec or DTLS), and an instance of IPv6 packet forwarding and routing viatheRPL, see "<xref target="RFC6550" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol forLow-powerLow-Power and LossyNetworks (RPL), seeNetworks"/>" <xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/>, thatformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>, which is separate from routing and forwarding for theData-Planedata plane (user traffic).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-4">The ACP uses only IPv6 to avoid the complexity of dual-stack (both IPv6 and IPv4) ACPoperations (IPv6/IPv4).operations. Nevertheless, it can be integrated without any changesbe integrated into evento otherwise IPv4-only network devices. TheData-Planedata plane itself would not need tochangechange, and it could continue to be IPv4 only. For such IPv4-only devices,theIPv6protocolitself would be additional implementation footprint that is only required for the ACP.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-5">The protocol choices of the ACP are primarily based on wide use and support in networks and devices,well understoodwell-understood securitypropertiesproperties, and required scalability. The ACP design is an attempt to produce the lowest risk combination of existing technologies and protocols to build a widelyapplicableapplicable, operational network management solution.</t><t>RPL<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-6">RPL was chosen because it requires a smaller routing table footprint in large networks compared to other routing protocols with an autonomically configured single area. The deployment experience oflarge scalelarge-scale Internet of Things (IoT) networks serves as the basis for wide deployment experience with RPL. The profile chosen for RPL in the ACP does not leverage anyRPL specificRPL-specific forwarding plane features (IPv6 extension headers), making its implementation a pure control plane software requirement.</t><t>GRASP<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-7">GRASP is the only completely novel protocol used in the ACP, and this choice was necessary because there is no existingsuitableprotocolto providesuitable for providing the necessary functions to the ACP, so GRASP was developed to fill that gap.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-8">The ACP design can be applicable to devices constrained with respect tocpuCPU and memory, and to networks constrained with respect to bitrate and reliability, but this document does not attempt to define the most constrained type of devices or networks to which the ACP is applicable. RPL and DTLS for ACP secure channels are two protocol choices already making ACP more applicable to constrained environments. Support for constrained devices in this specification is opportunistic, but not complete, because the reliable transport for GRASP (see <xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/>) only specifies TCP/TLS. See <xref target="reuse-acp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.8"/> for discussions about how future standards or proprietaryextensions/variationsextensions and/or variations of the ACP could better meetdifferentexpectations that are different from thoseonupon which the current design isbasedbased, including supporting constrained devices better.</t> </section><!-- applicability --></section><!-- intro --><section anchor="terminology" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Acronymstoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acronyms-and-terminology-in">Acronyms and Terminology (Informative)</name><t>[RFC-Editor: Please add ACP, BRSKI, GRASP, MASA to https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/abbrev.expansion.txt.]</t> <t>[RFC-Editor: What is the recommended way to reference a hanging text, e.g. to a definition in the list of definitions? Up to -28, this document was using XMLv2 and the only option I could find for RFC/XML to point to a hanging text was format="title", which leads to references such as '->"ACP certificate" ()', aka: redundant empty parenthesis. Many reviewers where concerned about this. I created a ticket to ask for an xml2rfc enhancement to avoid this in the future: https://trac.tools.ietf.org/tools/xml2rfc/trac/ticket/347. When i changed to XMLv3 in version -29, i could get rid of the unnecessary () by using format="none", but that format is declared to be deprecated in XMLv3. So i am not aware of any working AND "non-deprecated" option.]</t> <t>[RFC-Editor: Question: Is it possible to change the first occurrences of [RFCxxxx] references to "rfcxxx title" [RFCxxxx]? the XML2RFC format does not seem to offer such a format, but I did not want to duplicate 50 first references - one reference for title mentioning and one for RFC number.]</t> <t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">This document serves both as a normative specification forhowACPnodes have to behavenode behavior as well asdescribingan explanation of the context by providing descriptions of requirements, benefits,architecturearchitecture, and operationalaspects to explain the context.aspects. Normative sections arelabelledlabeled "(Normative)" and use BCP 14 keywords. Other sections arelabelledlabeled "(Informative)" and do not use those normative keywords.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-2-2">In the rest of thedocumentdocument, we will refer to systemsusingthat use the ACP as "nodes". Typically, such a node is a physical (network equipment) device, but it can equally be some virtualized system. Therefore, we do not refer to them as devices unless the context specifically calls for a physical system.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-2-3">This document introduces or uses the following terms (sorted alphabetically).Terms introducedIntroduced terms are explained on first use, so this list is for reference only.</t> <dlspacing="compact"> <dt>ACP:</dt> <dd>"Autonomicspacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-2-4"> <dt pn="section-2-4.1">ACP:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.2">Autonomic ControlPlane".Plane. TheAutonomic Function<xref target="af-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">autonomic function</xref> as defined in this document. It providessecuresecure, zero-touch (automated) transitive(network wide)(network-wide) IPv6 connectivity for all nodes in the same ACP domain as well as a GRASP instance running across this ACP IPv6 connectivity. The ACP is primarily meant to be used as a component of theANI<xref target="ani-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ANI</xref> to enableAutonomic Networks<xref target="an-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Autonomic Networks</xref>, but it can equally be used in simple ANI networks (with no otherAutonomic Functions)autonomic functions) or completely by itself. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.3">ACP address:</dt><dd>An<dd pn="section-2-4.4">An IPv6 address assigned to the ACP node. It is stored in theacp-node-name<xref target="acp-node-name-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">acp-node-name</xref> of the <xref target="domcert-def"format="none">->"ACP certificate"</xref>.format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificate</xref>. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.5">ACP addressrange/set:</dt> <dd>Therange or set:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.6">The ACP address may imply a range or set of addresses that the node can assign for different purposes. This addressrange/setrange or set is derived by the node from the format of the ACP address called the"addressing sub-scheme".addressing sub-scheme. </dd> <dt anchor="domcert-def" pn="section-2-4.7">ACP certificate:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.8">A Local Device IDentity (<xref target="ldevid" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">LDevID</xref>) certificate conforming to "<xref target="RFC5280" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"/>" <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> that carries the <xref target="acp-node-name-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">acp-node-name</xref>, which is used by the ACP to learn its address in the ACP and to derive and cryptographically assert its membership in the ACP domain. In the context of the ANI, the ACP certificate is also called the ANI certificate. In the context of AN, the ACP certificate is also called the AN certificate. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.9">ACP connect interface:</dt><dd>An<dd pn="section-2-4.10">An interface on an ACP nodeprovidingthat provides access to the ACP fornon ACP capablenon-ACP-capable nodes without using an ACP secure channel. See <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.11">ACP domain:</dt><dd>The<dd pn="section-2-4.12">The ACP domain is the set of nodes with <xref target="domcert-def"format="none">->"ACP certificates"</xref>format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificates</xref> that allow them to authenticate each other as members of the ACP domain. See also <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.</dd> <dt>ACP (ANI/AN) certificate:</dt> <dd anchor="domcert-def">A <xref target="RFC5280" format="default"/> certificate (LDevID) carrying the acp-node-name which is used by the ACP to learn its address in the ACP and to derive and cryptographically assert its membership in the ACP domain. </dd> <dt>ACP acp-node-name field:</dt> <dd>An information field in the ACP certificate in which the ACP relevant information is encoded: the ACP domain name, the ACP IPv6 address of the node and optional additional role attributes about the node. </dd> <dt>ACP Loopbackformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>.</dd> <dt anchor="acp-loopback-def" pn="section-2-4.13">ACP loopback interface:</dt> <ddanchor="acp-loopback-def">The Loopbackpn="section-2-4.14">The loopback interface in the ACPVirtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF)<xref target="vrf-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">VRF</xref> that has the ACP address assigned to it. See <xref target="ACP-loopback"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.1"/>. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.15">ACP network:</dt><dd>The<dd pn="section-2-4.16">The ACP networkconstitutescomprises all the nodes that have access to the ACP. It is the set of active and transitively connected nodes of an ACP domain plus all nodes that get access to the ACP of that domain via ACP edge nodes. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.17">ACP (ULA) prefix(es):</dt><dd>The<dd pn="section-2-4.18">The /48 IPv6 address prefixes used across the ACP. In thenormal/simplenormal or simple case, the ACP has oneULA<xref target="ula-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Unique Local Address (ULA)</xref> prefix, see <xref target="addressing"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11"/>. The ACP routing table may include multiple ULA prefixes if the"rsub"rsub option is used to create addresses from more than one ULA prefix. See <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>. The ACP may also include non-ULA prefixes if those are configured on ACP connect interfaces. See <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.19">ACP secure channel:</dt><dd>A<dd pn="section-2-4.20">A channel authenticated via <xref target="domcert-def"format="none">->"ACP certificates"</xref>format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificates</xref> providing integrity protection and confidentiality through encryption. These channels are established between (normally) adjacent ACP nodes to carrytraffic of theACPVRF securely and isolated from Data-Plane<xref target="vrf-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">VRF</xref> traffic in-band over the samelink/pathlinks and paths as data plane traffic but isolate it from theData-Plane.data plane traffic and secure it. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.21">ACP secure channel protocol:</dt><dd>The<dd pn="section-2-4.22">The protocol used to build an ACP secure channel, e.g., Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) with IPsec orDatagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).DTLS. </dd><dt>ACP<dt pn="section-2-4.23">ACP virtual interface:</dt><dd>An<dd pn="section-2-4.24">An interface in the ACPVRF<xref target="vrf-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">VRF</xref> mapped to one or more ACP secure channels. See <xref target="ACP_interfaces"format="default"/>. </dd> <dt>AN</dt> <dd>"Autonomic Network": A network according to <xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>. Its main components are ANI, Autonomic Functions and Intent.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5"/>. </dd><dt>(AN) Domain Name:</dt> <dd>An FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name)<dt anchor="acp-node-name-def" pn="section-2-4.25">acp-node-name field:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.26">An information field in theacp-node-name of the Domain Certificate. See<xreftarget="domcert-acpinfo" format="default"/>. </dd> <dt>ANItarget="domcert-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificate</xref> in which the following ACP-relevant information is encoded: the ACP domain name, the ACP IPv6 address of the node, and optional additional role attributes about the node. </dd> <dt anchor="an-def" pn="section-2-4.27">AN:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.28">Autonomic Network. A network according to <xref target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>. Its main components are <xref target="ani-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ANI</xref>, <xref target="af-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">autonomic functions</xref>, and <xref target="intent-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Intent</xref>. </dd> <dt pn="section-2-4.29">(AN) Domain Name:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.30">An FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) in the acp-node-name of the domain certificate. See <xref target="domcert-acpinfo" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>. </dd> <dt anchor="ani-def" pn="section-2-4.31">ANI (nodes/network):</dt><dd>"Autonomic<dd pn="section-2-4.32">Autonomic NetworkInfrastructure".Infrastructure. The ANI is the infrastructure to enableAutonomic Networks.<xref target="an-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Autonomic Networks</xref>. It includes ACP,BRSKIBRSKI, and GRASP. Every Autonomic Network includes the ANI, but not every ANI network needs to includeautonomic functions<xref target="af-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">autonomic functions</xref> beyond the ANI (norIntent).<xref target="intent-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Intent</xref>). An ANI network without further autonomic functionscancan, forexampleexample, support secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap and stable connectivity for SDNnetworks -networks, see <xref target="RFC8368"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368"/>. </dd><dt>ANIMA:</dt> <dd>"Autonomic<dt pn="section-2-4.33">ANIMA:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.34">Autonomic Networking Integrated Model andApproach".Approach. ACP,BRSKIBRSKI, and GRASP are specifications of the IETF ANIMAworking group.Working Group. </dd><dt>ASA:</dt> <dd>"Autonomic<dt pn="section-2-4.35">ASA:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.36">Autonomic ServiceAgent".Agent. Autonomic software modules running on anANI<xref target="ani-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ANI</xref> device. The components making up the ANI (BRSKI, ACP, and GRASP) are also described as ASAs. </dd><dt>Autonomic Function:</dt> <dd>A function/service<dt anchor="af-def" pn="section-2-4.37">autonomic function:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.38">A function and/or service in an Autonomic Network (AN) composed of one or moreASAASAs across one or more ANI nodes. </dd><dt>BRSKI:</dt> <dd>"Bootstrapping<dt pn="section-2-4.39">BRSKI:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.40">Bootstrapping Remote Secure KeyInfrastructures" (<xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>.Infrastructure <xref target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>. A protocol extendingEST<xref target="est-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">EST</xref> to enable secure zero-touch bootstrap in conjunction with ACP. ANI nodes use ACP,BRSKIBRSKI, and GRASP. </dd><dt>CA:</dt><dt anchor="ca-def" pn="section-2-4.41">CA:</dt> <ddanchor="ca-def">"Certification Authority".pn="section-2-4.42">Certification Authority. An entity that issues digital certificates. A CA uses its private key to sign the certificates it issues. Relying parties use the public key in the CA certificate to validate the signature.</dd><dt>CRL:</dt> <dd>"Certificate<dt pn="section-2-4.43">CRL:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.44">Certificate RevocationList".List. A list of revokedcertificates. Requiredcertificates is required to revoke certificates before their lifetime expires. </dd><dt>Data-Plane:</dt> <dd>The<dt pn="section-2-4.45">data plane:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.46">The counterpoint to the ACPVRF<xref target="vrf-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">VRF</xref> in an ACP node: the forwarding of user trafficandin non-autonomousnodes/networksnodes and/or networks and also any non-autonomous control and/or management plane functions. In a fullyAutonomic Network<xref target="an-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Autonomic Network</xref> node, theData-Planedata plane is managed autonomically viaAutonomic Functions<xref target="af-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">autonomic functions</xref> andIntent.<xref target="intent-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Intent</xref>. See <xref target="intro"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 1"/> for moredetailed explanations.details. </dd><dt>device:</dt> <dd>A<dt pn="section-2-4.47">device:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.48">A physicalsystem,system or physical node.</dd><dt>Enrollment:</dt> <dd>The<dt anchor="enrollment-def" pn="section-2-4.49">enrollment:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.50">The processthroughby which a node authenticates itself to a network with an initial identity, which is often calledIDevIDan <xref target="idevid-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Initial Device IDentity (IDevID)</xref> certificate, and acquires from the network anetwork specificnetwork-specific identity, which is often calledLDevIDan <xref target="ldevid" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">LDevID</xref> certificate, and certificates of one or moreTrust Anchor(s).<xref target="ta-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">trust anchor(s)</xref>. In the ACP, the LDevID certificate is called theACP certificate.<xref target="domcert-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificate</xref>. </dd><dt>EST:</dt> <dd>"Enrollment<dt anchor="est-def" pn="section-2-4.51">EST:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.52">Enrollment over SecureTransport" (<xrefTransport <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/>. IETFstandard-trackStandards Track protocol for enrollment of a node with anLDevID<xref target="ldevid" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">LDevID</xref> certificate. BRSKI is based on EST. </dd><dt>GRASP:</dt> <dd>"Generic<dt pn="section-2-4.53">GRASP:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.54">GeneRic Autonomic SignalingProtocol".Protocol. An extensible signaling protocol required by the ACP for ACP neighbor discovery.</dd><dt/> <dd>The<dt pn="section-2-4.55"/> <dd pn="section-2-4.56">The ACP also provides the "security and transport substrate" for the "ACP instance of GRASP". This instance of GRASP runs across the ACP secure channels to support BRSKI and otherNOC/OAMNOC and/or OAM orAutonomic Functions.<xref target="af-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">autonomic functions</xref>. See <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" format="default"/>.target="RFC8990" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8990"/>. </dd><dt>IDevID:</dt> <dd>An "Initial<dt anchor="idevid-def" pn="section-2-4.57">IDevID:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.58">An Initial DeviceIDentity"IDentity X.509 certificate installed by the vendor on new equipment.ContainsThe IDevID certificate contains information that establishes the identity of the node in the context of itsvendor/manufacturervendor and/or manufacturer such as devicemodel/typemodel and/or type and serial number. See <xref target="AR8021"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="AR8021"/>. The IDevID certificate cannot be used as a node identifier for the ACP because they are not provisioned by the owner of the network, so they can not directly indicate an ACP domain they belong to. </dd><dt>in-band (management/signaling):</dt><dt anchor="in-band-def" pn="section-2-4.59">in-band (as in management or signaling):</dt> <ddanchor="in-band-def">pn="section-2-4.60"> In-band management traffic and/or control plane signaling uses the same network resources such asrouters/switchesrouters and/or switches and network links that itmanages/controls.manages and/or controls. In-band is the standard management and signaling mechanism in IP networks. Compared to <xref target="out-of-band-def"format="none">->"out-of-band"</xref> itformat="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">out-of-band</xref>, the in-band mechanism requires no additional physical resources, but it introduces potentially circular dependencies for its correct operations. See <xref target="intro"format="none">->"introduction"</xref>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 1"/>. </dd><dt>Intent:</dt> <dd>Policy<dt anchor="intent-def" pn="section-2-4.61">Intent:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.62">The policy language of anautonomic networkAutonomic Network according to <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>.target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>. </dd><dt>Loopback<dt pn="section-2-4.63">Loopback interface:</dt><dd>See<dd pn="section-2-4.64">See <xref target="acp-loopback-def"format="none">->"ACP Loopback interface"</xref>.format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP loopback interface</xref>. </dd><dt>LDevID:</dt> <dd>A "Local<dt anchor="ldevid" pn="section-2-4.65">LDevID:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.66">A Local DeviceIDentity"IDentity is an X.509 certificate installed during"enrollment".<xref target="enrollment-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">enrollment</xref>. TheDomain Certificate<xref target="domcert-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">domain certificate</xref> used by the ACP is an LDevID certificate. See <xref target="AR8021"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="AR8021"/>. </dd><dt>Management:</dt> <dd>Used<dt pn="section-2-4.67">management:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.68">Used in this document as another word for <xref target="OAM"format="none">->"OAM"</xref>.format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">OAM</xref>. </dd><dt>MASA<dt pn="section-2-4.69">MASA (service):</dt><dd>"Manufacturer<dd pn="section-2-4.70">Manufacturer Authorized SigningAuthority".Authority. Avendor/manufacturervendor and/or manufacturer or delegated cloud service on the Internet used as part of the BRSKI protocol. </dd><dt>MIC:</dt> <dd>"Manufacturer<dt pn="section-2-4.71">MIC:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.72">Manufacturer InstalledCertificate". This is another word to describeCertificate. A synonym for anIDevID<xref target="idevid-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">IDevID</xref> in referenced materials. This term is not used in this document. </dd><dt>native<dt pn="section-2-4.73">native interface:</dt><dd>Interfaces<dd pn="section-2-4.74">Interfaces existing on a node without configuration of the already running node. On physicalnodesnodes, these are usually physical interfaces; on virtualnodesnodes, their equivalent. </dd><dt>NOC:</dt> <dd>Network<dt pn="section-2-4.75">NOC:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.76">Network Operations Center. </dd><dt>node:</dt> <dd>A<dt pn="section-2-4.77">node:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.78">A system supporting the ACP according to this document.CanA node can be virtual or physical. Physical nodes are called devices. </dd><dt>Node-ID:</dt><dt anchor="node-id" pn="section-2-4.79">Node-ID:</dt> <ddanchor="node-id">pn="section-2-4.80"> The identifier of an ACP node inside that ACP. It is either the last 64 bits (see <xref target="zone-scheme"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>) or78-bits78 bits (see <xref target="Vlong"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>) of the ACP address. </dd><dt>OAM:</dt><dt anchor="OAM" pn="section-2-4.81">OAM:</dt> <ddanchor="OAM">Operations, Administrationpn="section-2-4.82">Operations, Administration, and Management. IncludesNetwork Monitoring.network monitoring. </dd><dt>Operational<dt anchor="ot" pn="section-2-4.83">Operational Technology (OT):</dt> <ddanchor="ot"><eref target="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_Technology"/>:pn="section-2-4.84"> "The hardware and software dedicated to detecting or causing changes in physical processes through direct monitoring and/or control of physical devices such as valves, pumps,etc.".etc." <xref target="OP-TECH" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="OP-TECH"/>. In most cases today, OT networks aretoday in most caseswell separated from Information Technology (IT) networks. </dd><dt>out-of-band<dt anchor="out-of-band-def" pn="section-2-4.85">out-of-band (management) network:</dt> <ddanchor="out-of-band-def">pn="section-2-4.86"> An out-of-band network is a secondary network used to manage a primary network. The equipment of the primary network is connected to the out-of-band network via dedicated management ports on the primary network equipment. Serial (console) management ports were historically mostcommon, higher endcommon; however, higher-end network equipment now also hasethernetEthernet ports dedicated onlyforto management. An out-of-band network provides management access to the primary network independent of the configuration state of the primary network. See <xref target="intro"format="none">->"Introduction"</xref></dd> <dt>(virtual) out-of-band network:</dt>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 1"/>.</dd> <dt anchor="virtual-out-of-band-def" pn="section-2-4.87">out-of-band network, virtual:</dt> <ddanchor="virtual-out-of-band-def">pn="section-2-4.88"> The ACP can be called a virtual out-of-band network for management and control because it attempts to provide the benefits of a (physical) <xref target="out-of-band-def"format="none">->"out-of-band network"</xref>format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">out-of-band network</xref> even though it is physically carried <xref target="in-band-def"format="none">->"in-band"</xref>.format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">in-band</xref>. See <xref target="intro"format="none">->"introduction"</xref>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 1"/>. </dd><dt>root<dt pn="section-2-4.89">root CA:</dt><dd>"root<dd pn="section-2-4.90">root CertificationAuthority".Authority. A <xref target="ca-def"format="none">->"CA"</xref>format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">CA</xref> for which the root CAKeykey update procedures of <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/>, Section 4.4sectionFormat="comma" section="4.4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030#section-4.4" derivedContent="RFC7030"/>, can be applied. </dd><dt>RPL:</dt> <dd>"IPv6<dt pn="section-2-4.91">RPL:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.92">IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and LossyNetworks".Networks. The routing protocol used in the ACP. See <xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>. </dd><dt>(ACP/ANI/BRSKI) Registrar:</dt> <dd><dt pn="section-2-4.93">registrar (ACP, ANI/BRSKI):</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.94"> An ACP registrar is an entity (software and/or person) thatis orchestratingorchestrates theenrollment<xref target="enrollment-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">enrollment</xref> of ACP nodes with theACP certificate.<xref target="domcert-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP certificate</xref>. ANI nodes use BRSKI, so ANI registrars are also called BRSKI registrars. For non-ANI ACP nodes, the registrar mechanisms areundefined bynot defined in this document. See <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/>. Renewal and other maintenance (such as revocation) of ACP certificates may be performed byotherentities other than registrars. EST must be supported for ACP certificate renewal (see <xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>). BRSKI is an extension of EST, so ANI/BRSKI registrars can easily support ACP domain certificate renewal in addition to initial enrollment. </dd><dt>RPI:</dt> <dd>"RPL<dt pn="section-2-4.95">RPI:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.96">RPL PacketInformation".Information. Network extension headers for use withthe<xref target="rpl-def"format="none">->"RPL"</xref> routing protocols.format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">RPL</xref>. Not used with RPL in the ACP. See <xref target="rpl-Data-Plane"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.13"/>. </dd><dt>RPL:</dt><dt anchor="rpl-def" pn="section-2-4.97">RPL:</dt> <ddanchor="rpl-def">"Routingpn="section-2-4.98">Routing Protocol for Low-Power and LossyNetworks".Networks. The routing protocol used in the ACP. See <xref target="routing"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12"/>. </dd><dt>sUDI:</dt> <dd>"secured<dt anchor="sudi" pn="section-2-4.99">sUDI:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.100">secured Unique DeviceIdentifier".Identifier. This isanother word to describe ana synonym of IDevID in referenced material. This term is not used in this document. </dd><dt>TA:</dt><dt anchor="ta-def" pn="section-2-4.101">TA:</dt> <ddanchor="ta-def">"Trust Anchor".pn="section-2-4.102">Trust Anchor. ATrust AnchorTA is an entity that is trusted for the purpose of certificate validation.Trust Anchor InformationTA information such as self-signed certificate(s) of theTrust AnchorTA is configured into the ACP node as part ofEnrollment.<xref target="enrollment-def" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">enrollment</xref>. See <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>, Section 6.1.1.sectionFormat="comma" section="6.1.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-6.1.1" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>. </dd><dt>UDI:</dt> <dd>"Unique<dt pn="section-2-4.103">UDI:</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.104">Unique DeviceIdentifier".Identifier. In the context of thisdocumentdocument, unsecured identity information of a node typicallyconsistingconsists of at least a devicemodel/typemodel and/or type and a serial number, often in avendor specificvendor-specific format. SeesUDI<xref target="sudi" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">sUDI</xref> andLDevID.<xref target="ldevid" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">LDevID</xref>. </dd><dt>ULA:<dt anchor="ula-def" pn="section-2-4.105">ULA (Global IDprefix)</dt> <dd>prefix):</dt> <dd pn="section-2-4.106"> A"UniqueUnique LocalAddress" (ULA)Address is an IPv6 address in the block fc00::/7, defined in[RFC4193]."<xref target="RFC4193" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses"/>" <xref target="RFC4193" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>. ULA is the IPv6 successor of the IPv4 private address space(<xref("<xref target="RFC1918"format="default"/>). ULAformat="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Address Allocation for Private Internets"/>" <xref target="RFC1918" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC1918"/>). ULAs have important differences over IPv4 private addresses that are beneficial for and exploited by the ACP, such as theLocally Assignedlocally assigned Global ID prefix, whichareis the first48-bits48 bits of a ULA address <xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/>, section 3.2.1.sectionFormat="comma" section="3.2.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4193#section-3.2.1" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>. In thisdocumentdocument, this prefix is abbreviated as "ULA prefix". </dd><dt>(ACP)<dt anchor="vrf-def" pn="section-2-4.107">(ACP) VRF:</dt><dd>The<dd pn="section-2-4.108">The ACP is modeled in this document as a"VirtualVirtual Routing andForwarding" instance (VRF).Forwarding instance. This means that it is based on a "virtual router" consisting of a separate IPv6 forwarding table to which the ACP virtual interfaces are attached and an associated IPv6 routing table separate from theData-Plane.data plane. Unlike the VRFs onMPLS/VPN-PE (<xrefMPLS/VPN Provider Edge ("<xref target="RFC4364" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)"/>" <xref target="RFC4364"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4364"/>) or LISPXTR (<xrefxTR ("<xref target="RFC6830" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)"/>" <xref target="RFC6830"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6830"/>), the ACP VRF does not have any special "core facing" functionality orrouting/mappingrouting and/or mapping protocols shared across multiple VRFs. In vendorproductsproducts, a VRF such as theACP-VRFACP VRF may also be referred to as aso calledVRF-lite. </dd><dt>(ACP)<dt pn="section-2-4.109">(ACP) Zone:</dt><dd>An<dd pn="section-2-4.110">An ACP zone is a set of ACP nodes using the same zone field value in their ACP address according to <xref target="zone-scheme"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>. Zones are a mechanism to support structured addressing of ACP addresses within the same/48-bit/48 ULA prefix. </dd> </dl><t><t indent="0" pn="section-2-5"> The key words"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY","<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and"OPTIONAL""<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14 [RFC2119],[RFC8174]BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. </t> </section> <section anchor="usage" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Usetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3"> <name slugifiedName="name-use-cases-for-an-autonomic-">Use Cases for an Autonomic Control Plane (Informative)</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">This section summarizes the use cases that are intended to be supported by an ACP. To understand how these are derived from and relate to the larger set of use cases forautonomic networks,Autonomic Networks, please refer to "<xref target="RFC8316" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Autonomic Networking Use Case for Distributed Detection of Service Level Agreement (SLA) Violations"/>" <xref target="RFC8316"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8316"/>.</t> <section anchor="infrastructure" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Antoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-an-infrastructure-for-auton">An Infrastructure for Autonomic Functions</name><t>Autonomic Functions<t indent="0" pn="section-3.1-1">Autonomic functions need a stable infrastructure to run on, and all autonomic functions should use the same infrastructure to minimize the complexity of the network. In this way, there is only need for a single discovery mechanism, a single security mechanism, and single instances of other processes that distributed functions require.</t> </section><!-- infrastructure --><section anchor="secure-bootstrap" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Securetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-secure-bootstrap-over-an-un">Secure Bootstrap overa not configuredan Unconfigured Network</name><t>Today,<t indent="0" pn="section-3.2-1">Today, bootstrapping a new node typically requires all nodes between a controlling node such as an SDN controller("Software Defined Networking", see(see <xref target="RFC7426"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7426"/>) and the new node to be completely and correctly addressed,configuredconfigured, and secured. Bootstrapping and configuration of a network happens in rings around the controller--- configuring each ring of devices before the next one can be bootstrapped. Without console access (forexampleexample, through an out-of-bandnetwork)network), it is not possible today to make devices securely reachable before having configured the entire network leading up to them.</t><t>With<t indent="0" pn="section-3.2-2">With the ACP, secure bootstrap of new devices and whole new networks can happen without requiring any configuration of unconfigured devices along thepath:path. As long as all devices along the path support ACP and a zero-touch bootstrap mechanism such as BRSKI, the ACP across a whole network of unconfigured devices can be brought up withoutoperator/provisioningoperator and/or provisioning intervention. The ACP alsoprovidesoffers additional security for any bootstrapmechanism,mechanism because it can provide the encrypted discovery (via ACP GRASP) of registrars or other bootstrap servers by bootstrap proxies connecting to nodes that are to bebootstrapped and thebootstrapped. The ACP encryption hides the identities of the communicating entities (pledge and registrar), making it more difficult to learn which network node might be attackable. The ACP certificate can also be used to end-to-end encrypt the bootstrap communication between such proxies and server. Note that bootstrapping here includes not only the first step that can be provided by BRSKI (secure keys), but also later stages where configuration is bootstrapped.</t> </section><!-- bootstrap --><section anchor="reachability" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Data-Planetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-permanent-reachability-inde">Permanent Reachability IndependentPermanent Reachability</name> <t>Today,of the Data Plane</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-1">Today, most critical control plane protocols and OAM protocolsare usinguse theData-Planedata plane of the network. This leads to often undesirable dependencies between the control and OAM plane on one side and theData-Planedata plane on the other:Onlyonly if the forwarding and control plane of theData-Planedata plane are configured correctly, will theData-Planedata plane and theOAM/controlOAM and/or control plane work as expected.</t><t>Data-Plane<t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-2">Data plane connectivity can be affected by errors andfaults, for examplefaults. Examples include misconfigurations that make AAA (Authentication,AuthorizationAuthorization, and Accounting) servers unreachable or that can lock an administrator out of a device; routing or addressing issues can make a device unreachable; and shutting down interfaces over which a current management session is running can lock anadminadministrator irreversibly out of the device. Traditionally only out-of-band access via a serial console or Ethernet management port can help recover from suchissues (such as serial console or ethernet management port).</t> <t>Data-Planeissues.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-3">Data plane dependencies also affect applications in aNetwork Operations Center (NOC)NOC such as SDN controller applications:Certaincertain network changes aretodayhard toimplement,implement today because the change itself may affect reachability of the devices. Examplesareinclude address or mask changes, routing changes, or security policies. Today such changes requirepreciseprecise, hop-by-hop planning.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-4">Note that specific control plane functions for theData-Planedata plane oftenwant todepend onforwarding ofthe ability to forward their packets via theData-Plane: Alivenessdata plane: sending aliveness and routing protocol signaling packets across theData-Planedata plane to verifyreachability across the Data-Plane,reachability, using IPv4 signaling packets for IPv4 routingvs.and IPv6 signaling packets for IPv6 routing.</t><t>Assuming<t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-5">Assuming appropriate implementation (see <xref target="general_addressing"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.2"/> for more details), the ACP provides reachability that is independent of theData-Plane.data plane. This allows the control plane and OAM plane to operate more robustly: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Forspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-3.3-6"> <li pn="section-3.3-6.1">For management plane protocols, the ACP provides the functionality of a Virtualout-of-bandout-of-Band (VooB) channel, by providing connectivity to all nodes regardless of theirData-Planedata plane configuration, and routing and forwarding tables.</li><li>For<li pn="section-3.3-6.2">For control plane protocols, the ACP allows their operation even when theData-Planedata plane is temporarily faulty, or during transitional events, such as routing changes, which may affect the control plane at least temporarily. This is specifically important for autonomic service agents, which could affectData-Planedata plane connectivity.</li> </ul><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-3.3-7">The document <xref target="RFC8368"format="default">"Usingformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368">"Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM"</xref> explains this use case for the ACP in significantly more detail and explains how the ACP can be used in practical network operations.</t> </section><!-- reachability --></section><!-- usage --><section anchor="requirements" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Requirementstoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4"> <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-informative">Requirements (Informative)</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">The following requirements were identified for the design of the ACP based on the aboveuse-casesuse cases (<xref target="usage"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3"/>). These requirements are informative. The ACP as specified in the normative parts of this document is meeting or exceeding theseuse-caseuse case requirements:</t> <ol type="ACP%d:"spacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" indent="10" start="1" pn="section-4-2"> <li anchor="acp1" pn="section-4-2.1" derivedCounter="ACP1:">The ACP should provide robust connectivity:Asas far as possible, it should be independent of configured addressing,configurationconfiguration, and routing. Requirements 2 and 3 build on this requirement, but they also have value on their own.</li><li>The<li pn="section-4-2.2" derivedCounter="ACP2:">The ACP must have a separate address space from theData-Plane. Reason:data plane. This separate address space provides traceability,debug-ability,ease of debugging, separation fromData-Plane,data plane, and infrastructure security (filtering based on known address space).</li><li>The<li pn="section-4-2.3" derivedCounter="ACP3:">The ACP must use an autonomically managed address space.Reason: easyAn autonomically managed address space provides ease of bootstrap and setup("autonomic");("autonomic"), and robustness(admin(the administrator cannot break network easily). This document usesUnique Local Addresses (ULA)ULA for this purpose, see <xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>.</li> <li anchor="acp4" pn="section-4-2.4" derivedCounter="ACP4:">The ACP must be generic, thatisis, it must be usable by all the functions and protocols of the ANI. Clients of the ACP must not be tied to a particular application or transport protocol.</li><li>The<li pn="section-4-2.5" derivedCounter="ACP5:">The ACP must provide security:Messagesmessages coming through the ACP must be authenticated to be from a trusted node, and it is very strongly>recommended that they be encrypted.</li> </ol><t>Explanation<t indent="0" pn="section-4-3">The explanation forACP4: In<xref target="acp4" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP4</xref> is as follows: in a fullyautonomic networkAutonomic Network (AN), all newly written ASAs could potentiallyallcommunicateexclusively via GRASPwith eachother,other exclusively via GRASP, and if thatwas assumed to bewere the only requirementagainstfor the ACP, it would not need to provideIPv6 layerIPv6-layer connectivity between nodes, but only GRASP connectivity. Nevertheless, because ACP also intends to supportnon-ANnon-autonomous networks, it is crucial to supportIPv6 layerIPv6-layer connectivity across the ACP to support anytransporttransport-layer andapplication layerapplication-layer protocols.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-4-4">The ACP operateshop-by-hop,hop-by-hop because this interaction can be built on IPv6link locallink-local addressing, which is autonomic, and has no dependency on configuration (requirement1).<xref target="acp1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">ACP1</xref>). It may be necessary to have ACP connectivity across non-ACP nodes, forexampleexample, to link ACP nodes over the general Internet. This is possible, but it introduces a dependencyagainst stable/resilienton stable and/or resilient routing over the non-ACP hops (see <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>).</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/>).</t> </section><!-- requirements --><section anchor="overview" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Overviewtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5"> <name slugifiedName="name-overview-informative">Overview (Informative)</name><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-5-1">When a node has an ACP certificate (see <xref target="acp-certificates"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.1"/>) and is enabled to bring up the ACP (see <xref target="node-enable"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.5"/>), it will create its ACP without any configuration as follows. For details, see <xref target="self-creation"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/> andfurtherfollowing sections: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-5-2"> <li pn="section-5-2.1" derivedCounter="1.">The node creates a VRFinstance,instance or a similar virtual context for the ACP.</li><li>The<li pn="section-5-2.2" derivedCounter="2.">The node assigns its ULA IPv6 address (prefix) (see <xref target="addressing"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11"/>), which is learned from the acp-node-name (see <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>) of its ACP certificate (see <xref target="acp-certificates"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.1"/>), to an ACP loopback interface (see <xref target="addressing"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11"/>) and connects this interfaceintoto the ACP VRF.</li><li>The<li pn="section-5-2.3" derivedCounter="3.">The node establishes a list of candidate peer adjacencies and candidate channel types to try for the adjacency. This is automatic for all candidate link-localadjacencies, seeadjacencies (see <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>) across all native interfaces (see <xref target="if-enable-auto"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.4"/>). If a candidate peer is discovered via multiple interfaces, this will result in one adjacency per interface. If the ACP node has multiple interfaces connecting to the same subnet across which it is also operating as an L2 switch in theData-Plane,data plane, it employs methods for ACP with L2 switching, see <xref target="acp-l2-switches"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Forformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>.</li> <li pn="section-5-2.4" derivedCounter="4.">For each entry in the candidate adjacency list, the node negotiates a secure tunnel using the candidate channel types. See <xref target="channel-selection"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/>.</li> <li pn="section-5-2.5" derivedCounter="5.">The node authenticates the peer node during secure channel setup and authorizes it to become part of the ACP according to <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Unsuccessfulformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>.</li> <li pn="section-5-2.6" derivedCounter="6.">Unsuccessful authentication of a candidate peer results in throttled connection retries for as long as the candidate peer is discoverable. See <xref target="neighbor_verification"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Eachformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.7"/>.</li> <li pn="section-5-2.7" derivedCounter="7.">Each successfully established secure channel is mappedintoto an ACP virtual interface, which is placed into the ACP VRF. See <xref target="ACP-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Eachformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2"/>.</li> <li pn="section-5-2.8" derivedCounter="8.">Each node runs a lightweight routingprotocol, seeprotocol (see <xref target="routing"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12"/>) to announce reachability of the ACP loopback address (or prefix) across the ACP.</li><li>This<li pn="section-5-2.9" derivedCounter="9.">This completes the creation of the ACP with hop-by-hop secure tunnels,auto-addressingauto-addressing, and auto-routing. The node is now an ACP node with a running ACP.</li> </ol><t>Note:<t indent="0" pn="section-5-3">Note: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Nonespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-5-4"> <li pn="section-5-4.1">None of the above operations (except the followingexplicitexplicitly configured ones) are reflected in the configuration of the node.</li><li>Non-ACP NMS ("Network Management Systems")<li anchor="sec5bt2" pn="section-5-4.2">Non-ACP network management systems (NMS) or SDN controllers have to be explicitly configured for connectionintoto the ACP.</li><li>Additional<li pn="section-5-4.3">Additional candidate peer adjacencies for ACP connections across non-ACPLayer-3Layer 3 clouds requires explicit configuration. See <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>.</li>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/>.</li> </ul><t>The following figure<t indent="0" pn="section-5-5"><xref target="acp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 1"/> illustrates the ACP.</t> <figureanchor="acp"> <name>ACPanchor="acp" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-vrf-and-secure-channels">ACP VRF andsecure channels</name>Secure Channels</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-5-6.1"> ACPnodeNode 1 ACPnodeNode 2 ................... ................... secure . . secure . . secure channel: +-----------+ : channel : +-----------+ : channel ..--------| ACP VRF |---------------------| ACP VRF |---------.. : / \ / \<--routing--><--routing--> / \ / \ : : \ / \ / \ / \ / : ..--------|Loopbackloopback |---------------------|Loopbackloopback |---------.. : | interface | : : | interface | : : +-----------+ : : +-----------+ : : : : : :Data-PlaneData Plane :...............:Data-PlaneData Plane : : : link : : :.................: :.................:]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-5-7">The resulting overlay network is normally based exclusively on hop-by-hop tunnels. This is because addressing used on links is IPv6link locallink-local addressing, which does not require any priorset-up.setup. In thiswayway, the ACP can be built even if there is no configuration on the node, or if theData-Planedata plane has issues such as addressing or routing problems.</t> </section><!-- overview --><section anchor="self-creation" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Self-Creationtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6"> <name slugifiedName="name-self-creation-of-an-autonom">Self-Creation of an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) (Normative)</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6-1">This section specifies the components and steps to set up an ACP. The ACP is automatically"self-creating",self-creating, which makes it "indestructible" against most changes to theData-Plane,data plane, including misconfigurations of routing, addressing, NAT,firewallfirewall, or any other traffic policy filters that would inadvertently or otherwise unavoidablywouldalso impact the management plane traffic, such as the actual operatorCLIcommand-line interface (CLI) session or controller NETCONF session through which the configuration changes to theData-Planedata plane are executed.</t><t>Physical<t indent="0" pn="section-6-2">Physical misconfiguration of wiring between ACP nodes will also not break theACP:ACP. As long as there is a transitive physical path between ACP nodes, the ACP should be able to recover given that it automatically operates across all interfaces of the ACP nodes and automatically determines paths between them.</t><t>Attacks<t indent="0" pn="section-6-3">Attacks against the network via incorrect routing or addressing information for theData-Planedata plane will not impact the ACP. Even impaired ACP nodes will have a significantly reduced attack surface against malicious misconfiguration because only very limited ACP or interface up/down configuration can affect the ACP, andpendingdepending on their specificdesignsdesigns, thesetypetypes of attacks could also be eliminated. See more in <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/> and <xref target="security"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Anformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 11"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6-4">An ACP node can be a router, switch, controller, NMS host, or any otherIPv6 capableIPv6-capable node. Initially, itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have its ACP certificate, as well as an (empty) ACPAdjacency Tableadjacency table (described in <xref target="adj-table"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.3"/>). It then can start to discover ACP neighbors and build the ACP. This is described step by step in the followingsections:</t>sections.</t> <section anchor="tls" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Requirementstoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-for-the-use-of">Requirements forusethe Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-1">The following requirements apply to TLS that is required or used by ACP components. Applicable ACP components include ACP certificate maintenance viaEST, seeEST (see <xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>), TLS connections forCertificate Revocation List (CRL)CRL Distribution Point (CRLDP) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder (if used, see <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>), and ACP GRASP (see <xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/>). On ANInodesnodes, these requirements also apply to BRSKI.</t><t>TLS MUST<t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-2">TLS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> comply with "<xref target="RFC7525" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"/>" <xref target="RFC7525"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7525"/> except that TLS 1.2(<xref("<xref target="RFC5246" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"/>" <xref target="RFC5246"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5246"/>) isREQUIRED<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> and that older versions of TLSMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used. TLS 1.3(<xref("<xref target="RFC8446" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"/>" <xref target="RFC8446"format="default"/>) SHOULDformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8446"/>) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be supported. The choice for TLS 1.2 as the lowest common denominator for the ACP is based oncurrentthe currently expected and most likely availability across the wide range of candidate ACP node types, potentially with non-agile operating system TCP/IP stacks.</t><t>TLS MUST<t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-3">TLS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> offer TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 andMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> offer options with less than 256-bit symmetric key strength or hash strength of less than 384 bits. When TLS 1.3 is supported, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be offered and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256MAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be offered.</t><t>TLS MUST<t indent="0" pn="section-6.1-4">TLS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also include the "Supported Elliptic Curves" extension, and itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support the NIST P-256 (secp256r1(22)) and P-384 (secp384r1(24)) curves "<xref target="RFC8422" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier"/>" <xref target="RFC8422"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8422"/>. In addition, TLS 1.2 clientsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> send an ec_point_format extension with a single element, "uncompressed".</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-domain-certificate-and-">ACP Domain,CertificateCertificate, and Network</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-1">The ACP relies on group security. An ACP domain is a group of nodes that trust each other to participate in ACP operations such as creating ACP secure channels in anautonomousautonomous, peer-to-peer fashion between ACP domain members via protocols such as IPsec. To authenticate and authorize another ACP member node with access to the ACPDomain,domain, each ACP member requires keying material:Anan ACP nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> havea Local Device IDentity (LDevID) certificate, henceforth called the ACPan LDevID certificate and information about one or moreTrust Anchor (TA)TAs as required for the ACP domain membership check (<xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Manualformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-2">Manual keying via shared secrets is not usable for an ACP domain because it would require a single shared secret across all current and future ACP domain members to meet the expectation of autonomous, peer-to-peer establishment of ACP secure channels between any ACP domain members. Such a single shared secret would be aninacceptableunacceptable security weakness. Asymmetric keying material (public keys) without certificates does not provide themechanismsmechanism to authenticate ACP domain membership in an autonomous, peer-to-peer fashion for current and future ACP domain members.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-3">The LDevID certificate is henceforth called the ACP certificate. The TA is theCertification Authority (CA)CA root certificate of the ACP domain.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-4">The ACP does not mandate specific mechanisms by which this keying material is provisioned into the ACP node. It only requires that the certificatetocomply with <xref target="acp-certificates"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.1"/>, specificallytothat it have the acp-node-name as specified in <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/> in its domain certificate as well as those of candidate ACP peers. See <xref target="bootstrap"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.2"/> for more information about enrollment or provisioning options.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-5">This document uses the term ACP in many places where the Autonomic Networking reference documents <xref target="RFC7575"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7575"/> and <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/> use the word autonomic. This is done because those reference documents consider (only) fullyautonomic networksAutonomic Networks and nodes, but the support of ACP does not require the support for other components ofautonomic networksAutonomic Networks except forrelyingthe reliance on GRASP and the providing of security and transport for GRASP. Therefore, the word autonomic might be misleading to operators interested in only the ACP.</t><t><xref<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2-6"><xref target="RFC7575"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7575"/> defines the term"Autonomic Domain""autonomic domain" as a collection of autonomic nodes. ACP nodes do not need to be fully autonomic, but when they are, then the ACP domain is an autonomic domain. Likewise, <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/> defines the term"Domain Certificate""domain certificate" as the certificate used in an autonomic domain. The ACP certificate is that domain certificate when ACP nodes are (fully) autonomic nodes. Finally, this document uses the term ACP network to refer to the network created by active ACP nodes in an ACP domain. The ACP network itself can extend beyond ACP nodes through the mechanisms described in <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>.</t> <section anchor="acp-certificates" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-certificates">ACP Certificates</name><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-1">ACP certificatesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> compliant X.509 v3(<xref<xref target="X.509"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.509"/> certificates.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-2">ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support handling ACP certificates, TAcertificatescertificates, and certificate chain certificates (henceforth just called certificates in this section) with RSA public keys and certificates with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public keys.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-3">ACP nodesMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> support certificates with RSA public keys of less than a 2048-bit modulus or curves with group order of less than256-bit.256 bits. TheyMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support certificates with RSA public keys with 2048-bit modulus andMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support longer RSA keys. TheyMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support certificates with ECC public keys using NIST P-256 curves andSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support P-384 and P-521 curves.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-4">ACP nodesMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> support certificates with RSA public keys whose modulus is less than 2048 bits, or certificates whose ECC public keys are in groups whose order is less than256-bits.256 bits. RSA signing certificates with 2048-bit public keysMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported, and such certificates with longer public keysMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be supported. ECDSA certificates using the NIST P-256 curveMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported, and such certificates using the P-384 and P-521 curvesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be supported.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-5">ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support RSA certificates that are signed by RSA signatures over the SHA-256 digest of thecontents,contents andSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> additionally support SHA-384 and SHA-512 digests in such signatures. The same requirements for digest usage in certificate signatures apply toECDSAElliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) certificates, and additionally, ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support ECDSA signatures on ECDSA certificates.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-6">The ACP certificateSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use an RSA key and an RSA signature when the ACP certificate is intended to be used not only for ACP authentication but also for other purposes. The ACP certificateMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use an ECC key and an ECDSA signature if the ACP certificate is only used for ACP and ANI authentication and authorization.</t><t>Any<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-7">Any secure channel protocols used for the ACP as specified in this document or extensions of this documentMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> therefore support authentication(e.g. signing)(e.g., signing), starting with thesetypetypes of certificates. See <xref target="RFC8422"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8422"/> for more information.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-8">The reason for these choices are as follows:Asas of 2020, RSA is still more widely used than ECC, therefore theMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>-level requirements for RSA. ECC offers equivalent security at (logarithmically) shorter key lengths (see <xref target="RFC8422"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8422"/>). This can be beneficial especially in the presence of constrained bandwidth or constrained nodes in an ACP/ANI network. Some ACP functions such as GRASPpeer-2-peerpeer-to-peer across the ACP require end-to-end/any-to-anyauthentication/authorization,authentication and authorization, therefore ECC can only reliably be used in the ACP when itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported on all ACP nodes. RSA signatures are mandatory to be supported also for ECC certificates because the CAs themselves may not support ECC yet.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-9">The ACP certificateSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used for any authentication between nodes with ACP domain certificates (ACP nodes and NOC nodes) where a required authorization condition is ACP domain membership, such as ACP node to NOC/OAM end-to-end security and ASA to ASA end-to-end security. <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/> defines this "ACP domain membership check". The uses of this check that are standardized in this document are for the establishment of hop-by-hop ACP secure channels (<xreftarget="neighbor_verification" format="default"/>)target="associations" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8"/>) and for ACP GRASP (<xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>) end-to-endformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/>) end to end via TLS.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-10">The ACP domain membership check requires a minimumamountnumber of elements in a certificate as described in <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>. The identity of a node in the ACP is carried via the acp-node-name as defined in <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Toformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-11">To supportECDHElliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) directly with the key in the ACP certificate, ACP certificates with ECC keys need to indicateto be Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman capable (ECDH): Ifthat they are ECDH capable: if theX.509v3X.509 v3 keyUsage extension is present, the keyAgreement bit must then be set. Note that this option is not required for any of the required ciphersuites in this document and may not be supported by allCA.</t> <t>AnyCAs.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-12">Any other fields of the ACP certificate are to be populated as required by <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>:format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>. As long as they are compliant with <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>, any other field of an ACP certificate can be set as desired by the operator of the ACP domain through the appropriate ACPregistrar/ACPregistrar and/or ACP CA procedures. For example, other fields may be required forotherpurposes other than those that the ACP certificate is intended to be used for (such as elements of a SubjectName).</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-13">For further certificate details, ACP certificates may follow the recommendations from <xref target="CABFORUM"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Forformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="CABFORUM"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-14">For diagnostic and other operational purposes, it is beneficial to copy thedevice identifyingdevice-identifying fields of the node's IDevID certificate into the ACP certificate, such as the<xref target="X.520" format="default"/>, section 6.2.9"serialNumber" attribute (<xref target="X.520" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.520"/>, Section 6.2.9) in the subject field distinguished name encoding. Note that this is not the certificateserial number.serial-number. See also <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/> section 2.3.1.target="RFC8995" sectionFormat="comma" section="2.3.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995#section-2.3.1" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>. This can bedonedone, forexampleexample, if it would be acceptable for the device's "serialNumber" to be signaled via the Link Layer Discovery Protocol(LLDP,<xref target="LLDP"format="default"/>) becauseformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="LLDP"/> because, likeLLDP signaledLLDP-signaled information, the ACP certificate information can be retrieved by neighboring nodes without further authentication and can be used either for beneficial diagnostics or for malicious attacks. Retrieval of the ACP certificate is possible via a (failing) attempt to set up an ACP secure channel, and the "serialNumber" usually contains device type information that may help tofastermore quickly determine working exploits/attacks against the device.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.1-15">Note that there is no intention to constrain authorization within the ACP orautonomic networksAutonomic Networks using the ACP to just the ACP domain membership check as defined in this document. It can be extended or modified with additional requirements. Such future authorizations can use and require additional elements in certificates or policies or even additional certificates. See <xref target="domcert-maint" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/> for the additional check against the id-kp-cmcRA<xref target="RFC6402" format="default"/>extended key usage attribute(<xref target="domcert-maint" format="default"/>)("<xref target="RFC6402" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates"/>" <xref target="RFC6402" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6402"/>), andfor possible future extensions,see <xref target="role-assignments"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.5"/> for possible future extensions.</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert-acpinfo" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-certificate-acpnodename">ACP Certificate AcpNodeName</name><?rfc needLines="20" ?><figureanchor="acp-dominfo-abnf"> <name>ACPanchor="acp-dominfo-abnf" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-node-name-abnf">ACP Node Name ABNF</name><artwork<sourcecode name=""type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[type="abnf" markers="false" pn="section-6.2.2-1.1"> acp-node-name = local-part "@" acp-domain-name local-part = [ acp-address ] [ "+" rsub extensions ] acp-address = 32HEXDIG|/ "0" ; HEXDIG as ofRFC5234 section[RFC5234], Appendix B.1 rsub = [<subdomain><subdomain> ] ;<subdomain><subdomain> as ofRFC1034, section[RFC1034], Section 3.5 acp-domain-name =; <domain><domain> ; as ofRFC 1034, section[RFC1034], Section 3.5 extensions = *( "+" extension ) extension = 1*etext ; future standard definition. etext = ALPHA / DIGIT / ; Printable US-ASCII "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" /"&""&" / "'" / "*" / "-" / "/" / "=" / "?" / "^" / "_" / "`" / "{" / "|" / "}" / "~" routing-subdomain = [ rsub "." ] acp-domain-nameExample: given</sourcecode> </figure> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-2">Example:</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-3">Given an ACP address offd89:b714:f3db:0:200:0:6400:0000 andfd89:b714:f3db:0:200:0:6400:0000, an ACPdomain-namedomain name ofacp.example.comacp.example.com, and an rsubextenstionextension ofarea51.researcharea51.research, then this resultsin:in the following:</t> <artwork align="left" pn="section-6.2.2-4"> acp-node-name = fd89b714f3db00000200000064000000 +area51.research@acp.example.com acp-domain-name = acp.example.com routing-subdomain = area51.research.acp.example.com]]></artwork> </figure> <t>acp-node-name</artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-5">The acp-node-name inabove<xref target="acp-dominfo-abnf"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 2"/> is the ABNF(<xref target="RFC5234" format="default"/>)definition ("<xref target="RFC5234" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF"/>" <xref target="RFC5234" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5234"/>) of the ACP Node Name. An ACP certificateMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry this information. ItMUST be encoded as a subjectAltName /<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain an otherName/field in the X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension, and the otherName <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain an AcpNodeName as described in <xreftarget="asn1" format="default"/>.</t> <t>Nodestarget="domcert-acpinfo" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-6">Nodes complying with this specificationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to receive their ACP address through the domain certificate, in which case their own ACP certificateMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have a 32HEXDIG acp-address field.Acp-addressThe acp-address field is case insensitive because ABNF HEXDIG is. It is recommended to encode acp-address withlower caselowercase letters. Nodes complying with this specificationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be able to authenticate nodes as ACP domain members or ACP secure channel peers when they have a0-valuezero-value acp-address field and as ACP domain members (but not as ACP secure channel peers) when the acp-address field is omitted from their AcpNodeName. See <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.</t> <t>acp-domain-nameformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-7">The acp-domain-name is used to indicate the ACPDomaindomain across which ACP nodes authenticate and authorize each other, forexampleexample, to build ACP secure channels to each other, see <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>. The acp-domain-nameSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the FQDN of an Internet domain owned by the network administration of the ACP and ideally reserved to only be used for the ACP. In thisspecificationspecification, it servesto beas a name for the ACP that ideally is globally unique. When acp-domain-name is a globally unique name, collision of ACP addresses across different ACP domains can only happen due to ULA hash collisions (see <xref target="scheme"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.2"/>). Using different acp-domain-names, operators can distinguish multipleACPACPs even when using the same TA.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-8">To keep the encoding simple, there is no consideration for internationalized acp-domain-names. The acp-node-name is not intended forend userend-user consumption. There is no protection against an operatorto pickpicking any domain name for an ACP whether or not the operator can claim to own the domain name. Instead, the domain name only serves as a hash seed for the ULA and for diagnosticstofor the operator. Therefore, any operator owning only an internationalized domain name should be able to pick an equivalently unique 7-bit ASCII acp-domain-name string representing the internationalized domain name.</t><t>"routing-subdomain"<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-9">The routing-subdomain is a string that can be constructed from the acp-node-name, and it is used in thehash-creationhash creation of the ULA (seebelow).<xref target="scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.2"/>). The presence of the"rsub"rsub component allows a single ACP domain to employ multiple /48 ULA prefixes. See <xref target="domain-usage"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.6"/> for exampleuse-cases.</t> <t>Theuse cases.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-10">The optional"extensions"extensions field is used for future standardized extensions to this specification. ItMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored if present and not understood.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-11">The following points explain and justify the encoding choices described: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li> <t>Formattingspacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-6.2.2-12"> <li pn="section-6.2.2-12.1" derivedCounter="1."> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-12.1.1">Formatting notes: </t> <ol type="1.%d"spacing="compact"> <li>"rsub"spacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-6.2.2-12.1.2"> <li pn="section-6.2.2-12.1.2.1" derivedCounter="1.1">The rsub component needs to be in the"local-part": Iflocal-part: if the format just had routing-subdomain as the domain part of the acp-node-name, rsub and acp-domain-name could not be separated from each other to determine in the ACP domain membership check which part is the acp-domain-name and which is solely for creating a different ULA prefix.</li><li>If<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.1.2.2" derivedCounter="1.2">If both"acp-address"acp-address and"rsub"rsub are omitted from AcpNodeName, the"local-part"local-part will have the format "++extension(s)". The two plus characters are necessary so the node can unambiguously parse that both"acp-address"acp-address and"rsub"rsub are omitted.</li> </ol> </li><li> <t>The<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.2" derivedCounter="2."> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.1">The encoding of the ACP domain name and ACP address as described in this section is used for the following reasons: </t> <ol type="2.%d"spacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.2"> <li pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.2.1" derivedCounter="2.1">The acp-node-name is the identifier of a node's ACP. It includes the necessary components to identify a node's ACP both from within the ACP as well as from the outside of the ACP.</li><li>For<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.2.2" derivedCounter="2.2">For manual and/or automated diagnostics and backend management of devices and ACPs, it is necessary to have an easilyhuman readablehuman-readable andsoftware parsedsoftware-parsable standard, single string representation of the information in the acp-node-name. For example, inventory or other backend systems can always identify an entity by one unique string field but not by a combination of multiple fields, which would be necessary if therewaswere no single string representation.</li><li>If<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.2.3" derivedCounter="2.3">If the encoding was notthat ofsuch a string, it would be necessary to define a second standard encoding to provide this format (standard string encoding) for operator consumption.</li><li>Addresses<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.2.2.4" derivedCounter="2.4">Addresses of the form <local>@<domain> have become the preferred format for identifiers of entities in many systems, including the majority of useridentificationidentifiers in web or mobile applications such as multi-domain single-sign-on systems.</li> </ol> </li><li> <t>Compatibilities:<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.3" derivedCounter="3."> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-12.3.1">Compatibilities: </t> <ol type="3.%d"spacing="compact"> <li>Itspacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-6.2.2-12.3.2"> <li pn="section-6.2.2-12.3.2.1" derivedCounter="3.1">It should be possible to use the ACP certificate as an LDevID certificate on the system forotherusesbesidebesides the ACP. Therefore, the information element required for the ACP should be encoded so that it minimizes the possibility of creating incompatibilities withsuchother such uses. The attributes of the subjectfieldfield, forexampleexample, are often used in non-ACP applications andshouldtherefore should not be occupied by new ACP values.</li><li>The<li pn="section-6.2.2-12.3.2.2" derivedCounter="3.2">The element should not require additional ASN.1en/decoding,encoding and/or decoding because librariesto accessfor accessing certificateinformationinformation, especially for embeddeddevicesdevices, may not support extended ASN.1 decoding beyond predefined, mandatory fields. subjectAltName / otherName is already used with a single string parameter for several otherNames (see "<xref target="RFC6120" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core"/>" <xreftarget="RFC3920" format="default"/>,target="RFC6120" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6120"/>, "<xref target="RFC7585" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access Identifier (NAI)"/>" <xref target="RFC7585"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7585"/>, "<xref target="RFC4985" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Alternative Name for Expression of Service Name"/>" <xref target="RFC4985"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4985"/>, "<xref target="RFC8398" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 Certificates"/>" <xref target="RFC8398"format="default"/>).</li> <li>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8398"/>).</li> <li pn="section-6.2.2-12.3.2.3" derivedCounter="3.3">The element required for the ACP should minimize the risk of being misinterpreted by other uses of the LDevID certificate. It also must not be misinterpretedto actually beas an email address, hence the use of the otherName / rfc822Name option in the certificate would be inappropriate.</li> </ol> </li> </ol><t>See section 4.2.1.6 of<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2-13">See <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>sectionFormat="of" section="4.2.1.6" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> for details on the subjectAltName field.</t> <section anchor="asn1" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>AcpNodeNametoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acpnodename-asn1-module">AcpNodeName ASN.1 Module</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.2.1-1">The following ASN.1 module normatively specifies the AcpNodeName structure. This specification uses the ASN.1 definitions from "<xref target="RFC5912" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"/>" <xref target="RFC5912"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> with the 2002 ASN.1 notation used in that document. <xref target="RFC5912"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> updates normative documents using older ASN.1 notation.</t><figure> <artwork name="" type=""<figure align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[suppress-title="false" pn="figure-3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acpnodename-asn1-module-2">AcpNodeName ASN.1 Module</name> <sourcecode name="" type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-6.2.2.1-2.1"> ANIMA-ACP-2020 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)id-mod-anima-acpnodename-2020(IANA1)id-mod-anima-acpnodename-2020(97) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS OTHER-NAME FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) } id-pkix FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ; id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } AcpNodeNameOtherNames OTHER-NAME ::= { on-AcpNodeName, ... } on-AcpNodeName OTHER-NAME ::= { AcpNodeName IDENTIFIED BY id-on-AcpNodeName } id-on-AcpNodeName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-onIANA210 } AcpNodeName ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..MAX)) -- AcpNodeName as specified in this document carries the -- acp-node-name as specified in the ABNF in Section6.1.26.2.2 END]]></artwork></sourcecode> </figure> </section> </section><!-- domcert-acpinfo --><section anchor="certcheck" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP domain membership check</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-domain-membership-check">ACP Domain Membership Check</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-1">The following points constitute the ACP domain membership check of a candidate peer via its certificate: </t><dl spacing="compact"> <dt>1: </dt> <dd>The<ol spacing="normal" group="acp" start="1" indent="adaptive" type="1" pn="section-6.2.3-2"> <li anchor="step1" pn="section-6.2.3-2.1" derivedCounter="1.">The peer has proved ownership of the private key associated with the certificate's public key. This check is performed by the security association protocol used, forexampleexample, Section <xref target="RFC7296"format="default"/>, section 2.15.</dd> <dt>2: </dt> <dd>Thesection="2.15" sectionFormat="bare" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296#section-2.15" derivedContent="RFC7296"/> of <xref target="RFC7296" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7296">"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"</xref>.</li> <li anchor="step2" pn="section-6.2.3-2.2" derivedCounter="2.">The peer's certificate passes certificate path validation as defined in <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>, section 6sectionFormat="comma" section="6" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-6" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>, against one of theTATAs associated with the ACP node's ACP certificate (see <xref target="trust-anchors"format="default"/> below).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.4"/>). This includes verification of the validity (lifetime) of the certificates in thepath.</dd> <dt>3: </dt> <dd>Ifpath.</li> <li anchor="step3" pn="section-6.2.3-2.3" derivedCounter="3."> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-2.3.1">If the peer's certificate indicates aCertificate Revocation List (CRL) Distribution Point (CRLDP)CRLDP (<xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>, section 4.2.1.13)sectionFormat="comma" section="4.2.1.13" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>) orOnline Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)OCSP responder (<xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>, section 4.2.2.1),sectionFormat="comma" section="4.2.2.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.2.1" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>), then the peer's certificateMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be valid according to those mechanisms when they are available:Anan OCSP check for the peer's certificate across the ACP mustsucceedsucceed, or thepeerpeer's certificate must not be listed in the CRL retrieved from the CRLDP. These mechanisms are not available when the ACP node has no ACP or non-ACP connectivity to retrieve a current CRL or has no access an OCSPresponderresponder, and the security association protocol itselfhasalso has no way to communicate the CRL or OCSPcheck.</dd> <dt> </dt> <dd>Retriescheck.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-2.3.2">Retries to learn revocation viaOCSP/CRL SHOULDOCSP or CRL <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be made using the same backoff as described in <xref target="neighbor_verification"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.7"/>. If and when the ACP node then learns that an ACP peer's certificate is invalid for whichrule 3<xref target="step3" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Rule 3</xref> had to be skipped during ACP secure channel establishment, then the ACP secure channel to that peerMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be closed even if this peer is the only connectivity to access CRL/OCSP. This applies (of course) to all ACP secure channels to this peer if there are multiple. The ACP secure channel connectionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be retried periodically to support the case that the neighbor acquires a new, validcertificate.</dd> <dt>4: </dt> <dd>Thecertificate.</t> </li> <li anchor="step4" pn="section-6.2.3-2.4" derivedCounter="4.">The peer's certificate has a syntactically valid acp-node-namefieldfield, and the acp-domain-name in that peer's acp-node-name is the same as in this ACP node's certificate (lowercasenormalized).</dd> </dl> <t>Whennormalized).</li> </ol> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-3">When checking a candidate peer's certificate for the purpose of establishing an ACP secure channel, one additional check is performed: </t><dl spacing="compact"> <dt>5: </dt> <dd>The<ol group="acp" start="5" indent="adaptive" spacing="normal" type="1" pn="section-6.2.3-4"> <li anchor="step5" pn="section-6.2.3-4.1" derivedCounter="5.">The acp-address field of the candidate peer certificate's AcpNodeName is not omitted but is either 32HEXDIG or 0, according to <xref target="acp-dominfo-abnf"format="default"/>.</dd> </dl> <t>Technically,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 2"/>.</li> </ol> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-5">Technically, ACP secure channels can only be built with nodes that have an acp-address.Rule 5<xref target="step5" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Rule 5</xref> ensures that this is taken into account during ACP domain membership check.</t><t>Nodes<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-6">Nodes with an omitted acp-address field can only use their ACP domain certificate fornon-ACP-securenon-ACP secure channel authentication purposes. Thisincludesincludes, forexampleexample, NMS type nodes permitted to communicate into the ACP via <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default">ACPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1">ACP connect</xref></t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-7"> The special value0"0" in an ACPcertificatescertificate's acp-address field is used for nodes that can and should determine their ACP address throughothermechanisms other than learning it through the acp-address field in their ACP certificate. These ACP nodes are permitted to establish ACP secure channels. Mechanisms for those nodes to determine their ACP address are outside the scope of this specification, but this option is defined here so that any ACP nodes can build ACP secure channels to them according toRule 5.</t> <t>The<xref target="step5" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Rule 5.</xref></t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-8">The optional rsub field of the AcpNodeName is not relevant to the ACP domain membership check because it only serves to structure routing and addressing within an ACP but not to segment mutualauthentication/authorizationauthentication and authorization (hence the name "routing subdomain").</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-9">In summary: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Steps 1...4spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.2.3-10"> <li pn="section-6.2.3-10.1"> <xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Steps 1 through 4</xref> constitute standard certificate validity verification and private key authentication as defined by <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> and security association protocols (such asInternet Key Exchange Protocol version 2<xref target="RFC7296"format="default">IKEv2</xref>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7296">IKEv2</xref>) when leveraging certificates. </li><li>Steps 1...4<li pn="section-6.2.3-10.2">Except for its public key, <xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Steps 1 through 4</xref> do not include the verification of anypre-existingpreexisting form ofnon-public-key-only based identity elements ofacertificatecertificate's identity elements, such as a webserversserver's domain nameprefixprefix, which is often encoded in the certificate common name.Step 5<xref target="step5" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Step 5</xref> is an equivalent step for the AcpNodeName.</li><li>Step 4<li pn="section-6.2.3-10.3"> <xref target="step4" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Step 4</xref> constitutes standardCRL/OCSPCRL and OCSP checks refined for the case of missing connectivity andlimited functionalitylimited-functionality security association protocols.</li><li>Steps 1...4<li pn="section-6.2.3-10.4"> <xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Steps 1 through 4</xref> authorizeto buildthe building of any secure connection between members of the same ACP domain except for ACP secure channels.</li><li>Step 5<li pn="section-6.2.3-10.5"> <xref target="step5" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Step 5</xref> is the additional verification of the presence of an ACP address as necessary for ACP secure channels.</li><li>Steps 1...5<li pn="section-6.2.3-10.6"> <xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Steps 1 through 5</xref> therefore authorizeto buildthe building of an ACP secure channel.</li> </ul><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3-11">For brevity, the remainder of this document refers to this process only as authentication instead of as authentication and authorization.</t><t>[RFC-Editor: Please remove the following paragraph].</t> <t>Note that the ACP domain membership check does not verify the network layer address of the security association. See <xref target="ACPDRAFT"/>, Appendix B.2 for explanations.</t><section anchor="cert-time" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Realtime clocktoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.3.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-realtime-clock-and-time-val">Realtime Clock and Time Validation</name><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3.1-1">An ACP node with a realtime clock in which it hasconfidence, MUSTconfidence <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check thetime stampstimestamps when performing an ACP domain membershipcheckcheck, such as checking the certificate validity period instep 1.<xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Step 1</xref> and the respective times instep 4<xref target="step4" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Step 4</xref> for revocation information (e.g., signingTimes inCMSCryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signatures).</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3.1-2">An ACP node without such a realtime clockMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> ignore thosetime stamptimestamp validation steps if it does not know the current time. Such an ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> obtain the current time in a secured fashion, such as viaa Network Time ProtocolNTP signaled through the ACP. It then ignorestime stamptimestamp validation only until the current time is known. In the absence of implementing a secured mechanism, such an ACP nodeMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use a current time learned in an insecure fashion in the ACP domain membership check.</t><t>Current<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3.1-3">Current timeMAY for example<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be learned in an unsecured fashion, for example, via NTP(<xref("<xref target="RFC5905"format="default"/>)format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification"/>" <xref target="RFC5905" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5905"/>) over the same link-local IPv6 addresses used for the ACP from neighboring ACP nodes. ACP nodes that do provide unsecured NTPinsecureover their link-local addressesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> primarily run NTP across the ACP and provide NTP time across the ACP only when they have a trusted time source. Details for such NTP procedures are beyond the scope of this specification.</t><t>Beside<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.3.1-4">Besides the ACP domain membership check, the ACP itself has no dependencyagainst knowledge ofon knowing the current time, but protocols and services using theACPACP, for example, event logging, will likelyhave theneed to know the currenttime. For example, event logging.</t>time.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="trust-anchors" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Trusttoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-trust-anchors-ta">Trust Anchors (TA)</name><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-1">ACP nodes need TA information according to <xref target="RFC5280"format="default"/>, section 6.1.1sectionFormat="comma" section="6.1.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-6.1.1" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> (d), typically in the form of one or morecertificatecertificates of the TA to perform certificate path validation as required by <xreftarget="certcheck" format="default"/>, rule 2.target="step2" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Section 6.2.3, Rule 2</xref>. TA informationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be provisioned to an ACP node (together with its ACP domain certificate) by an ACPRegistrarregistrar during initial enrollment of a candidate ACP node. ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also support the renewal of TA information via EST as describedbelowin <xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-2">The required information about a TA can consist ofnot only a single, but multipleone or more certificates as required for dealing with CA certificate renewals as explained in Section4.4<xref target="RFC4210" section="4.4" sectionFormat="bare" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4210#section-4.4" derivedContent="RFC4210"/> ofCMP (<xref<xref target="RFC4210"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Aformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4210">"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)"</xref>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-3">A certificate path is a chain of certificates starting at the ACP certificate(leaf/end-entity)(the leaf and/or end entity), followed by zero or more intermediate CAcertificatescertificates, and ending with the TA information, whichareis typically one or twotheself-signed certificates of the TA. The CA that signs the ACP certificate is called the assigning CA. If there are no intermediateCA,CAs, then the assigning CA is the TA. Certificate path validation authenticates that theACP certificate is permitted by aTA associated with theACP,ACP permits the ACP certificate, either directly or indirectly via one or more intermediate CA.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-4">Note that different ACP nodes may have different intermediateCACAs in their certificate path and even different TA. The set ofTATAs for an ACP domain must be consistent across all ACP members so that any ACP node can authenticate any other ACP node. The protocols through which the ACP domain membership checkrules 1-3<xref target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Rules 1 through 3</xref> are performed need to support the exchange not only of the ACP nodescertificates,certificates but also the exchange of theintermediaintermediate TA.</t><t>ACP nodes MUST support for<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-5">For the ACP domain membershipcheck thecheck, ACP nodes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support certificate path validation with0zero or1one intermediate CA. TheySHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support2two intermediateCACAs and twoTATAs (to permit migrationtofrom one TA to another TA).</t><t>Certificates<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-6">Certificates for an ACPMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be given to nodes that are allowed to be members of that ACP. When the signing CA relies on an ACPRegistrar,registrar, the CAMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only sign certificates with acp-node-name through trusted ACPRegistrars.registrars. In this setup, any existing CA, unaware of the formatting of acp-node-name, can be used.</t><t>These<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-7">These requirements can be achieved by using a TA private to the owner of the ACP domain or potentially through appropriate contractual agreements between the involved parties(Registrar(registrar and CA). Using a public CA is out of scope of this document.[RFC-Editor: please remove the following sentence]. See <xref target="ACPDRAFT"/>, Appendix B.3 for further considerations.</t> <t>A</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.4-8">A single owner can operatemultiplemultiple, independent ACP domains from the same set ofTA.TAs. Registrars must then know into which ACP a node needs to beenrolled into.</t>enrolled.</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert-maint" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Certificatetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-certificate-and-trust-ancho">Certificate and Trust Anchor Maintenance</name><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5-1">ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support renewal of theirCertificatecertificate and TA information via EST andMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support other mechanisms. See <xref target="tls"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.1"/> for TLS requirements. An ACP networkMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have at least one ACP node supporting EST server functionality across the ACP so that EST renewal isuseable.</t> <t>ACPusable.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5-2">ACP nodesSHOULD be able to<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> remember theIPv6 locator parameters of the O_IPv6_LOCATOR inGRASP O_IPv6_LOCATOR parameters of the EST serverfromwith which they last renewed their ACP certificate. TheySHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide the ability for these EST server parameters to also be set by the ACPRegistrarregistrar (see <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/>) that initially enrolled the ACP device with its ACP certificate. When BRSKI is used (see <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>) is used,target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>), the IPv6 locator of the BRSKI registrar from the BRSKI TLS connectionSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be remembered and used for the next renewal via EST if that registrar also announces itself as an EST server via GRASP(see next section)on its ACPaddress.</t> <t>Theaddress (see <xref target="domcert-grasp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5.1"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5-3">The EST serverMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> present a certificate thatis passingpasses the ACP domain membership check in its TLS connection setup (<xreftarget="certcheck" format="default"/>,target="step1" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Section 6.2.3, rules1...4,1 through 4</xref>, notrule 5<xref target="step5" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">rule 5</xref> as this is not for an ACP secure channel setup). The EST server certificateMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also contain the id-kp-cmcRA<xref target="RFC6402" format="default"/>extended key usage attribute <xref target="RFC6402" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6402"/>, and the EST clientMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check its presence.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5-4">The additional check against the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage extension field ensures that clients do not fall prey to an illicit EST server. While such illicit EST servers should not be able to support certificate signing requests (as they are not able to elicit a signing response from a valid CA), such an illicit EST server would be able to provide faked CA certificates to EST clients that need to renew their CA certificates when they expire.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5-5">Note that EST servers supporting multiple ACP domains will need to have a separate certificate for each of these ACP domainsa separate certificateand respond on a different transport address (IPv6 address and/or TCPport), but thisport). This is easily automated on the EST serveras long asif the CAdoes not restrictallows registrars to request certificates with the id-kp-cmcRA extended usage extension for themselves.</t> <section anchor="domcert-grasp" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>GRASP objectivetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-objective-for-est-ser">GRASP Objective for ESTserver</name> <t>ACPServer</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.1-1">ACP nodes that are EST serversMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> announce their servicevia GRASPin the ACPthrough M_FLOODvia GRASP Flood Synchronization (M_FLOOD) messages. See <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" format="default"/>, section 2.8.11target="RFC8990" sectionFormat="comma" section="2.8.11" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8990#section-2.8.11" derivedContent="RFC8990"/> for the definition of this messagetype:</t> <figure anchor="est-example"> <name>GRASP SRV.est example</name> <artwork name="" type=""type and <xref target="est-example" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 4"/> for an example.</t> <figure anchor="est-example" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[ Example:suppress-title="false" pn="figure-4"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-srvest-objective-exam">GRASP "SRV.est" Objective Example</name> <sourcecode name="" type="" markers="false" pn="section-6.2.5.1-2.1"> [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', 210000, [["SRV.est", 4, 255 ], [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, h'fd89b714f3db0000200000064000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 443]] ]]]></artwork></sourcecode> </figure><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.1-3"> The formal definition of the objective inConcise data definition language (CDDL)CDDL (see "<xref target="RFC8610" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures"/>" <xref target="RFC8610"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8610"/>) is as follows: </t> <figureanchor="est-def"> <name>GRASP SRV.est definition</name> <artwork name="" type=""anchor="est-def-fig" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[suppress-title="false" pn="figure-5"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-srvest-definition">GRASP "SRV.est" Definition</name> <sourcecode name="" type="cddl" markers="false" pn="section-6.2.5.1-4.1"> flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl, +[objective, (locator-option / [])]] ;seeSee example above and explanation ; below for initiator andttlttl. objective = ["SRV.est", objective-flags, loop-count, objective-value] objective-flags = sync-only ;asAs inGRASP spec[RFC8990]. sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requiressynchronizationsynchronization. loop-count = 255 ;recommendedRecommended as there is no mechanism ; to discover network diameter. objective-value = any ;reservedReserved for futureextensions ]]></artwork>extensions. </sourcecode> </figure><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.1-5">The objective name "SRV.est" indicates that the objective is an<xref target="RFC7030" format="default"/> compliantEST server compliant with <xref target="RFC7030" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/> because "est" isan <xref target="RFC6335" format="default"/>a registered service name ("<xref target="RFC6335" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry"/>" <xref target="RFC6335" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6335"/>) for <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/>. Objective-value MUSTformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/>. The 'objective-value' field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored if present.Backward compatibleBackward-compatible extensions to <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/> MAYformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be indicated throughobjective-value. Non <xref target="RFC7030" format="default"/> compatible certificate'objective-value'. Certificate renewal optionsMUSTthat are incompatible with <xref target="RFC7030" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a differentobjective-name. Non-recognized objective-values'objective-name'. Unrecognized 'objective-value' fields (or parts thereof if it is astructurepartiallyunderstood) MUSTunderstood structure) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.1-6">The M_FLOOD messageMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent periodically. The defaultSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be 60 seconds; the valueSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be operator configurable butSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be not smaller than 60 seconds. The frequency of sendingMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be such that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs from all flooding sources cause only negligible traffic across the ACP. The time-to-live (ttl) parameterSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be 3.5 times the period so that up to three consecutive messages can be dropped beforeconsideringan announcement is considered expired. In the example above, the ttl is 210000 msec, that is, 3.5 times 60 seconds. When a service announcer using these parameters unexpectedly dies immediately after sending the M_FLOOD, receivers would consider it expired 210 seconds later. When a receiver tries to connect to this dead service before this timeout, it will experience a failing connection and use that as an indication that the service instance is dead and select another instance of the same service instead (from another GRASP announcement).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.1-7">The "SRV.est" objective(s)SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> only be announced when the ACP node knows that it can successfully communicate with a CA to perform the ESTrenewal/rekeyingrenewal and/or rekeying operations for the ACP domain. See also <xreftarget="security"/>.</t>target="security" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 11"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert-renewal" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Renewal</name> <t>Whentoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-renewal">Renewal</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.2-1">When performing renewal, the nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> attempt to connect to the remembered EST server. If that fails, itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> attempt to connect to an EST server learned via GRASP. The server with which certificate renewal succeedsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be remembered for the next renewal.</t><t>Remembering<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.2-2">Remembering the last renewal server and preferring it provides stickinesswhichthat can help diagnostics. It also provides some protection againstoff-pathoff-path, compromised ACP members announcing bogus information into GRASP.</t><t>Renewal<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.2-3">Renewal of certificatesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> start after less than 50% of the domain certificate lifetime so that network operationshashave ample time to investigate and resolve any problems thatcausescause a node to not renew its domain certificate intime -time, and to allow prolonged periods of running parts of a network disconnected from any CA.</t> </section><!-- DO NOT FORCE THE TTL=255 OPTION RIGHT NOW. IT MIGHT MAKE MORE SENSE TO DO FOLLOWUP WORK IN WHICH WE DO PROVIDE A MORE COMPLETE SET OF SELECTION OPTIONS COMPATIBLE WITH DNS-SD - 10/2017, Toerless Eckert <t>The locator-option indicates the ACP transport address for the EST server. The loop-count MUST be set to 255. When an ACP node receives the M_FLOOD, it will have been reduced by the number of hops from the EST server.</t> <t>When it is time for domain certificate renewal, the ACP node MUST attempt to connect to the EST server(s) learned via GRASP starting with the one that has the highest remaining loop-count (closest one). If certificate renewal does not succeed, the node MUST attempt to use the EST server(s) learned during initial provisioning/enrollment of the certificate. After successful renewal of the domain certificate, the ACP address from the certificate of the EST server as learned during the handshake of the TLS connection to the EST server MAY be remembered could be preferred for future renewal operations. As long as that EST server is reachable, this provides stickiness in the selection of the EST server and can simplify troubleshooting.</t> <t>This logic of selecting an EST server for renewal is chosen to allow for distributed EST servers to be used effectively but to also allow fallback to the most reliably learned EST server - those that performed already successful enrollment in before. A compromised (non EST-server) ACP node for example can filter or fake GRASP announcements, but it can not successfully renew a certificate and can only prohibit traffic to a valid EST server when it is on the path between the ACP node and the EST server.</t> --><section anchor="domcert-crl" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Certificatetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-certificate-revocation-list">Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.3-1">The ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support revocation through CRL(s) via HTTP from one or more CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP). The CRLDP(s)MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be indicated in theDomain Certificatedomain certificate when used. If the CRLDP URL uses an IPv6 address (ULA address when using the addressing rules specified in this document), the ACP node will connect to the CRLDP via the ACP. If the CRLDP uses a domain name, the ACP node will connect to the CRLDP via theData-Plane.</t> <t>Itdata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.3-2">It is common to use domain names for CRLDP(s), but there is no requirement for the ACP to support DNS. Any DNS lookup in theData-Planedata plane is not only a possible security issue, but it would also not indicate whether the resolved address is meant to be reachable across the ACP. Therefore, the use of an IPv6 address versus the use of a DNS name doubles as an indicator whether or not to reach the CRLDP via the ACP.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.3-3">A CRLDP can be reachable across the ACP either by running it on a node with ACP or by connecting its node via an ACP connect interface (see <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Whenformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.3-4">When using a private PKI for ACP certificates, the CRL may be need-to-know, forexampleexample, to prohibit insight into the operational practices of the domain by tracking the growth of the CRL. In this case, HTTPS may be chosen to provide confidentiality, especially when making the CRL available via theData-Plane.data plane. Authentication and authorizationSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use ACP certificates and the ACP domain membershipcheck.check (<xref target="certcheck" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>). The CRLDPMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> omit the CRL verification during authentication of the peer to permitretrieval of theCRL retrieval by an ACP node with a revoked ACPcertificate. Thiscertificate, which can allowfor thatthe (ex) ACP node to quickly discover its ACP certificate revocation. This may violate the desired need-to-knowrequirementrequirement, though. ACP nodesMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support CRLDP operations via HTTPS.</t><!-- <t>The CRLDP SHOULD use an ACP certificate for its HTTPs connections. The connecting ACP node SHOULD verify that the CRLDP certificate used during the HTTPs connection has the same ACP address as indicated in the CRLDP URL of the node's ACP certificate if the CRLDP URL uses an IPv6 address.</t> --></section> <section anchor="domcert-lifetime" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Lifetimes</name> <t>Certificatetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-lifetimes">Lifetimes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.4-1">The certificate lifetime may be set to shorter lifetimes than customary(1(one year) because certificate renewal is fully automated via ACP and EST. The primary limiting factor for shorter certificate lifetimes is the load on the EST server(s) and CA. It is therefore recommended that ACP certificates are managed via a CA chain where the assigning CA has enough performance to manageshort livedshort-lived certificates. See also <xref target="sub-ca"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2.4"/> for a discussion about an example setup achieving this. See also "<xref target="RFC8739" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Support for Short-Term, Automatically Renewed (STAR) Certificates in the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)"/>" <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-acme-star" format="default"/>.</t> <t>Whentarget="RFC8739" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8739"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.4-2">When certificate lifetimes are sufficiently short, such as few hours, certificate revocation may not be necessary, allowingto simplifythe simplification of the overall certificate maintenance infrastructure.</t><t>See<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.4-3">See <xref target="bootstrap"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.2"/> for further optimizations of certificate maintenance when BRSKI can be used("Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures", see<xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>).</t>target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert-re-enroll" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Re-enrollment</name> <t>Antoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-reenrollment">Reenrollment</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-1">An ACP node may determine that its ACP certificate has expired, forexampleexample, because the ACP node was powered down or disconnected longer than its certificate lifetime. In this case, the ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> convert to a role of are-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP node.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-2">In this role, the nodedoes maintainmaintains the TA and certificate chain associated with its ACP certificate exclusively for the purpose ofre-enrollment,reenrollment, and it attempts (or waits) to getre-enrolledreenrolled with a new ACP certificate. The details depend on themechanisms/protocolsmechanisms and protocols used by the ACPRegistrars.</t> <t>Pleaseregistrars.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-3">Please refer to <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/> and <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/> for explanations about ACPRegistrarsregistrars and vouchers as used in the following text. When ACP is intended to be used without BRSKI, the details about BRSKI and vouchers in the following text can be skipped.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-4">When BRSKI is used(i.e.:(i.e., on ACP nodes that are ANI nodes), there-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP nodewould attemptattempts to enroll like a candidate ACP node (BRSKI pledge), but instead of using the ACPnodesnode's IDevID certificate, itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> first attempt to use its ACP domain certificate in the BRSKI TLS authentication. The BRSKI registrarMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> honor this certificate beyond its expiration date purely for the purpose ofre-enrollment.reenrollment. Using the ACP node's domain certificate allows the BRSKI registrar to learn that node'sacp-node-name,acp-node-name so that the BRSKI registrar canre-assignreassign the same ACP address information to the ACP node in the new ACP certificate.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-5">If the BRSKI registrar denies the use of the old ACP certificate, there-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP nodeMUST re-attempt re-enrollment<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reattempt reenrollment using its IDevID certificate as defined in BRSKI during the TLS connection setup.</t><t>Both when<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-6">When the BRSKI connection is attempted with either with the old ACP certificate or the IDevID certificate, there-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> authenticate the BRSKI registrar during TLS connection setup based on its existing TA certificate chain information associated with its old ACP certificate. There-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> only fall back to requesting a voucher from the BRSKI registrar when this authentication fails during TLS connection setup. As a countermeasure against attacks that attempt to force the ACP node to forget its prior (expired) certificate and TA, the ACP node should alternate between attempting tore-enrollreenroll using its old keying material and attempting tore-enrollreenroll with its IDevID and requesting a voucher.</t><t>When other<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-7">When mechanisms other than BRSKI are used for ACP certificate enrollment, the principles of there-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP node are the same. There-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP node attempts to authenticate any ACPRegistrarregistrar peersduring re-enrollment protocol/mechanismsusing reenrollment protocols and/or mechanisms via its existing certificatechain/TAchain and/or TA information and provides its existing ACP certificate and other identification (such as the IDevID certificate) as necessary to the registrar.</t><t>Maintaining<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-8">Maintaining existing TA information is especially important when using enrollment mechanismsare usedthatunlike BRSKIdo not leverage a mechanism(such as the voucher in BRSKI)to authenticate the ACP registrar (such as the voucher in BRSKI), andwhere thereforewhen the injection of certificate failures could otherwise make the ACPnode easily attackable remotely by returningvulnerable to remote attacks by returning the ACP node to a "duckling" state in which it acceptsto be enrolledenrollment by any network it connects to. The (expired) ACP certificate and ACP TASHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore be maintained and attempted to be used as one possible credential forre-enrollmentreenrollment until new keying material is acquired.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.5-9">When using BRSKI or otherprotocol/mechanisms supportingprotocols and/or mechanisms that support vouchers, maintaining existing TA information allows forre-enrollmentlighter-weight reenrollment of expired ACPcertificates to be more lightweight,certificates, especially in environments where repeated acquisition of vouchers during the lifetime of ACP nodes may be operationally expensive or otherwise undesirable.</t> </section> <section anchor="domcert-failing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Failingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.2.5.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-failing-certificates">Failing Certificates</name><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.6-1">An ACP certificate is called failing in thisdocument, if/whendocument if or when the ACP node to which the certificate was issued can determine that it was revoked (or explicitly not renewed), or in the absence of such explicit local diagnostics, when the ACP node fails to connect to other ACP nodes in the same ACP domain using its ACP certificate.For connection failures toTo determine that the ACP certificateasis theculprit,culprit of a connection failure, the peer should pass the domain membership check (<xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>), and connection error diagnostics should exclude other reasons for the connectionfailure can be excluded because of the connection error diagnostics.</t> <t>Thisfailure.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.6-2">This type of failure can happen duringsetup/refreshthe setup or refreshment of a secure ACP channelconnectionsconnection or during any other use of the ACP certificate, such as for the TLS connection to an EST server for the renewal of the ACP domain certificate.</t><t>Example reasons for<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.6-3">The following are examples of failing certificates that the ACP node can only discover through connectionfailure are thatfailure: the domain certificate or any of its signing certificates could have been revoked or may have expired, but the ACP node cannotself-diagnosediagnose this conditiondirectly.directly by itself. Revocation information or clock synchronization may only be available across the ACP, but the ACP node cannot build ACP secure channels because the ACP peers reject the ACP node's domain certificate.</t><t>ACP nodes SHOULD<t indent="0" pn="section-6.2.5.6-4">An ACP node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support the option todeterminesdetermine whether its ACP certificate is failing, and when it does, put itself into the role of are-enrollingreenrolling candidate ACP node as explainedabove (<xrefin <xref target="domcert-re-enroll"format="default"/>).</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5.5"/>.</t> </section> </section><!-- domcert-maint --></section><!-- domcert --><section anchor="adj-table" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-adjacency-table">ACP Adjacency Table</name><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-1">To know to which nodes to establish an ACP channel, every ACP node maintains an adjacency table. The adjacency table contains information about adjacent ACP nodes, at a minimum: Node-ID(identifier(the identifier of the node inside the ACP, see <xref target="zone-scheme"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/> and <xref target="Vlong"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>), the interface on which neighbor was discovered (by GRASP as explained below), the link-local IPv6 address of the neighbor on that interface, and the certificate (including acp-node-name). An ACP nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> maintain this adjacency table. This table is used to determine to which neighbor an ACP connection is established.</t><t>Where<t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-2">When the next ACP node is not directly adjacent (i.e., not on a link connected to this node), the information in the adjacency table can be supplemented by configuration. For example, the Node-ID and IP address could be configured. See <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-3">The adjacency tableMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain information about the validity and trust of the adjacent ACP node's certificate. However, subsequent stepsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> always start with the ACP domain membership check against the peer (see <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.3-4">The adjacency table contains information about adjacent ACP nodes in general,independentlyindependent of their domain and trust status. The next step determines to which of those ACP nodes an ACP connection should be established.</t> </section> <section anchor="discovery-grasp" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Neighbortoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-neighbor-discovery-with-dul">Neighbor Discovery with DULL GRASP</name><t>[RFC-Editor: GRASP draft is in RFC editor queue, waiting for dependencies, including ACP. Please ensure that references to I-D.ietf-anima-grasp that include section number references (throughout this document) will be updated in case any last-minute changes in GRASP would make those section references change.</t> <t>Discovery<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-1">Discovery Unsolicited Link-Local (DULL) GRASP is a limited subset of GRASP intended to operate across an insecure link-local scope. Seesection 2.5.2 of<xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" format="default"/>target="RFC8990" sectionFormat="of" section="2.5.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8990#section-2.5.2" derivedContent="RFC8990"/> for its formal definition. The ACP uses one instance of DULL GRASP for every L2 interface of the ACP node to discoverlink level adjacentcandidate ACPneighbors.neighbors that are link-level adjacent. Unless modified by policy as noted earlier (<xreftarget="overview" format="default"/>target="sec5bt2" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">Section 5, bullet point2.),2</xref>), native interfaces (e.g., physical interfaces on physical nodes)SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be initialized automatically to a state in which ACP discovery can beperformedperformed, and any native interfaces with ACP neighbors can then be brought into the ACP even if the interface is otherwisenot configured.unconfigured. Reception of packets on such otherwisenot configuredunconfigured interfacesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be limited so that at first onlyIPv6 StateLessSLAAC ("<xref target="RFC4862" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IPv6 Stateless AddressAuto Configuration (SLAAC -Autoconfiguration"/>" <xref target="RFC4862"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4862"/>) and DULL GRASPworkwork, and then only the following ACP secure channel setup packets-work, but not any other unnecessary traffic (e.g., no other link-local IPv6 transport stackrespondersresponders, for example).</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-2">Note that the use of the IPv6 link-local multicast address (ALL_GRASP_NEIGHBORS) implies the need to useMulticastMLDv2 (see "<xref target="RFC3810" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2(MLDv2, see(MLDv2) for IPv6"/>" <xref target="RFC3810"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3810"/>) to announce the desire to receive packets for that address.OtherwiseOtherwise, DULL GRASP could fail to operate correctly in the presence ofMLD snooping (<xref target="RFC4541" format="default"/>)MLD-snooping switches ("<xref target="RFC4541" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping Switches"/>" <xref target="RFC4541" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4541"/>) that either do not support ACP or are not ACPsupporting/enabled -enabled because those switches would stop forwarding DULL GRASP packets. Switches that do notsupportingsupport MLD snooping simply need to operate as pure L2 bridges for IPv6 multicast packets for DULL GRASP to work.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-3">ACP discoverySHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be enabled by default on non-native interfaces. In particular, ACP discoveryMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> run inside the ACP across ACP virtual interfaces. See <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/> forfurther,further non-normative suggestions on how toenable/disableenable and disable ACP at the node and interface level. See <xref target="conf-tunnel"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2.2"/> for more details about tunnels (typical non-native interfaces). See <xref target="acp-l2-switches"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/> forhowextending ACPshould be extendedon devices operating (also) as L2 bridges.</t><t>Note: If<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-4">Note: if an ACP node also implements BRSKI to enroll its ACP certificate (see <xref target="bootstrap"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.2"/> for a summary), then the above considerations also apply to GRASP discovery for BRSKI. Each DULL instance of GRASP set up for ACP is then also used for the discovery of a bootstrap proxy via BRSKI when the node does not have a domain certificate. Discovery of ACP neighbors happens only when the node does have the certificate. The node therefore never needs to discover both a bootstrap proxy and an ACP neighbor at the same time.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-5">An ACP node announces itself to potential ACP peers by use of the "AN_ACP" objective. This is a synchronization objective intended to be flooded on a single link using the GRASP Flood Synchronization (M_FLOOD) message. In accordance with the design of the Flood Synchronization message, a locator consisting of a specific link-local IP address, IP protocolnumbernumber, and port number will be distributed with the flooded objective. An example of the message is informally:</t> <figureanchor="an-acp-example"> <name>GRASP AN_ACP example</name> <artworkanchor="an-acp-example" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-6"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-an_acp-objective-exam">GRASP "AN_ACP" Objective Example</name> <sourcecode name="" type=""align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[markers="false" pn="section-6.4-6.1"> [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe80000000000000c0011001feef0000', 210000, [["AN_ACP", 4, 1, "IKEv2" ], [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, h'fe80000000000000c0011001feef0000', IPPROTO_UDP, 15000]] [["AN_ACP", 4, 1, "DTLS" ], [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, h'fe80000000000000c0011001feef0000', IPPROTO_UDP, 17000]] ]]]></artwork></sourcecode> </figure><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-7"> The formal CDDL definition is: </t> <figureanchor="an-acp-def"> <name>GRASP AN_ACP definition</name> <artwork name="" type=""anchor="an-acp-def" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[suppress-title="false" pn="figure-7"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-an_acp-definition">GRASP "AN_ACP" Definition</name> <sourcecode name="" type="cddl" markers="false" pn="section-6.4-8.1"> flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl, +[objective, (locator-option / [])]] objective = ["AN_ACP", objective-flags, loop-count, objective-value] objective-flags = sync-only ; as inthe GRASP specification[RFC8990] sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization loop-count = 1 ; limit to link-local operation objective-value = method-name / [ method, *extension ] method = method-name / [ method-name, *method-param ] method-name = "IKEv2" / "DTLS" / id extension = any method-param = any id = text .regexp "[A-Za-z@_$]([-.]*[A-Za-z0-9@_$])*"]]></artwork></sourcecode> </figure><t>The objective-flags<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-9">The 'objective-flags' field is set to indicate synchronization.</t><t>The loop-count<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-10">The 'loop-count' is fixed at 1 since this is a link-local operation.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-11">In the aboveexampleexample, theRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> period of sending of the objective is 60 seconds. The indicatedttl'ttl' of 210000 msec means that the objective would be cached by ACP nodes even when two out of three messages are dropped in transit.</t><t>The session-id<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-12">The 'session-id' is a random number used for loop prevention (distinguishing a message from a prior instance of the same message). In DULL this field is irrelevant but has to be set according to the GRASP specification.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-13">The originatorMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the IPv6link locallink-local address of the originating ACP node on the sending interface.</t><t>The method-name<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-14">The 'method-name' in the 'objective-value' parameter is a string indicating the protocol available at the specified or implied locator. It is a protocol supported by the node to negotiate a secure channel.IKEv2"IKEv2" as shownabovein <xref target="an-acp-example" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 6"/> is the protocol used to negotiate an IPsec secure channel.</t><t>Method-params<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-15">The 'method-param' parameter allows method-specific parameters tocarry method specific parameters.be carried. This specification does not define anymethod-param(s)'method-param'(s) for "IKEv2" or "DTLS".Method-paramsAny method-params for these two methods that are not understood by an ACP nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored by it.</t><t>extension(s)<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-16">The 'extension' parameter allowsto define method independentthe definition of method-independent parameters. This specification does not define any extensions. Extensions not understood by an ACP nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored by it.</t><t>The locator-option<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-17">The 'locator-option' is optional and is only required when the secure channel protocol is not offered at a well-defined port number, or if there is no well-defined port number.</t><t>IKEv2<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-18">IKEv2 is the actual protocol used to negotiate anInternet Protocol security architecture (IPsec)IPsec connection. GRASP therefore indicates "IKEv2" and not "IPsec". If "IPsec" was used, thistoocould mean the use of theobsoleteobsolete, older version IKE (v1)(<xref("<xref target="RFC2409" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"/>" <xref target="RFC2409"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2409"/>). IKEv2 has anIANA assignedIANA-assigned port number 500, but inthe above example,<xref target="an-acp-example" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 6"/>, the candidate ACP neighbor is offering ACP secure channel negotiation via IKEv2 on port 15000 (purely to show through the example that GRASP allowsto indicatethe indication of a portnumbernumber, and it does not have to betheIANAassigned one).</t> <t>Thereassigned).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-19">There is no default UDP port for DTLS, it is always locally assigned by the node. For further details about the "DTLS" secure channel protocol, see <xref target="DTLS"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Ifformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.4"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-20">If a locator is included, itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an O_IPv6_LOCATOR, and the IPv6 addressMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the same as the initiator address (these are DULL requirements to minimizethird partythird-party DoS attacks).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-21">The secure channel methods defined in this document usethe objective-values of"IKEv2" and"DTLS"."DTLS" for 'objective-value'. There is no distinction between IKEv2 native and GRE-IKEv2 because this is purely negotiated via IKEv2.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-22">A node that supports more than one secure channel protocol method needs to flood multiple versions of the "AN_ACP" objective so that each method can be accompanied by its ownlocator-option.'locator-option'. This can use a single GRASP M_FLOOD message as shown in <xref target="an-acp-example"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 6"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-23">The primary use of DULL GRASPprimarily servesis to discover the link-local IPv6 address of candidate ACP peers on subnets. The signaling of the supported secure channel option is primarily for diagnostic purposes, but it is also necessary for discovery when the protocol has no well-known transport address, such as in the case of DTLS.[RFC-Editor: Please remove the following sentence]. See <xref target="ACPDRAFT"/>, Appendix B.4.</t> <t>Note</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-24">Note that a node serving both as an ACP node and BRSKI Join Proxy may choose to distribute the "AN_ACP" objective and the respective BRSKI in the same M_FLOOD message, since GRASP allows multiple objectives in one message. This may beimpractical thoughimpractical, though, if ACP and BRSKI operations are implemented via separate software modules/and/or ASAs.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-25">The result of the discovery is the IPv6 link-local address of the neighbor as well as its supported secure channel protocols (and the non-standard port they are running on). It is stored in the ACPAdjacency Tableadjacency table (see <xref target="adj-table"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.3"/>), which then drives the further building of the ACP to that neighbor.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.4-26">Note that the described DULL GRASP objectivedescribedintentionally does not include the ACP node's ACPcertificatecertificate, even though this would be useful for diagnostics and to simplify the security exchange in ACP secure channel security association protocols (see <xref target="associations"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8"/>). The reason is that DULL GRASP messages are periodicallymulticastedmulticast across IPv6subnetssubnets, and full certificates could easily lead to fragmented IPv6 DULL GRASP multicast packets due to the size of a certificate. This would be highly undesirable.</t> </section><!-- discovery-grasp --><section anchor="selection" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Candidatetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-candidate-acp-neighbor-sele">Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection</name><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-1">An ACP node determines to which other ACP nodes in the adjacency table it should attempt to build an ACP connection. This is based on the information in the ACPAdjacencyadjacency table.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-2">The ACP is established exclusively between nodes in the same domain. This includes all routing subdomains. <xref target="domain-usage"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.6"/> explains how ACP connections across multiple routing subdomains are special.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.5-3">The result of the candidate ACP neighbor selection process is a list of adjacent or configured autonomic neighbors to which an ACP channel should be established. The next step begins that channel establishment.</t> </section><!-- selection --><section anchor="channel-selection" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Channeltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-channel-selection">Channel Selection</name><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-1">To avoid attacks, the initial discovery of candidate ACP peers cannot include anynon-protectedunprotected negotiation. To avoidre-inventingreinventing and validating security association mechanisms, the next step after discovering the address of a candidate neighborcan only be to try firstis to establish a security association with that neighbor using a well-known security association method.</t><t>From the use-cases it<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-2">It seems clear from the use cases that not alltypetypes of ACP nodes can or need to connect directly to eachother orother, nor are they able to support or prefer all possible mechanisms. For example,code space limitedIoT devices that are codespace limited may only support DTLS because that code exists already on them for end-to-end security, butlow-endlow-end, in-ceiling L2 switches may only want to support Media Access Control Security (MacSec, see 802.1AE(<xref<xref target="MACSEC"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="MACSEC"/>) because that is also supported in their chips. Only a flexible gateway device may need to support both of these mechanisms and potentially more. Note that MacSec is not required by any profiles of the ACP in this specification. Instead, MacSec is mentioned asa likely nextan interesting potential secure channel protocol. Note also that the security model allows and requiresforany-to-any authentication and authorization between all ACP nodes because there isalso end-to-end andnot only hop-by-hop but also end-to-end authentication for secure channels.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-3">To support extensible selection of the secure channel protocolselectionwithout a single commonmandatory to implementmandatory-to-implement (MTI) protocol, an ACPnodes MUSTnode <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> try all the ACP secure channel protocols it supports and that arefeasible becausealso announced by the candidate ACP neighboralso announced themvia itsAN_ACP"AN_ACP" GRASP parameters (these are called the "feasible" ACP secure channel protocols).</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-4">To ensure that the selection of the secure channel protocols always succeeds in a predictable fashion without blocking, the following rules apply: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Anspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.6-5"> <li pn="section-6.6-5.1">An ACP node may choose to attempt to initiate the different feasible ACP secure channel protocols it supports according to its local policies sequentially or in parallel, but itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support acting as a responder to all of them in parallel.</li><li>Once<li pn="section-6.6-5.2">Once the first ACP secure channel protocol connection to a specific peer IPv6 address passes peer authentication, the two peers know each other's certificate because those ACP certificates are used by all secure channel protocols for mutual authentication. The peer with the higher Node-ID in the AcpNodeName of its ACP certificate takes on the role of the Decider towards the peer. The other peer takes on the role of the Follower. The Decider selects which secure channel protocol to ultimately use.</li><li>The<li pn="section-6.6-5.3">The Follower becomes passive: it does not attempt to further initiate ACP secure channel protocol connections with the Decider and does not consider it to be an error when the Decider closes secure channels. The Decider becomes the active party,continuescontinuing to attemptsetting upthe setup of secure channel protocols with the Follower. This process terminates when the Decider arrives at the "best" ACP secure channel connection option that also works with the Follower ("best" from theDecidersDecider's point of view).</li><li>A<li pn="section-6.6-5.4">A peer with a "0" acp-address in its AcpNodeName takes on the role of Follower when peering with a node that has a non-"0" acp-address (note that this specification does not fully define the behavior of ACP secure channel negotiation for nodes with a "0" ACP address field, it only defines interoperability with such ACP nodes).</li> </ul><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-6">In a simple example, ACP peer Node 1 attempts to initiate an IPsec connection via IKEv2connectionto peer Node 2. The IKEv2 authentication succeeds. Node 1 has the lower ACP address and becomes the Follower. Node 2 becomes the Decider. IKEv2 might not be the preferred ACP secure channel protocol for the Decider Node 2. Node 2 would therefore proceed to attempt secure channel setups with(in its view)more preferred protocol options(e.g.,(in its view, e.g., DTLS/UDP). If any such preferred ACP secure channel connection of the Decider succeeds, it would close the IPsec connection. If Node 2 has no preferred protocol option over IPsec, or no such connection attempt from Node 2 to Node 1 succeeds, Node 2 would keep the IPsec connection and use it.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-7">The DeciderSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> send actual payload packets across a secure channel until it has decided to use it. The FollowerMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> delay linking the ACP secure channelintoto the ACP virtual interface until it sees the first payload packet from the Decider up to a maximum of 5 seconds to avoid unnecessarily linking a secure channel that will be terminated as undesired by the Decider shortlyafterwards.</t> <?rfc needLines="48" ?> <t>Theafterward.</t> <t keepWithNext="true" indent="0" pn="section-6.6-8">The following sequence of steps show this example in more detail. Each step is tagged with [<step#>{:<connection>}]. The connection is included to more easily distinguish which of the two competing connections the step belongs to, one initiated by Node 1, one initiated by Node 2. </t><figure anchor="sequence-of-steps"> <name>Secure Channel sequence of steps</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ [1] Node<dl newline="false" indent="10" spacing="normal" pn="section-6.6-9"> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.1">[1]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.2">Node 1 sends GRASPAN_ACP"AN_ACP" message to announceitself [2] Nodeitself.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.3">[2]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.4">Node 2 sends GRASPAN_ACP"AN_ACP" message to announceitself [3] Nodeitself.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.5">[3]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.6">Node 2 receives [1] from Node1 [4:C1] Because1.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.7">[4:C1]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.8">Because of [3], Node 2 starts as initiator on its preferred secure channel protocol towards Node 1. ConnectionC1. [5] NodeC1.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.9">[5]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.10">Node 1 receives [2] from Node2 [6:C2] Because2.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.11">[6:C2]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.12">Because of [5], Node 1 starts as initiator on its preferred secure channel protocol towards Node 2. ConnectionC2. [7:C1] Node1C2.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.13">[7:C1]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.14">Node 1 andNode2Node 2 have authenticated eachothersother's certificate on connection C1 as valid ACPpeers. [8:C1] Node 1peers.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.15">[8:C1]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.16">Node 1's certificate has a lower ACP Node-ID thanNode2,Node 2's, therefore Node 1 considers itself the Follower and Node 2 the Decider on connection C1. Connection setup C1 iscompleted. [9] Nodecompleted.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.17">[9]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.18">Node 1 refrains from attempting any further secure channel connections to Node 2 (the Decider) as learned from [2] because it knows from [8:C1] that it is the Follower relative to Node1. [10:C2] Node12. </dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.19">[10:C2]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.20">Node 1 andNode2Node 2 have authenticated eachothersother's certificate on connection C2 (like[7:C1]). [11:C2] Node 1[7:C1]).</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.21">[11:C2]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.22">Node 1's certificate has a lower ACP Node-ID thanNode2,Node 2's, therefore Node 1 considers itself the Follower and Node 2 the Decider on connection C2, but they also identify that C2 is to the same mutual peer as their C1, so this has no further impact: the roles Decider and Follower where already assigned between these two peers by[8:C1]. [12:C2] Node[8:C1].</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.23">[12:C2]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.24">Node 2 (the Decider) closes C1. Node 1 is fine with this, because of its role as the Follower (from[8:C1]). [13] Node[8:C1]).</dd> <dt pn="section-6.6-9.25">[13]</dt> <dd pn="section-6.6-9.26">Node 2 (the Decider) and Node 1 (the Follower) start data transfer across C2, which makes it become a secure channel for theACP. ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>AllACP.</dd> </dl> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-10">All this negotiation is in the context of an"L2 interface".L2 interface. The Decider and Follower will build ACP connections to each other on every"L2 interface"L2 interface that they both connect to. An autonomic nodeMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that neighbors with the same L2 or link-local IPv6 addresses on different L2 interfaces are the same node. This can only be determined after examining the certificate after a successful security association attempt.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.6-11">The DeciderSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> suppress attempting a particular ACP secure channel protocol connection on one L2 interface because this type of ACP secure channel connection has failed to the peer with the same ACP certificate on another L2 interface:Notnot only may the supported ACP secure channel protocol optionsmaybe different on the same ACP peer across different L2 interfaces, but also error conditions may cause inconsistent failures across different L2 interfaces. Avoiding such connection attempt optimizations can therefore help to increase robustness in the case of errors.</t> </section><!-- channel-selection --><section anchor="neighbor_verification" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Candidatetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-candidate-acp-neighbor-veri">Candidate ACP Neighborverification</name> <t>IndependentVerification</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.7-1">Independent of the security association protocol chosen, candidate ACP neighbors need to be authenticated based on their domain certificate. This implies that any secure channel protocolMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> supportcertificate basedcertificate-based authentication that can support the ACP domain membership check as defined in <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>. If it fails, the connection attempt is aborted and an error logged. Attempts to reconnectMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be throttled. TheRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> default is exponentialbase 2base-two backoff with an initial retransmission time (IRT) of 10 seconds and a maximum retransmission time (MRT) of 640 seconds.</t><t>Failure<t indent="0" pn="section-6.7-2">Failure to authenticate an ACP neighbor when acting in the role of a responder of the security authentication protocolMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> impact the attempts of the ACP node to attempt establishing a connection as an initiator. Only failed connection attempts as an initiator must cause throttling. This rule is meant to increase resilience of secure channel creation. <xref target="channel-selection"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/> shows how simultaneous mutual secure channel setup collisions are resolved.</t> </section> <section anchor="associations" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Securitytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8"> <name slugifiedName="name-security-association-secure">Security Association (Secure Channel)protocols</name> <t>ThisProtocols</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8-1">This section describes how ACP nodes establish secured data connections to automatically discovered or configured peers in the ACP. <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/> above describedformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/> describes how peers that are adjacent on an IPv6 subnetadjacent peersare discovered automatically. <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/> describes hownon IPv6 subnet adjacentto configure peerscan be configured.</t> <t><xrefthat are not adjacent on an IPv6 subnet.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8-2"><xref target="ACP-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2"/> describes how secure channels are mapped to virtual IPv6 subnet interfaces in the ACP. The simple case is to map every ACP secure channelintoto a separate ACP point-to-point virtual interface<xref(<xref target="ACP-p2p-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2.1"/>). When a single subnet has multiple ACPpeerspeers, this results in multiple ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces across that underlyingmulti-partymultiparty IPv6 subnet. This can be optimized with ACP multi-access virtual interfaces (<xref target="ACP-ma-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2.2"/>), but the benefits of that optimization may not justify the complexity of that option.</t> <section anchor="general-considerations" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>General considerations</name> <t>Duetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-general-considerations">General Considerations</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.1-1">Due to<xrefchannel selection (<xref target="channel-selection"format="default">Channel Selection</xref>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/>), ACP can support an evolving set of security association protocols and does not require support for a singlenetwork widenetwork-wide MTI. ACP nodes only need to implement those protocols required to interoperate with their candidate peers, not with potentially any node in the ACP domain. See <xref target="Profiles"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.5"/> for an example of this.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.1-2">The degree of security required on every hop of an ACP network needs to be consistent across the network so that there is no designated "weakest link" because it is that "weakest link" that would otherwise become the designated point of attack. When the secure channel protection on one link is compromised, it can be used tosend/receivesend and/or receive packets across the whole ACP network. Therefore, even though the security association protocols can be different, their minimum degree of security should be comparable.</t><t>Secure<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.1-3">Secure channel protocols do not need to always support arbitraryL3Layer 3 (L3) connectivity between peers, but can leverage the fact that the standard use case for ACP secure channels is an L2 adjacency. Hence, L2 dependent mechanisms could be adopted for use as secure channel associationprotocols:</t> <t>L2protocols.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.1-4">L2 mechanisms such as strong encrypted radio technologies or <xref target="MACSEC"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="MACSEC"/> may offer equivalentencryptionencryption, and the ACP security association protocol may only be required to authenticate ACP domain membership of a peer and/or derive a key for the L2 mechanism. Mechanisms that leverage such underlying L2 security to auto-discover and associate ACP peersleveraging such underlying L2 securityare possible and desirable to avoid duplication of encryption, but none are specified in this document.</t><t>Strong<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.1-5">Strong physical security of a link may stand in where cryptographic security is infeasible. As there is no secure mechanism to automatically discover strong physical security solely between two peers, it can only be used with explicitconfigurationconfiguration, and that configuration too could become an attack vector. This document thereforeonlyspecifies with <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default">ACPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1">ACP connect</xref> only one explicitly configured mechanism without any secure channel association protocol-for the case where both the link and the nodes attached to it have strong physical security.</t> </section> <section anchor="common-requirements" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Common requirements</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-common-requirements">Common Requirements</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-1">The authentication of peers in any security association protocolMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the ACP certificate according to <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>. Because auto-discovery of candidate ACP neighbors via GRASP (see <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>) as specified in this document does not communicate theneighborsneighbor's ACP certificate, and ACP nodes may not (yet) have any other network connectivity to retrieve certificates, any security association protocolMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a mechanism to communicate the certificate directly instead of relying on a referential mechanism such as communicating only a hash and/or URL for the certificate.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-2">A security association protocolMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use Forward Secrecy (whether inherently or as part of a profile of the security association protocol). </t><t>Because<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-3">Because the ACP payload of legacy protocol payloads inside the ACP and hop-by-hop ACP flooded GRASP information is unencrypted, the ACP secure channel protocol requires confidentiality. Symmetric encryption for the transmission of secure channel dataMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use encryption schemes considered to be security wise equal to or better than 256-bit key strength, such asAES256.AES-256. ThereMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be support for NULL encryption. </t><t>Security<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-4">Security association protocols typically only signal theEnd Entityend entity certificate(e.g.(e.g., the ACP certificate) and any possible intermediate CA certificates for successful mutual authentication. The TA has to be mutually known andtrustedtrusted, and therefore its certificate does not need to be signaled for successful mutual authentication. Nevertheless, for use with ACP secure channel setup, thereSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the option to include the TA certificate in the signaling to aid troubleshooting, see <xref target="ta-troubleshoot"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Signalingformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.1.1"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-5">Signaling of TA certificates may not be appropriate when the deploymentis relyingrelies on a security model where the TA certificate content is consideredconfidentialconfidential, and only its hash is appropriate for signaling. ACP nodesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> have a mechanism to select whether the TA certificate is signaled ornot. Assumingnot, assuming that both options are possible with a specific secure channel protocol.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-6">An ACP secure channelMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> immediately be terminated when the lifetime of any certificate in the chain used to authenticate the neighbor expires or becomes revoked. This may not be standard behavior in secure channel protocols because the certificate authentication may only influence the setup of the secure channel in these protocols, but may not bere-validatedrevalidated during the lifetime of the secure connection in the absence of this requirement.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.2-7">When specifying an additional security association protocol for ACP secure channels beyond those covered in this document, any protocol optionsSHOULD be eliminatedthat arenot necessary tounnecessary for the support of devices that are expected to be able to support the ACP <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be eliminated in order to minimize implementation complexity. For example, definitions for security protocols often includeold/inferiorold and/or inferior security options required only to interoperate with existing devices thatwill not be able tocannot update to the currently preferred security options. Suchold/inferiorold and/or inferior security options do not need to be supported when a security association protocol is first specified for the ACP, thus strengthening the "weakest link" and simplifying ACP implementation overhead.</t> </section> <section anchor="IPsec-group" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-via-ipsec">ACP via IPsec</name><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3-1">An ACP node announces its ability to support IPsec, negotiated via IKEv2, as the ACP secure channel protocol using the "IKEv2"objective-value'objective-value' in the "AN_ACP" GRASP objective.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3-2">The ACP usage of IPsec and IKEv2 mandates a profile with a narrow set of options of the currentstandards-trackStandards Track usage guidance for IPsec ("<xref target="RFC8221" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)"/>" <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/>) and IKEv2 ("<xref target="RFC8247" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"/>" <xref target="RFC8247"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8247"/>). Theseoptionoptions result in stringent security properties and can excludedeprecated/legacydeprecated and legacy algorithms because there is no need for interoperability with legacy equipment for ACP secure channels. Any such backward compatibility would lead only to an increased attack surface and implementation complexity, for no benefit.</t> <section anchor="IPsec" toc="include"numbered="true"> <name>Nativenumbered="true" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.3.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-native-ipsec">Native IPsec</name><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1-1"> An ACP node that is supporting native IPsecMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use IPsec in tunnel mode, negotiated via IKEv2, and with IPv6 payload (e.g., ESP Next Header of 41). ItMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use local and peer link-local IPv6 addresses for encapsulation. Manual keyingMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used, see <xref target="domcert"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2"/>. Traffic Selectors are:</t><t>TSi<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-6.8.3.1-2"> TSi = (0, 0-65535, :: -FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)</t> <t>TSrFFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF) TSr = (0, 0-65535, :: -FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)</t> <t>IPsecFFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF) </artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1-3">IPsec tunnel mode is required because the ACP willroute/forwardroute and/or forward packets received from any other ACP node across the ACP secure channels, and not only its own generated ACP packets. With IPsec transport mode (and no additional encapsulation header in the ESP payload), it would only be possible to send packets originated by the ACP node itself because the IPv6 addresses of the ESP must be the same as that of the outer IPv6 header.</t> <section anchor="rfc8221req" toc="include"numbered="true"> <name>RFC8221numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-rfc-8221-ipsec-esp">RFC 8221 (IPsec/ESP)</name><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-1">ACP IPsec implementationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> comply with <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/> (and its updates).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/> and any specifications that update it. The requirements from above and this section amend andsupersededsupersede its requirements.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-2">The IP Authentication Header (AH)MUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used (because it does not provide confidentiality).</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-3">For the required ESP encryption algorithms insection 5 of<xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>sectionFormat="of" section="5" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8221#section-5" derivedContent="RFC8221"/>, the following guidance applies: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>ENCR_NULLspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-4"> <li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-4.1">ENCR_NULL AHMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used (because it does not provide confidentiality).</li><li>ENCR_AES_GCM_16<li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-4.2">ENCR_AES_GCM_16 is the only MTI ESP encryption algorithm for ACP via IPsec/ESP (it is already listed asMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> in <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>).</li> <li>ENCR_AES_CBCformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/>).</li> <li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-4.3">ENCR_AES_CBC with AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (as the ESP authentication algorithm) and ENCR_AES_CCM_8MAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be supported. If either provides higher performance thanENCR_AES_GCM_16ENCR_AES_GCM_16, itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be supported.</li><li>ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 SHOULD<li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-4.4">ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be supported at equal or higher performance than ENCR_AES_GCM_16. If that performance is not feasible, itMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be supported.</li> </ul><t>IKEv2<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-5">IKEv2 indicates an order for the offered algorithms. The algorithmsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be ordered by performance. The first algorithm supported by both sides is generally chosen.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-6"> Explanations: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-7"> <li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-7.1"> There is no requirement to interoperate with legacy equipment in ACP secure channels, so a single MTI encryption algorithm for IPsec in ACP secure channels is sufficient for interoperability and allows for the most lightweight implementations. </li><li><li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-7.2"> ENCR_AES_GCM_16 is anauthenticated encryptionAuthenticated Encryption withassociated dataAssociated Data (AEAD) cipher mode, so no additional ESP authentication algorithm is needed, simplifying the MTI requirements of IPsec for the ACP. </li><li>There<li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-7.3">There is no MTI requirement for the support of ENCR_AES_CBC because ENCR_AES_GCM_16 is assumed to be feasible with lesscost/highercost and/or higher performance in moderndevices hardware accelerateddevices' hardware-accelerated implementations compared to ENCR-AES_CBC. </li><li><li pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-7.4"> ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is mandatory in <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/> because of its target use as a fallback algorithm in case weaknesses in AES are uncovered. Unfortunately, there is currently no way to automatically propagate across an ACP a policy to disallow use ofAES basedAES-based algorithms, so this target benefit of ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 cannot fully be adopted yet for the ACP. Therefore, this algorithm is only recommended. Changing from AES to this algorithmatwith a potentially big drop in performance could also render the ACP inoperable. Therefore,thethere is a performance requirement against this algorithm so that it could become an effective security backup to AES for the ACP once a policy to switch over to it or prefer it is available in an ACP framework. </li> </ul><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-8"> <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/> allows for 128-bit or 256-bit AES keys. This document mandates that only 256-bit AES keysMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.1-9"> When <xref target="RFC8221"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8221"/> is updated, ACP implementations will need to consider legacyinteroperability, and the IPsec WG has generally done a very good job of taking that into account in its recommendations.interoperability. </t> </section> <section anchor="rfc4247req" toc="include"numbered="true"> <name>RFC8247numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-rfc-8247-ikev2">RFC 8247 (IKEv2)</name><!-- tte PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 requirement superseded by requirement for RFC8247, which includes this PRF requirement: <t>The IKEv2 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 pseudorandom function MUST be supported (<xref target="rfc4868"/>).</t> --> <t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-1"> <xref target="RFC8247"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8247"/> provides a baseline recommendation formandatory to implementmandatory-to-implement ciphers, integrity checks,pseudo-random-functionspseudorandom functions, and Diffie-Hellman mechanisms. Those recommendations, and the recommendations of subsequentdocumentsdocuments, apply as well to the ACP. Because IKEv2 for ACP secure channels is sufficient to be implemented in control planesoftware,software rather than inASICApplication-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) hardware, and ACP nodes supporting IKEv2 are not assumed to becode-spacecode space constrained, and because existing IKEv2 implementations are expected to support <xref target="RFC8247"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8247"/> recommendations, thisdocumentsdocument makes no attempt to simplify its recommendations for use with the ACP. </t><t>See<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-2">See <xref target="IKEV2IANA"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IKEV2IANA"/> for IANA IKEv2 parameter names used in this text.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-3"> ACPNodesnodes supporting IKEv2MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> comply with <xref target="RFC8247"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8247"/> amended by the followingrequirementsrequirements, which constitute a policy statement as permitted by <xref target="RFC8247"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8247"/>. </t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-4">To signal the ACP certificate chain (including TA) as required by <xref target="common-requirements"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.2"/>, the "X.509 Certificate - Signature" payload in IKEv2 can be used. It is mandatory according to <xref target="RFC7296"format="default"/> section 3.6.</t> <t>ACPsectionFormat="comma" section="3.6" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296#section-3.6" derivedContent="RFC7296"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-5">ACP nodesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set up IKEv2 to only use the ACP certificate and TA when acting as an IKEv2 responder on the IPv6link locallink-local address and port number indicated in theAN_ACP"AN_ACP" DULL GRASP announcements (see <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Whenformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-6">When CERTREQ is received from a peer, and it does not indicate any of this ACPnodesnode's TA certificates, the ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ignore the CERTREQ and continue sending its certificate chain including its TA as subject to the requirements and explanations in <xref target="common-requirements"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.2"/>. This will not result in successful mutual authentication but assists diagnostics.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-7">Note that with IKEv2, failing authentication will only result in the responder receiving the certificate chain from the initiator, but not vice versa. Because ACP secure channel setup is symmetric (see <xref target="neighbor_verification"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.7"/>), every non-malicious ACP neighbor will attempt to connect as aninitiatorinitiator, though, allowing it to obtain the diagnostic information about theneighborsneighbor's certificate.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-8">In IKEv2, ACP nodes are identified by their ACPaddress.addresses. The ID_IPv6_ADDR IKEv2 identification payloadMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used andMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> convey the ACP address. If the peer's ACP certificate includes a 32HEXDIG ACP address in the acp-node-name (not "0" or omitted), the address in the IKEv2 identification payloadMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match it. See <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/> for more information about "0" or omitted ACP address fields in the acp-node-name. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-9"> IKEv2 authenticationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use authentication method 14 ("Digital Signature") for ACP certificates; this authentication method can be used with both RSA and ECDSA certificates, indicated by an ASN.1 object AlgorithmIdentifier. </t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-10">The Digital Signature hash SHA2-512MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported (in addition to SHA2-256).</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.1.2-11"> The IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange group 19 (256-bit random ECP),MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported. Reason: ECC provides a similar security level to finite-field(MODP)(modular exponentiation (MODP)) key exchange with a shorter key length, so is generally preferred absent other considerations. </t> </section> </section> <section anchor="IPsec-GRE" toc="include"numbered="true"> <name>IPsecnumbered="true" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.3.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-ipsec-with-gre-encapsulatio">IPsec with GREencapsulation</name> <t>InEncapsulation</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.2-1">In networkdevicesdevices, it is often more common to implementhigh performancehigh-performance virtual interfaces on top of GRE encapsulation than on top of a "native" IPsec association (without any other encapsulation than those defined by IPsec). On thosedevicesdevices, it may be beneficial to run the ACP secure channel on top of GRE protected by the IPsec association.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.2-2">The requirements for ESP/IPsec/IKEv2 with GRE are the same as for native IPsec (see <xref target="IPsec"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.3.1"/>) except that IPsec transport mode and next protocol GRE (47) are to be negotiated. Tunnel mode is not required because of GRE. Traffic Selectors are:</t><t>TSi<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-6.8.3.2-3"> TSi = (47, 0-65535, Initiator-IPv6-LL-addr ...Initiator-IPv6-LL-addr)</t> <t>TSrInitiator-IPv6-LL-addr) TSr = (47, 0-65535, Responder-IPv6-LL-addr ...Responder-IPv6-LL-addr)</t> <t>IfResponder-IPv6-LL-addr) </artwork> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.3.2-4">If the IKEv2 initiator and responder support IPsec over GRE, it will be preferred over native IPsec because ofthe wayhow IKEv2 negotiates transport mode (as used by this IPsec over GRE profile) versus tunnel mode as used by native IPsec (see <xref target="RFC7296"format="default"/>, section 1.3.1).sectionFormat="of" section="1.3.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296#section-1.3.1" derivedContent="RFC7296"/>). The ACP IPv6 traffic has to be carried across GRE according to "<xref target="RFC7676" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IPv6 Support for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)"/>" <xref target="RFC7676"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7676"/>.</t> </section> </section><!-- IPsec --><section anchor="DTLS" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-via-dtls">ACP via DTLS</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-1">This document defines the use of ACP viaDTLS,DTLS on the assumption that it is likely the first transport encryption supported in some classes of constrained devices: DTLS is commonly used in constrained devices when IPsec is not.Code-spaceCode space on those devices may be also be too limited to support more than the minimum number of required protocols.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-2">An ACP node announces its ability to support DTLS version 1.2(<xref("<xref target="RFC6347"format="default"/>)format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2"/>" <xref target="RFC6347" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6347"/>) compliant with the requirements defined in this document as an ACP secure channel protocol in GRASP through the "DTLS"objective-value'objective-value' in the "AN_ACP" objective (see <xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Toformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-3">To run ACP via UDP and DTLS, a locally assigned UDP port is used that is announced as a parameter in the GRASPAN_ACP"AN_ACP" objective to candidate neighbors. This port can also be any newer version of DTLS as long as that version can negotiate a DTLSv1.21.2 connection in the presence ofan DTLS v1.2a peer that onlypeer.</t> <t>Allsupports DTLS 1.2.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-4">All ACP nodes supporting DTLS as a secure channel protocolMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> adhere to the DTLS implementation recommendations and security considerations ofBCP 195,<xref target="RFC7525"format="default">BCPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7525">BCP 195</xref> except with respect to the DTLS version. ACP nodes supporting DTLSMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support DTLS 1.2. TheyMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> support older versions of DTLS.</t><t>Unlike<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-5">Unlike for IPsec, no attempts are made to simplify the requirements of theBCP 195recommendations in <xref target="RFC7525" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7525">BCP 195</xref> because the expectation is that DTLS wouldbe usinguse software-only implementations where the ability to reuseofwidely adopted implementations is more important thanminimizingthe ability to minimize the complexity of ahardware accelerated implementationhardware-accelerated implementation, which is known to be important for IPsec.</t><t>DTLS v1.3 (<xref<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-6">DTLS 1.3 <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="TLS-DTLS13"/> is "backward compatible" with DTLSv1.21.2 (seesection 1. of DTLS v1.3).<xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" sectionFormat="of" section="1" format="default" derivedLink="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43#section-1" derivedContent="TLS-DTLS13"/>). A DTLS implementation supporting both DTLSv1.21.2 and DTLSv1.31.3 does comply with the above requirements of negotiating to DTLSv1.21.2 in the presence of a DTLSv1.21.2 only peer, but using DTLSv1.31.3 when booth peers support it.</t><t>Version v1.2<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-7">Version 1.2 is the MTI version of DTLS in this specification because of the following: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Therespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.8.4-8"> <li pn="section-6.8.4-8.1">There is more experience with DTLSv1.21.2 across the spectrum of target ACP nodes.</li><li>Firmware<li pn="section-6.8.4-8.2">Firmware oflower end,lower-end, embedded ACP nodes may not support a newer version for a long time.</li><li>There<li pn="section-6.8.4-8.3">There are significant changesofwith DTLSv1.3,1.3, such as a different record layer requiring time to gain implementation and deployment experience especially onlower end, code spacelower-end devices with limiteddevices.</li> <li>Thecode space.</li> <li pn="section-6.8.4-8.4">The existing BCP <xref target="RFC7525"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7525"/> for DTLSv1.21.2 mayequallytake an equally longer time to be updated with experience from a newer DTLS version.</li><li><li pn="section-6.8.4-8.5"> There are no significantuse-case relevantbenefits of DTLSv1.31.3 over DTLSv1.21.2 that are use-case relevant in the context of the ACP options for DTLS. For example, signaling performance improvements for session setup in DTLSv1.31.3 is not important for the ACP given the long-lived nature of ACP secure channel connections and the fact that DTLS connections are mostlylink-locallink local (short RTT).</li> </ul><t>Nevertheless,<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-9">Nevertheless, newer versions of DTLS, such as DTLSv1.31.3, have stricter securityrequirementsrequirements, and the use of the latest standard protocol version is in general recommended for IETF securitystandards in general recommended.standards. Therefore, ACP implementations are advised to support all the newer versions of DTLS that can still negotiate down to DTLSv1.2.</t> <t>[RFC-editor: if by the time of AUTH48, DTLS 1.3 would have evolved to be an RFC, then not only would the references to the DTLS v1.3 draft be changed to the RFC number, but that RFC is then going to be put into the normative list of references and the above paragraph is going to be amended to say: Implementations SHOULD support [DTLSv1.3-RFC]. This is not done right now, because there is no benefit in potentially waiting in RFC-editor queue for that RFC given how the text already lays out a non-normative desire to support DTLSv1.3.]</t> <t>There1.2.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.4-10">There is no additional session setup or other security association besides this simple DTLS setup. As soon as the DTLS session is functional, the ACP peers will exchange ACP IPv6 packets as the payload of the DTLS transport connection.oAny DTLS definedAny DTLS-defined security association mechanisms such asre-keyingrekeying are used as they would be for any transport application relying solely on DTLS.</t><!-- RFC 6125 is a common reference for TLS server-identification/verification procedures, but it covers only names, and only server identities; as such, it's not really a good fit here. In fact, we can't really do much name validation since the connection is over link-local IPv6 addresses anyway. --></section><!-- DTLS --><section anchor="Profiles" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.8.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-secure-channel-profiles">ACP Secure Channel Profiles</name><t>As<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.5-1">As explained in the beginning of <xref target="channel-selection"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/>, there is no single secure channel mechanism mandated for all ACP nodes. Instead, this section defines two ACPprofiles (baselineprofiles, "baseline" andconstrained)"constrained", for ACP nodes that do introduce such requirements.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.5-2">An ACP node supporting the"baseline"baseline profileMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support IPsec natively andMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support IPsec via GRE. An ACP node supporting the"constrained"constrained profilenodethat cannot support IPsecMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support DTLS. An ACP node connecting an area of constrained ACP nodes with an area of baseline ACP nodes needs to support both IPsec and DTLS andsupportstherefore supports both the baseline and constrainedprofile.</t> <t>Explanation: Notprofiles.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.5-3">Explanation: not alltypetypes of ACP nodescanare able to or need to connect directly to eachother orother, nor are they able to support or prefer all possible secure channel mechanisms. For example,code space limitedIoT devices with limited code space may only support DTLS because that codeexistsalready exists on them for end-to-end security, but high-end core routers may not want to support DTLS because they can perform IPsec in acceleratedhardwarehardware, but they would need to support DTLS in an underpowered CPU forwarding path shared with critical control plane operations. This is not a deployment issue for a single ACP across thesetypetypes of nodes as long as there are also appropriate gateway ACP nodes thatsupportsufficiently support many secure channel mechanisms to allow interconnecting areas of ACP nodes with a more constrained set of secure channel protocols. On the edge between IoT areas and high-end core networks, general-purpose routers that act as those gateways and that can support a variety of secure channel protocolsisare the norm already.</t><t>IPsec natively<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.5-4">Native IPsec with tunnel mode provides the shortest encapsulation overhead. GRE may be preferred by legacy implementationsbecausebecause, in the past, the virtual interfaces required by ACP design in conjunction with secure channels havein the past more oftenbeen implemented more often for GRE than purely for native IPsec.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.8.5-5">ACP nodes need to specifyin documentationthe set of secure ACP mechanisms they support in documentation and should declare which profile they support according to the above requirements.</t> </section><!-- Profiles --></section><!-- associations --><section anchor="GRASP" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>GRASPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.9"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-in-the-acp">GRASP in the ACP</name> <section anchor="GRASP-core" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>GRASPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.9.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-as-a-core-service-of-">GRASP as acore serviceCore Service of the ACP</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.1-1">The ACPMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> run an instance of GRASP inside of it. It is a key part of the ACP services. The function in GRASP that makes it fundamental as a service of the ACP is the ability to provideACP wideACP-wide service discovery (using objectives in GRASP).</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.1-2">ACP provides IP unicast routing viatheRPLrouting protocol(see <xref target="routing"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.1-3">The ACP does not use IP multicast routing nor does it provide generic IP multicast services (the handling of GRASP link-local multicast messages is explained in <xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/>). Instead, the ACP provides service discovery via the objective discovery/announcement and negotiation mechanisms of the ACP GRASP instance (services are a form of objectives). These mechanisms use hop-by-hop reliable flooding of GRASP messages for both service discovery (GRASP M_DISCOVERY messages) and service announcement (GRASP M_FLOOD messages).</t><t>See<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.1-4">See <xref target="acp-grasp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.5"/> for discussion about this design choice of the ACP.</t> </section> <section anchor="GRASP-substrate" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.9.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-as-the-security-and-tra">ACP as the Security and TransportsubstrateSubstrate for GRASP</name><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-1">In the terminology of GRASP(<xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" format="default"/>),<xref target="RFC8990" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8990"/>, the ACP is the security and transport substrate for the GRASP instance run inside the ACP ("ACP GRASP").</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-2">This means that the ACP is responsible for ensuring that this instance of GRASP is only sending messages across the ACP GRASP virtual interfaces. Whenever the ACP adds or deletes such an interface because of new ACP secure channels or loss thereof, the ACP needs to indicate this to the ACP instance of GRASP. The ACP exists also in the absence of any active ACP neighbors. It is created when the node has a domain certificate, and it continues to exist even if all of its neighbors cease operation.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-3">In thiscasecase, ASAs using GRASP running on the same nodewouldstill need to be able to discover each other's objectives. When the ACP does not exist, ASAs leveraging the ACP instance of GRASP via APIsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> still be able to operate, andMUSTthey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to understand that there is no ACP and that therefore the ACP instance of GRASP cannot operate.</t><t>The following explanation how<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-4">How the ACP acts as the security and transport substrate for GRASP isvisualizedshown in <xref target="acp-grasp-picture"format="default"/> below.</t> <t>GRASPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 8"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-5">GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP always use the ACP address. Link-local addresses from the ACP VRFMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used inside objectives. GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP are transported via TLS. See <xref target="tls"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.1"/> for TLS requirements. TLS mutual authenticationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the ACP domain membership check defined in(<xref<xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>).</t> <t>GRASPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-6">GRASP link-local multicast messages are targeted for a specific ACP virtual interface (as defined <xref target="ACP_interfaces"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5"/>), but they are sent by the ACPintoto an ACP GRASP virtual interface that is constructed from the TCP connection(s) to the IPv6 link-local neighbor address(es) on the underlying ACP virtual interface. If the ACP GRASP virtual interface has two or more neighbors, the GRASP link-local multicast messages are replicated to all neighbor TCP connections.</t><t>TCP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2-7">TCP and TLS connections for GRASP in the ACP use theIANA assignedIANA-assigned TCP port for GRASP(7107). Effectively(7017). Effectively, the transport stack is expected to be TLS for connectionsfrom/toto and from the ACP address (e.g.,global scopeglobal-scope address(es)) and TCP for connectionsfrom/toto and from the link-local addresses on the ACP virtual interfaces. The latter ones are only used for the flooding of GRASP messages.</t><!-- https://trac.tools.ietf.org/tools/xml2rfc/trac/ticket/344 --> <?rfc needLines="48" ?><figureanchor="acp-grasp-picture"> <name>ACPanchor="acp-grasp-picture" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-8"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-as-security-and-transpo">ACP assecuritySecurity andtransport substrateTransport Substrate for GRASP</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-6.9.2-8.1"> ..............................ACP.............................. . . . /-GRASP-flooding-\ ACP GRASP instance . . / \ A . GRASP GRASP GRASP C . link-local unicast link-local P . multicast messages multicast . . messages | messages . . | | | . ............................................................... . v v v ACP security and transport . . | | | substrate for GRASP . . | | | . . | ACP GRASP | - ACP GRASP A . |Loopbackloopback |Loopbackloopback interface C . | interface | - ACP-cert auth P . | TLS | . . ACP GRASP | ACP GRASP - ACP GRASP virtual . . subnet1 | subnet2virtualinterfaces . . TCP | TCP . . | | | . ............................................................... . | | | ^^^ Users of ACP (GRASP/ASA) . . | | | ACP interfaces/addressing . . | | | . . | | | A . |ACP-Loopback Interf.| <-ACPLoopbackloopback interf.| <- ACP loopback interface C . | ACP-address | - address (global ULA) P . subnet1 | subnet2<-<- ACP virtual interfaces . . link-local | link-local - link-local addresses . ............................................................... . | | | ACP VRF . . | RPL-routing | virtual routing and forwarding . . | /IP-Forwarding\ | A . | / \ | C . ACP IPv6 packets ACP IPv6 packets P . |/ \| . . IPsec/DTLS IPsec/DTLS - ACP-cert auth . ............................................................... | |Data-PlaneData Plane | | | | - ACP secure channel link-local link-local - encapsulation addresses subnet1 subnet2 -Data-Planedata plane interfaces | | ACP-Nbr1 ACP-Nbr2]]></artwork></artwork> </figure> <section anchor="GRASP-discussion" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Discussion</name> <t>TCPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.9.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-discussion">Discussion</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2.1-1">TCP encapsulation for GRASP M_DISCOVERY and M_FLOODlink locallink-local messages is used because these messages are flooded across potentially many hops to all ACPnodesnodes, and a single link with even temporarypacket losspacket-loss issues (e.g.,WiFi/Powerlinea Wi-Fi or Powerline link) can reduce the probability forloss freeloss-free transmission so much that applications would want to increase the frequency with which they send these messages. Such shorter periodic retransmission of datagrams would result in more traffic and processing overhead in the ACP than thehop-by-hophop-by-hop, reliable retransmission mechanism offered by TCP and duplicate elimination by GRASP.</t><t>TLS<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2.1-2">TLS is mandated for GRASP non-link-local unicast because the ACP secure channel mandatory authentication and encryption protects only against attacks from the outside but not against attacks from the inside:Compromisedcompromised ACP members that have (not yet) been detected and removed (e.g., via domain certificate revocation/and/or expiry).</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2.1-3">If GRASP peer connections were to use just TCP, compromised ACP members could simply eavesdrop passively on GRASP peer connections forwhomwhich they are on-path ("man in the middle"-or MITM) or intercept and modifythem.messages. With TLS, it is not possible to completely eliminate problems with compromised ACP members, but attacks are a lot morecomplex:</t> <t>Eavesdropping/spoofingcomplex.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2.1-4">Eavesdropping and/or spoofing by a compromised ACP node is still possible because in the model of the ACP and GRASP, the provider and consumer of an objective have initially no unique information (such as an identity) about the other sidewhichthat would allow them to distinguish a benevolent from a compromised peer. The compromised ACP node would simply announce the objective as well, potentially filter the original objective in GRASP when it is a MITM and act as anapplication levelapplication-level proxy. This of course requires that the compromised ACP node understand the semantics of the GRASP negotiation to an extent that allowsitthe compromised node to proxyitthe messages without being detected, but in an ACPenvironmentenvironment, this is quite likely public knowledge or even standardized.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.9.2.1-5">The GRASP TLS connections are run the same as any other ACP traffic through the ACP secure channels. This leads to doubleauthentication/encryption,authentication and encryption, which has the following benefits:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Securespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.9.2.1-6"> <li pn="section-6.9.2.1-6.1">Secure channel methods such as IPsec may provide protection against additional attacks, forexample reset-attacks.</li> <li>Theexample, reset attacks.</li> <li pn="section-6.9.2.1-6.2">The secure channel method may leverage hardwareaccelerationacceleration, and there may be little or no gain in eliminating it.</li><li>There is no different<li pn="section-6.9.2.1-6.3">The security model for ACP GRASPfromis no different than other ACP traffic. Instead, there is just another layer of protection against certain attacks from theinsideinside, which is important due to the role of GRASP in the ACP.</li> </ul> </section> </section> </section><!-- GRASPinstances --><section anchor="separation" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Contexttoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.10"> <name slugifiedName="name-context-separation">Context Separation</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.10-1">The ACP is in a separate context from the normalData-Planedata plane of the node. This context includes the ACP channels' IPv6 forwarding and routing as well as any requiredhigher layerhigher-layer ACP functions.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.10-2">In a classical network system, a dedicated VRF is one logical implementation option for the ACP. Ifpossibleallowed by thesystemssystem's software architecture, separation options that minimize sharedcomponents are preferred,components, such as a logical container or virtual machineinstance.instance, are preferred. The context for the ACP needs to be established automatically during the bootstrap of a node. As much aspossiblepossible, it should be protected from being modified unintentionally by("Data-Plane")(data plane) configuration.</t><t>Context<t indent="0" pn="section-6.10-3">Context separation improvessecurity,security because the ACP is not reachable from theData-Planedata plane routing or forwarding table(s). Also, configuration errors from theData-Planedata plane setup do not affect the ACP.</t> </section><!-- separation --><section anchor="addressing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Addressingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11"> <name slugifiedName="name-addressing-inside-the-acp">Addressing inside the ACP</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11-1">The channels explained above typically only establish communication between two adjacent nodes. In order for communication to happen across multiple hops, theautonomic control planeAutonomic Control Plane requires ACPnetwork widenetwork-wide valid addresses and routing. Each ACP node creates aLoopbackloopback interface with an ACPnetwork widenetwork-wide unique address (prefix) inside the ACP context (as explained inin<xref target="separation"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.10"/>). This address may be used also in other virtual contexts.</t><t>With<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11-2">With the algorithm introduced here, all ACP nodes in the same routing subdomain have the same /48 ULA prefix. Conversely, ULAglobalGlobal IDs from different domains are unlikely to clash, such that two ACP networks can be merged, as long as the policy allows that merge. See also <xref target="self-healing"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 10.1"/> for a discussion on merging domains.</t><t>Links<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11-3">Links inside the ACP only use link-local IPv6 addressing, such that each node's ACP only requires one routable address prefix.</t> <section anchor="addr-fundamentals" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Fundamentaltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-fundamental-concepts-of-aut">Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing</name> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Usage: Autonomicspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.1-1"> <li pn="section-6.11.1-1.1">Usage: autonomic addresses are exclusively used for self-management functions inside a trusted domain. They are not used for user traffic. Communications with entities outside the trusted domain use another address space, forexampleexample, a normally managed routable address space (called"Data-Plane""data plane" in this document).</li><li>Separation: Autonomic<li pn="section-6.11.1-1.2">Separation: autonomic address space is used separately from user address space and other address realms. This supports the robustness requirement.</li><li>Loopback-only: Only<li pn="section-6.11.1-1.3">Loopback only: only ACPLoopbackloopback interfaces (and potentially those configured for"ACP connect",ACP connect, see <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>) carry routable address(es); all other interfaces (called ACP virtual interfaces) only use IPv6link locallink-local addresses. The usage of IPv6link locallink-local addressing is discussed in "<xref target="RFC7404" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Using Only Link-Local Addressing inside an IPv6 Network"/>" <xref target="RFC7404"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Use-ULA: For Loopbackformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7404"/>.</li> <li pn="section-6.11.1-1.4">Use of ULA: for loopback interfaces of ACP nodes, we use ULA withL=1the L bit set to 1 (as defined insection 3.1 of<xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/>).sectionFormat="of" section="3.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4193#section-3.1" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>). Note that the random hash for ACPLoopbackloopback addresses uses the definition in <xref target="scheme"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.2"/> and not the oneofin <xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/> section 3.2.2.</li> <li>NosectionFormat="comma" section="3.2.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4193#section-3.2.2" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>.</li> <li pn="section-6.11.1-1.5">No external connectivity:Theythe addresses do not provide access to the Internet. If a node requires furtherreachingconnectivity, it should use another, traditionally managedaddressaddressing scheme in parallel.</li><li>Addresses<li pn="section-6.11.1-1.6">Addresses in the ACP arepermanent,permanent and do not support temporary addresses as defined in "<xref target="RFC8981" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6"/>" <xreftarget="RFC4941" format="default"/>.</li> <li>Addressestarget="RFC8981" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8981"/>.</li> <li pn="section-6.11.1-1.7">Addresses in the ACP are not considered sensitive on privacy grounds because ACP nodes are not expected to be end-userhostshosts, and therefore ACP addresses dothereforenot representend-usersend users or groups ofend-users.end users. All ACP nodes are in one (potentially federated) administrative domain.TheyFor ACP traffic, the nodes are assumed to beto beeither candidate hostsof ACP traffic amongst each otheror transitthereof.nodes. There are no transit nodesless privilegedwith fewer privileges to knowaboutthe identity of other hosts in the ACP. Therefore, ACP addresses do not need to bepseudo-randompseudorandom as discussed in "<xref target="RFC7721" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms"/>" <xref target="RFC7721"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7721"/>. Because they are not propagated to untrusted(non ACP)(non-ACP) nodes and stay within a domain (of trust), we also do not consider themnotto be subject to scanning attacks.</li> </ul><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.1-2">The ACP is based exclusively on IPv6addressing,addressing for a variety of reasons: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Simplicity, reliabilityspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.1-3"> <li pn="section-6.11.1-3.1">Simplicity, reliability, and scale:Ifif othernetwork layernetwork-layer protocols were supported, each would have to have its own set of security associations, routingtabletable, and process, etc.</li><li>Autonomic<li pn="section-6.11.1-3.2">Autonomic functions do not require IPv4:Autonomicautonomic functions and autonomic service agents are new concepts. They can be exclusively built on IPv6 from day one. There is no need for backward compatibility.</li><li>OAM<li pn="section-6.11.1-3.3">OAM protocols do not require IPv4:Thethe ACP may carry OAM protocols. All relevant protocols (SNMP, TFTP, SSH, SCP, RADIUS, Diameter,NETCONF ...)NETCONF, etc.) are available in IPv6. See also <xref target="RFC8368"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368"/> for how ACP could be made to interoperate withIPv4 onlyIPv4-only OAM.</li> </ul><t>Further<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.1-4">Further explanation about the addressing androuting relatedrouting-related reasons for the choice of the autonomous ACP addressing can be found in <xref target="ACP-loopback"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.1"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="scheme" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-the-acp-addressing-base-sch">The ACP Addressing Base Scheme</name><t>The Base<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-1">The ULA addressing base scheme for ACP nodes has the following format:</t> <figureanchor="base-addr-scheme"> <name>ACPanchor="base-addr-scheme" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-9"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-addressing-base-scheme">ACP Addressing Base Scheme</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-6.11.2-2.1"> 8 40 2 78 +--+-------------------------+------+------------------------------+ |fd| hash(routing-subdomain) | Type | (sub-scheme) | +--+-------------------------+------+------------------------------+]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-3">The first48-bits48 bits follow the ULAscheme,scheme as defined in <xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>, to which atypeType field isadded:added. </t><ul spacing="compact"> <li>"fd" identifies<dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.2-4"> <dt pn="section-6.11.2-4.1">fd:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.2-4.2">Identifies a locally defined ULAaddress.</li> <li>The 40-bitsaddress.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.2-4.3">hash(routing-subdomain):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.2-4.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-4.4.1">The 40-bit ULA"global ID" (termGlobal ID (a term from <xref target="RFC4193"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4193"/>) for ACP addresses carried in the acp-node-name in the ACP certificates are the first40-bits40 bits of theSHA256SHA-256 hash of therouting subdomainrouting-subdomain from the same acp-node-name. In the example of <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>, therouting subdomainrouting-subdomain is"area51.research.acp.example.com""area51.research.acp.example.com", and the40-bits40-bit ULA"global ID" 89b714f3db.</li> <li>WhenGlobal ID is 89b714f3db.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-4.4.2">When creating a new routing-subdomain for an existingautonomic network,Autonomic Network, itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> beensured,ensured that rsub is selected so the resulting hash of the routing-subdomain does not collide with the hash of anypre-existingpreexisting routing-subdomains of theautonomic network.Autonomic Network. This ensures that ACP addresses created by registrars for different routing subdomains do not collide with eachother.</li> <li>Toother.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-4.4.3">To allow for extensibility, the fact that the ULA"global ID"Global ID is a hash of therouting subdomain SHOULD NOTrouting-subdomain <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be assumed by any ACP node during normal operations. The hash function is only executed during the creation of the certificate. If BRSKI is used, then the BRSKI registrar will create the acp-node-name in response to the EST Certificate Signing Request (CSR)AttributeAttributes Request message sent by thepledge.</li> <li>Establishingpledge.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-4.4.4">Establishing connectivity between differentACPACPs (differentacp-domain-name)acp-domain-names) is outside the scope of this specification. If it is being done through future extensions, then the rsub of all routing-subdomains across thoseautonomic networks needAutonomic Networks needs to be selected so that the resulting routing-subdomain hashes do not collide. For example, a large cooperation with its own private TA may want to create differentautonomic networksAutonomic Networks that initiallyshoulddo notbe able toconnect but where the option to do so should be kept open. When taking thisfuturepossibility into account, it is always easy toalwaysselect rsub so that no collisionshappen.</li> <li>Type: Thishappen.</t> </dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.2-4.5">Type:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.2-4.6">This field allows differentaddressaddressing sub-schemes. This addresses the "upgradability" requirement. Assignment of types for this field will be maintained byIANA.</li> </ul> <t>TheIANA.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.2-4.7">(sub-scheme):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.2-4.8">The sub-scheme may imply a range or set of addresses assigned to thenode, thisnode. This is called the ACP address range/set and explained in eachsub-scheme.</t> <t>Pleasesub-scheme.</dd> </dl> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-5">Please refer to <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/> and <xref target="address-spaces"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.1"/> for further explanations for why the followingSub-Addressing schemesaddressing sub-schemes are used and why multiple are necessary.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-6"> The following summarizes the addressingSub-Schemes:sub-schemes: </t><figure anchor="addr-scheme-summary"> <name>Addressing<table anchor="tab-1" align="center" pn="table-1"> <name slugifiedName="name-addressing-sub-schemes">Addressing Sub-Schemes</name><artwork name="" type=""<thead> <tr> <th align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[ +------+-----------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Type | Name |F-bit| Z | V-bits | Prefix | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x00 | ACP-Zone | N/A | 0 | 1 bit | /127 | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x00 | ACP-Manual | N/A | 1 | N/A | /64 | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x01 | ACP-VLong-8 | 0 | N/A | 8 bits | /120 | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x01 | ACP-VLong-16 | 1 | N/A | 16 bits | /112 | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x10 | Reservedcolspan="1" rowspan="1">Type</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Name</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">F-bit</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Z</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">V-bits</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Prefix</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">0</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP-Zone</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">N/A</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">0</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1 bit</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">/127</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">0</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP-Manual</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">N/A</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">N/A</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">/64</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP-Vlong-8</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">0</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">N/A</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">8 bits</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">/120</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP-Vlong-16</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">N/A</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">16 bits</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">/112</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">2</td> <td colspan="5" align="left" rowspan="1">Reserved / For futuredefinition/allocation | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ | 0x11 | Reserveddefinition/allocation</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">3</td> <td colspan="5" align="left" rowspan="1">Reserved / For futuredefinition/allocation | +------+-----------------+-----+-----+----------+--------+ ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>F-Bitdefinition/allocation</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.2-8">The F-bit (format bit, <xref target="Vlong" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>) and Z (<xref target="manual-scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.4"/>) are two encoding fields that are explainedbelow forin theSub-Schemessections covering the sub-schemes thatintroduce/useuse them. V-bits is the number of bits of addresses allocated to the ACP node. Prefix is the prefix that the ACP node is announcing intothe RPL routing protocol.</t>RPL.</t> </section><!-- base-scheme --><section anchor="zone-scheme" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-zone-addressing-sub-sch">ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP-Zone)</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-1">This sub-scheme is used when the Type field of the base scheme is0x000 and the Z bit is0x0.</t>0.</t> <figureanchor="addr-scheme"> <name>ACPanchor="addr-scheme" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-10"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-zone-addressing-sub-sche">ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-6.11.3-2.1"> 64 64 +-----------------+---+---------++-----------------------------+---+ | (base scheme) | Z | Zone-ID || Node-ID | | | | || Registrar-ID | Node-Number| V | +-----------------+---+---------++--------------+--------------+---+ 50 1 13 48 15 1]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-3">The fields are defined as follows:</t><ul spacing="compact"> <li>Type: MUST be 0x0.</li> <li>Z: MUST<dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.3-4"> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.1">Type:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.2"> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be0x0.</li> <li>Zone-ID:0.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.3">Z: </dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.4"> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 0.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.5">Zone-ID:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.6"> A value for a networkzone.</li> <li>Node-ID: Azone.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.7">Node-ID:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.1">A unique value for eachnode.</li> </ul> <t>Thenode.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.2">The 64-bit Node-ID must be unique across the ACP domain for each node. It is derived and composed as follows:</t><ul spacing="compact"> <li>Registrar-ID (48-bit): A<dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.3"> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.3.1">Registrar-ID (48 bits): </dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.3.2">A number unique inside the domainthat identifiesidentifying the ACP registrarwhichthat assigned the Node-ID to the node. One or more domain-wide unique identifiers of the ACP registrar can be used for this purpose. See <xref target="registrars-unique"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Node-Number: Numberformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7.2"/>.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.3.3">Node-Number:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.8.3.4"> A number to make the Node-ID unique. This can be sequentially assigned by the ACPRegistrarregistrar owning theRegistrar-ID.</li> <li>V (1-bit): Virtualization bit: 0: IndicatesRegistrar-ID.</dd> </dl> </dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.9">V (1 bit):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.10"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.1">Virtualization bit:</t> <dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.2"> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.2.1">0:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.2.2">Indicates the ACP itself ("ACP node basesystem); 1: Indicatessystem)</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.2.3">1:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.3-4.10.2.4">Indicates the optional "host" context on the ACP node (seebelow).</li> </ul> <t>Inbelow).</dd> </dl> </dd> </dl> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-5">In theACPZone Addressing Sub-Scheme, the ACP address in the certificate has V field as all zero bits.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-6">The ACP address set of the node includes addresses with any Zone-ID value and any V value.NoTherefore, no two nodes in the same ACP and the same hash(routing-subdomain) can have the sameNode-ID, but different Zone-IDs.</t> <t>The VirtualNode-ID with the Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme, for example, by differing only in their Zone-ID.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-7">The Virtualization bit in this sub-scheme allows the easy addition of the ACP as a component to existing systems without causing problems in the port number space between the services in the ACP and the existing system.V:0V=0 is the ACP router (autonomic node base system),V:1V=1 is the host withpre-existingpreexisting transport endpoints on it that could collide with the transport endpoints used by the ACP router. The ACP hostcouldcould, forexampleexample, have ap2pP2P (peer-to-peer) virtual interface with theV:0V=0 address as its routerintoto the ACP. Depending on the software design of ASAs, which is outside the scope of this specification, they may use theV:0V=0 orV:1V=1 address.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-8">The location of the V bit(s) at the end of the address allows the announcement of a single prefix for each ACP node. For example, in a network with 20,000 ACP nodes, thisavoidavoids 20,000 additional routes in the routing table.</t><t>It<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-9">It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that only Zone-ID 0 is used unless it is meant to be used in conjunction with operational practices forpartial/incrementalpartial or incremental adoption of the ACP as described in <xref target="incremental-adoption"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Note:format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.4"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.3-10">Note: Zones and Zone-ID as defined here are not related to<xref target="RFC4007" format="default"/>zones orzone_id.zone_id defined in "<xref target="RFC4007" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture"/>" <xref target="RFC4007" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4007"/>. ACP zone addresses are not scoped(reachable(i.e., reachable only from withinan RFC4007 zone)a zone as defined by <xref target="RFC4007" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4007"/>) but are reachable across the whole ACP.An RFC4007A zone_id is a zone index that has only local significance on anode,node <xref target="RFC4007" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4007"/>, whereas an ACP Zone-ID is an identifier for an ACP zone that is unique across that ACP.</t> </section><!-- zone-scheme --><section anchor="manual-scheme" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-manual-addressing-sub-s">ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP-Manual)</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-1">This sub-scheme is used when the Type field of the base scheme is0x000 and the Z bit is0x1.</t>1.</t> <figureanchor="manual-scheme-pic"> <name>ACPanchor="manual-scheme-pic" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-11"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-manual-addressing-sub-sc">ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-6.11.4-2.1"> 64 64 +---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+ | (base scheme) | Z | Subnet-ID|| Interface Identifier | +---------------------+---+----------++-----------------------------+ 50 1 13]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-3">The fields are defined as follows: </t><ul spacing="compact"> <li>Type: MUST be 0x0.</li> <li>Z: MUST<dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.4-4"> <dt pn="section-6.11.4-4.1">Type:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.4-4.2"> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 0.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.4-4.3">Z:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.4-4.4"> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be0x1.</li> <li>Subnet-ID:1.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.4-4.5">Subnet-ID:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.4-4.6"> Configured subnetidentifier.</li> <li>Interface Identifier.</li> </ul> <t>Thisidentifier.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.4-4.7">Interface Identifier:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.4-4.8">Interface identifier according to <xref target="RFC4291" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4291"/>.</dd> </dl> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-5">This sub-scheme is meant for the "manual" allocation to subnets where the other addressing schemes cannot be used. The primary use case is for assignment to ACP connect subnets (see <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>).</t> <t>"Manual"format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-6">"Manual" means that allocations of the Subnet-ID need to be donetodaywithpre-existing,preexisting, non-autonomic mechanisms. Every subnet that uses this addressing sub-scheme needs to use a unique Subnet-ID (unless some anycast setup is done).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-7">The Z bit field was added to distinguish between the ZoneaddressingAddressing Sub-Scheme andmanual addressing sub-schemesthe Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme without requiring one more bit in the base scheme and therefore allowing for the VlongschemeAddressing Sub-Scheme (describedbelow)in <xref target="Vlong" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>) to have one more bit available.</t><t>Manual addressing sub-scheme<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-8">The Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme addressesSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be used in ACP certificates. Any node capableto buildof building ACP secure channels and is permitted byRegistrarregistrar policy to participate in building ACP secure channelsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> receive an ACP address (prefix) from one of the other ACP addressing sub-schemes.NodesA node that cannot or is notcapable (or permitted)permitted to participate in ACP secure channels can connect to the ACP via ACP connect interfaces of ACP edge nodes (see <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>) without setting up an ACP secure channel.TheirIts ACP certificateMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the acp-address field to indicate thattheirits ACP certificate is only usable fornon- ACPnon-ACP secure channel authentication, such as end-to-end transport connections across the ACP orData-Plane.</t> <t>Addressdata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.4-9">Address management of ACP connect subnets is done using traditional assignment methods and existing IPv6 protocols. See <xref target="ACautoconfig"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.3"/> for details. Therefore, the notion ofV-bit many/V-bits multiple addresses assigned to the ACP nodes does not apply to thisSub-Scheme.</t>sub-scheme.</t> </section><!-- manual --><section anchor="Vlong" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-vlong-addressing-sub-sc">ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme(ACP-VLong-8/ACP-VLong-16</name> <t>This(ACP-Vlong-8/ACP-Vlong-16)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-1">This addressing sub-scheme is used when the Type field of the base scheme is0x01.</t>1.</t> <figureanchor="v8-scheme"> <name>ACPanchor="v8-scheme" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-12"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-vlong-addressing-sub-sch">ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-6.11.5-2.1"> 50 78 +---------------------++-----------------------------+----------+ | (base scheme) || Node-ID | | || Registrar-ID |F| Node-Number| V | +---------------------++--------------+--------------+----------+ 50 46 1 23/15 8/16]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-3"> This addressingschemesub-scheme foregoes the Zone-ID field (<xref target="zone-scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>) to allow for larger, flatter routed networks (e.g., as in IoT) with84213768,421,376 Node-Numbers(2^23+2^15).(2<sup>23</sup> + 2<sup>15</sup>). It also allows for up to2^16 (i.e. 65536)2<sup>16</sup> (i.e., 65,536) different virtualized addresses within a node, which could be used to address individual software components in an ACP node. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-4"> The fields are the same as in theZone-ID sub-schemeZone Addressing Sub-Scheme (<xref target="zone-scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>) with the following refinements:</t><ul spacing="compact"> <li> F: format<dl spacing="normal" newline="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.11.5-5"> <dt pn="section-6.11.5-5.1"> F:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.5-5.2">Format bit. This bit determines the format of the subsequent bits.</li> <li> V: Virtualization</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.5-5.3"> V:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.5-5.4">Virtualization bit: this is a field that is either 8 or 16 bits. For F=0, it is 8 bits, for F=1 it is 16 bits. TheV bitsV-bits are assigned by the ACP node. In the ACP certificate's ACP address<xref(<xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>), the V-bits are always set to 0.</li> <li> Registrar-ID:</dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.5-5.5"> Registrar-ID:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.5-5.6"> To maximize Node-Number and V, the Registrar-ID is reduced to46-bits.46 bits. One or more domain-wide unique identifiers of the ACP registrar can be used for this purpose. See <xref target="registrars-unique"format="default"/>. </li> <li> Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7.2"/>. </dd> <dt pn="section-6.11.5-5.7"> Node-Number:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.11.5-5.8">The Node-Number is unique to each ACP node. There are two formats for the Node-Number. When F=0, thenode-numberNode-Number is 23 bits, forF=1F=1, it is 15 bits. Each format ofnode-numberNode-Number is considered to be in a unique number space.</li> </ul> <t></dd> </dl> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-6"> The F=0 bit format addresses are intended to be used for "general purpose" ACP nodes that would potentially have a limited number(<(less than 256) of clients(ASA/Autonomic Functions(ASA and/or autonomic functions or legacy services) of the ACP that require separate V(irtual) addresses. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-7"> The F=1 bit Node-Numbers are intended for ACP nodes that are ACP edge nodes (see <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>) or that have a large number of clients requiring separate V(irtual)addresses. Foraddresses, for example, large SDN controllers with container modular software architecture (see <xref target="software"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.2"/>). </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.5-8"> In the Vlongaddressing sub-scheme,Addressing Sub-Scheme, the ACP address in the certificate has all V field bits as zero. The ACP address set for the node includes any V value. </t> </section><!-- Vlong --><section anchor="other-sub-schemes" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Othertoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-other-acp-addressing-sub-sc">Other ACP Addressing Sub-Schemes</name><t>Before<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.6-1">Before further addressing sub-schemes are defined, experience with the schemes defined here should be collected. The schemes defined in this document have been devised to allow hopefully a sufficiently flexible setup of ACPs for a variety ofsituation.situations. These reasons also lead to the fairly liberal use of address space:Thethe Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme is intended to enable optimized routing in large networks by reserving bits forZone-ID's.Zone-IDs. The Vlongaddressing sub-schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme enables the allocation of 8/16-bit of addresses inside individual ACP nodes. Both address spaces allow distributed, uncoordinated allocation of node addresses by reserving bits for theregistrar-IDRegistrar-ID field in the address.</t> </section> <section anchor="acp-registrars" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-registrars">ACP Registrars</name><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7-1">ACP registrars are responsibleto enrollfor enrolling candidate ACP nodes with ACP certificates and associated trust anchor(s). They are also responsiblethatfor including an acp-node-name fieldis includedin the ACPcertificate carryingcertificate. This field carries the ACP domain name and the ACPnodesnode's ACP address prefix. This address prefix is intended to persist unchanged through the lifetime of the ACP node.</t><t>Because<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7-2">Because of the ACP addressing sub-schemes, an ACP domain can have multiple distributed ACP registrars that do not need to coordinate for address assignment. ACP registrars can also be sub-CAs, in which case they can also assign ACP certificates without dependencies against a (shared) TA (except during renewals of their own certificates).</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7-3">ACP registrars are PKI registration authorities (RA) enhanced with the handling of the ACPcertificate specificcertificate-specific fields. They request certificates for ACP nodes from aCertification AuthorityCA through any appropriate mechanism (out of scope in this document, but this mechanism is required to be BRSKI for ANI registrars). Only nodes that are trusted to be compliant with therequirements againstregistrar requirements described in this section can be given the necessary credentials to perform this RA function, such ascredentialsthe credential for theBRSKI connectionACP registrar to connect to the CAfor ANI registrars.</t>as a registrar.</t> <section anchor="registrars-protocols" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Usetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-use-of-brski-or-other-mecha">Use of BRSKI orother Mechanism/Protocols</name> <t>AnyOther Mechanisms or Protocols</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.1-1">Any protocols or mechanisms may be used by ACPregistrars,registrars as long as the resulting ACP certificate and TA certificate(s)allowcan be used by other domain members to perform the ACP domain membership check described in <xref target="certcheck"format="default"/> with other ACP domain members,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>, andmeetthe acp-node-name meets the ACP addressing requirementsfor its acp-node-name asdescribedfurther belowinthis section.</t> <t>Anthe next three sections.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.1-2">An ACP registrar could be a person deciding whether to enroll a candidate ACP node and then orchestrating the enrollment of the ACP certificate and associated TA, using command line orweb basedweb-based commands on the candidate ACP node and TA to generate and sign the ACP certificate and configure certificate and TA onto the node.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.1-3">The only currently defined protocol for ACP registrars is BRSKI(<xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>).<xref target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>. When BRSKI is used, the ACP nodes are called ANI nodes, and the ACP registrars are called BRSKI or ANI registrars. The BRSKI specification does not define the handling of the acp-node-name field because the rules do not depend on BRSKI but apply equally to anyprotocols/mechanismsprotocols or mechanisms that an ACP registrar may use.</t> </section> <section anchor="registrars-unique" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Uniquetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-unique-address-prefix-alloc">Unique Address/Prefixallocation</name> <t>ACPAllocation</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.2-1">ACP registrarsMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> allocate ACP address prefixes to ACP nodes via the acp-node-name that would collide with the ACP address prefixes of other ACP nodes in the same ACP domain. This includes both prefixes allocated by the same ACP registrar to different ACP nodes as well as prefixes allocated by other ACP registrars for the same ACP domain.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.2-2">To support such unique address allocation, an ACP registrarMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have one or more 46-bitidentifiersidentifiers, called the Registrar-ID, that are unique across the ACPdomain which is called the Registrar-ID.domain. Allocation of Registrar-ID(s) to an ACP registrar can happen through OAM mechanisms in conjunction with some database/and/or allocation orchestration.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.2-3">ACP registrars running on physical devices with known globally unique EUI-48 MAC address(es) (EUI stands for "Extended Unique Identifier") can use the lower 46 bits of those address(es) as unique Registrar-IDs without requiring any externalsignaling/configurationsignaling and/or configuration (the upper two bits, V andUU, are not uniquely assigned but are functional). This approach is attractive for distributed, non-centrally administered, lightweight ACP registrar implementations. There is no mechanism to deduce from a MAC address itself whether it is actually uniquely assigned. Implementations need to consult additional offline information before making thisassumption. For exampleassumption, for example, by knowing that a particular physicalproduct/MIC-chipproduct or Network Interface Controller (NIC) chip is guaranteed to use globally unique assigned EUI-48 MAC address(es).</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.2-4">When the candidate ACP device (calledPledgepledge in BRSKI) is to be enrolled into an ACP domain, the ACP registrar needs to allocate a unique ACP address to the node and ensure that the ACP certificate getsaan acp-node-name field (<xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>) with the appropriateinformation -information: ACP domain name, ACPdomain-name, ACP-address,address, and so on. If the ACP registrar uses BRSKI, it signals the ACP acp-node-name field to thePledgepledge viatheEST/csrattrs commandCSR Attributes (see <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>, section 5.9.2 -target="RFC8995" sectionFormat="comma" section="5.9.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995#section-5.9.2" derivedContent="RFC8995"/>, "EST CSR Attributes").</t><t>[RFC-Editor: please update reference to section 5.9.2 accordingly with latest BRSKI draft at time of publishing, or RFC]</t></section> <section anchor="registrars-policy" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Addressingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-addressing-sub-scheme-polic">Addressing Sub-Scheme Policies</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-1">The ACP registrar selects for the candidate ACP node a unique address prefix from an appropriate ACP addressing sub-scheme, either azone addressing sub-schemeZone Addressing Sub-Scheme prefix (see <xref target="zone-scheme"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>), or a Vlongaddressing sub-schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme prefix (see <xref target="Vlong"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>). The assigned ACP address prefix encoded in the acp-node-name field of the ACP certificate indicates to the ACP node its ACP address information. Thesub-addressing schemeaddressing sub-scheme indicates the prefix length: /127 forzone address sub-scheme,the Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme, /120 or /112 for the Vlongaddress sub-scheme.Addressing Sub-Scheme. The first address of the prefix is the ACP address. All other addresses in the prefix are for other uses by the ACP node as described in thezoneZone Addressing Sub-Scheme and Vlongaddressing sub schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme sections. The ACP address prefix itself is then signaled by the ACP node into the ACP routing protocol (see <xref target="routing"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12"/>) to establish IPv6 reachability across the ACP.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-2">The choice of addressing sub-scheme andprefix-lengthprefix length in the Vlongaddress sub-schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme is subject to ACP registrar policy. It could be an ACPdomain widedomain-wide policy, or a per ACP node or per ACP node type policy. For example, in BRSKI, the ACP registrar is aware of the IDevID certificate of the candidate ACP node, which typically contains a "serialNumber" attribute in the subject field distinguished name encoding thatisoftenindicatingindicates the node's vendor and devicetypetype, and it can be used to drive a policy for selecting an appropriate addressing sub-scheme for the (class of) node(s).</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-3">ACP registrarsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> default toallocate ACP zone sub-address schemeallocating Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme addresses with Zone-ID 0.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-4">ACP registrars that are aware of the IDevID certificate of a candidate ACP deviceSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be able to choose thezoneZone vs. Vlongsub-address schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme for ACP nodes based on the<xref target="X.520" format="default"/>"serialNumber" attribute <xref target="X.520" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.520"/> in the subject field distinguished name encoding of the IDevID certificate, forexampleexample, by the PID (Product Identifier)partpart, which identifies the product type, or by the complete "serialNumber". ThePIDPID, forexampleexample, could identify nodes that allow for specialized ASA requiring multiple addresses or for non-autonomicVMsvirtual machines (VMs) forservicesservices, and those nodes could receive Vlongsub-address schemeAddressing Sub-Scheme ACP addresses.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-5">In a simple allocation scheme, an ACP registrar remembers persistently across reboots its currently used Registrar-IDandand, for each addressing scheme (Zone with Zone-ID 0, Vlong with /112, Vlong with /120), the next Node-Number available forallocationallocation, andincreasesit increases the next Node-Number during successful enrollmenttoof an ACP node. In this simple allocation scheme, the ACP registrar would not recycle ACP address prefixes from ACP nodes that are no longerused ACP nodes.</t> <t>Ifused.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.3-6">If allocated addresses cannot be remembered by registrars, then it is necessarytoeither to use a new value for the Register-ID field in the ACPaddresses,addresses or to determine allocated ACP addressesfromby determining the addresses of reachable ACP nodes, which is not necessarily the set of all ACP nodes.Non-trackedUntracked ACP addresses can be reclaimed by revoking or not renewing their certificates and instead handing out newcertificatecertificates with new addresses (forexampleexample, with a new Registrar-ID value). Note that such strategies may require coordination amongst registrars.</t> </section> <section anchor="registrars-renewal" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Address/Prefixtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-address-prefix-persistence">Address/Prefix Persistence</name><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.4-1">When an ACP certificate is renewed or rekeyed via EST or other mechanisms, the ACP address/prefix in the acp-node-name fieldMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be maintained unless security issues or violations of the unique address assignment requirements exist or are suspected by the ACP registrar.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.4-2">ACP address informationSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be maintained even when therenewing/rekeyingrenewing and/or rekeying ACP registrar is not the same as the one that enrolled the prior ACP certificate. See <xref target="sub-ca"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2.4"/> for an example.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.4-3">ACP address informationSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also be maintained even after an ACP certificatedid expireexpires orfailed.fails. See <xref target="domcert-re-enroll"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5.5"/> and <xref target="domcert-failing"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5.6"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="registrars-further" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Furthertoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.11.7.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-further-details">Further Details</name><t><xref<t indent="0" pn="section-6.11.7.5-1"><xref target="registrar-considerations"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2"/> discusses further informative details of ACP registrars:What interactions registrars need, what parameters they require,needed interactions, required parameters, certificate renewal and limitations, use of sub-CAs onregistrarsregistrars, and centralized policy control.</t> </section> </section> </section><!-- addressing --><section anchor="routing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Routingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12"> <name slugifiedName="name-routing-in-the-acp">Routing in the ACP</name><t>Once<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12-1">Once ULAaddressaddresses are setupup, all autonomic entities should run a routing protocol within theautonomic control planeACP context. This routing protocol distributes the ULA created in the previous section for reachability. The use of theautonomic control plane specificACP-specific context eliminates the probable clash withData-Planedata plane routing tables and also secures the ACP from interference fromtheconfiguration mismatch or incorrect routing updates.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12-2">The establishment of the routing plane and its parameters are automatic and strictly within the confines of theautonomic control plane.ACP. Therefore, no explicit configuration is required.</t><t>All<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12-3">All routing updates are automatically secured in transit as the channels of the ACP are encrypted, and this routing runs only inside the ACP.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12-4">The routing protocol inside the ACP is RPL(<xref<xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>. See <xref target="why-rpl"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.4"/> for more details on the choice of RPL.</t><t>RPL<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12-5">RPL adjacencies are set up across all ACP channels in the same domain including all its routing subdomains. See <xref target="domain-usage"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.6"/> for more details.</t> <section anchor="rpl-profile" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-rpl-profile">ACP RPL Profile</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1-1">The following is a description of the RPL profile that ACP nodes need to support by default. The format of this section is derived from <xref target="I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="ROLL-APPLICABILITY"/>.</t> <section anchor="rpl-summary" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Overview</name> <t>RPLtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-overview">Overview</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1-1">RPL Packet Information(RPI)(RPI), defined in <xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/>, section 11.2sectionFormat="comma" section="11.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6550#section-11.2" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>, defines the data packetartefactsartifacts required or beneficial in the forwarding of packets routed by RPL. This profile does not use RPI for better compatibility with accelerated hardware forwardingplanesplanes, which most oftendoesdo not support the Hop-by-Hop headers used for RPI, but also to avoid the overhead of the RPI header on the wire and cost ofadding/removingadding and/or removing them. </t><!-- Note: Insertion/removal of headers by a (potentially silicon based) ACP node would be be necessary when senders/receivers of ACP packets are legacy NOC devices connected via ACP connect (see <xref target="NMS"/> to the ACP. Their connectivity can be handled in RPL as non-RPL-aware leafs (or "Internet") according to the Data-Plane architecture explained in <xref target="I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo" />. --><section anchor="rpl-single-instance" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Singletoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-single-instance">Single Instance</name><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.1-1"> To avoid the need for RPI, the ACP RPL profile uses a simpledestination prefix basedrouting/forwardingtable.table based on destination prefix. To achieve this, theprofilesprofile uses only one RPL instanceID. This single instanceID can contain only oneDestination OrientedDestination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG), and the routing/forwarding table can therefore only calculate a single class of service ("best effort towards the primary NOC/root") and cannot create optimized routing paths to accomplish latency or energy goals between any two nodes. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.1-2"> This choice is a compromise. Consider a network that has multiple NOCs in different locations. Only one NOC will become the DODAG root. Traffic to and from other NOCs has to be sent through the DODAG (shortest path tree) rooted in the primary NOC. Depending on topology, this can be an annoyance from alatencypoint of view of latency orfromminimizing network path resources, but this is deemed to be acceptable given how ACP traffic is "only" network management/control traffic. See <xref target="future-rpl"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.4"/> for more details.</t><t>Using<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.1-3">Using a single instanceID/DODAG does not introduce a single point of failure, as the DODAG will reconfigure itself when it detectsData-Planedata plane forwardingfailuresfailures, including choosing a different root when the primary one fails. </t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.1-4">The benefit of this profile, especially compared to otherIGPsIGPs, is that it does not calculate routes fornodenodes reachable through the same interface as the DODAG root. This RPL profile can therefore scale to a much larger number of ACP nodes in the same amount ofcomputecomputation and memory than other routingprotocols. Especiallyprotocols, especially on nodes that are leafs of the topology or those close to those leafs. </t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-convergence" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Reconvergence</name> <t>toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.1.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-reconvergence">Reconvergence</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.2-1"> In RPL profiles whereRPL Packet Information (RPI, seeRPI (see <xref target="rpl-Data-Plane"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.13"/>) is present, it is also used to trigger reconvergence when misrouted, forexample looping, packetsexample, looping packets, which are recognized because of their RPI data. This helps to minimize RPL signalingtraffictraffic, especially in networks without stable topology and slow links. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.2-2"> The ACP RPL profile instead relies onquickquickly reconverging the DODAG by recognizing link state change (down/up) and triggering reconvergence signaling as described in <xref target="rpl-dodag-repair"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.7"/>. Since links in the ACP are assumed to be mostly reliable (or havelink layerlink-layer protection against loss) and because there is no stretch according to <xref target="rpl-dodag-repair"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.7"/>, loops caused by loss of RPLrouting protocolsignaling packets should be exceedingly rare. </t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.2-3"> In addition, there are a variety of mechanisms possible in RPL to further avoid temporary loopsRECOMMENDEDthat are <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to be used for theACPLACP RPL profile: DODAG Information Objects (DIOs)SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sent2two or3three times to inform children when losing the last parent. The technique in <xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/> section 8.2.2.6.sectionFormat="comma" section="8.2.2.6" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6550#section-8.2.2.6" derivedContent="RFC6550"/> (Detaching)SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be favored over that insection 8.2.2.5.,Section <xref target="RFC6550" sectionFormat="bare" section="8.2.2.5" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6550#section-8.2.2.5" derivedContent="RFC6550"/> (Poisoning) because it allows local connectivity. NodesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> select more than one parent, at least3three if possible, and send Destination Advertisement Objects(DAO)s(DAOs) to all of them in parallel.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.1.2-4"> Additionally, failed ACP tunnels can be quickly discoveredtroughthrough the secure channel protocol mechanisms such as IKEv2Dead Peer Detection.dead peer detection. This can function as a replacement for a Low-power and LossyNetworks'Network's (LLN's) Expected Transmission Count (ETX)feature thatfeature, which is not used in this profile. A failure of an ACP tunnel should immediately signal the RPL control plane to pick a different parent. </t> </section> </section> <section anchor="rpl-instances" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>RPLtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-rpl-instances">RPL Instances</name><t>Single<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.2-1">There is a single RPL instance.DefaultThe default RPLInstanceID=is 0.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-storing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Storingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-storing-vs-non-storing-mode">Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode</name><t>RPL<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.3-1">The RPL Mode ofOperations (MOP): MUSTOperation (MOP) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support mode2 -2, "Storing Mode of Operations with no multicast support". ImplementationsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support mode 3 ("... with multicastsupport"support") as that is a superset of mode2).2. Note: Root indicates mode in DIO flow.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-dao-policy" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>DAOtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-dao-policy">DAO Policy</name><t>Proactive,<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.4-1">The DAO policy is proactive, aggressive DAO state maintenance:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Use K-flagspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-6.12.1.4-2"> <li pn="section-6.12.1.4-2.1">Use the 'K' flag in unsolicited DAOindicatingto indicate change from previous information (to require DAO-ACK).</li><li>Retry<li pn="section-6.12.1.4-2.2">Retry such DAO DAO-RETRIES(3) times withDAO- ACK_TIME_OUT(256ms)DAO-ACK_TIME_OUT(256ms) in between.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="rpl-path-metric" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Path Metric</name> <t>Use Hopcounttoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-path-metrics">Path Metrics</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.5-1">Use Hop Count according to "<xref target="RFC6551" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation in Low-Power and Lossy Networks"/>" <xref target="RFC6551"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6551"/>. Note that this is solely for diagnostic purposes as it is not used by theobjective function.</t>Objective Function.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-objective-function" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Objectivetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-objective-function">Objective Function</name><t>Objective<dl indent="3" newline="false" spacing="normal" pn="section-6.12.1.6-1"> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.1">Objective Function(OF): Use OF0(OF):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.2">Use Objective Function Zero (OF0) ("<xref target="RFC6552" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Objective Function Zero for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)"/>" <xref target="RFC6552"format="default"/>. No use of metric containers.</t> <t>rank_factor: Derivedformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6552"/>). Metric containers are not used.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.3">rank_factor:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.4.1">Derived from link speed:<= 100Mbps:if less than or equal to 100 Mbps, LOW_SPEED_FACTOR(5), elseHIGH_SPEED_FACTOR(1)</t> <t>ThisHIGH_SPEED_FACTOR(1).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.6-1.4.2">This is a simple rank differentiation between typical "low speed" or"IoT"IoT links that commonly max out at 100 Mbps and typical infrastructure links with speeds of 1 Gbps or higher. Given how the path selection for the ACPfocussesfocuses only on reachability but not on path cost optimization, no attempts atfiner grainedfiner-grained path optimization are made. </t> </dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="rpl-dodag-repair" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>DODAGtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-dodag-repair">DODAG Repair</name><t>Global Repair: we<dl indent="3" newline="false" spacing="normal" pn="section-6.12.1.7-1"> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.1">Global Repair:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.2">We assume stable links and ranks (metrics), so there is no need to periodically rebuild the DODAG. The DODAG version is only incremented under catastrophic events (e.g., administrativeaction).</t> <t>Local Repair: Asaction).</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.3">Local Repair:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.4"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.4.1">As soon as link breakage is detected, the ACP nodesendsends a No-Path DAO for all the targets that were reachable only via this link. As soon as link repair is detected, the ACP node validates if this link provides a better parent. If so, a new rank is computed by the ACPnodenode, and it sends a new DIO thatadvertiseadvertises the new rank. Then it sends a DAO with a new path sequence about itself.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.4.2">When using ACP multi-access virtual interfaces, local repair can be triggered directly by peer breakage, see <xref target="ACP-ma-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>.</t> <t>stretch_rank: noneformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2.2"/>.</t> </dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.5">stretch_rank:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.6">None provided ("notstretched").</t> <t>Data Path Validation: Not used.</t> <t>Trickle:stretched").</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.7">Data-Path Validation:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.8"> Notused.</t>used.</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.9">Trickle:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.7-1.10">Not used.</dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="rpl-multicast" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Multicast</name> <t>Nottoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.8"> <name slugifiedName="name-multicast">Multicast</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.8-1">Multicast is not usedyetyet, but it is possible because of the selected mode of operations.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-security" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Security</name> <t><xref target="RFC6550" format="default"/>toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.9"> <name slugifiedName="name-security">Security</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.9-1">RPL security <xref target="RFC6550" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6550"/> is not used,substituted byand ACPsecurity.</t> <t>Becausesecurity is substituted.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.9-2">Because the ACP links already include provisions for confidentiality and integrity protection, their usage at the RPL layer would be redundant, and so RPL security is not used.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-p2p" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>P2P communications</name> <t>Nottoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.10"> <name slugifiedName="name-p2p-communications">P2P Communications</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.10-1">Not used.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-ipv6" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>IPv6 address configuration</name> <t>Everytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.11"> <name slugifiedName="name-ipv6-address-configuration">IPv6 Address Configuration</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.11-1">Every ACP node (RPL node) announces an IPv6 prefix covering the addresses assigned to the ACP node via the AcpNodeName. The prefix length depends on the addressing sub-scheme of the acp-address, /127 for the Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme and /112 or /120 for the Vlongaddressing sub-scheme.Addressing Sub-Scheme. See <xref target="addressing"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11"/> for more details.</t><t>Every<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.11-2">Every ACP nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> install a black hole(aka null)route (also known as a null route) if there are unused parts of the ACP address space assigned to the ACP node via its AcpNodeName. This is superseded by longer prefixes assigned to interfaces for the address space actually used by the node. For example, when the node has anACP-VLong-8ACP-Vlong-8 address space, it installs a /120 black hole route. If it thenfor exampleonly uses the ACP address (first address from the space), for example, it would assign that address via a /128 address prefix to the ACP loopback interface (see <xref target="ACP-loopback"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.1"/>). None of those longer prefixes are announced into RPL.</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.11-3">For ACP-Manual address prefixes configured on an ACP node, forexampleexample, for ACP connect subnets (see <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>), the node announces the /64 subnet prefix.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-admin" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Administrative parameters</name> <t>Administrativetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.12"> <name slugifiedName="name-administrative-parameters">Administrative Parameters</name> <dl indent="3" newline="false" spacing="normal" pn="section-6.12.1.12-1"> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.1">Administrative Preference (<xref target="RFC6550"format="default"/>, 3.2.6 – tosection="3.2.6" sectionFormat="comma" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6550#section-3.2.6" derivedContent="RFC6550"/> --to becomeroot): Indicatedroot):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.1">The preference is indicated in the DODAGPreference field of DIO message. </t><ul spacing="compact"> <li>Explicit<dl indent="3" newline="false" spacing="normal" pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2"> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.1">Explicitly configured”root”: 0b100</li> <li>ACP"root":</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.2"> 0b100</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.3">ACP registrar(Default): 0b011</li> <li>ACP-connect (non-registrar): 0b010</li> <li>Default: 0b001.</li> </ul>(default):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.4"> 0b011</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.5">ACP connect (non-registrar):</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.6"> 0b010</dd> <dt pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.7">Default:</dt> <dd pn="section-6.12.1.12-1.2.2.8"> 0b001</dd> </dl> </dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="rpl-Data-Plane" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>RPLtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.13"> <name slugifiedName="name-rpl-packet-information">RPL Packet Information</name><t>RPI<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.13-1">RPI is not required in the ACP RPL profile for the following reasons. </t><t>One<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.13-2">One RPI option is the RPL Source Routing Header (SRH) ("<xref target="RFC6554" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="An IPv6 Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)"/>" <xref target="RFC6554"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6554"/>), which is not necessary because the ACP RPL profile uses storing mode where each hop has the necessary next-hop forwarding information.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.13-3">The simpler RPL Option header "<xref target="RFC6553" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) Option for Carrying RPL Information in Data-Plane Datagrams"/>" <xref target="RFC6553"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6553"/> is also not necessary in this profile, because it uses a single RPL instance anddata pathdata-path validation is also not used.</t> </section> <section anchor="rpl-unknown" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Unknowntoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.12.1.14"> <name slugifiedName="name-unknown-destinations">Unknown Destinations</name><t>Because<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.14-1">Because RPL minimizes the size of the routing and forwarding table, prefixes reachable through the same interface as the RPL root are not known on every ACP node. Therefore, traffic to unknown destination addresses can only be discovered at the RPL root. The RPL rootSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> haveattach safeattach-safe mechanisms to operationally discover and log such packets.</t><t>As<t indent="0" pn="section-6.12.1.14-2">As this requirement places additional constraints on theData-Planedata plane functionality of the RPL root, it does not apply to "normal" nodes that are not configured to have special functionality (i.e., the administrative parameter from <xref target="rpl-admin"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.12"/> has value 0b001). If the ACP network is degraded to the point where there are no nodes that could be configured as root, registrar, orACP-connectACP connect nodes, it is possible that the RPL root (and thus the ACP as a whole) would be unable to detect traffic to unknown destinations. However, in the absence of nodes with administrative preference other than 0b001, there is also unlikely to be a way to get diagnostic information out of the ACP, so detection of traffic to unknown destinations would not be actionable anyway. </t> </section> </section><!-- rpl --></section><!-- routing --><section anchor="acp_general" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Generaltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13"> <name slugifiedName="name-general-acp-considerations">General ACP Considerations</name><t>Since<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13-1">Since channels areby defaultestablished between adjacentneighbors,neighbors by default, the resulting overlay network does hop-by-hop encryption. Each node decrypts incoming traffic from theACP,ACP and encrypts outgoing traffic to its neighbors in the ACP. Routing is discussed in <xref target="routing"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12"/>.</t> <section anchor="performance" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Performance</name> <t>Theretoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-performance">Performance</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.1-1">There are no performance requirementsagainstfor ACP implementations defined in this document because the performance requirements depend on the intended use case. It is expected thatfulla fully autonomic node with a wide range of ASA can require high forwarding plane performance in the ACP, forexampleexample, for telemetry. Implementations of ACPtothat solely supporttraditional/SDN styletraditional or SDN-style use cases can benefit from ACP at lower performance, especially if the ACP is used only for critical operations, e.g., when theData-Planedata plane is not available. The design of the ACP as specified in this document is intended to support a wide range of performance options:Itit is intended to allow software-only implementations at potentially low performance, but the design can also supporthigh performancehigh-performance options. See <xref target="RFC8368"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368"/> for more details.</t> </section><!-- performance --><section anchor="general_addressing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Addressingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-addressing-of-secure-channe">Addressing of Secure Channels</name><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.2-1">In order to be independent of theData-Planedata plane routing and addressing, theGRASP discoveredACP secure channels discovered via GRASP use IPv6link locallink-local addresses between adjacent neighbors. Note: <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/> specifies extensions in which secure channels are configured tunnels operating over theData-Plane,data plane, so those secure channels cannot be independent of theData-Plane.</t> <t>Todata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.2-2">To avoidthat Data-Plane configuration can impactimpacting the operations of the IPv6 (link-local) interface/address used for ACPchannels,channels when configuring the data plane, appropriate implementation considerations are required. If the IPv6 interface/link-local address is shared with theData-Plane,data plane, it needs to be impossible tounconfigure/disableunconfigure and/or disable it through configuration. Instead of sharing the IPv6 interface/link-local address, a separate (virtual) interface with a separate IPv6 link-local address can be used. For example, the ACP interface could be run over a separate MAC address of an underlying L2 (Ethernet) interface. For more details and options, see <xref target="dp-dependency"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Noteformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.2-3">Note that other(non-ideal)(nonideal) implementation choices may introduceadditionaladditional, undesired dependencies against theData-Plane. Fordata plane, for example, shared code and configuration of the secure channel protocols (IPsec/and/or DTLS).</t> </section> <section anchor="general_MTU" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>MTU</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-mtu">MTU</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.3-1">The MTU for ACP secure channelsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be derived locally from the underlying link MTU minus the secure channel encapsulation overhead.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.3-2">ACP secureChannelchannel protocols do not need to perform MTU discovery because they are built across L2adjacencies -adjacencies: theMTUMTUs on both sides connecting to the L2 connection are assumed to be consistent. Extensions to ACP where the ACPisis, forexampleexample, tunneled need to consider how to guarantee MTU consistency. This is an issue of tunnels, not an issue of running the ACP across a tunnel. Transport stacks running across ACP can perform normal PMTUD (Path MTU Discovery). Because the ACP is meant to prioritize reliability over performance, theyMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> opt to only expect IPv6 minimum MTU(1280)(1280 octets) to avoid running into PMTUD implementation bugs or underlying link MTU mismatch problems.</t> </section> <section anchor="general_multipath" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Multiple linkstoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-multiple-links-between-node">Multiple Links betweennodes</name> <t>IfNodes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.4-1">If two nodes are connected via several links, the ACPSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be established across every link, but it is possible to establish the ACP only on asub-setsubset of links. Having an ACP channel on every link has a number of advantages, forexampleexample, it allows for a faster failover in case of link failure, and it reflects the physical topology more closely. Using a subset of links (for example, a single link), reduces resource consumption on thenode,node because state needs to be kept per ACP channel. The negotiation scheme explained in <xref target="channel-selection"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/> allows the Decider (the node with the higher ACP address) to drop all but the desired ACP channels to theFollower -Follower, and the Follower will notre-tryretry to build these secure channels from its side unless the Decidershows upappears with a previously unknown GRASP announcement (e.g., on a different link or with a different address announced in GRASP).</t> </section><!-- multiple_interfaces --><section anchor="ACP_interfaces" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP interfaces</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-interfaces">ACP Interfaces</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5-1">Conceptually, the ACP VRF hasconceptuallytwotypetypes of interfaces:Thethe "ACPLoopbackloopback interface(s)" to which the ACP ULA address(es) are assigned and the "ACP virtual interfaces" that are mapped to the ACP secure channels.</t> <section anchor="ACP-loopback" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP loopback interfaces</name> <t>Fortoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.5.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-loopback-interfaces">ACP Loopback Interfaces</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-1">For autonomous operations of the ACP, as described in <xref target="self-creation"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/> and <xref target="acp-l2-switches"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>, the ACP node uses the first address from the N bit ACP prefix(Nassigned to the node. N =128(128 - number of Vbits of the ACPaddress) assigned to the node.address). This address is assigned with an address prefix of N or larger to a loopback interface.</t><t>Other<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-2">Other addresses from the prefix can be used by the ACP of the node as desired. The autonomous operations of the ACPdoesdo not require additionalglobal scopeglobal-scope IPv6 addresses, they are instead intended for ASA or non-autonomous functions.Non fully autonomic componentsComponents of the ACP that are not fully autonomic, such as ACP connect interfaces (see <xref target="acp-connect"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 14"/>), may also introduce additionalglobal scopeglobal-scope IPv6 addresses on other types of interfacesinto the ACP.</t> <t>[RFC-Editor: please remove this paragraph: Notetoreviewers: Please do not complain again about an obsolete RFC number in the following paragraph. The text should make it clear thatthereference was chosen to indicate a particular point in time, but not to recommend/use a particularly obsolete protocol spec.]</t> <t>TheACP.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-3">The use of loopback interfaces forglobal scopeglobal-scope addresses is common operational configuration practice on routers, forexampleexample, inIBGPInternal BGP (IBGP) connections since BGP4 (see "<xref target="RFC1654" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)"/>" <xref target="RFC1654"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC1654"/>) or earlier. The ACP adopts and automates this operational practice.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-4">A loopback interface for use with the ACP as described above is an interfacebehavingthat behaves according to Section <xref target="RFC6724"format="default"/> Section 4., paragraph 2:section="4" sectionFormat="bare" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-4" derivedContent="RFC6724"/> of <xref target="RFC6724" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6724">"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)"</xref>, paragraph 2. Packets sent by the host of the node from the loopback interface behave as if they are looped back by the interface so that they look as if they originated from the loopback interface, are then received by the node and forwarded by it towards the destination.</t><t>The word loopback only<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-5">The term "loopback only" indicates this behavior, but not the actual name of the interface typechoosenchosen in an actual implementation. A loopback interface for use with the ACP can be avirtual/softwarevirtual and/or software construct without any associated hardware, or it can be a hardware interface operating in loopback mode.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-6">A loopback interface used for the ACPMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> have connectivity to other nodes.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-7">The following list reviews the reasons for the choice of loopback addresses for ACPaddressesaddresses, which is based on the IPv6 address architecture and common challenges: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li>IPv6spacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-6.13.5.1-8"> <li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.1" derivedCounter="1.">IPv6 addresses are assigned to interfaces, not nodes. IPv6 continues the IPv4 model that a subnet prefix is associated with one link, see Section <xref target="RFC4291"format="default"/>, Section 2.1.</li> <li>IPv6section="2.1" sectionFormat="bare" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4291#section-2.1" derivedContent="RFC4291"/> of <xref target="RFC4291" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4291">"IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture"</xref>.</li> <li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.2" derivedCounter="2.">IPv6 implementations commonly do not allow assignment of the same IPv6global scopeglobal-scope address in the same VRF to more than one interface.</li><li>Global scope<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.3" derivedCounter="3.">Global-scope addresses assigned to interfaces thatare connectingconnect to other nodes (external interfaces) may not be stable addresses for communications because any such interface could fail due to reasons external to the node. This could render the addresses assigned to that interface unusable.</li><li>If<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.4" derivedCounter="4.">If failure of the subnet does notresult in bringingbring down the interface andmakingmake the addresses unusable, it could result in unreachability of the address because the shortest path to the node might go through one of the other nodes on the samesubnetsubnet, which could equally consider the subnet to be operational even though it is not.</li><li>Many<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.5" derivedCounter="5.">Many OAM service implementations on routers cannot deal with more than one peer address, often because theydoalready expect that a single loopback address can be used, especially to provide a stable address under failure of external interfaces or links.</li><li>Even<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.6" derivedCounter="6.">Even when an application supports multiple addresses to a peer, it can only use one addressfor a connectionat a time for a connection with the most widely deployed transportprotocolsprotocols, TCP and UDP. While "<xref target="RFC6824" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses"/>" <xref target="RFC6824"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6824"/>/<xref target="RFC8684" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8684"/> solves this problem, it is not widely adoptedforby implementations of router OAMservices implementations.</li> <li>Toservices.</li> <li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.7" derivedCounter="7.">To completely autonomously assignglobal scopeglobal-scope addresses to subnets connecting to other nodes, it would be necessary for every node to have an amount of prefix address spaceinon the order of the maximum number of subnets that the node could connecttoto, and then the node would have to negotiate with adjacent nodes across those subnetswhosewhich address space to use for each subnet.</li><li>Using global scope<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.8" derivedCounter="8.">Using global-scope addresses for subnets between nodes is unnecessary if those subnets only connect routers, such as ACP secure channels, because they can communicate to remote nodes via theirglobal scopeglobal-scope loopback addresses. Usingglobal scopeglobal-scope addresses for thoseexternexternal subnets is therefore wasteful for the address space and also unnecessarilyincreasingincreases the size of the routing and forwarding tables,whichwhich, especially for theACPACP, is highly undesirable because it should attempt to minimize the per-node overhead of the ACP VRF.</li><li>For<li pn="section-6.13.5.1-8.9" derivedCounter="9.">For all these reasons, the ACP addressingschemessub-schemes do not consider ACP addresses for subnets connecting ACP nodes.</li> </ol><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.1-9">Note that "<xref target="RFC8402" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Segment Routing Architecture"/>" <xref target="RFC8402"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8402"/> introduces the term Node-SID to refer to IGP prefix segments that identify a specific router, forexampleexample, on a loopback interface. An ACP loopback address prefix may similarly be called an ACP Node Identifier.</t> </section> <section anchor="ACP-virtual-interfaces" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP virtual interfaces</name> <t>Anytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.5.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-virtual-interfaces">ACP Virtual Interfaces</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2-1">Any ACP secure channel to another ACP node is mapped to ACP virtual interfaces in one of the following ways. This is independent of the chosen secure channel protocol (IPsec,DTLSDTLS, or other futureprotocol - standardsprotocol, either standardized ornon-standards).</t> <t>Notenot).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2-2">Note that all the considerations described hereare assumingassume point-to-point secure channel associations. Mappingmulti-partymultiparty secure channelassociationsassociations, such as "<xref target="RFC6407" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The Group Domain of Interpretation"/>" <xref target="RFC6407"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6407"/>, is out of scope.</t> <section anchor="ACP-p2p-virtual-interfaces" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces</name> <t>Intoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.5.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-point-to-point-virtual-">ACP Point-to-Point Virtual Interfaces</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.1-1">In this option, each ACP secure channel is mappedintoto a separate point-to-point ACP virtual interface. If a physical subnet has more than twoACP capableACP-capable nodes (in the same domain), this implementation approach will lead to a full mesh of ACP virtual interfaces between them.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.1-2">When the secure channel protocol determines a peer to be dead, thisSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> result in indicating link breakage to trigger RPL DODAG repair, see <xref target="rpl-dodag-repair"format="default"/>.</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.7"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="ACP-ma-virtual-interfaces" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP multi-access virtual interfaces</name> <t>Intoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-multi-access-virtual-in">ACP Multi-Access Virtual Interfaces</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-1">In a more advanced implementation approach, the ACP will construct a single multi-access ACP virtual interface for all ACP secure channels toACP capableACP-capable nodes reachable across the same underlying (physical) subnet. IPv6 link-local multicast packets sentintoto an ACP multi-access virtual interface are replicated to every ACP secure channel mappedintoto the ACPmulticast-accessmulti-access virtual interface. IPv6 unicast packets sentintoto an ACP multi-access virtual interface are sent to the ACP secure channel that belongs to the ACP neighbor that is thenext-hopnext hop in the ACP forwarding table entry used to reach thepacketspackets' destination address.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-2">When the secure channel protocol determines that a peerto beis dead for a secure channel mappedintoto an ACP multi-access virtual interface, thisSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> result in signaling breakage of that peer to RPL, so it can trigger RPL DODAG repair, see <xref target="rpl-dodag-repair"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Thereformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.7"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-3">There is no requirement for all ACP nodes on the same multi-access subnet to use the same type of ACP virtual interface. This is purely anode localnode-local decision.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-4">ACP nodesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform standard IPv6 operations across ACP virtual interfaces including SLAAC(Stateless Address Auto-Configuration) -<xref target="RFC4862"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4862"/> to assign their IPv6link locallink-local address on the ACP virtual interface and ND(Neighbor("<xref target="RFC4861" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Neighbor Discovery-for IP version 6 (IPv6)"/>" <xref target="RFC4861"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4861"/>) to discover which IPv6 link-local neighbor address belongs to which ACP secure channel mapped to the ACP virtual interface. This is independent of whether the ACP virtual interface is point-to-point or multi-access.</t><t>"Optimistic<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-5">Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection(DAD)"(DAD) according to "<xref target="RFC4429" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for IPv6"/>" <xref target="RFC4429"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4429"/> isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> because the likelihood for duplicates between ACP nodes is highly improbable as long as the address can be formed from a globallyunique localunique, locally assigned identifier (e.g., EUI-48/EUI-64, see below).</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-6">ACP nodesMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reduce the amount of link-local IPv6 multicast packets from ND by learning the IPv6 link-local neighbor address to ACP secure channel mapping from othermessagesmessages, such as the source address of IPv6 link-local multicast RPLmessages -messages, and therefore forego the need to send Neighbor Solicitation messages.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-7">The ACP virtual interface IPv6link locallink-local address can be derived from any appropriate localmechanismmechanism, such asnode localnode-local EUI-48 orEUI-64 ("EUI" stands for "Extended Unique Identifier").EUI-64. ItMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> depend on something that is attackable from theData-Planedata plane, such as the IPv6 link-local address of the underlying physical interface, which can be attacked by SLAAC, or parameters of the secure channel encapsulation header that may not be protected by the secure channel mechanism.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-8">The link-layer address of an ACP virtual interface is the address used for the underlying interface across which the secure tunnels are built, typically Ethernet addresses. Because unicast IPv6 packets sent to an ACP virtual interface are not sent to a link-layer destination address but rather to an ACP secure channel, the link-layer address fieldsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be ignored onreceptionreception, and instead the ACP secure channel from which the message was received should be remembered.</t><t>Multi-access<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-9">Multi-access ACP virtual interfaces are preferable implementations when the underlying interface is a (broadcast) multi-access subnet because theydoreflect the presence of the underlying multi-access subnetintoto the virtual interfaces of the ACP. This makesitit, forexampleexample, simpler to build services with topology awareness inside the ACP VRF in the same way as they could have been built running natively on the multi-access interfaces.</t><t>Consider<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-10">Consider also the impact of point-to-point vs. multi-access virtualinterfaceinterfaces on the efficiency of flooding vialink local multicasted messages:</t> <t>Assumelink-local multicast messages.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-11">Assume a LAN with three ACP neighbors, Alice,BobBob, and Carol. Alice's ACP GRASP wants to send a link-local GRASP multicast message to Bob and Carol. If Alice's ACP emulates the LAN as per-peer, point-to-point virtual interfaces, one to Bob and one to Carol, Alice's ACP GRASP will send two copies of multicast GRASP messages:Oneone to Bob and one to Carol. If Alice's ACP emulates a LAN via a multipoint virtual interface, Alice's ACP GRASP will send one packet to thatinterfaceinterface, and the ACP multipoint virtual interface will replicate the packet to each secure channel, one to Bob, one to Carol. The result is the same. The difference happens when Bob and Carol receive theirpacket.packets. If they use ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces, their GRASP instance would forward the packet from Alice to each other as part of the GRASP flooding procedure. These packets are unnecessary and would be discarded by GRASP on receipt as duplicates (by use of the GRASP Session ID). If Bob and Carol's ACPwould emulateemulated a multi-access virtual interface, then this would nothappen,happen becauseGRASPsGRASP's flooding procedure does not replicatebackpackets back to the interfacethatfrom which they werereceived from.</t> <t>Notereceived.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-12">Note that link-local GRASP multicast messages are not sent directly as IPv6 link-local multicast UDP messagesintoto ACP virtual interfaces, but insteadintoto ACP GRASP virtualinterfaces,interfaces that are layered on top of ACP virtual interfaces to add TCP reliability to link-local multicast GRASP messages. Nevertheless, these ACP GRASP virtual interfaces perform the same replication ofmessage and, therefore, result inmessages and therefore have the same impact on flooding. See <xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/> for more details.</t><t>RPL<t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-13">RPL does support operations and correct routing table construction across non-broadcast multi-access (NBMA) subnets. This is common when using many radio technologies. When such NBMA subnets are used, theyMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be represented as ACP multi-access virtual interfaces because the replication of IPv6 link-local multicast messages will not reach all NBMA subnet neighbors.InAs a result, GRASP message flooding would fail. Instead, each ACP secure channel across such an interfaceMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be represented asaan ACP point-to-point virtual interface. See also <xref target="future-rpl"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Careformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.4"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-6.13.5.2.2-14">Care needs to be taken when creating multi-access ACP virtual interfaces across ACP secure channels between ACP nodes in different domains or routing subdomains.IfIf, forexampleexample, future inter-domain ACP policies are defined as "peer-to-peer" policies, it is easier to create ACP point-to-point virtual interfaces for these inter-domain secure channels.</t> </section> </section> </section><!-- acp_interfaces --> </section> <!-- acp_general --> </section> <!-- self-creation --></section> </section> <section anchor="acp-l2-switches" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP supporttoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-support-on-l2-switches-">ACP Support on L2switches/portsSwitches/Ports (Normative)</name> <section anchor="acp-l2-switches-why" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Whytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-why-benefits-of-acp-on-l2-s">Why (Benefits of ACP on L2switches)</name>Switches)</name> <figureanchor="acp-example"> <name>Topologyanchor="acp-example" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-13"> <name slugifiedName="name-topology-with-l2-acp-switch">Topology with L2 ACPswitches</name>Switches</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-7.1-1.1"> ANrtr1 ------ ANswitch1 --- ANswitch2 ------- ANrtr2 .../ \ \ ... ANrtrM ------ \ ------- ANrtrN ANswitchM ...]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>Consider<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-2">Consider a large L2 LAN withANrtr1...ANrtrNrouters ANrtr1 through ANrtrN connected via some topology of L2 switches. Examples include large enterprise campus networks with an L2 core, IoTnetworksnetworks, or broadband aggregationnetworksnetworks, which often haveevenamulti-level L2 switchedmultilevel L2-switched topology.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-3">If the discovery protocol used for the ACPis operatingoperates at the subnet level, every ACP router will see all other ACP routers on the LAN asneighborsneighbors, and a full mesh of ACP channels will be built. If some or all of the AN switches are autonomic with the same discovery protocol, then the full mesh would include those switches as well.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-4">A full mesh of ACP connections can create fundamental scale challenges. The number of security associations of the secure channel protocols will likely not scale arbitrarily, especially when they leverageplatform acceleratedplatform-accelerated encryption/decryption. Likewise, any other ACP operations (such as routing)needsneed to scale to the number of direct ACP neighbors. An ACP router with just4four physical interfaces might be deployed into a LAN with hundreds of neighbors connected via switches. Introducing such anewnew, unpredictable scaling factor requirement makes it harder to support the ACP on arbitrary platforms and in arbitrary deployments.</t><t>Predictable<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-5">Predictable scaling requirements for ACP neighbors can most easily be achievedifif, in topologies such as these,ACP capableACP-capable L2 switches can ensure that discovery messages terminate on them so that neighboring ACP routers and switches will only find the physically connected ACP L2 switches as their candidate ACP neighbors. With such a discovery mechanism in place, the ACP and its security associations will only need to scale to the number of physical interfaces instead of a potentially much larger number of "LAN-connected"neighbors. Andneighbors, and the ACP topology will follow directly the physical topology, somethingwhichthat can then also be leveraged in management operations or by ASAs.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-6">In the example above, consider that ANswitch1 and ANswitchM are ACP capable, and ANswitch2 is not ACP capable. The desired ACP topology is that ANrtr1 and ANrtrM only have an ACP connection to ANswitch1, and that ANswitch1, ANrtr2, and ANrtrN have a full mesh of ACPconnectionconnections amongst each other. ANswitch1 also has an ACP connection withANswitchMANswitchM, and ANswitchM has ACP connections to anything else behind it.</t> </section><!-- switched-lans-why --><section anchor="acp-l2-switches-how" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Howtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-how-per-l2-port-dull-grasp">How (per L2portPort DULL GRASP)</name><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-1">To support ACP on L2 switches orL2 switchedL2-switched ports of an L3 device, it is necessary to make those L2 ports look like L3 interfaces for the ACP implementation. This primarily involves the creation of a separate DULL GRASP instance/domain on every such L2 port. Because GRASP has a dedicated link-local IPv6 multicast address (ALL_GRASP_NEIGHBORS), it is sufficient that all packets for this address arebeingextracted at the port level and passed to that DULL GRASP instance.LikewiseLikewise, the IPv6 link-local multicast packets sent by that DULL GRASP instance need to be sent only towards the L2 port for this DULL GRASP instance (instead of being flooded across all ports of the VLAN to which the port belongs).</t><t>When Ports/Interfaces<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-2">When the ports/interfaces across which the ACP is expected to operate in an ACP-awareL2-switchL2 switch orL2/L3-switch/routerL2/L3 switch/router are L2-bridged, packets for the ALL_GRASP_NEIGHBORS multicast addressMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> never beforwardforwarded between these ports. If MLD snooping is used, itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be prohibited from bridging packets for the ALL_GRASP_NEIGHBORS IPv6 multicast address.</t><t>On<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-3">On hybrid L2/L3 switches, multiple L2 ports are assigned to a single L3 VLAN interface. With the aforementioned changes for DULL GRASP, ACP can simply operate on the L3 VLAN interfaces, so no further (hardware) forwarding changes are required to make ACP operate on L2 ports. This is possible because the ACP secure channel protocols only use link-local IPv6 unicast packets, and these packets will be sent to the correct L2 port towards the peer by the VLAN logic of the device.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-4">This is sufficient whenp2pP2P ACP virtual interfaces are established to every ACP peer. When it is desired to create multi-access ACP virtual interfaces (see <xref target="ACP-ma-virtual-interfaces"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5.2.2"/>), it isREQIURED<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> not to coalesce all the ACP secure channels on the same L3 VLAN interface, but only all those on the same L2 port.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-5">If VLAN tagging is used, thenalltheabove describedlogic described above only applies to untagged GRASP packets. For the purpose of ACP neighbor discovery via GRASP, noVLAN taggedVLAN-tagged packetsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sent or received. In a hybrid L2/L3 switch, each VLAN would therefore only create ACP adjacencies across those ports where the VLAN is carried untagged.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-6">As a result, the simple logic is that ACP secure channels would operate over the same L3 interfaces that present asinglesingle, flat bridged network across all routers, but because DULL GRASP is separated on a per-port basis, no full mesh of ACP secure channels is created, but only per-port ACP secure channels to per-port L2-adjacent ACP node neighbors.</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-7">For example, in the above picture, ANswitch1 would run separate DULL GRASP instances on its ports to ANrtr1,ANswitch2ANswitch2, and ANswitchI, even though allthosethree ports may be in the data plane in the same (V)LAN and perform L2 switching between these ports, ANswitch1 would perform ACP L3 routing between them.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-8">The description in the previous paragraphwasis specifically meant to illustratethatthat, on hybrid L3/L2 devices that are common in enterprise,IoTIoT, and broadband aggregation, there is only the GRASP packet extraction (by Ethernet address) and GRASP link-local multicast per L2-port packet injection that has to consider L2 ports at thehardware forwardinghardware-forwarding level. The remaining operations are purely ACP control plane and setup of secure channels across the L3 interface. This hopefully makes support for per-L2 port ACP on those hybrid devices easy.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-9">In devices without such a mix of L2 port/interfaces and L3 interfaces (to terminate anytransport layertransport-layer connections), implementation details will differ. Logically and most simply every L2 port is considered and used as a separate L3 subnet for all ACP operations. The fact that the ACP only requires IPv6 link-local unicast and multicast should make support for it on any type of L2 devices as simple as possible.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-10">A generic issue with ACP inL2 switchedL2-switched networks is the interaction with the Spanning TreeProtocol.Protocol (STP). Without further L2 enhancements, the ACP would run only across the active STPtopologytopology, and the ACP would be interrupted andre-convergereconverge with STP changes. Ideally, ACP peeringSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be built also across ports that are blocked in STP so that the ACP does not depend on STP and can continue to run unaffected across STP topology changes, wherere-convergencereconvergence can be quite slow. The above described simple implementation options are not sufficient to achieve this.</t> </section><!-- switched-lans-how --> </section> <!-- switched-lans --></section> <section anchor="workarounds" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Supporttoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8"> <name slugifiedName="name-support-for-non-acp-compone">Support for Non-ACP Components (Normative)</name> <section anchor="ACPconnect" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-connect">ACP Connect</name> <section anchor="NMS" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Non-ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-non-acp-controller-and-or-n">Non-ACP Controller/ NMS system</name> <t>The Autonomic Control Planeand/or Network Management System (NMS)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-1">The ACP can be used by management systems, such as controllers ornetwork management system (NMS) hosts (henceforth called simply "NMS hosts"),NMS hosts, to connect to devices (or other type of nodes) through it. For this, an NMS host needs to have access to the ACP. The ACP is a self-protecting overlay network, which allowsby defaultaccess only to trusted, autonomicsystems.systems by default. Therefore, a traditional, non-ACP NMSsystemdoes not have access to the ACP by default, such as any other external node.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-2">If the NMS host is not autonomic, i.e., it does not support autonomic negotiation of the ACP, then it can be brought into the ACP by explicit configuration. To support connections to adjacent non-ACP nodes, an ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support "ACP connect" (sometimes also called "autonomicconnect"):</t> <t>"ACPconnect").</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-3">"ACP connect" is aninterface levelinterface-level, configured workaround for connection of trusted non-ACP nodes to the ACP. The ACP node on which ACP connect is configured is called an "ACP edge node". With ACP connect, the ACP is accessible from those non-ACP nodes (such as NOC systems) on such an interface without those non-ACP nodes having to support any ACP discovery or ACP channel setup. This is also called "native" access to the ACPbecausebecause, to those NOCsystemssystems, the interface looks like a normal network interface without any ACP secure channel that is encapsulating the traffic.</t> <figureanchor="acp-connect"> <name>ACP connect</name>anchor="acp-connect" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-14"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-connect-2">ACP Connect</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[ Data-Planealt="" pn="section-8.1.1-4.1"> Data Plane "native" (no ACP) . +--------+ +----------------+ . +-------------+ | ACP | |ACP Edge Node | . | | | Node | | | v | | | |-------|...[ACP VRF]....+----------------| |+ | | ^ |. | | NOC Device || | | . |.[Data-Plane]..+----------------|.[Data Plane]..+----------------| "NMS hosts" || | | . | [ ] | . ^ | || +--------+ . +----------------+ . . +-------------+| . . . +-------------+ . . .Data-PlaneData Plane "native" . ACP "native" (unencrypted) + ACP auto-negotiated . "ACP connect subnet" and encrypted . ACP connect interface e.g., "VRF ACP native" (config)]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-5">ACP connect has security consequences:Allall systems and processes connected via ACP connect have access to all ACP nodes on the entire ACP, without further authentication. Thus, the ACP connect interface and the NOC systems connected to itneedsneed to be physicallycontrolled/secured.controlled and/or secured. For thisreasonreason, the mechanisms described heredoexplicitly do not include options to allow for a non-ACP router to be connected across an ACP connect interface and addresses behind such a router routed inside the ACP.</t><t>Physical controlled/secured<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-6">Physically controlled and/or secured means that attackerscancannot gainnoaccess to the physical device hosting the ACPEdge Node,edge node, the physical interfaces and links providing the ACP connectlinklink, nor the physical devices hosting the NOCDevice.device. In a simple case, ACPEdgeedge node and NOCDevicedevice areco-locatedcolocated in anaccess controlledaccess-controlled room, such as a NOC, to which attackers cannot gain physical access.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-7">An ACP connect interface providesexclusivelyexclusive access to only the ACP. This is likely insufficient for many NMS hosts. Instead, they would require a second"Data-Plane""data plane" interface outside the ACP for connections between the NMS host and administrators, orInternet basedInternet-based services, or for direct access to theData-Plane.data plane. The document <xref target="RFC8368"format="default">"Usingformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8368">"Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM"</xref> explains in more detail how the ACP can be integrated in a mixed NOC environment.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-8">An ACP connect interfaceSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use an IPv6 address/prefix from theACPManual Addressing Sub-Scheme (<xref target="manual-scheme"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.4"/>), letting the operatorconfigureconfigure, forexampleexample, only the Subnet-ID and having the node automatically assign the remaining part of the prefix/address. ItSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use a prefix that is also routed outside the ACP so that the addresses clearly indicate whether it is used inside the ACP or not.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-9">The prefix of ACP connect subnetsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be distributed by the ACP edge node into the ACP routingprotocolprotocol, RPL. The NMShosts MUSThost <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> connect to prefixes in the ACP routing table via its ACP connect interface. In the simple case where the ACP uses only one ULAprefixprefix, and all ACP connect subnets have prefixes covered by that ULA prefix, NMS hosts can rely on <xref target="RFC6724"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6724"/> to determine longest match prefix routes towards its different interfaces, ACP andData-Plane.data plane. WithRFC6724, The<xref target="RFC6724" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>, the NMS host will select the ACP connect interface for all addresses in the ACP because any ACP destination address is longest matched by the address on the ACP connect interface. If the NMShostshost's ACP connect interface uses anotherprefixprefix, or if the ACP uses multiple ULA prefixes, then the NMShosts requirehost requires (static) routes towards the ACP interface for these prefixes.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-10"> When an ACPEdgeedge node receives a packet from an ACP connect interface, the ACPEdgeedge nodeMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only forward the packetintoto the ACP if the packet has an IPv6 source address from that interface (this is sometimes called"RPF filtering").Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) filtering). This filtering ruleMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be changed through administrative measures. The more any such administrative actionenableenables reachability ofnon ACPnon-ACP nodes to the ACP, the more this may cause security issues.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-11">To limit the security impact of ACP connect, nodes supporting itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> implement a security mechanism to allowconfiguration/useconfiguration and/or use of ACP connect interfaces only on nodes explicitly targeted to be deployed with it (those in physically secure locations such as a NOC). For example, the registrar could disable the ability to enable ACP connect on devices duringenrollmentenrollment, and that property could only be changed throughre-enrollment.reenrollment. See also <xref target="role-assignments"format="default"/>.</t> <t>ACP Edgeformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.5"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.1-12">ACP edge nodesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> have a configurable option to prohibit packets with RPI headers (see <xref target="rpl-Data-Plane"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.12.1.13"/>) across an ACP connect interface. These headers are outside the scope of the RPL profile in this specification but may be used in future extensions of this specification.</t> </section><!-- NMS --><section anchor="software" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Softwaretoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-software-components">Software Components</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.2-1">The previous section assumed that the ACPEdgeedge node and NOC devices are separate physical devices and that the ACP connect interface is a physical network connection. This section discusses the implication when these components are instead software components running on a single physical device.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.2-2">The ACP connect mechanismcannot onlycan be used not only to connect physically external systems (NMS hosts) to the ACP but also other applications,containerscontainers, or virtual machines. In fact, one possible way to eliminate the security issue of the external ACP connect interface is tocollocatecolocate an ACP edge node and an NMS host by making one a virtual machine or container inside the other;andtherefore converting the unprotected external ACP subnet into an internal virtual subnet in a single device. This would ultimately result in a fullyACP enabledACP-enabled NMS host with minimum impact to the NMShostshost's software architecture. This approach is not limited to NMS hosts but could equally be applied to devices consisting of one or more VNF (virtual network functions):Anan internal virtual subnet connecting out-of-band management interfaces of the VNFs to an ACP edge router VNF.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.2-3">The core requirement is that the software components need to have a network stack that permits access to the ACP and optionally also to theData-Plane.data plane. Like in the physical setup for NMShostshosts, this can be realized via two internal virtualsubnets. Onesubnets: one thatis connectingconnects to the ACP (which could be a container or virtual machine by itself), and one (or more) connectingintoto theData-Plane.</t> <t>Thisdata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.2-4">This "internal" use of the ACP connect approach should not be considered to be a "workaround"becausebecause, in thiscasecase, it is possible to build a correct security model:Itit is not necessary to rely onunprovableunprovable, external physical security mechanisms as in the case of external NMS hosts. Instead, the orchestration of the ACP, the virtualsubnetssubnets, and the software components can be done by trusted software that could be considered to be part of the ANI (or even an extended ACP). This software component is responsible for ensuring that only trusted software components will get access to that virtual subnet and that only even more trusted software components will get access to both the ACP virtual subnet and theData-Planedata plane (because those ACP users could leak traffic between ACP andData-Plane).data plane). This trust could beestablishedestablished, forexampleexample, through cryptographic means such as signed software packages.</t> </section><!-- software --><section anchor="ACautoconfig" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Auto Configuration</name> <t>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-autoconfiguration">Autoconfiguration</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-1">ACP edge nodes, NMShostshosts, and software componentsthatthat, as described in the previoussectionsection, are meant to be composed via virtual interfacesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support SLAAC <xref target="RFC4862" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4862"/> on the ACP connect subnetStateLess Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC - <xref target="RFC4862" format="default"/>)and routeauto configurationautoconfiguration according to<xref"<xref target="RFC4191"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Theformat="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes"/>" <xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-2">The ACP edge node acts as the router towards the ACP on the ACP connect subnet, providing the(auto-)configured(auto)configured prefix for the ACP connect subnet and(auto-)configured(auto)configured routesintoto the ACP to NMS hosts and/or software components.</t><t><t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-3"> The ACP edge node uses the Route Information Option (RIO) ofRFC4191<xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/> to announce aggregated prefixes for address prefixes used in the ACP (with normal RIOlifetimes.lifetimes). In addition, the ACP edge node also uses a RIO to announce the default route (::/0) with a lifetime of 0.</t><t>These<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-4">These RIOs allowto connect Typethe connecting of type C hosts to the ACP via an ACP connect subnet on one interface and another network (Data Plane/and/or NMS network) on the same or another interface of theTypetype C host, relying onotherrouters other than the ACP edge node. The RIOs ensure that these hosts will only route the prefixes used in the ACP to the ACP edge node.</t><t>Type A/B host<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-5">Type A and B hosts ignore the RIOs and will consider the ACP node to be their default router for alldestination.destinations. This is sufficient when the typeA/B hostsA or type B host onlyneedneeds to connect to the ACP but not to other networks. AttachingType A/B hostsa type A or type B host to both the ACP and othernetworks,networks requireseitherexplicit ACP prefix route configuration on either theType A/B hostshost or the combinedACP/Data-PlaneACP and data plane interface on the ACP edge node, see <xref target="SingleIF"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Aggregatedformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.4"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-6">Aggregated prefix means that the ACP edge node needs to only announce the /48 ULA prefixes used in the ACP but none of the actual /64 (Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme), /127(ACP Zone(Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme), /112 or /120 (Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme) routes of actual ACP nodes. If ACP interfaces are configured withnon ULAnon-ULA prefixes, then those prefixes cannot be aggregated without further configured policy on the ACP edge node. This explains the above recommendation to use ACP ULAprefix coveredprefixes for ACP connect interfaces:Theythey allow for a shorter list of prefixes to be signaled viaRFC4191<xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/> to NMS hosts and software components.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.3-7">The ACP edge nodes that have a Vlong ACP addressMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> allocate a subset of their /112 or /120 address prefix to ACP connect interface(s) to eliminate the need to non-autonomicallyconfigure/provisionconfigure and/or provision the address prefixes for such ACP connect interfaces.</t><!-- See <xref target="up4291"/> for considerations how this updates the IPv6 address architecture and ULA specification.</t> --></section><!-- ACautoconfig --><section anchor="SingleIF" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Combined ACP/Data-Planetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-combined-acp-and-data-plane">Combined ACP and Data Plane Interface (VRF Select)</name> <figureanchor="vrf-select"> <name>VRF select</name>anchor="vrf-select" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-15"> <name slugifiedName="name-vrf-select">VRF Select</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left"alt=""><![CDATA[alt="" pn="section-8.1.4-1.1"> Combined ACP andData-Planedata plane interface . +--------+ +--------------------+ . +--------------+ | ACP | |ACP Edge No | . | NMS Host(s) | | Node | | | . | / Software | | | | [ACP ]. | . | |+ | | | .[VRF ] .[VRF ] | v | "ACPaddress"||Address"|| | +-------+. .[Select].+--------+"Date"Data Plane || | | ^ | .[Data ]. | | Address(es)"|| | | . | [Plane] | | || | | . | [ ] | +--------------+| +--------+ . +--------------------+ +--------------+ .Data-PlaneData plane "native" and + ACP auto-negotiated/encrypted]]></artwork></artwork> </figure><t>Using<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-2">Using two physical and/or virtual subnets (and therefore interfaces)intoto NMSHostshosts (as per <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>) orSoftwaresoftware (as per <xref target="software"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.2"/>) may be seen as additional complexity, forexampleexample, with legacy NMSHostshosts that support only one IP interface, or it may be insufficient to support<xref target="RFC4191" format="default"/> Typetype A or type Bhosthosts <xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/> (see <xref target="ACautoconfig"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Toformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.3"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-3">To provide a single subnetintoto both the ACP andData-Plane,Data plane, the ACPEdgeedge node needs tode-multiplexdemultiplex packets from NMS hosts into ACP VRF andData-Plane.data plane. This is sometimes called "VRF select". If the ACP VRF has no overlapping IPv6 addresses with theData-Planedata plane (it should have no overlapping addresses), then this function can use the IPv6Destinationdestination address. The problem isSource Address Selectionsource address selection on the NMSHost(s)host(s) according toRFC6724.</t> <t>Consider<xref target="RFC6724" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-4">Consider the simple case:Thethe ACP uses only one ULA prefix, and the ACP IPv6 prefix for theCombinedcombined ACP andData-Planedata plane interface is covered by that ULA prefix. The ACP edge node announces both the ACP IPv6 prefix and one (or more) prefixes for theData-Plane.data plane. Without further policy configurations on the NMSHost(s),host(s), it may select its ACP address as a source address forData-Planedata plane ULA destinations because of Rule 8of RFC6724.(<xref target="RFC6724" section="5" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-5" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>). The ACP edge node can pass on the packet to theData-Plane,data plane, but the ACP source address should not be used forData-Planedata plane traffic, and return traffic may fail.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-5">If the ACP carries multiple ULA prefixes or non-ULA ACP connect prefixes, then the correct source address selection becomes even more problematic.</t><t>With<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-6">With separate ACP connect andData-Planedata plane subnets andRFC4191prefix announcements <xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/> that are to be routed across the ACP connect interface,RFC6724the source address selection of Rule 5 (use address of outgoing interface) (<xref target="RFC6724" section="5" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-5" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>) will be used, so that above problems do not occur, even in more complex cases of multiple ULA and non-ULA prefixes in the ACP routing table.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-7">To achieve the same behavior with aCombinedcombined ACP andData-Planedata plane interface, the ACPEdge Nodeedge node needs to behave as two separate routers on the interface:Oneone link-local IPv6 address/router for its ACP reachability, and one link-local IPv6 address/router for itsData-Planedata plane reachability. The Router Advertisements for both are as describedabove (<xrefin <xref target="ACautoconfig"format="default"/>): Forformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.3"/>: for the ACP, the ACP prefix is announced together withRFC4191 option fortheprefixesprefix option <xref target="RFC4191" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4191"/> routed across theACPACP, andlifetime=0the lifetime is set to zero to disqualify thisnext-hopnext hop as a default router. For theData-Plane,data plane, theData-Planedata plane prefix(es) are announced together with whateverdafaultdefault router parameters are used for theData-Plane.</t> <t>Indata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-8">As a result,RFC6724source address selection Rule 5.5 (<xref target="RFC6724" section="5" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-5" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>) may result in the same correct source address selection behavior of NMS hosts without further configurationon itas the separate ACP connect andData-Plane interfaces.data plane interfaces on the host. As described in the text for Rule5.5,5.5 (<xref target="RFC6724" section="5" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-5" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>), this is only aMAY,<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> because IPv6 hosts are not required to track next-hop information. If an NMSHosthost does not do this, then separate ACP connect andData-Planedata plane interfaces are the preferable method of attachment. Hosts implementing "<xref target="RFC8028" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="First-Hop Router Selection by Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network"/>" <xref target="RFC8028"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8028"/> should (instead of may) implement<xref target="RFC6724" format="default"/>Rule5.5,5.5 (<xref target="RFC6724" section="5" sectionFormat="of" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724#section-5" derivedContent="RFC6724"/>), so it is preferred for hosts to support <xref target="RFC8028"format="default"/>.</t> <t>ACPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8028"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.4-9">ACP edge nodesMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support theCombinedcombined ACP andData-Planedata plane interface.</t> </section><!-- SingleIF --><section anchor="ACgrasp" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Usetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.1.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-use-of-grasp">Use of GRASP</name><t>GRASP<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.5-1">GRASP can and should be possible to use across ACP connect interfaces, especially in thearchitecturalarchitecturally correct solution when it is used as a mechanism to connectSoftwaresoftware (e.g., ASA or legacy NMS applications) to the ACP.</t><t>Given<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.5-2">Given how the ACP is the security and transport substrate for GRASP, the requirementsforare that those devices connected via ACP connectis that thoseare equivalently (if not better) secured against attacks than ACP nodes that do not use ACPconnectconnect, and they run only software that is equally (if not better) protected, known (or trusted) not to bemaliciousmalicious, and accordingly designed to isolate access to the ACP against external equipment.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.5-3">The difference in security is that cryptographic security of the ACP secure channel is replaced by required physicalsecurity/controlsecurity and/or control of the network connection between an ACP edge node and the NMS or other host reachable via the ACP connect interface. See <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Whenformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.1.5-4">When using"Combinedthe combined ACP andData-Plane Interfaces",data plane interface, care has to be taken that only GRASP messages received from software or NMS hosts and intended for the ACP GRASP domainreceived from Software or NMS Hostsare forwarded by ACP edge nodes. Currently there is no definition for a GRASP security and transport substrate beside the ACP, so there is no definition how suchSoftware/NMS Hostsoftware/NMS host could participate in two separate GRASPDomainsdomains across the same subnet (ACP andData-Planedata plane domains).At currentCurrently it is assumed that all GRASP packets on aCombinedcombined ACP andData-Planedata plane interface belong to the GRASP ACPDomain.domain. TheySHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> all use the ACP IPv6 addresses of theSoftware/NMS Hosts.software/NMS hosts. The link-local IPv6 addresses ofSoftware/NMS Hostssoftware/NMS hosts (used for GRASP M_DISCOVERY and M_FLOOD messages) are also assumed to belong to the ACP address space.</t> </section><!-- ACgrasp --></section><!-- ACP connect --><section anchor="remote-acp-neighbors" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Connectingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-connecting-acp-islands-over">Connecting ACPislandsIslands over Non-ACP L3networksNetworks (Remote ACPneighbors)</name> <t>NotNeighbors)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.2-1">Not all nodes in a network may support the ACP. If non-ACPLayer-2L2 devices are between ACP nodes, the ACP will work acrossitthem since it is IP based. However, the autonomic discovery of ACP neighbors via DULL GRASP is only intended to work across L2 connections, so it is not sufficient to autonomically create ACP connections across non-ACPLayer-3L3 devices.</t> <section anchor="conf-remote" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Configuredtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-configured-remote-acp-neigh">Configured Remote ACPneighbor</name> <t>OnNeighbor</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.1-1">On the ACP node, remote ACP neighbors are configured explicitly. The parameters of such a "connection" are described in the followingABNF.</t>ABNF. The syntax shown is non-normative (as there are no standards for configuration) but only meant to illustrate the parameters and which ones can be optional.</t> <figureanchor="abnf"> <name>Parametersanchor="abnf" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-16"> <name slugifiedName="name-parameters-for-remote-acp-n">Parameters forremoteRemote ACPneighbors</name> <artworkNeighbors</name> <sourcecode name=""type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[type="abnf" markers="false" pn="section-8.2.1-2.1"> connection =[method, local-addr, remote-addr, ?pmtu"," local-addr "," remote-addr [ "," pmtu ] method = "any" / ( "IKEv2" ["IKEv2", ?port":" port ]method =/) / ( "DTLS" ["DTLS",":" port ] ) port = 1*DIGIT local-addr = [ address, ?vrf[ ":" vrf ] ] remote-addr =[address]address =("any" | ipv4-address | ipv6-address )"any" / IPv4address / IPv6address ; From [RFC5954] vrf =tstrsystem-dependent ; Name ofaVRFon this node withfor local-address]]></artwork></sourcecode> </figure><t>Explicit<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.1-3">Explicit configuration of aremote-peerremote peer according to this ABNF provides all the information to build a secure channel without requiring a tunnel to that peer and running DULL GRASP inside of it.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.1-4">The configuration includes the parameters otherwise signaled via DULL GRASP: local address, remote (peer)locatorlocator, and method. The differences over DULL GRASP local neighbor discovery and secure channel creation are as follows:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-8.2.1-5"> <li pn="section-8.2.1-5.1">The local and remote address can be IPv4 or IPv6 and are typicallyglobal scopeglobal-scope addresses.</li><li>The<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.2">The VRF across which the connection is built (and in which local-addr exists) cantobe specified. If vrf is not specified, it is the default VRF on the node. In DULLGRASPGRASP, the VRF is implied by the interface across which DULL GRASP operates.</li><li>If<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.3">If local address is "any", the local address used when initiating a secure channel connection is decided by source address selection (<xref target="RFC6724"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6724"/> for IPv6). As a responder, the connection listens on all addresses of the node in the selected VRF.</li><li>Configuration<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.4">Configuration of port is only required for methods where no defaults exist (e.g., "DTLS").</li><li>If<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.5">If the remote address is "any", the connection is only a responder. It is a "hub" that can be used by multiple remote peers to connect simultaneously--- without having to know or configure theiraddresses. Example: Hubaddresses, for example, a hub site for remote "spoke" sites reachable over the Internet.</li><li>Pmtu<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.6">The pmtu parameter should be configurable to overcomeissues/limitationsissues or limitations of Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD).</li><li>IKEv2/IPsec<li pn="section-8.2.1-5.7">IKEv2/IPsec to remote peers should support the optional NAT Traversal (NAT-T) procedures.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="conf-tunnel" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Tunneledtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-tunneled-remote-acp-neighbo">Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbor</name><t>An IPinIP, GRE<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.2-1">An IP-in-IP, GRE, or other form ofpre-existingpreexisting tunnel is configured between two remote ACPpeerspeers, and the virtual interfaces representing the tunnel are configured for "ACP enable". This will enable IPv6link locallink-local addresses and DULL on this tunnel.InAs a result, the tunnel is used for normal "L2 adjacent" candidate ACP neighbor discovery with DULL and secure channel setup procedures described in this document.</t><t>Tunneled<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.2-2">Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbor requires two encapsulations: the configured tunnel and the secure channel inside of that tunnel. This makes it in general less desirable than Configured Remote ACP Neighbor. Benefits of tunnels are that it may be easier to implement because there is no change to the ACP functionality - just running it over a virtual (tunnel) interface instead of only native interfaces. The tunnel itself may also provide PMTUD while the secure channel method may not. Or the tunnel mechanism is permitted/possible through some firewall while the secure channel method may not.</t><t>Tunneling<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.2-3">Tunneling using an insecure tunnel encapsulationincreasesincreases, onaverageaverage, the risk of a MITM downgrade attack somewhere along the underlaypath that blockspath. In such an attack, the MITM filters packets for all but the most easily attacked ACP secure channel option to force use of that option. ACP nodes supportingtunneled remoteTunneled Remote ACP NeighborsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support configuration on such tunnel interfaces to restrict or explicitly select the available ACP secure channel protocols (if the ACP node supports more than one ACP secure channel protocol in the first place).</t> </section> <section anchor="conf-summary" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Summary</name> <t>Configured/Tunneledtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8.2.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-summary">Summary</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.3-1">Configured and Tunneled Remote ACPneighborsNeighbors are less "indestructible" than L2 adjacent ACP neighbors based onlink locallink-local addressing, since they depend on more correctData-Planedata plane operations, such as routing and global addressing.</t><t>Nevertheless,<t indent="0" pn="section-8.2.3-2">Nevertheless, these options may be crucial to incrementallydeploydeploying the ACP, especially if it is meant to connect islands across the Internet. ImplementationsSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support at least Tunneled Remote ACP Neighbors via GREtunnels -tunnels, which is likely the most common router-to-router tunneling protocol in use today.</t> </section> </section><!-- remote-acp-neighbors--></section><!-- workarounds --><section anchor="operational" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-operations-informative">ACP Operations (Informative)</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9-1">The following sections document important operational aspects of the ACP. They are not normative because they do not impact the interoperability between components of the ACP, but they includerecommendations/requirementsrecommendations and/or requirements for the internal operational model that are beneficial or necessary to achieve the desired use-case benefits of the ACP (see <xref target="usage"format="default"/>).</t>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3"/>).</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li><xrefspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9-2"> <li pn="section-9-2.1"> <xref target="diagnostics"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.1"/> describes the recommended capabilities of operator diagnosticscapabilitiesof ACP nodes.</li><li><xref<li pn="section-9-2.2"> <xref target="registrar-considerations"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2"/> describes at a high level how an ACP registrar needs to work, what its configuration parametersareare, and specific issues impacting the choices of deployment design due to renewal and revocation issues. It describes a model where ACPRegistrarsregistrars have their own sub-CA to provide the most distributed deployment option for ACPRegistrars,registrars, and it describes considerations for centralized policy control of ACPRegistrarregistrar operations.</li><li><xref<li pn="section-9-2.3"> <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/> describes suggested ACP node behavior and operational interfaces (configuration options) to manage the ACP in so-called greenfield devices (previously unconfigured) and brownfield devices (preconfigured).</li> </ul><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9-3">The recommendations and suggestions of this chapter were derived from operational experience gained with a commercially available pre-standard ACP implementation.</t> <section anchor="diagnostics" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-and-brski-diagnostics">ACP (and BRSKI) Diagnostics</name><t>Even<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-1">Even though ACP and ANI in general aretaking outremoving many manual configuration mistakes through their automation, it is important to provide good diagnostics for them.</t><t>Basic<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-2">Basic standardized diagnostics would require support for(yang)(YANG) models representing the complete(auto-)configuration(auto)configuration and operational state of all components: GRASP,ACPACP, and the infrastructure used bythem:them, such as TLS/DTLS, IPsec, certificates, TA, time,VRFVRF, and so on. While necessary, this is notsufficient:</t> <t>Simplysufficient.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-3">Simply representing the state of components does not allow operators to quickly take action--- unless theydounderstand how to interpret the data,and thatwhich can mean a requirement for deep understanding of all components and how they interact in the ACP/ANI.</t><t>Diagnostic<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-4">Diagnostic supports should help to quickly answer the questions operators are expected to ask, such as"is"Is the ACP workingcorrectly?",correctly?" or"why"Why is there no ACP connection to a known neighboring node?"</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-5">In current network management approaches, the logic to answer these questions is most often builtasinto centralized diagnostics software that leverages the above mentioned data models. While this approach is feasible for components utilizing the ANI, it is not sufficient to diagnose the ANI itself:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Developingspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-6"> <li pn="section-9.1-6.1">Developing the logic to identify common issues requires operational experience with the components of the ANI. Letting each management system define its own analysis is inefficient.</li><li>When<li pn="section-9.1-6.2">When the ANI is not operating correctly, it may not be possible to run diagnosticsfrom remoteremotely because of missing connectivity. The ANI should therefore have diagnostic capabilities available locally on the nodes themselves.</li><li>Certain<li pn="section-9.1-6.3">Certain operations are difficult or impossible to monitor inreal-time,real time, such as initial bootstrap issues in a network location where no capabilities exist to attach local diagnostics. Therefore, it is important to also definemeans of capturing (logging)how to capture (log) diagnostics locally for later retrieval. Ideally, these captures are alsonon-volatilenonvolatile so that they can survive extended power-offconditions -conditions, forexampleexample, when a device that fails to be brought up zero-touch isbeingsentbackfor diagnostics at a more appropriate location.</li> </ul><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-7">The simplest form of diagnostics for answering questions such as the above is to represent the relevant information sequentially in dependency order, so that the firstnon-expected/non-operationalunexpected and/or nonoperational item is the most likely rootcause. Orcause, or justlog/highlight thatlog and/or highlight that item. For example:</t><t>Q:<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-8">Question: Is the ACP operational to accept neighborconnections:connections? </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Checkspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-9"> <li pn="section-9.1-9.1">Check ifany potentiallythe necessaryconfigurationconfigurations to make ACP/ANI operational are correct (see <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/> for a discussion of such commands).</li><li>Does<li pn="section-9.1-9.2">Does the system time look reasonable, or could it be the default system time afterclock chipbattery failure(certificateof the clock chip? Certificate checks depend on reasonable notion oftime)?.</li> <li>Doestime.</li> <li pn="section-9.1-9.3">Does the node have keyingmaterial -material, such as domain certificate, TA certificates,...></li> <li>Ifetc.?</li> <li pn="section-9.1-9.4">If there is no keying material and the ANI is supported/enabled, check the state of BRSKI (not detailed in this example).</li><li> <t>Check<li pn="section-9.1-9.5"> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-9.5.1">Check the validity of the domain certificate: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Doesspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-9.5.2"> <li pn="section-9.1-9.5.2.1">Does the certificate validate against the TA?</li><li>Has<li pn="section-9.1-9.5.2.2">Has it been revoked?</li><li>Was<li pn="section-9.1-9.5.2.3">Was the last scheduled attempt to retrieve a CRLsuccessfulsuccessful? (e.g., do we know that our CRL information is up todate).</li> <li>Isdate?)</li> <li pn="section-9.1-9.5.2.4">Is the certificatevalid:valid? The validity start time is in the past, and the expiration time is in the future?</li><li>Does<li pn="section-9.1-9.5.2.5">Does the certificate have a correctly formatted acp-node-name field?</li> </ul> </li><li>Was<li pn="section-9.1-9.6">Was the ACP VRF successfully created?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-9.7">Is ACP enabled on one or more interfaces that are up and running?</li> </ul><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-10">If allthisof the above looks good, the ACP should be runninglocally"fine"-locally, but we did not check any ACP neighbor relationships.</t><t>Question: why<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-11">Question: Why does the node not create a working ACP connection to a neighbor on an interface? </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Isspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-12"> <li pn="section-9.1-12.1">Is the interface physically up? Does it have an IPv6 link-local address?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-12.2">Is it enabled for ACP?</li><li>Do<li pn="section-9.1-12.3">Do we successfully send DULL GRASP messages to theinterface (link layer errors)?</li> <li>Dointerface? (Are there link-layer errors?)</li> <li pn="section-9.1-12.4">Do we receive DULL GRASP messages on the interface? If not, some intervening L2 equipment performing bad MLD snooping could have caused problems.ProvideProvide, e.g., diagnostics of the MLD querier IPv6 and MAC address.</li><li>Do<li pn="section-9.1-12.5">Do we see the ACP objective in any DULL GRASP message from that interface? Diagnose the supported secure channel methods.</li><li>Do<li pn="section-9.1-12.6">Do we know the MAC address of the neighbor with the ACP objective? If not, diagnose SLAAC/ND state.</li><li>When<li pn="section-9.1-12.7">When did we last attempt to build an ACP secure channel to the neighbor?</li><li> <t>If<li pn="section-9.1-12.8"> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-12.8.1">If itfailed, why:failed: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Didspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-12.8.2"> <li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.1">Did the neighbor close the connection onusus, or did we close the connection on it because the domain certificate membership failed?</li><li>If<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.2">If the neighbor closed the connection on us, provide any error diagnostics from the secure channel protocol.</li><li> <t>If<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3"> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.1">If we failed the attempt, display our local reason: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Therespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2"> <li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.1">There was no common secure channel protocol supported by the two neighbors (this could not happen on nodes supporting this specification because it mandates common support for IPsec).</li><li> <t>The<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2"> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.1">Did the ACP certificate membership check (<xref target="certcheck"format="default"/>) fails:format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>) fail? </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.2"> <li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.2.1">The neighbor's certificate is not signed directly or indirectly by one of thenodesnode's TA. Provide diagnostics which TA it has (can identify whom the device belongs to).</li><li>The<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.2.2">The neighbor's certificate does not have the same domain (or no domain at all). Diagnosedomain-nameacp-domain-name and potentially other cert info.</li><li>The<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.2.3">The neighbor's certificate has been revoked or could not be authenticated by OCSP. </li><li>The<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.3.2.2.2.4">The neighbor's certificate hasexpired -expired, or it is not yet valid.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li><li>Any<li pn="section-9.1-12.8.2.4">Are there any other connectionissues inissues, e.g.,IKEv2 / IPsec, DTLS?.</li>IKEv2/IPsec, DTLS?</li> </ul> </li> </ul><t>Question:<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-13">Question: Is the ACP operating correctly across its secure channels? </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Arespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.1-14"> <li pn="section-9.1-14.1">Are there one or more active ACP neighbors with secure channels?</li><li>Is the<li pn="section-9.1-14.2">Is RPLrouting protocolfor the ACP running?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-14.3">Is there a default route to the root in the ACP routing table?</li><li>Is there<li pn="section-9.1-14.4">Is there, for each direct ACP neighbor not reachable over the ACP virtual interface to therootroot, a route in the ACP routing table?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-14.5">Is ACP GRASP running?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-14.6">Is at least oneSRV.est"SRV.est" objective cached (to support certificate renewal)?</li><li>Is<li pn="section-9.1-14.7">Is there at least one BRSKI registrar objectivecached (in casecached? (If BRSKI issupported)</li> <li>Issupported.)</li> <li pn="section-9.1-14.8">Is the BRSKI proxy operating normally on all interfaces where ACP is operating?</li><li>...</li></ul><t>These<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-15">These lists are not necessarily complete, but they illustrate the principle and show that there are variety of issues ranging from normal operational causes (a neighbor in another ACP domain)overto problems in the credentials management (certificate lifetimes), to explicit security actions (revocation) or unexpected connectivity issues (intervening L2 equipment).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-16">The items so farare illustratingillustrate how the ANI operations can be diagnosed with passive observation of the operational state of its components includinghistoric/cached/countedhistoric, cached, and/or counted events. This is notnecessarynecessarily sufficient to provide good enough diagnosticsoverall:</t> <t>Theoverall.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-17">The components of ACP and BRSKI are designed with security inmindmind, but they do not attempt to provide diagnostics for building the network itself. Consider two examples: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li>BRSKIspacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-9.1-18"> <li pn="section-9.1-18.1" derivedCounter="1.">BRSKI does not allow for a neighboring device to identify thepledgespledge's IDevID certificate. Only the selected BRSKI registrar can do this, but it may be difficult to disseminate informationabout undesired pledgesfrom those BRSKI registrars about undesired pledges tolocations/nodeslocations and/or nodes where information about those pledges is desired.</li><li>LLDP<li pn="section-9.1-18.2" derivedCounter="2.">LLDP disseminates information aboutnodes to their immediate neighbors,nodes, such as nodemodel/type/softwaremodel, type, and/or software and interfacename/numbername and/or number of theconnection.connection, to their immediate neighbors. This information is often helpful or even necessary in network diagnostics. It can equally be consideredto betoo insecure to make this information available unprotected to all possible neighbors.</li> </ol><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1-19">An "interested adjacent party" can always determine the IDevID certificate of a BRSKI pledge by behaving like a BRSKI proxy/registrar. Therefore, the IDevID certificate of a BRSKI pledge is not meant to be protected--- it just has to be queried and is not signaled unsolicited (as it would be in LLDP) so that other observers on the same subnet can determine who is an "interested adjacent party".</t> <section anchor="ta-troubleshoot" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Securetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.1.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-secure-channel-peer-diagnos">Secure Channel Peerdiagnostics</name> <t>WhenDiagnostics</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-1">When using mutual certificate authentication, the TA certificate is not required to be signaled explicitly because its hash is sufficient for certificate chain validation. In the case of ACP secure channelsetupsetup, this leads to limited diagnostics when authentication fails because of TA mismatch. For this reason, <xref target="common-requirements"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.2"/> recommendstoalsoincludeincluding the TA certificate in the secure channel signaling. This should be possible to do withoutprotocol modifications inmodifying the security association protocols used by the ACP. For example, while <xref target="RFC7296"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7296"/> does not mention this, it also does not prohibit it.</t><t>One<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-2">One commondeploymentuse case wherethe diagnosticdiagnostics through the signaled TA of a candidate peerisare very helpfulareis the multi-tenantenvironmentsenvironment, such as an officebuildings,building, where different tenants run their own networks and ACPs. Each tenant is given supposedly disjoint L2 connectivity through the building infrastructure. In theseenvironmentsenvironments, there are various common errors through which a device may receive L2 connectivity into the wrongtenantstenant's network.</t><t>While<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-3">While the ACP itself is notimpactimpacted by this, theData-Planedata plane to be built later may be impacted. Therefore, it is important to be able to diagnose such undesirable connectivity from the ACP so that any autonomic or non-autonomic mechanisms to configure theData-Planedata plane canaccordinglytreat suchinterfaces.interfaces accordingly. The information in the TA of the peer can then ease troubleshooting of such issues.</t><t>Another example<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-4">Another use case is the intended or accidentalre-activationreactivation ofequipment whose TA certificate has long expired,equipment, such as redundant gear taken fromstorage after years.</t> <t>Astorage, whose TA certificate has long expired.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-5">A thirdexampleuse case iswhenwhen, in amergers &merger and acquisitioncasecase, ACP nodes have not been correctly provisioned with the mutual TA of a previously disjoint ACP. Thisis assumingassumes that the ACP domain nameswherewere already aligned so that the ACP domain membership check is only failing on the TA.</t><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-9.1.1-6">A fourthexampleuse case is when multiple registrarswhereare set up for the same ACP butwithoutare not correctlysettingset up with the same TA. For example, when registrars supporttoalsobe CAbeing CAs themselves but are misconfigured to becomeTATAs instead of intermediateCA.</t>CAs.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="registrar-considerations" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-registrars-2">ACP Registrars</name><t>As<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-1">As described in <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/>, the ACP addressing mechanism is designed to enable lightweight,distributeddistributed, and uncoordinated ACP registrars thatare providingprovide ACP address prefixes to candidate ACP nodes by enrolling them with an ACP certificate into an ACP domain via any appropriatemechanism/protocol,mechanism and/or protocol, automated or not.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2-2">This section discusses informatively more details and options for ACP registrars.</t> <section anchor="reg-interact" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Registrar interactions</name> <t>Thistoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-registrar-interactions">Registrar Interactions</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-1">This section summarizes and discusses the interactions with other entities required by an ACP registrar.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-2">In a simple instance of an ACP network, no central NOC component beside a TA is required. Typically, this is a root CA. One or more uncoordinated acting ACPregistrarregistrars can be set up, performing the followinginteractions:</t> <t>Tointeractions.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-3">To orchestrate enrolling a candidate ACP node autonomically, the ACP registrar can rely on the ACP and useProxiesproxies to reach the candidate ACP node, therefore allowingminimum pre-existing (auto-)configuredminimal, preexisting (auto)configured network services on the candidate ACP node. BRSKI defines the BRSKI proxy, a design that can be adopted for various protocols thatPledges/candidatepledges and/or candidate ACP nodes could want to use, forexampleexample, BRSKI over CoAP (Constrained ApplicationProtocol),Protocol) or the proxying of NETCONF.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-4">To reach a TA that has no ACP connectivity, the ACP registrarwould useuses theData-Plane.data plane. The ACP andData-Planedata plane in an ACP registrar could (and by defaultshould be)should) be completely isolated from each other at the network level. Only applications such as the ACP registrar would need the ability for their transport stacks to access both.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-5">In non-autonomic enrollment options, theData-Planedata plane betweenaan ACP registrar and the candidate ACP node needs to be configured first. This includes the ACP registrar and the candidate ACP node. Then any appropriate set of protocols can be used between the ACP registrar and the candidate ACP node to discover the other side, and then connect and enroll (configure) the candidate ACP node with an ACP certificate. For example, NETCONFZeroTouch (<xrefZero Touch ("<xref target="RFC8572" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)"/>" <xref target="RFC8572"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8572"/>) isan examplea protocol that could be used for this. BRSKI using optional discovery mechanisms is equally a possibility for candidate ACP nodes attempting to be enrolled across non-ACP networks, such as the Internet.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-6">When a candidate ACPnodes have secure bootstrap,node, such as a BRSKIPledges, theypledge, has secure bootstrap, it will not trustto be configured/enrolledbeing configured and/or enrolled across thenetwork,network unlessbeingit is presented with a voucher (see "<xref target="RFC8366" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols"/>" <xref target="RFC8366"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8366"/>) authorizing the network to take possession of the node. An ACP registrar will then need a method to retrieve such a voucher, eitheroffline,offline or online from a MASA (Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority). BRSKI and NETCONFZeroTouchZero Touch are two protocols that include capabilities to present the voucher to the candidate ACP node.</t><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.1-7">An ACP registrar could operate EST for ACP certificate renewal and/or act as a CRL Distributionpoint.Point. A node performing these services does not need to support performing (initial) enrollment, but it does require the same above described connectivity as an ACP registrar: via the ACP to the ACP nodes and via theData-Planedata plane to the TA and other sources of CRL information.</t> </section> <section anchor="reg-config" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Registrar Parameter</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-registrar-parameters">Registrar Parameters</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.2-1">The interactions of an ACP registrar outlined in <xref target="acp-registrars"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/> and <xref target="reg-interact"format="default"/> aboveformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2.1"/> depend on the following parameters: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Aspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.2.2-2"> <li pn="section-9.2.2-2.1">A URL to the TA and credentials so that the ACP registrar can let the TA sign candidate ACP node certificates.</li><li>The<li pn="section-9.2.2-2.2">The ACPdomain-name.</li> <li>Thedomain name.</li> <li pn="section-9.2.2-2.3">The Registrar-ID to use. This could default to a MAC address of the ACP registrar.</li><li>For<li pn="section-9.2.2-2.4">For recovery, thenext-useablenext usable Node-IDs forzone (Zone-ID=0) sub-addressing scheme, for Vlong /112the Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (Zone-ID 0) and for the Vlong/120 sub-addressing scheme.Addressing Sub-Scheme (/112 and /120). These IDs would only need to be provisioned after recovering from a crash. Some other mechanism would be required to remember these IDs in a backup location or to recover them from the set of currently known ACP nodes.</li><li>Policies if<li pn="section-9.2.2-2.5">Policies on whether the candidate ACP nodes should receive a domain certificate or not, forexampleexample, based on thedevicesdevice's IDevID certificate as in BRSKI. The ACP registrar mayhave awhitelist or blacklistof devicesbased on a device's "serialNumber" attribute <xref target="X.520"format="default"/> "serialNumbers" attributeformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X.520"/> in the subject field distinguished name encodingfrom theirof its IDevID certificate.</li><li>Policies<li pn="section-9.2.2-2.6">Policies on what type of address prefix to assign to a candidate ACPdevices,device, likely based onlikelythe same information.</li><li>For<li pn="section-9.2.2-2.7">For BRSKI or other mechanisms using vouchers:Parametersparameters to determine how to retrieve vouchers for specifictypetypes of secure bootstrap candidate ACP nodes (such as MASA URLs), unless this information is automaticallylearnedlearned, such as from the IDevID certificate of candidate ACP nodes (as defined in BRSKI).</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="cert-renewal" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Certificate renewaltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-certificate-renewal-and-lim">Certificate Renewal andlimitations</name> <t>WhenLimitations</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.3-1">When an ACP noderenews/rekeysrenews and/or rekeys its certificate, it may end up doing so via a different registrar (e.g., EST server) than the one it originally received its ACP certificate from, forexampleexample, because that original ACP registrar is gone. The ACP registrar through which the renewal/rekeying is performed would by default trust the acp-node-name from the ACPnodesnode's current ACP certificate and maintain this information so that the ACP node maintains its ACP address prefix. In EST renewal/rekeying, the ACPnodesnode's current ACP certificate is signaled during the TLS handshake.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.3-2">This simple scenario has two limitations: </t> <ol type="1"spacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-9.2.3-3"> <li pn="section-9.2.3-3.1" derivedCounter="1.">The ACPregistrarsregistrar cannot directly assign certificates to nodes and therefore needs an "online" connection to the TA.</li><li>Recovery<li pn="section-9.2.3-3.2" derivedCounter="2.">Recovery from a compromised ACP registrar is difficult. When an ACP registrar is compromised, it caninsertinsert, forexampleexample, a conflicting acp-node-name andcreatethereby create an attack against other ACP nodes through the ACP routing protocol.</li> </ol><t>Even<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.3-4">Even when such a malicious ACP registrar is detected, resolving the problem may be difficult because it would require identifying all the wrong ACP certificates assigned via the ACP registrar after it was compromised.And withoutWithout additional centralized tracking of assignedcertificatescertificates, there is no way to do this.</t> </section> <section anchor="sub-ca" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACPtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-registrars-with-sub-ca">ACP Registrars withsub-CA</name> <t>In situations,Sub-CA</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.4-1">In situations where either of the above two limitations are an issue, ACP registrars could also be sub-CAs. This removes the need for connectivity to a TA whenever an ACP node is enrolled, and it reduces the need for connectivity of such an ACP registrar to a TA to only those times when it needs to renew its own certificate. The ACP registrar would also now use its own (sub-CA) certificate to enroll and sign the ACPnodesnode's certificates, and therefore it is only necessary to revoke a compromised ACPregistrarsregistrar's sub-CA certificate.AlternativelyAlternatively, one can let it expire and not renewit,it when the certificate of the sub-CA is appropriately short-lived.</t><t>As<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.4-2">As the ACP domain membership check verifies a peer ACP node's ACP certificate trust chain, it will also verify the signingcertificatecertificate, which is thecompromised/revokedcompromised and/or revoked sub-CA certificate. Therefore, ACP domain membership for an ACP node enrolledfromby a compromised and discovered ACP registrar will fail.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.4-3">ACP nodes enrolled by a compromised ACP registrar would automatically fail to establish ACP channels and ACP domain certificate renewal via EST and therefore revert to their role asacandidate ACP members and attempt to get a new ACP certificate from an ACPregistrar -registrar, for example, via BRSKI.InAs a result, ACP registrars that have an associated sub-CAmakesmake isolating and resolving issues with compromised registrars easier.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.4-4">Note that ACP registrars with sub-CA functionality also can control the lifetime of ACP certificateseasiermore easily and thereforealsocan be used as a tool to introduceshort livedshort-lived certificates andnotto no longer rely on CRL, whereas the certificates for the sub-CAs themselves could be longer lived and subject to CRL.</t> </section> <section anchor="pms" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Centralizedtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.2.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-centralized-policy-control">Centralized Policy Control</name><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.5-1">When using multiple, uncoordinated ACP registrars, several advanced operations are potentially more complex than with a single, resilient policy control backend, forexampleexample, including but not limitedto:to the following: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Whichspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.2.5-2"> <li pn="section-9.2.5-2.1">Deciding which candidate ACP node is permitted or not permitted into an ACP domain. This may not be a decision to betakenmade upfront, so that a policy per "serialNumber" attribute in the subject field distinguished name encoding can be loaded into every ACP registrar. Instead, it may better be decided inreal-time includingreal time, potentially including a human decision in a NOC.</li><li>Tracking of<li pn="section-9.2.5-2.2">Tracking all enrolled ACP nodes and their certificate information. For example, in support of revoking an individual ACPnodesnode's certificates.</li><li>More<li pn="section-9.2.5-2.3">Needing more flexible policieswhatas to which type of address prefix or evenwhatwhich specific address prefix to assign to a candidate ACP node.</li> </ul><t>These<t indent="0" pn="section-9.2.5-3">These and other operations could be introduced more easily by introducing a centralized Policy Management System (PMS) and modifying ACP registrar behavior so that it queries the PMS for any policy decision occurring during the candidate ACP node enrollment process and/or the ACP node certificate renewalprocess. Forprocess, for example, which ACP address prefix to assign.LikewiseLikewise, the ACP registrar would report any relevant state change information to the PMS as well, forexampleexample, when a certificate was successfully enrolled onto a candidate ACP node.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="enabling-acp" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Enablingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-enabling-and-disabling-the-">Enabling anddisabling ACP/ANI</name> <t>Disabling the ACP and/or the ANI</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-1"> Both ACP and BRSKI require interfaces to be operational enough to supportsending/receivingthe sending and receiving of their packets. In node types where interfaces are enabled by default (e.g., without operatorconfiguration) enabled,configuration), such as most L2 switches, this would be less of a change in behavior than in most L3 devices(e.g.(e.g., routers), where interfaces are disabled bydefault disabled.default. In almost all networkdevicesdevices, though, it is commonthoughfor configuration to change interfaces to a physically disabledstatestate, andthatthis would break the ACP.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3-2">In this section, we discuss a suggested operational model toenable/disableenable and disable interfaces and nodes for ACP/ANI in a way that minimizes the risk ofoperator action to breakbreaking the ACPin this way,due to operator action andthatalso minimizes operator surprise when the ACP/ANI becomes supported in node software.</t> <section anchor="secure-enabling" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Filtering for non-ACP/ANI packets</name> <t>Whenevertoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-filtering-for-non-acp-ani-p">Filtering for Non-ACP/ANI Packets</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.1-1">Whenever this document refers to enabling an interface for ACP (or BRSKI), it only requiresto permitpermitting the interface tosend/receivesend and receive packets necessary to operate ACP (or BRSKI)--- but not any otherData-Planedata plane packets. Unless theData-Planedata plane is explicitlyconfigured/enabled,configured and enabled, all packets that are not required for ACP/BRSKI should be filtered on input andoutput:</t> <t>Bothoutput.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.1-2">Both BRSKI and ACP requirelink-local onlylink-local-only IPv6 operations on interfaces and DULL GRASP. IPv6 link-local operationsmeansmean the minimum signaling to auto-assign an IPv6 link-local address and talk to neighbors via their link-localaddress:addresses: SLAAC(Stateless Address Auto-Configuration -<xref target="RFC4862"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4862"/> and ND(Neighbor Discovery -<xref target="RFC4861"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4861"/>. When the device is a BRSKI pledge, it may also require TCP/TLS connections to BRSKI proxies on the interface. When the device has keying material, and the ACP is running, it requires DULL GRASP packets and packets necessary for thesecure-channelsecure channel mechanism it supports, e.g., IKEv2 and IPsec ESP packets or DTLS packets to the IPv6 link-local address of an ACP neighbor on the interface. It also requires TCP/TLS packets for its BRSKI proxyfunctionality,functionality if itdoes supportsupports BRSKI.</t> </section> <section anchor="admin-down" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Admin Downtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-admin-down-state">"admin down" State</name><t>Interfaces<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-1">Interfaces on most network equipment have at least two states: "up" and "down". These may haveproduct specificproduct-specific names. For example, "down"for examplecould be called"shutdown""shutdown", and "up" could be called "no shutdown". The "down" state disables all interface operations down to the physical level. The "up" state enables the interface enough for all possible L2/L3 services to operate on top ofitit, and it may also auto-enable some subset of them. More commonly, the operations of various L2/L3 servicesisare controlled via additional node-wide orinterface levelinterface-level options, but they all becomeonlyactive only when the interface is not "down". Therefore, an easy way to ensure that all L2/L3 operations on an interface are inactive is to put the interface into "down" state. The fact that this also physically shuts down the interface isin many casesjust a sideeffect,effect in many cases, but it may be important in other cases (seebelow,<xref target="down-fast-state-propagation"format="default"/>).</t> <t>One of theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.2.2"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-2">A commonproblemsproblem of remote management isforthe operator or SDN controllerto cutcutting its own connectivity to the remote nodeby a configurationvia configuration, impacting its own management connectionintoto the node. The ACP itself should have no dedicated configuration other than the aforementionedenablementenabling of the ACP on brownfield ACP nodes. This leaves configuration that cannot distinguish between the ACP andData-Planedata plane as sources of configuration mistakes as these commands will impact the ACP even though they should only impact theData-Plane.</t> <t>Thedata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-3">The one ubiquitous type ofcommandscommand thatdodoes this on manytypetypes of routersareis the interface "down"commands/configurations.command/configuration. When such a command is applied to the interface through which the ACP provides access for remotemanagementmanagement, itwould cutcuts the remote management connection through the ACP because, as outlined above, the "down"commandscommand typicallyimpactimpacts the physicallayer toolayer, too, and not only theData-Planedata plane services.</t><t>To<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-4">To provide ACP/ANI resilience against such operator misconfiguration, this document recommendsto separateseparating the "down" state of interfaces into an "admin down"statestate, where the physical layer is kept running and the ACP/ANI can use theinterfaceinterface, and a "physical down" state. Any existing "down" configurations would map to "admin down". In "admin down", any existing L2/L3 services of theData-Planedata plane should see no difference to "physical down" state. To ensure that noData-Planedata plane packets could besent/received,sent or received, packet filtering could be established automatically as describedabovein <xref target="secure-enabling"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Anformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.1"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-5">An example ofnon-ACPANI, butANInot ACP, traffic that should be permitted to pass even in"admin-down""admin down" state is BRSKI enrollment traffic between a BRSKI pledge and a BRSKI proxy.</t><t>As necessary (see discussion below) new<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-6">New configuration options could be introduced as necessary (see discussion below) to issue "physical down". The options should be provided with additional checks to minimize the risk of issuing them in a way that breaks the ACP without automatic restoration.For example, they could be deniedExamples of checks include not allowing the option to be issued from a control connection (NETCONF/SSH) that goes across the interface itself ("do not disconnectyourself"). Or they could be performed only temporary andyourself") or onlybe made permanent withapplying the option after additionallaterreconfirmation.</t><t>In the<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2-7">The followingsub-sectionssubsections discuss important aspectstoof the introduction of "admin down"state are discussed.</t>state.</t> <section anchor="down-security" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Security</name> <t>Interfacestoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-security-2">Security</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.1-1">Interfaces are physically brought down (or left in defaultdown"down" state) as a form of security."AdminThe "admin down" state as described above also provides also a high level of security because it only permits ACP/ANIoperationsoperations, which are both well secured. Ultimately, it is subject to the deployment's security reviewfor the deploymentwhether "admin down" is a feasible replacement for "physical down".</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.1-2">The need to trust the security of ACP/ANI operations needs to be weighed against the operational benefits of permittingthis: Considerthe following: consider the typical example of a CPE (customer premises equipment) with no on-site network expert. User ports are inphysical down"physical down" state unless explicitly configured not to be. In a misconfiguration situation, the uplink connection is incorrectly plugged into suchasa user port. The device is disconnected from thenetworknetwork, and thereforenodiagnostics from the network sideis possible anymore.are no longer possible. Alternatively, all ports default to "admin down". The ACP (but not theData-Plane)data plane) would still automatically form. Diagnostics from the network sideis possibleare possible, and operator reaction could includetoeither to make this port the operational uplink port or to instruct re-cabling. Security wise, only the ACP/ANI could be attacked, all other functions are filtered on interfaces in "admin down" state.</t> </section> <section anchor="down-fast-state-propagation" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Fast state propagationtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-fast-state-propagation-and-">Fast State Propagation and Diagnostics</name><t>"Physical<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.2-1">The "physical down" state propagates on many interface types (e.g., Ethernet) to the other side. This can trigger fast L2/L3 protocol reaction on the othersideside, and "admin down" would not have the same (fast) result.</t><t>Bringing<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.2-2">Bringing interfaces to "physical down" stateisis, to the best of ourknowledgeknowledge, always a result of operatoraction, butaction and, today, never the result of autonomic L2/L3 services running on the nodes. Therefore, one option is tochangeend theoperator action to not relyoperator's reliance onlink-stateinterface state propagationanymore.via the subnet link or physical layer. This may not be possible when both sides are under the control of differentoperator control,operators, but in thatcasecase, it is unlikely that the ACP is running across thelinklink, and actually putting the interface into "physical down" state may still be a good option.</t><t>Ideally,<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.2-3">Ideally, fast physical state propagation is replaced by fastsoftware drivensoftware-driven state propagation. For example, a DULL GRASP "admin-state" objective could be used toauto configureautoconfigure aBidirectionalBFD session ("<xref target="RFC5880" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Bidirectional ForwardingProtocol (BFD,Detection (BFD)"/>" <xref target="RFC5880"format="default"/>) sessionformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5880"/>) between the two sides of the link that would be used to propagate the "up" vs.admin down"admin down" state.</t><t>Triggering physical down<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.2-4">Triggering "physical down" state may also be used as ameanmeans of diagnosing cabling issues in the absence of easier methods. It is more complex than automated neighbor diagnostics because it requires coordinated remote access toboth(likely) both sides of a link to determine whether up/down toggling will cause the same reaction on the remote side.</t><t>See<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.2-5">See <xref target="diagnostics"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.1"/> for a discussion about how LLDP and/or diagnostics via GRASP could be used to provide neighbordiagnostics,diagnostics and therefore hopefullyeliminatingeliminate the need for "physical down" for neighbor diagnostics--- as long as both neighbors support ACP/ANI.</t> </section> <section anchor="low-level-link" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Low Leveltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.2.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-low-level-link-diagnostics">Low-Level Link Diagnostics</name><t>"Physical<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.3-1">The "physical down" state isperformedused to diagnose low-level interface behavior whenhigher layerhigher-layer services (e.g., IPv6) are not working.EspeciallyEthernet links are especially subject to a wide variety of possiblewrong configuration/cablingsincorrect configurations/cablings if they do not support automatic selection of variable parameters such as speed (10/100/1000 Mbps), crossover(Auto-MDIX)(automatic medium-dependent interface crossover (MDI-X)), and connector (fiber, copper--- when interfaces have multiple but can only enable one at a time). The need forlow levellow-level linkdiagnosticdiagnostics can therefore be minimized by using fullyauto configuringautoconfiguring links.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.3-2">In addition to"Physical down", low levelthe "physical down" state, low-level diagnostics of Ethernet or other interfaces also involve the creation of other states on interfaces, such as physicalLoopbackloopback (internal and/or external) or the bringing down of all packet transmissions forreflection/cable-lengthreflection and/or cable-length measurements. Any of these options would disrupt ACP as well.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.3-3">In cases where such low-level diagnostics of an operational linkisare desired but where the link could be a single point of failure for the ACP, the ASA on both nodes of the link could perform a negotiated diagnostic that automatically terminates in a predetermined manner without dependence on externalinputinput, ensuring the link will become operational again.</t> </section> <section anchor="power-consumption" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Powertoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.2.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-power-consumption-issues">Power Consumption Issues</name><t>Power<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.2.4-1">Power consumption of "physical down"interfaces,interfaces may be significantly lower than those in "admin down" state, forexampleexample, on long-range fiber interfaces. Bringing up interfaces, forexampleexample, to probereachability,reachability may also consume additional power. This can make thesetypetypes of interfaces inappropriate to operate purely for the ACP when they are not currently needed for theData-Plane.</t>data plane.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="if-enable" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Interface level ACP/ANI enable</name> <t>The interface leveltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-enabling-interface-level-ac">Enabling Interface-Level ACP and ANI</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.3-1">The interface-level configuration option "ACP enable" enables ACP operations on an interface, starting with ACP neighbor discovery via DULLGRAP.GRASP. Theinterface levelinterface-level configuration option "ANI enable" on nodes supporting BRSKI and ACP starts with BRSKI pledge operations when there is no domain certificate on the node. On ACP/BRSKI nodes,"ACPonly "ANI enable" maynotneed to besupported, but only "ANIsupported and not "ACP enable". Unless overridden by global configuration options (seelater), "ACP/ANI<xref target="if-enable-auto" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.4"/>), either "ACP enable" or "ANI enable" (both abbreviated as "ACP/ANI enable") will result in the "down" state on an interfaceto behavebehaving as "admin down".</t> </section> <section anchor="if-enable-auto" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Which interfaces to auto-enable?</name> <t>(<xreftoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-which-interfaces-to-auto-en">Which Interfaces to Auto-Enable?</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-1"><xref target="discovery-grasp"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/> requires that "ACP enable" is automatically set on native interfaces, but not on non-native interfaces (reminder: a native interface is one that exists without operator configurationactionaction, such as physical interfaces in physical devices).</t><t>Ideally, ACP enable<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-2">Ideally, "ACP enable" is set automatically on all interfaces that provide access to additionalconnectivity thatconnectivity, which allowsto reachmore nodes of the ACPdomain.domain to be reached. The best set of interfaces necessary to achieve this is not possible to determine automatically. Native interfaces are the best automatic approximation.</t><t>Consider<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-3">Consider an ACP domain of ACP nodes transitively connected via native interfaces. AData-Planedata plane tunnel between two of these nodes that arenon-adjacentnonadjacent iscreatedcreated, and "ACP enable" is set for that tunnel. ACP RPL sees this tunnel as just as a single hop. Routes in the ACP would use this hop as an attractive path element to connect regions adjacent to the tunnel nodes.InAs a result, the actual hop-by-hop paths used by traffic in the ACP can become worse. In addition, correct forwarding in the ACP now depends on correctData-Planedata plane forwardingconfigconfiguration including QoS,filteringfiltering, and other security on theData-Planedata plane path across which this tunnel runs. This is the mainissuereason why "ACP/ANI enable" should not be set automatically on non-native interfaces.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-4">If the tunnel would connect two previously disjoint ACP regions, then it likely would be useful for the ACP. AData-Planedata plane tunnel could also run across nodes without ACP and provide additional connectivity for an already connected ACP network. The benefit of this additional ACP redundancy has to be weighed against the problems of relying on theData-Plane.data plane. If a tunnel connects two separate ACPregions:regions, how many tunnels should be created to connect these ACP regions reliably enough? Between which nodes? These are all standard tunneled network design questions not specific to the ACP, and there are nogenericgeneric, fully automated answers.</t><t>Instead<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-5">Instead of automatically setting "ACP enable" on thesetypetypes of interfaces, the decision needs to be based on the use purpose of the non-nativeinterfaceinterface, and "ACP enable" needs to be set in conjunction with the mechanism through which the non-native interface iscreated/configured.</t> <t>Increated and/or configured.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-6">In addition to the explicit setting of "ACP/ANI enable", non-native interfaces also need to support configuration of the ACP RPL cost of the link-to avoid the problems of attracting too much traffic to the link as described above.</t><t>Even<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-7">Even native interfaces may not be able to automatically perform BRSKI or ACP because they may require additional operator input to become operational.ExampleExamples include DSL interfaces requiringPPPoEPoint-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) credentials or mobile interfaces requiring credentials from a SIM card. Whatever mechanism is used to provide the necessaryconfigconfiguration to the device to enable the interface can also be expanded to decideonwhether or not to set "ACP/ANI enable".</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.4-8">The goal of automatically setting "ACP/ANI enable" on interfaces (native or not) is to eliminate unnecessary "touches" to the node to make its operation as much as possible "zero-touch" with respect to ACP/ANI. If there are "unavoidable touches" such acreating/configuringcreating and/or configuring a non-native interface or provisioning credentials for a native interface, then "ACP/ANI enable" should be added as an option to that "touch". Ifa wrongan erroneous "touch" is easily fixed(not creating(does not create another high-cost touch), then the default should be not to enable ANI/ACP, and if it is potentially expensive or slow to fix (e.g., parameters on SIM card shipped to remote location), then the default should be to enable ACP/ANI.</t> </section> <section anchor="node-enable" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Node Level ACP/ANI enable</name> <t>A node leveltoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-enabling-node-level-acp-and">Enabling Node-Level ACP and ANI</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5-1">A node-level command "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" enables ACP or ANI on the node (ANI = ACP + BRSKI). Without this command set, anyinterface levelinterface-level "ACP/ANI enable" is ignored. Once set, ACP/ANI will operate an interface where "ACP/ANI enable" is set. Setting ofinterface levelinterface-level "ACP/ANI enable" is either automatic (default) or explicit through operator action as described inthe previous section.</t> <t>If<xref target="if-enable-auto" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.4"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5-2">If the option "up-if-only" is selected, the behavior of "down" interfaces is unchanged, and ACP/ANI will only operate on interfaces where "ACP/ANI enable" is set and that are "up". When it is not set, then "down" state of interfaces with "ACP/ANI enable" is modified to behave as "admin down".</t> <section anchor="brownfield" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Brownfield nodes</name> <t>Atoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.5.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-brownfield-nodes">Brownfield Nodes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.1-1">A "brownfield" node is one that already has a configuredData-Plane.</t> <t>Executingdata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.1-2">Executing global "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" on each node is the only command necessary to create an ACP across a network of brownfield nodes once all the nodes have a domain certificate. When BRSKI is used ("ANI enable"), provisioning of the certificates only requiresset-upthe setup of a single BRSKI registrarnodenode, which could also implement a CA for the network. This is the simplest way to introduce ACP/ANI into existing(==(i.e., brownfield) networks.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.1-3">The need to explicitly enable ACP/ANI is especially important in brownfield nodes because otherwise software updates may introduce support forACP/ANI: Automatic enablementACP/ANI. The automatic enabling of ACP/ANI in networks where the operator does notonly notwant ACP/ANIbut where the operatoror has likely never even heard of it could be quite irritating to theoperator. Especiallyoperator, especially when "down" behavior is changed to "admin down".</t><t>Automatically<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.1-4">Automatically setting "ANI enable" on brownfield nodes where the operator is unaware of BRSKI and MASA operations could also be anunlikelyunlikely, butthen criticalcritical, security issue. If an attacker could impersonate the operatorand registerby registering as the operator at the MASA or otherwisegetgetting hold of vouchers andcancould get enough physical access to the network so pledges would register to an attacking registrar, then the attacker could gain access to theACP, andACP and, through theACPACP, gain access to theData-Plane.</t> <t>Indata plane.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.1-5">In networks where the operator explicitlywants to enableenables theANIANI, this could nothappen,happen because the operator would create a BRSKI registrar that would discover attack attempts, and the operator wouldbe settingset up his registrar with the MASA. Nodes requiring "ownership vouchers" would not be subject to that attack. See <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" format="default"/>target="RFC8995" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8995"/> for more details. Note that a global "ACP enable" alone is not subject to thesetypetypes ofattacks,attacks becauseitthey alwaysdependsdepend on some other mechanism first to provision domain certificates into the device.</t> </section> <section anchor="greenfield" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Greenfield nodes</name> <t>Antoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.5.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-greenfield-nodes">Greenfield Nodes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-1">An ACP "greenfield" node is one that does not have any prior configuration and that can be bootstrapped into the ACP across the network. To support greenfield nodes, ACP as described in this document needs to be combined with a bootstrapprotocol/mechanismprotocol and/or mechanism that will enroll the node with the ACP keyingmaterial -material: the ACP certificate and the TA. For ANI nodes, this protocol/mechanism is BRSKI.</t><t>When<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-2">When such a node is powered on and determines that it is in greenfield condition, it enables the bootstrapprotocol(s)/mechanism(s), and onceprotocol(s) and/or mechanism(s). Once the ACP keying material is enrolled, the greenfield state ends and the ACP is started. When BRSKI is used, the node's state reflects this by setting "ANI enable" upon determination of greenfield stateat powerwhen it is powered on.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-3">ACP greenfield nodesthatthat, in the absence ofACPACP, would have their interfaces in "down" stateSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set all native interfaces into "admin down" state and only permitData-Planedata plane traffic required for the bootstrapprotocol/mechanisms.</t> <t>ACPprotocol and/or mechanisms.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-4">The ACP greenfield state ends either through the successfulenrolmentenrollment of ACP keying material(certificate,(certificate and TA) or the detection of a permitted termination of ACP greenfield operations.</t><t>ACP<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-5">ACP nodes supporting greenfield operationsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> want to provide backward compatibility with other forms ofconfiguration/provisioning,configuration and/or provisioning, especially when only a subset of nodes are expected to be deployed with ACP. Such an ACP nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> observe attempts toprovision/configureprovision or configure the node viainterfaces/methods thatinterfaces and/or methods that traditionally indicate physical possession of the node, such as a serial or USB console port or a USB memory stick with a bootstrap configuration. When such an operation is observed before enrollment of the ACP keying material has completed, the nodeSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> put itself into the state the node would have beenin,in if ACP/ANI was disabled atboot (terminateboot. This terminates ACP greenfieldoperations).</t> <t>Whenoperations.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-6">When an ACP greenfield node enablesmultiplemultiple, automated ACP or non-ACPenrollment/bootstrap protocols/mechanismsenrollment and/or bootstrap protocols or mechanisms in parallel, care must be taken not to terminate any protocol/mechanism beforeanother one hasthe others either have succeededto enrollin enrolling ACP keying material orhashave progressed to a pointwhere it isof permittedto be aterminationreasonfor ACP greenfield operations.</t><t>Highly<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-7">Highly secure ACP greenfield nodes may not permit any reason to terminate ACP greenfield operations, including physical access.</t><t>Nodes<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-8">Nodes that claim to support ANI greenfield operationsSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> enable in parallel to BRSKI any enrollment/bootstrap protocol/mechanism that allows Trust On First Use (TOFU, "<xref target="RFC7435" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time"/>" <xref target="RFC7435"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7435"/>) over interfaces other than those traditionally indicating physical possession of the node. Protocols/mechanisms with published default username/password authentication are considered to suffer from TOFU. Securing the bootstrap protocol/mechanism by requiring a voucher(<xref<xref target="RFC8366"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8366"/> can be used to avoid TOFU.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.5.2-9">In summary, the goal of ACP greenfield support is to allowremoteremote, automated enrollment of ACP keying materials, and therefore automated bootstrap into the ACP and to prohibit TOFU during bootstrap with the likely exception (for backward compatibility) of bootstrapping via interfaces traditionally indicating physical possession of the node.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="disabling" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Undoing ANI/ACP enable</name> <t>Disablingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-undoing-ani-acp-enable">Undoing "ANI/ACP enable"</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.6-1">Disabling ANI/ACP by undoing "ACP/ANI enable" is a risk for the reliable operations of the ACP if it can be executed by mistake orunauthorized.without authorization. This behavior could be influenced through some additional (future) property in the certificate (e.g., in the acp-node-name extension field):Inin an ANI deployment intended for convenience, disabling it could be allowed without further constraints. In an ANI deployment considered to becriticalcritical, more checks would be required. One very controlled option would be to not permit these commands unless the domain certificate has been revoked or is denied renewal. Configuring this option would be a parameter on the BRSKI registrar(s). As long as the node did not receive a domain certificate, undoing "ANI/ACP enable" should not have any additional constraints.</t> </section> <section anchor="enable-summary" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Summary</name> <t>Node-widetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.3.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-summary-2">Summary</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.7-1">Node-wide "ACP/ANI enable [up-if-only]" commands enable the operation of ACP/ANI. This is only auto-enabled on ANI greenfield devices, otherwise it must be configured explicitly.</t><t>If<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.7-2">If the option "up-if-only" is not selected, interfaces enabled for ACP/ANI interpret the "down" state as "admin down" and not "physical down". In the "admin-down" state, all non-ACP/ANI packets are filtered, but the physical layer is kept running to permit ACP/ANI to operate.</t><t>(New)<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.7-3">(New) commands that result in physical interruption ("physical down", "loopback") ofACP/ANI enabledACP/ANI-enabled interfaces should be built to protect continuance or reestablishment of ACP as much as possible.</t><t>Interface level<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.7-4">Interface-level "ACP/ANI enable" commands control per-interface operations. It is enabled by default on native interfaces and has to be configured explicitly on other interfaces.</t><t>Disabling<t indent="0" pn="section-9.3.7-5">Disabling "ACP/ANI enable"globalglobally andper-interfaceper interface should have additional checks to minimize undesired breakage of ACP. The degree of control could be adomain widedomain-wide parameter in the domain certificates.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="incremental-adoption" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Partialtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-partial-or-incremental-adop">Partial or Incrementaladoption</name> <t>The ACPAdoption</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-1">The Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (see <xref target="zone-scheme"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>) allows incremental adoption of the ACP in a network where ACP can be deployed on edge areas, but not across the core that is connecting those edges.</t><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-2">In such a setup, each edge network, such as a branch or campus of an enterprisenetworknetwork, has adisjoineddisjoint ACP to which one or more unique Zone-IDs are assigned: ACP nodes registered for a specific ACP zone have to receiveACPZone AddressingSub-schemeSub-Scheme addresses, forexampleexample, by virtue of configuring for each such zone one or more ACPRegistrarsregistrars with that Zone-ID. All theRegistrarsregistrars for these ACPZoneszones need to get ACP certificates from CAs relying on a common set ofTATAs and of course the same ACP domain name.</t><t>These<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-3">These ACP zones can first be brought up as separate networks without any connection between them and/or they can be connected across a non-ACP enabled core network through various non-autonomic operational practices. For example, each separate ACPZonezone can have an edge node that is alayer 3L3 VPN PE (MPLS or IPv6layer 3 VPN),L3VPN), where a complete non-autonomic ACP-Core VPN is created by using the ACP VRFs and exchanging the routes from those ACP VRFs across theVPNsVPN's non-autonomic routing protocol(s).</t><t>While<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-4">While such a setup is possible with any ACP addressing sub-scheme, theACP-ZoneZone Addressingsub-schemeSub-Scheme makes it easy to configure and scalable for any VPN routing protocols because every ACP zonewouldonlyneedneeds to indicate one or more /64 ACPZone Addressingzone addressing prefix routes into the ACP-Core VPN as opposed to routes for every individual ACP node as required in the other ACP addressing schemes.</t><t>Note<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-5">Note that the non-autonomous ACP-Core VPNwould requirerequires additional extensions to propagate GRASP messages when GRASP discovery is desired across the zones.</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-6">For example, one could set up on eachZonezone edge router a remote ACP tunnel to a GRASP hub. The GRASP hub could be implemented at the application level and could run in the NOC of the network. It would serve to propagate GRASP announcements between ACPZoneszones and/or generate GRASP announcements for NOC services.</t><t>Such<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-7">Such a partial deployment may prove to be sufficient or could evolve to become more autonomous through future standardized ornon-standardizednonstandard enhancements, forexampleexample, by allowing GRASP messages to be propagated across thelayer 3 VPN,L3VPN, leveraging for example L3VPNMulticastmulticast support.</t><t>Finally,<t indent="0" pn="section-9.4-8">Finally, these partial deployments can be merged into asinglesingle, contiguouscomplete autonomousACP that is completely autonomous (given appropriate ACP support across the core) without changes in thecrypto material,cryptographic material because the node's ACP certificates are from a single ACP.</t> </section> <section anchor="configuration" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Configurationtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-configuration-and-the-acp-s">Configuration and the ACP(summary)</name> <t>There(Summary)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.5-1">There is no desirable configuration for the ACP. Instead, all parameters that need to be configured in support of the ACP are limitations of the solution, but they are only needed in cases where not all components are made autonomic. Wherever this is necessary, it relies onpre-existingpreexisting mechanisms for configuration such as CLI or YANG(<xref target="RFC7950" format="default"/>)datamodels.</t> <t>Themodels ("<xref target="RFC7950" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language"/>" <xref target="RFC7950" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7950"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-9.5-2">The most important examples of such configuration include:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Whenspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-9.5-3"> <li pn="section-9.5-3.1">When ACP nodes do not support an autonomic way to receive an ACP certificate, forexampleexample, BRSKI, then such a certificate needs to be configured via somepre-existingpreexisting mechanisms outside the scope of this specification. Today,router haverouters typically have a variety of mechanisms to do this.</li><li>Certificate<li pn="section-9.5-3.2">Certificate maintenance requires PKI functions. Discovery of these functions across the ACP is automated (see <xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>), but their configuration is not.</li><li>When non-ACP capable<li pn="section-9.5-3.3">When non-ACP-capable nodes such aspre-existingpreexisting NMS need to be physically connected to the ACP, the ACP node to which they attach needs to be configured withACP-connectACP connect according to <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>. It is also possible to use that single physical connection to connect both to the ACP and theData-Planedata plane of the network as explained in <xref target="SingleIF"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Whenformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.4"/>.</li> <li pn="section-9.5-3.4">When devices are not autonomically bootstrapped, explicit configuration to enable the ACP needs to be applied. See <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>.</li> <li>Whenformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/>.</li> <li pn="section-9.5-3.5">When the ACP needs to be extended across interfaces other than L2, the ACP as defined in this document cannotautodiscoverauto-discover candidate neighbors automatically. Remote neighbors need to be configured, see <xref target="remote-acp-neighbors"format="default"/>.</li>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.2"/>.</li> </ul><t>Once<t indent="0" pn="section-9.5-4">Once the ACP is operating, any further configuration for theData-Planedata plane can beconfigureddone more reliably across the ACP itself because the ACP provides addressing and connectivity (routing) independent of theData-Plane itself.data plane. For this, the configuration methods simply need toalsoallowto operateoperating across the ACPVRF -VRF, for example, with NETCONF,SSHSSH, or any other method.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.5-5">The ACP also provides additional security through its hop-by-hop encryption for any such configurationoperations:operations. Some legacy configuration methods(SNMP,(for example, SNMP, TFTP, or HTTP) may not use end-to-end encryption, and most of the end-to-end secured configuration methods still allow foreasyeasy, passive observation along the pathaboutof the configuration taking place(transport(for example, transport flows, port numbers, and/or IP addresses).</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-9.5-6">The ACP can and shouldequallybe used equally as the transport to configure any of the aforementioned non-autonomic components of the ACP, but in that case, the same caution needs to be exercised as withData-Planedata plane configuration withoutACP:the ACP. Misconfiguration may cause the configuring entity to be disconnected from the node itconfigures -configures, forexampleexample, when incorrectly unconfiguring a remote ACP neighbor through which the configured ACP node is reached.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="benefit" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Summary:toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10"> <name slugifiedName="name-summary-benefits-informativ">Summary: Benefits (Informative)</name> <section anchor="self-healing" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Self-Healingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-self-healing-properties">Self-Healing Properties</name><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-1">The ACP is self-healing:</t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Newspacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-10.1-2"> <li pn="section-10.1-2.1">New neighbors will automatically join the ACP after successful validation and will become reachable using their unique ULA address across the ACP.</li><li>When<li pn="section-10.1-2.2">When any changes happen in the topology, the routing protocol used in the ACP will automatically adapt to the changes and will continue to provide reachability to all nodes.</li><li>The<li pn="section-10.1-2.3">The ACP tracks the validity of peer certificates and tears down ACP secure channels when a peer certificate has expired. When short-lived certificates with lifetimesinon the order of OCSP/CRL refresh times are used, then this allows for removal of invalid peers (whose certificate was not renewed) at similar speeds as when using OCSP/CRL. The same benefit can be achieved when using CRL/OCSP, periodically refreshing the revocation information and also tearing down ACP secure channels when the peer's (long-lived) certificate is revoked. There is no requirementagainstfor ACP implementations to require thisenhancement thoughenhancement, though, in order to keep the mandatory implementations simpler.</li> </ul><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-3">The ACP can also sustain network partitions and mergers. Practically all ACP operations are link local, where a network partition has no impact. Nodes authenticate each other using the domain certificates to establish the ACP locally. Addressing inside the ACP remains unchanged, and the routing protocol inside both parts of the ACP will lead to two working (although partitioned) ACPs.</t><t>There<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-4">There are a few central dependencies:Aa CRL may not be available during a networkpartition;partition. This can be addressed by a suitable policy to not immediately disconnect neighbors when no CRL isavailable can address this issue.available. Also, an ACPRegistrarregistrar orCertification AuthorityCA might not be available during a partition. This may delay renewal of certificates that are to expire in the future, and it may prevent the enrollment of new nodes during the partition.</t><t>Highly<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-5">Highly resilient ACP designs can be built by using ACPRegistrarsregistrars with embeddedsub-CA,sub-CAs, as outlined in <xref target="sub-ca"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2.4"/>. As long as a partition is left with one or more of such ACPRegistrars,registrars, it can continue to enroll new candidate ACP nodes as long as the ACPRegistrar'sregistrar's sub-CA certificate does not expire. Because the ACP addressing relies on unique Registrar-IDs, a laterre-mergemerging of partitions willalsonot cause problems with ACP addresses assigned during partitioning.</t><t>After<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-6">After a network partition,a re-mergemerging will just establish the previousstatus,status: certificates can be renewed, the CRL is available, and new nodes can be enrolled everywhere. Since all nodes use the same TA,a re-mergethe merging will be smooth.</t><t>Merging<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-7">Merging two networks with differentTATAs requires the ACP nodes to trust the union ofTA.TAs. As long as the routing-subdomain hashes are different, the addressing will not overlap.Accidentally, overlapsOverlaps will only happen accidentally in the unlikely event of a 40-bit hash collision inSHA256SHA-256 (see <xref target="addressing"format="default"/>).format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11"/>). Note that the complete mechanisms to merge networks is out of scope of this specification.</t><t>It<t indent="0" pn="section-10.1-8">It is also highly desirable for an implementation of the ACP to be able to run it over interfaces that are administratively down. If this is not feasible, then it might instead be possible to request explicit operator override upon administrative actions that would administratively bring down an interface across which the ACP isrunning. Especiallyrunning, especially if bringing down the ACP is known to disconnect the operator from the node. For example, any suchdownadministrative down action could perform a dependency check to see if the transport connection across which this action is performed is affected by the down action (with default RPL routing used, packet forwarding will be symmetric, so this is actually possible to check).</t> </section><!-- self-healing --><section anchor="self-protecting" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Self-Protectiontoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-self-protection-properties">Self-Protection Properties</name> <section anchor="self-protecting-outside" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>From the outside</name> <t>Astoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10.2.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-from-the-outside">From the Outside</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-1">As explained in <xref target="self-creation"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/>, the ACP is based on secure channels built between nodes that have mutually authenticated each other with their domain certificates. The channels themselves are protected using standard encryption technologies such as DTLS orIPsecIPsec, which provide additional authentication during channel establishment, dataintegrityintegrity, and data confidentiality protectionof datainside theACPACP, andin addition,also provide replay protection.</t><t>Attacker<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-2">An attacker will not be able to join the ACP unlessthey haveit has a valid ACP certificate.On-path attackersAn on-path attacker without a valid ACP certificate cannot inject packets into the ACP due to ACP secure channels.They canAn attacker alsonotcannot decrypt ACP trafficexcept if theyunless it can crack the encryption.TheyIt can attempt behavioral traffic analysis on the encrypted ACP traffic.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-3">The degree to which compromised ACP nodes can impact the ACP depends on the implementation of the ACP nodes and their impairment. When an attacker has only gained administrative privileges to configure ACP nodes remotely, the attacker can disrupt the ACP only through one of the few configuration options to disableit, seeit (see <xref target="enabling-acp"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3"/>) or by the configuring of non-autonomic ACP options if those are supported on the impaired ACPnodes, seenodes (see <xref target="workarounds"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8"/>). Injecting traffic into or extracting trafficinto/fromfrom an impaired ACP node is only possible when an impaired ACP node supports ACP connect (see <xref target="ACPconnect"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1"/>), and the attacker can control traffic into/from one of the ACPnodesnode's interfaces, such as by having physical access to the ACP node.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-4">The ACP also serves as protection (through authentication and encryption) for protocols relevant to OAM that may not have secured protocol stack options or where implementation or deployment of those options failondue to somevendor/product/customervendor, product, or customer limitations. This includes protocols such as SNMP(<xref("<xref target="RFC3411" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"/>" <xref target="RFC3411"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3411"/>), NTP(<xref<xref target="RFC5905"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5905"/>, PTP(<xref(Precision Time Protocol <xref target="IEEE-1588-2008"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IEEE-1588-2008"/>), DNS(<xref("<xref target="RFC3596"format="default"/>),format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6"/>" <xref target="RFC3596" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3596"/>), DHCPv6(<xref("<xref target="RFC3315"format="default"/>),format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)"/>" <xref target="RFC3315" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3315"/>), syslog(<xref("<xref target="RFC3164"format="default"/>),format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="The BSD Syslog Protocol"/>" <xref target="RFC3164" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3164"/>), RADIUS(<xref("<xref target="RFC2865" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"/>" <xref target="RFC2865"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2865"/>), Diameter(<xref("<xref target="RFC6733" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Diameter Base Protocol"/>" <xref target="RFC6733"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6733"/>), TACACS(<xref("<xref target="RFC1492" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called TACACS"/>" <xref target="RFC1492"format="default"/>),format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC1492"/>), IPFIX(<xref("<xref target="RFC7011"format="default"/>), Netflow (<xrefformat="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information"/>" <xref target="RFC7011" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7011"/>), NetFlow ("<xref target="RFC3954"format="default"/>) -format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Cisco Systems NetFlow Services Export Version 9"/>" <xref target="RFC3954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3954"/>) -- just to name a few. Not all of these protocol references are necessarily the latest version ofprotocolsprotocols, but they are versions that are still widely deployed.</t><t>Protection<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-5">Protection via the ACP secure hop-by-hop channels for these protocols is meant to be only astopgapstopgap, though:Thethe ultimate goal is for these and other protocols to use end-to-end encryption utilizing the domain certificate and to rely on the ACP secure channels primarily for zero-touch reliable connectivity, but not primarily for security.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.1-6">The remaining attack vector would be to attack the underlying ACP protocols themselves, either via directed attacks or by denial-of-service attacks. However, as the ACP is built using link-local IPv6 addresses, remote attacks from theData-Planedata plane are impossible as long as theData-Planedata plane has no facilities to remotely send IPv6 link-local packets. The only exceptions areACP connected interfacesACP-connected interfaces, which requirehighergreater physical protection. The ULA addresses are only reachable inside the ACPcontext, therefore,context and therefore unreachable from theData-Plane.data plane. Also, the ACP protocols should be implemented to be attack resistant and to not consume unnecessary resources even while under attack.</t> </section> <section anchor="self-protecting-inside" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>From the inside</name> <t>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10.2.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-from-the-inside">From the Inside</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.2-1">The security model of the ACP is based on trusting all members of the group of nodes that receive an ACP certificate for the same domain. Attacks from the inside by a compromised group member are therefore the biggest challenge.</t><t>Group<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.2-2">Group members must be protected against attackers so that there is no easy way to compromisethem,them or use them as a proxy for attacking other devices across the ACP. For example, management plane functions (transport ports) shouldonlybe reachable only from the ACPbutand not from theData-Plane. Especially fordata plane. This applies especially to those management plane functions thathave no good protection by themselves because they do not havelack secure end-to-end transport and towhomwhich the ACPnot onlyprovidesautomaticboth automatic, reliable connectivitybut alsoand protection against attacks. Protection across all potential attack vectors is typically easier to do in devices whose software is designed from theground upbeginning with the ACP in mind thanwith legacy software basedin legacy, software-based systems where the ACP is added on as another feature.</t><t>As<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.2-3">As explained above, traffic across the ACP should still be end-to-end encrypted whenever possible. This includes traffic such as GRASP,ESTEST, and BRSKI inside the ACP. This minimizesman in the middleman-in-the-middle attacks by compromised ACP group members. Such attackers cannot eavesdrop or modify communications, but they can just filter them (which is unavoidable by any means).</t><t>See<t indent="0" pn="section-10.2.2-4">See <xref target="compromised"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.8"/> for further considerationshow to avoidon avoiding anddealdealing with compromised nodes.</t> </section> </section><!-- self-protecting --><section anchor="admin-view" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Thetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-the-administrator-view">The Administrator View</name><t>An<t indent="0" pn="section-10.3-1">An ACP is self-forming,self-managingself-managing, andself-protecting, thereforeself-protecting; therefore, it has minimal dependencies on the administrator of the network. Specifically, since it is (intended to be) independent of configuration, there is only limited scope for configuration errors on the ACP itself. The administrator may have the option to enable or disable the entire approach, but detailed configuration is not possible. This means that the ACP must not be reflected in the running configuration of nodes, except for a possible on/off switch (and even that is undesirable).</t><t>While<t indent="0" pn="section-10.3-2">While configuration (except for <xref target="workarounds"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8"/> and <xref target="registrar-considerations"format="default"/>)format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2"/>) is not possible, an administrator must have full visibilityofinto the ACP and all itsparameters,parameters to be able todo trouble-shooting.troubleshoot. Therefore, an ACP must support all show and debug options, asforwith any other network function. Specifically,a network management systeman NMS or controller must be able to discover theACP,ACP and monitor its health. This visibilityofinto ACP operations must clearly be separated from the visibility ofData-Planethe data plane so automated systems will never have to deal with ACP aspects unless they explicitly desire to do so.</t><t>Since<t indent="0" pn="section-10.3-3">Since an ACP is self-protecting, a node that does notsupportingsupport theACP,ACP orwithout a valid domainthat does not have a valid domain certificate cannot connect to it. This means that by default a traditional controller ornetwork management systemNMS cannot connect to an ACP. See <xref target="NMS"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8.1.1"/> formoredetails on how to connect an NMS hostintoto the ACP.</t> </section><!-- admin-view --></section><!-- benefits --><section anchor="security" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Securitytoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-11"> <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name><t>A<t indent="0" pn="section-11-1">A set of ACP nodes with ACP certificates for the same ACP domain and with ACP functionality enabled is automatically "self-building":Thethe ACP is automatically established between neighboring ACP nodes. It is also"self-protecting": Theself-protecting: the ACP secure channels are authenticated and encrypted. No configuration is required for this.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-11-2">The self-protecting property does not include workarounds for non-autonomic components as explained in <xref target="workarounds"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 8"/>. See <xref target="self-protecting"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 10.2"/> for details of how the ACP protects itself against attacks from the outsideandand, to a more limiteddegreedegree, from the inside as well.</t><t>However,<t indent="0" pn="section-11-3">However, the security of the ACP depends on a number of other factors: </t> <ulspacing="compact"> <li>Thespacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-11-4"> <li pn="section-11-4.1">The usage of domain certificates depends on a valid supporting PKI infrastructure. If the chain of trust of this PKI infrastructure is compromised, the security of the ACP is also compromised. This is typically under the control of the network administrator.</li><li>ACP<li pn="section-11-4.2">ACP nodes receive their certificates from ACP registrars. These ACP registrars aresecurity criticalsecurity-critical dependencies of theACP:ACP. Procedures and protocols for ACP registrars are outside the scope of this specification as explained in <xref target="registrars-protocols"format="default"/>,format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7.1"/>; only the requirementsagainstfor the resulting ACP certificates are specified.</li><li>Every<li pn="section-11-4.3">Every ACP registrar (for enrollment of ACP certificates) and ACP EST server (for renewal of ACP certificates) is asecurity criticalsecurity-critical entity and its protocols aresecurity criticalsecurity-critical protocols. Both need to be hardened against attacks, similar to a CA and its protocols. A malicious registrar can enroll malicious nodes to an ACP network (if the CA delegates this policy to the registrar) or break ACProutingrouting, forexampleexample, by assigning duplicate ACPaddress assignmentaddresses to ACP nodes via their ACP certificates.</li><li>ACP<li pn="section-11-4.4">ACP nodes that are ANI nodes rely on BRSKI as the protocol for ACP registrars. ForANI typeANI-type ACP nodes, the security considerations of BRSKI apply. It enables automated, secure enrollment of ACP certificates.</li><li>BRSKI<li pn="section-11-4.5">BRSKI and potentially other ACP registrar protocol options require that nodes have an(X.509v3(X.509 v3 based) IDevID. IDevIDs are an option for ACP registrars to securely identify candidate ACP nodes that should be enrolled into an ACP domain.</li><li>For<li pn="section-11-4.6">For IDevIDs to securely identify the node to whichitits IDevID is assigned, the node needsto(1) to utilize hardware support such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to protect againstextraction/cloningextraction and/or cloning of the private key of the IDevID and (2) a hardware/software infrastructure to prohibit execution ofnon-authenticatedunauthenticated software to protect against malicious use of the IDevID.</li><li>Like<li pn="section-11-4.7">Like the IDevID, the ACP certificate should equally be protected from extraction or other abuse by the same ACP node infrastructure. This infrastructure for IDevID and ACP certificate is beneficial independent of the ACP registrar protocol used (BRSKI or other).</li><li>Renewal<li pn="section-11-4.8">Renewal of ACP certificates requires support forEST, thereforeEST; therefore, the security considerations of <xref target="RFC7030"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7030"/> related to certificaterenewal/rekeyingrenewal and/or rekeying and TP renewal apply to the ACP. EST security considerations when using other than mutual certificate authentication do notapplyapply, nor do considerations for initial enrollment via EST apply, except forANI typeANI-type ACP nodes because BRSKI leverages EST.</li><li>A<li pn="section-11-4.9">A malicious ACP node could declare itself to be an EST server via GRASP across the ACP if malicious software could be executed on it. The CA should therefore authenticate only known trustworthy EST servers, such as nodes with hardware protections against malicious software. WhenRegistrarsregistrars use their ACP certificate to authenticate towards a CA, the id-kp-cmcRA <xref target="RFC6402"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6402"/> extended key usage attribute allows the CA to determine that the ACP node was permitted during enrollment to act as an ACP registrar. Without the ability to talk to the CA, a malicious EST server can still attract ACP nodes attempting to renew their keying material, but they will fail to perform successful renewal of a valid ACP certificate. The ACP node attempting to use the malicious EST server can then continue to use a different ESTserver,server and log a failure against a malicious EST server.</li><li>Malicious<li pn="section-11-4.10">Malicious on-path ACP nodes may filter valid EST server announcements across the ACP, but such malicious ACP nodes could equally filter any ACP traffic such as the EST traffic itself. Either attack requires the ability to execute malicious software on an impaired ACPnodenode, though.</li><li>In<li pn="section-11-4.11">In the absence of malicious software injection, an attacker that can misconfigure an ACP nodewhich is supportingthat supports EST server functionality could attempt to configure a malicious CA. This would not result in the ability to successfully renew ACP certificates, but it could result in DoS attacks by becoming an EST server and by making ACP nodesattemptingattempt their ACP certificate renewal via this impaired ACP node. This problem can be avoided when the EST server implementation can verify that theCAconfigured CA is indeed providing renewal for certificates of the node's ACP. The ability to do so depends on theEST-Server to CA protocol,protocol between the EST server and the CA, which is outside the scope of this document.</li> </ul><t>In<t indent="0" pn="section-11-5">In summary, attacks against the PKI/certificate dependencies of the ACP can be minimized by a variety ofhardware/software componentshardware and/or software components, including options such as TPM forIDevID/ACP-certificate,IDevID and/or ACP certificate, prohibitions against the execution ofnon-trusted softwareuntrusted software, and design aspects of the ESTServerserver functionality for the ACPtothat eliminateconfiguration levelconfiguration-level impairment.</t><t>Because<t indent="0" pn="section-11-6">Because ACP peers select one out of potentially more than one mutually supported ACP secure channel protocols via the approach described in <xreftarget="channel-selection"/>,target="channel-selection" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/>, ACP secure channel setup is subject to downgrade attacks by MITM attackers. This can be discovered after such an attack by additional mechanisms described in <xreftarget="downgrade"/>.target="downgrade" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.9"/>. Alternatively, more advanced channel selection mechanisms can bedevised. [RFC-Editor: Please remove the following sentence]. See <xref target="ACPDRAFT"/> Appendix B.1. Both options are out of scope of this document.</t> <t>Thedevised.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-7">The security model of the ACP as defined in this document is tailored for use with private PKI. The TA of a private PKIprovideprovides the security against maliciously created ACP certificatestothat give access to an ACP. Such attacks can create fake ACP certificates withcorrect lookingcorrect-looking AcpNodeNames, but those certificates would not pass the certificate path validation of the ACP domain membership check (see <xreftarget="certcheck"/>,target="certcheck" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>, point 2).</t><t>[RFC-Editor: please remove the following paragraph].</t> <t>Using public CA is out of scope of this document. See <xref target="ACPDRAFT"/>, Appendix B.3 for further considerations.</t> <t>There<t indent="0" pn="section-11-8">There is no prevention of source-address spoofing inside the ACP. This implies that if an attacker gains access to the ACP, it can spoof all addresses inside the ACP and fake messages from any other node. Newprotocol/services runprotocols and/or services running across the ACP should therefore use end-to-end authentication inside the ACP. This is already done by GRASP as specified in this document.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-11-9">The ACP is designed to enable automation of current network management and the management of future autonomic peer-to-peer/distributednetwork automation.networks. Any ACP member can send ACP IPv6packetpackets to other ACP members and announce via ACP GRASP services to all ACP members withoutdependency againstdepending on centralized components.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-11-10">The ACP relies on peer-to-peer authentication and authorization using ACP certificates. This security model is necessary to enable the autonomicad-hocad hoc, any-to-any connectivity between ACP nodes. It provides infrastructure protection throughhop by hophop-by-hop authentication and encryption--- without relying on third parties. For any services where this complete autonomic peer-to-peer group security model is appropriate, the ACP certificate can also be usedunchanged. Forunchanged, for example, for any type ofData-Planedata plane routing protocol security.</t><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-11-11">This ACP security model is designed primarily to protect against attack from the outside,butnot against attacks from the inside. To protect against spoofing attacks from compromised on-path ACP nodes, end-to-end encryption inside the ACP is used by new ACP signaling: GRASP across the ACP using TLS. The same is expected from any non-legacyservices/protocolsservices or protocols using the ACP. Because nogroup-keysgroup keys are used, there is no riskforof impacted nodesto accessaccessing end-to-end encrypted traffic from other ACP nodes.</t><t>Attacks<t indent="0" pn="section-11-12">Attacks from impacted ACP nodes against the ACP are more difficult than against theData-Planedata plane because of the autoconfiguration of the ACP and the absence of configuration options that could be abusedthat allowtochange/breakchange or break ACP behavior. This is excluding configuration for workaround in support of non-autonomic components.</t><t>Mitigation<t indent="0" pn="section-11-13">Mitigation against compromised ACP members is possible through standard automated certificate management mechanisms including revocation andnon-renewalnonrenewal of short-lived certificates. In thisversion of thespecification, there are no furtheroptimizationoptimizations of these mechanisms defined for the ACP (but see <xref target="compromised"format="default"/>).</t> <t>Higher layerformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.8"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-14">Higher-layer service built using ACP certificates should not solely rely on undifferentiated group security when another model is moreappropriate/moreappropriate or more secure. For example, central network configuration relies on a security model where only a few especially trusted nodes are allowed to configure theData-Planedata plane of network nodes (CLI, NETCONF). This can be done through ACP certificates by differentiating them andintroduceintroducing roles. See <xref target="role-assignments"format="default"/>.</t> <!-- <t>Fundamentally, security depends on avoiding operator and network operations automation mistakes, implementation and architecture. Autonomic approaches such as the ACP largely eliminate operator mistakes and make it easier to recover from network operations mistakes. Implementation and architectural mistakes are still possible, as in all networking technologies.</t> --> <t>Operatorsformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.9.5"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-15">Operators and developers of provisioning softwaredevelopersneed to be aware of how theprovisioning/configurationprovisioning and configuration of network devices impacts the ability of the operator/and/or provisioning software to remotely access the network nodes. By using the ACP, most of the issues ofconfiguration/provisioning causedprovisioning/configuration causing connectivity loss ofconnectivity forremoteprovisioning/configurationprovisioning and configuration will be eliminated, see <xref target="self-creation"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/>. Only a fewexceptionsexceptions, such as explicit physical interface downconfigurationconfiguration, will beleftleft. See <xref target="admin-down"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Manyformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.3.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-16">Many details of ACP are designed with security in mind and discussed elsewhere in thedocument:</t> <t>IPv6document.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-17">IPv6 addresses used by nodes in the ACP are covered as part of the node's domain certificate as described in <xref target="domcert-acpinfo"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.2"/>. This allows even verification of ownership of a peer's IPv6 address when using a connection authenticated with the domain certificate.</t><t>The<t indent="0" pn="section-11-18">The ACP acts as a security (and transport) substrate for GRASP inside the ACP such that GRASP is not only protected by attacks from the outside, but also by attacks from compromised inside attackers--- by relying not only on hop-by-hop security of ACP secure channels, but also by adding end-to-end security for those GRASP messages. See <xref target="GRASP-substrate"format="default"/>.</t> <t>ACPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.9.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-19">ACP provides for secure, resilient zero-touch discovery of EST servers for certificate renewal. See <xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>.</t> <t>ACPformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-20">ACP provides extensible,auto-configuringautoconfiguring hop-by-hop protection of the ACP infrastructure via the negotiation of hop-by-hop secure channel protocols. See <xref target="channel-selection"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Theformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.6"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-21">The ACP is designed to minimize attacks from the outside by minimizing its dependencyagainston any non-ACP(Data-Plane) operations/configuration(data plane) operations and/or configuration on a node. See also <xref target="general_addressing"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Informat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-22">In combination with BRSKI, ACP enables a resilient, fully zero-touch network solution for short-lived certificates that can be renewed orre-enrolledreenrolled even after unintentional expiry (e.g.,because ofdue to interrupted connectivity). See <xref target="bootstrap"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Becauseformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.2"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-23">Because ACP secure channels can be long lived, but certificates used may beshort lived,short-lived, secure channels, forexampleexample, built viaIPsecIPsec, need to be terminated when peer certificates expire. See <xref target="Profiles"format="default"/>.</t> <t><xrefformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.8.5"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-11-24"><xref target="acp-l2-switches-how"format="default"/>format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7.2"/> describes how to implement a routed ACP topology operating on what effectively is a largebridge-domainbridge domain when using L3/L2 routers that operate at L2 in theData-Plane.data plane. In this case, the ACP is subject to a much higher likelihood of attacks by other nodes "stealing" L2 addresses than in the actual routedcase. Especiallycase, especially when the bridged network includesnon-trusteduntrusted devices such as hosts. This is a generic issue in L2 LANs. L2/L3 devices often already have some form of "port security" to prohibit this. They rely onNDPNeighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) or DHCP learningofwhich port/MAC-address and IPv6 address belong together andblockblocking MAC/IPv6 source addresses from wrong ports. This type of function needs to be enabled to prohibit DoS attacks and specifically to protect the ACP.LikewiseLikewise, the GRASP DULL instance needs to ensure that the IPv6 address in the locator-option matches the source IPv6 address of the DULL GRASP packet.</t> </section><!-- security --><section anchor="iana" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>IANAtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-12"> <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name><t>This<t indent="0" pn="section-12-1">This document defines the "Autonomic Control Plane".</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-12-2">For the ANIMA-ACP-2020 ASN.1 module, IANAis asked to registerhas assigned valueIANA197 for "id-mod-anima-acpnodename-2020" in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry.</t><t>For<t indent="0" pn="section-12-3">For the otherName / AcpNodeName, IANAis asked to register ahas assigned valuefor IANA210 for id-on-AcpNodeName in the "SMI Security for PKIX Other Name Forms" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8) registry.</t><t> The IANA is requested to register the value "AN_ACP" (without quotes) to<t indent="0" pn="section-12-4">IANA has registered theGRASP Objectives Names Tablenames inthe GRASP Parameter Registry. The specification for this value is this document,<xreftarget="discovery-grasp" format="default"/>.</t> <t> The IANA is requested to register the value "SRV.est" (without quotes) to the GRASP Objectives Names Tabletarget="iana-objnames" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Table 2"/> in theGRASP Parameter Registry. The specification for this value is this document, <xref"GRASP Objective Names" subregistry of the "GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP) Parameters" registry.</t> <table anchor="iana-objnames" align="center" pn="table-2"> <name slugifiedName="name-grasp-objective-names">GRASP Objective Names</name> <thead> <tr> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Objective Name</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">AN_ACP</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 8994 (<xref target="discovery-grasp" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.4"/>)</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">SRV.est</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 8994 (<xref target="domcert-maint"format="default"/>.</t> <t>Explanation: Thisformat="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.5"/>)</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t indent="0" pn="section-12-6">Explanation: this document chooses the initially strange looking format "SRV.<service-name>" because these objective names would be in line with potential future simplification of the GRASP objective registry. Today, every name in the GRASP objective registry needs to be explicitly allocatedwithby IANA. In the future, this type of objective names could be considered to be automatically registered in that registry for the same service for which a<service-nameh><service-name> is registered according to <xref target="RFC6335"format="default"/>.format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6335"/>. This explanation is solely informational and has no impact on the requested registration.</t><t> The IANA is requested to create<t indent="0" pn="section-12-7">IANA has created anACP Parameter Registry with currently one"Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)" registrytable -with the subregistry, "ACP Address Type"table.</t> <t>"ACP(<xref target="iana-acpaddresstype" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Table 3"/>).</t> <table anchor="iana-acpaddresstype" align="center" pn="table-3"> <name slugifiedName="name-initial-values-in-the-acp-a">Initial Values in the "ACP Address Type"Table. The valueSubregistry</name> <thead> <tr> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Value</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th> <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">0</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme/ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 8994 (<xref target="zone-scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.3"/>, <xref target="manual-scheme" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.4"/>)</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">1</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 8994 (<xref target="Vlong" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.5"/>)</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">2-3</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Unassigned</td> <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1"/> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t indent="0" pn="section-12-9">The values inthis tablethe "ACP Address Type" subregistry are numeric values0...30..3 paired with a name (string). Future valuesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be assigned using the Standards Action policy defined by<xref"<xref target="RFC8126"format="default"/>. The following initial values are assigned by this document:</t> <t> 0: ACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC <xref target="zone-scheme" format="default"/>) </t> <t> 1: ACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC <xref target="Vlong" format="default"/>) / ACP Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme (ACP RFC <xref target="manual-scheme" format="default"/>) </t> </section> <!-- iana --> <section anchor="ack" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>This work originated fromformat="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Guidelines for Writing anAutonomic Networking project at Cisco Systems, which startedIANA Considerations Section inearly 2010. Many people contributed to this projectRFCs"/>" <xref target="RFC8126" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8126"/>.</t> </section> </middle> <back> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" to="TLS-DTLS13"/> <displayreference target="I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig" to="NOC-AUTOCONFIG"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template" to="ROLL-APPLICABILITY"/> <references pn="section-13"> <name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name> <references pn="section-13.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name> <reference anchor="IKEV2IANA" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="IKEV2IANA"> <front> <title>Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters</title> <author fullname="IANA"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1034" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC1034"> <front> <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title> <author initials="P.V." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P.V. Mockapetris"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="1987" month="November"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This RFC is theidearevised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes theAutonomic Control Plane, amongst which (in alphabetical order): Ignas Bagdonas, Parag Bhide, Balaji BL, Alex Clemm, Yves Hertoghs, Bruno Klauser, Max Pritikin, Michael Richardson, Ravi Kumar Vadapalli.</t> <t>Special thanks to Brian Carpenter, Elwyn Davies, Joel Halpern and Sheng Jiang for their thorough reviews.</t> <t>Many thanks Ben Kaduk, Roman Danyliv and Eric Rescorla for their thorough SEC AD reviews, Russ Housleydomain style names andErik Kline fortheirreviews and to Valery Smyslov, Tero Kivinen, Paul Wouters and Yoav Nirused forreview of IPsechost address look up andIKEv2 parameterselectronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients andhelping to understand thoseservers in the domain name system andother securitythe protocoldetails better. Thanks for Carsten Bormanused between them.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119"> <front> <title>Key words forCBOR/CDDL help.</t> <t>Further input, review or suggestions were received from: Rene Struik, Benoit Claise, William Atwood and Yongkang Zhang.</t> </section> <!-- ack --> <section anchor="contributors" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Contributors</name> <t>For all things GRASP including validation code, ongoing document text support and technical input.</t> <contact fullname="Brian Carpenter" initials="B. E." surname="Carpenter"> <organization abbrev="Univ. of Auckland"/> <address> <postal> <street>School of Computer Science</street> <street>University of Auckland</street> <street>PB 92019</street> <city>Auckland</city> <region/> <code>1142</code> <country>New Zealand</country> </postal> <email>brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com</email> </address> </contact> <t>For RPL contributions and all things BRSKI/bootstrap including validation code, ongoing document text support and technical input.</t> <contact fullname="Michael C. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"> <organization abbrev="Sandelman">Sandelman Software Works</organization> <address> <email>mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</email> <uri>http://www.sandelman.ca/mcr/</uri> </address> </contact> <t>For the RPL technology choices and text.</t> <contact initials="P" surname="Thubert" fullname="Pascal Thubert">use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title> <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"> <organizationabbrev="Cisco Systems">Cisco Systems, Inc</organization> <address> <postal> <street>Building D</street> <street>45 Allee des Ormes - BP1200 </street> <city>MOUGINS - Sophia Antipolis</city> <code>06254</code> <country>FRANCE</country> </postal> <phone>+33 497 23 26 34</phone> <email>pthubert@cisco.com</email> </address> </contact> </section> <!-- contributors --> <section anchor="changes" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Change log [RFC-Editor: Please remove]</name> <t>This document was developed on <eref target="https://github.com/anima-wg/autonomic-control-plane/tree/master/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane"/>. That github repository also contains the document review/reply emails.</t> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Summary of changes since entering IESG review</name> <t>This text replaces the prior changelog with a summaryshowOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="1997" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used toprovide guidance for further IESG review.</t> <t>Please see revision -21 forsignify theindividual changelogs of prior versions .</t> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Reviews (whilerequirements inIESG review status) / status</name> <t>This document entered IESG review with version -13. It has since seenthefollowing reviews:</t> <t/> <t>IESG: Original owner/Yes: Terry Manderson (INT).</t> <t>IESG: No Objection: Deborah Brungard (RTG), Alissa Cooper (GEN), Warren Kumari (OPS), Mirja Kuehlewind (TSV), Alexey Melnikov (ART), Adam Roach (ART).</t> <t>IESG: No Objection, not counted anymorespecification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as theyhave left IESG: Ben Campbell (ART), Spencer Dawkins (TSV).</t> <t>IESG: Open DISCUSS hopefully resolved by this version: Eric Rescorla (SEC, left IESG), Benjamin Kaduk (SEC).</t> <t>Other: Michael Richardson (WG), Brian Carpenter (WG), Pascal Thubert (WG), Frank Xialiang (WG), Elwyn Davies (GEN), Joel Halpern (RTGdir), Yongkang Zhang (WG), William Atwood (WG).</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>BRSKI / ACP registrar related enhancements</name> <t>Only after ACP entered IESG review did it become clear that the in-progress BRSKIshould be interpreted in IETF documents. This documentwould not provide allspecifies an Internet Best Current Practices for theexplanations neededInternet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions forACP registrars as expected earlier by ACP authors. Instead, BRSKI will only specify a subset of required ACP behavior related to certificate handlingimprovements.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3810" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3810"> <front> <title>Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6</title> <author initials="R." surname="Vida" fullname="R. Vida" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Costa" fullname="L. Costa" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2004" month="June"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document updates RFC 2710, andregistrar. There,itbecame clear thatspecifies Version 2 of theACP draft should specify generic ACP registrar behavior independentulticast Listener Discovery Protocol (MLDv2). MLD is used by an IPv6 router to discover the presence ofBRSKI so ACP couldmulticast listeners on directly attached links, and to discover which multicast addresses are of interest to those neighboring nodes. MLDv2 is designed to beimplementedinteroperable withor without BRSKI and any manual/proprietary or future standardized BRSKI alternatives (for example via NETCONF) would understandMLDv1. MLDv2 adds therequirementsability forACP registrars and its certificate handling.</t> <t>This leada node toadditional text about ACP registrarsreport interest inthe ACP document:</t> <t>1. Defined relationship ACP / ANI (ANI = ACP + BRSKI).</t> <t>6.1.4 (new) Overview of TA required for ACP.</t> <t>6.1.5.5 Added explanations/requirements for Re-enrollment.</t> <t>6.10.7 Normative requirements for ACP registrars (BRSKI or not).</t> <t>10.2 Operational expectations against ACP registrars (BRSKI or not).</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Normative enhancements since start of IESG review</name> <t>In additionlistening toabove ACP registrar / BRSKI related enhancements there ispackets with arange of minor normative (also explanatory) enhancements since the start of IESG review:</t> <t>6.1.1 Hex digits in ACP domain information field now upper-case (noparticular multicast address only from specificreasonsource addresses or from all sources exceptthat both options are equally good, but capitalized ones are used in rfc5234).</t> <t>6.1.5.3 Added explanations about CRLs.</t> <t>6.1.5.6 Added explanations of behavior under failing certificates.</t> <t>6.1.2 Allow ACP address '0' in ACP domain information field: presence of address indicates permissionfor specific source addresses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3810"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3810"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4191" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4191"> <front> <title>Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes</title> <author initials="R." surname="Draves" fullname="R. Draves"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2005" month="November"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document describes an optional extension tobuild ACP secure channelRouter Advertisement messages for communicating default router preferences and more-specific routes from routers tonode, 0 indicates thathosts. This improves theaddressability of hosts to pick an appropriate router, especially when thenodehost isassigned by (future) other means than certificate. Non-autonomic nodes have no address at all (that was in -13),multi-homed andcan only connect via ACP connect interfaces to ACP.</t> <t>6.1.3 Distinction of real ACP nodes (with address)the routers are on different links. The preference values andthose with domain certificate without address added as a new rule to ACP domain membership check.</t> <t>6.6 Added throttling of secure-channel setup attempts.</t> <t>6.11.1.14 Removed requirement to handle unknown destination ACP traffic in low-end nodes that would never be RPL roots.</t> <t>6.12.5 Added recommendationspecific routes advertised tousehosts require administrative configuration; they are not automatically derived from routing tables. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4191"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4191"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4193" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4193"> <front> <title>Unique Local IPv6DAD.</t> <t>6.1.1, 6.7.1.1, 6.7.2, 6.7.3, 6.8.2 Various refined additional certificate, secure channel protocol (IPsec/IKEv2 and DTLS)Unicast Addresses</title> <author initials="R." surname="Hinden" fullname="R. Hinden"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Haberman" fullname="B. Haberman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2005" month="October"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document defines an IPv6 unicast address format that is globally unique andACP GRASP TLS protocol parameter requirements to ensure interoperating implementations (from SEC-AD review).</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Explanatory enhancements since startis intended for local communications, usually inside ofIESG review</name> <t>Beyonda site. These addresses are not expected to be routable on thefunctional enhancements fromglobal Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4193"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4193"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4291" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4291"> <front> <title>IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture</title> <author initials="R." surname="Hinden" fullname="R. Hinden"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Deering" fullname="S. Deering"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2006" month="February"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This specification defines theprevious two sections,addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes themayorityIPv6 addressing model, text representations ofchanges since -13 are additional explanations from review feedback, textual nitsIPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, andrestructuring - with no functional requirement additions/changes.</t> <t>1.1 Added "applicabilitymulticast addresses, andscope" section with summarized explanations.</t> <t>2.Added in-band vs. out-of-band management definitions.</t> <t>6.1.2 (was 6.1.1) expanded explanations of reasoningan IPv6 node's required addresses.</t> <t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4291"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4291"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4301" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4301"> <front> <title>Security Architecture forelements oftheACP domain information field.</t> <t>6.1.3 refined explanationsInternet Protocol</title> <author initials="S." surname="Kent" fullname="S. Kent"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Seo" fullname="K. Seo"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2005" month="December"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document describes an updated version ofACP domain membership check and justificationsthe "Security Architecture forit.</t> <t>6.5 Elaborated step-by-step secure channel setup.</t> <t>6.10 Additional explanationsIP", which is designed to provide security services foraddressing modes, additional table of addressing formats (thanks MichaelR).</t> <t>6.10.5 introduced 'F' bit position as a better visual representation intraffic at theVlong address space.</t> <t>6.11.1.1 extensive overhaul to improve readability ofIP layer. This document obsoletes RFC 2401 (November 1998). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4301"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4301"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4861" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4861"> <front> <title>Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)</title> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Nordmark" fullname="E. Nordmark"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Simpson" fullname="W. Simpson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="H." surname="Soliman" fullname="H. Soliman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2007" month="September"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies the Neighbor Discovery protocol for IP Version 6. IPv6 nodes on the same link useof RPL (from IESG feedback of non-routing/RPL experts).</t> <t>6.12.2 Added cautionNeighbor Discovery to discover each other's presence, to determine each other's link-layer addresses, to find routers, and to maintain reachability information aboutunconfiguring Data-Plane IPv6the paths to active neighbors. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4861"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4861"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4862" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4862"> <front> <title>IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration</title> <author initials="S." surname="Thomson" fullname="S. Thomson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Jinmei" fullname="T. Jinmei"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2007" month="September"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies the steps a host takes in deciding how to autoconfigure its interfaces in IP version 6. The autoconfiguration process includes generating a link-local address, generating global addresses via stateless address autoconfiguration, andimpactthe Duplicate Address Detection procedure toACP (limitationverify the uniqueness ofcurrent ACP design, and pointintthe addresses on a link. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4862"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4862"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5234"> <front> <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title> <author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="D. Crocker" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="P. Overell"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2008" month="January"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Internet technical specifications often need tomore details in 10.2).</t> <t>10.4 New explanations / summarydefine a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version ofconfigurations for ACP (aka: all config is undesirableBackus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness andonly required for integratingsimplicity withnon-autonomic components, primarily ACP-connectreasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF andRegistrars).</t> <t>11. Textually enhanced / better structured security considerations section after IESG security review.</t> <t>A. (new) Moved all explanationsABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, anddiscussions about futures from section 10 into this new appendix.value ranges. Thistext should not be removed because it captures a lot of repeated asked questions in WG and during reviews and from users, andspecification alsocaptures ideassupplies additional rule definitions and encoding forsome likely important followup work. But nonea core lexical analyzer ofthis is relevant to implementing (section 6) and operating (section 10)theACP.</t> </section> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30</name> <t>-29 did pass all IESG DISCUSS. This version cleans up reamining comments.</t> <t>Plannedtype common tobe removed section Appendix A.6 was moved into new Appendix B.1several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5246" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5246"> <front> <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title> <author initials="T." surname="Dierks" fullname="T. Dierks"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2008" month="August"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications tobe amended by further A.2, A.3 containing text feltcommunicate in a way that is designed tobe unfitprevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280"> <front> <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title> <author initials="D." surname="Cooper" fullname="D. Cooper"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="S. Santesson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Boeyen" fullname="S. Boeyen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="R. Housley"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Polk" fullname="W. Polk"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2008" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) forpublicationuse inRFC (see below). Added reference tothe Internet. An overview of thislast draft,approach andreferencing those sections ([ACPDRAFT]).</t> <t>Final discussion with responsible AD (Eric Vyncke): marked all references to [ACPDRAFT] as to be removed from RFC,model is provided asthis would be too unconventional. Likewise also [ACPDRAFT] reference itself. Added explanation to appendix B.</t> <t>Comments from Erik Kline:</t> <t>2. Fine tuned ULA definition.</t> <t>Comments Michael Richardson / Eric Vyncke.</t> <t>6.2.4. / 11. Removed text arguing ability how to use public CA (or not). Replaced with reference to new [ACPDRAFT] section B.3 (notan introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described inRFC) that explains current state of understanding (unfinished).</t> <t>B.3 New text detailling authors understandingdetail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics ofuseInternet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set ofpublic CA (will not berequired certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described inRFC).</t> <t>Comments/proposals from Ben Kaduk:</t> <t>Various: Replaced RFC4492detail along withRFC8422 which is superceeding it.</t> <t>6.1 Text fix for hash strength 384 bits (from SHA384); Text fix for ec_point_format extension.</t> <t>6.2.1 Text fixup. Removed requirementsstandard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm forECDH support in certificate, instead merely explaining the dependencies required IF thisX.509 certification path validation isdesired (educational).</t> <t>6.2.5.4. Fine tuning 2 sentences.</t> <t>6.3.2. (ACP domain memebership check) Add reference to ACPDRAFT B.2 explaining why ACP domain membership does not validate ACP address ofdescribed. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in theconnection.</t> <t>6.4. Downgraded SHOULD to MAYappendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5954" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5954" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5954"> <front> <title>Essential Correction for IPv6 ABNF and URI Comparison innew -29 suggestion how to deal with DoS attacksRFC 3261</title> <author initials="V." surname="Gurbani" fullname="V. Gurbani" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Carpenter" fullname="B. Carpenter" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Tate" fullname="B. Tate" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2010" month="August"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document corrects the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) production rule associated withmany GRASP announcements. Will also separately ask TSV ADs.</t> <t>6.4. Fixed extension pointsgenerating IPv6 literals inCDDL objective-value definitions (with help from Carsten/Brian).</t> <t>9.3.5.2. Added explanation when ACP greenfield state ends, and refined text explaining how to deal with this.</t> <t>11. removed duplicate paragraph (first, kept paragraph wasRFC 3261. It also clarifies thefixed up, improved correct version).</t> <t>11. Added references to ACPDRAFT B.1, B.2 as possible future solutions for downgrade attacks.</t> <t>12. Fixed up textrule forIANA code point allocation request.</t> <t>A.6 - removed.</t> <t>A.9.9 - added one explanatory intro paragraph to makes it easier to distinguish this option fromUniform Resource Identifier (URI) comparison when theB.1 considerations.</t> <t>B.1 - new text suggested from Ben, replacing A.6 (will not be in RFC).</t> <t>B.2 - new text discussing why there is no network layer address verification in ACP domain membership check (will not be in RFC).</t> <t>B.4 - Text discussing DULL GRASP attacks via port sweeps and what do do against it.</t> <t>Other.</t> <t>1. Added sentence about FCC outage report from June as example for in-band management.</t> <t>15. added reference to github where document was developed (removed in RFC, part of changelog).</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-29</name> <t>Comments from Robert Wilton:</t> <t>Improved several textual nits.</t> <t>Discuss/Comments from Erik Kline:</t> <t>Editorial suggestions and nits. Thanks!.</t> <t>6.1.3 Added text about how/why rsub is irrelevant for domain membership check.</t> <t>6.3 Added extension points to AN_ACP DULL GRASP objective because for example ACP domain certificate could be a nice optional additional parameter and prior syntax would have forced us to encode into separate objective unnecessarily.</t> <t>6.7 Using RFC8415 terminology for exponential backoff parameters.</t> <t>6.11.2 Amended ACP Sub-Addressing table with future code points, explanations and prefix announced into RPL.</t> <t>6.12.1.11. Reworked text to better explain how black hole route works and added expanation for prefix for manual address scheme.</t> <t>8.1.3. Reworked explanation of RIOs for ACP connect interfaces for Type C vs. Type A/B hosts.</t> <t>8.1.4. Added explanation how this "VRF select" option is required for auto-attachment of Type A/B hosts to ACP and other networks.</t> <t></t> <t>Discuss/Comments from Barry Leiba:</t> <t>Various editorial nits - thanks.</t> <t>6.1 New section pulling in TLS requirements, no need anymore to duplicat for ACP GRASP, EST, BRSKI (ACP/ANI nodes) and (if desired) OCSP/CRLDP. Added rule to start use secure channel only after negotiation has finished. Added rules not to optimize negotiation across multiple L2 interfaces to the same peer.</t> <t>6.6 Changed role names in secure channel negotiation process: Alice/Bob -> Decider/Follower. Explanation enhancements. Added definition for ACP nodes with "0" address.</t> <t>6.8.3 Improved explanation how IKEv2 forces preference of IPsec over GRE due to ACP IPsec profiles being Tunneled vs. Transport.</t> <t>6.8.4 Limited mentioning of DTLS version requirements to this section.</t> <t>6.9.2 Removed TLS requirements, they are now in 6.1.</t> <t>6.10.6 Removed explanation of IANA allocation requirement. Redundant - already in IANA section, and was seen as confusing.</t> <t>8.1.1 Clarified that there can be security impacts when weakening directly connected address RPF filtering for ACP connect interfaces.</t> <t></t> <t>Discuss/Comments from Ben Kaduk:</t> <t>Many good editorial improvements - thanks!.</t> <t>5. added explanation of what to do upon failed secure channel establishment.</t> <t>6.1.1. refined/extended cert public cey crypto algo and better distinguished algo for the keys of the cert and the key of the signer.</t> <t>6.1.1. and following: explicitly defining "serialNumber" to be the X.520 subject name serialNumber, not the certificate serial Number.</t> <t> 6.1.1. emhasize additional authorization step for EST servers (id-kp-cmcRA).</t> <t>6.1.2 changed AcpNodeName ABNF to again use 32HEXDIG instead of self-defined variation, because authors overlooked that ABNF is case agnostic (which is fine). Added recommendation to encode as lower case. Added full ABNF encoding for extensions (any characters as in "atoms" except the new "+" separator).</t> <t>6.1.5.3. New text to explain reason for use of HTTPS (instead of HTTP) for CRLDP and when and how to use HTTPS then.</t> <t>6.1.5.5. added text explaning why/how and when to maintain TA data upon failing cert renewal (one version with BRSKI, one version with other, ess secure bootstrap protocols).</t> <t>6.3. new text and requirement about the signaling of transport ports in DULL GRASP - benefits (no well-known ports required), and problems (additional DoS attack vector, albeit not worse than pre-existing ones, depending on setup of L2 subnets.).</t> <t>6.7.3.1.1. Specified AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (as the ESP authentication algorithm).</t> <t>6.8.2. Added recommendations for TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 when supporting TLS 1.3.</t> <t>8.2.2. Added explanation about downgrade attack across configured ACP tunnels and what to do against it.</t> <t>9.3.5.2. Rewrote most of section as it originally was too centric on BRSKI. Should now well describe expectations against automated bootstrap. Introduces new requirement not to call node as in support of ANI if is ALSO has TOFU bootstrap.</t> <t>11. Expanded text about malicious EST servers. Added paragraph about ACP secure channel downgrade attacks. Added paragraphs about private PKI as a core to allow security against fake certificates, added paragraph about considerationsproblems when using public PI.</t> <t>A.10.9 New appendix suggesting how to discover ACP secure channel negotiation downgrade attacks.</t> <t></t> <t>Discuss from Roman Danyliw:</t> <t>6.1.5.1 - Added requirement to only announce SRV.est when a working CA connection.</t> <t>15 - Amended security considerations with text about registrar dependencies, security of IDevID/ACP-certificate, EST-Server and GRASP for EST server discovery.</t> <t>Other:</t> <t>Conversion to XML v3. Solved empty () taxonomy xref problems. Various formatting fixes for v3.</t> <t>Added contributors section.</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28</name> <t>IESG review Roman Danyliw:</t> <t>6. Requested additional text elaborating misconfiguration plus attack vectors.</t> <t>6.1.3.1 Added paragraph about unsecured NTP as basis for time in the absence of other options.</t> <t>6.7.2 reworded text about additional secure channel protocol reqiurements.</t> <t> 6.7.3.1.2. Added requirement for ACP nodes supporting IKEv2 to support RFC8247 (not sure how that got dropped from prior versions.</t> <t>Replaced minimum crypto requirements definition via specific AES options with more generic "symmetric key/hash strength" requirements.</t> <t>6.10.7.3. Added example how to derive addressing scheme from IDevID (PID). Added explanation how to deal with non-persistant registrar address database (hint: it sucks or is wasteful, what did you expect).</t> <t>8.1.1. Added explanation for 'Physical controlled/secured'.</t> <t>8.1.5. Removed 'Physical controlled/secured' text, refer back to 8.1.1.</t> <t>8.2.1. Fixed ABNF 'or' syntax line.</t> <t>9.3.2. Added explanation of remote management problem with interface "down" type commands.</t> <t>10.2.1. Added explanations for attacks from impaired ACP nodes.</t> <t>11. Rewrote intro paragraph. Removed text referring to enrollment/registrars as they are out of scope of ACP (dependencies only).</t> <t>11. Added note about need for new protocols inside ACP to use end-to-end authentication.</t> <t>11. Rewrote paragraph about operator mistakes so as to be actionably. Operators must not make mistakes - but ACP minimizes the mistakes they can make.</t> <t>ACP domain certificate -> ACP certificate.</t> <t>Various other cosmetic edits (thanks!) and typo fixes (sorry for not running full spell check for every version. Will definitely do before RFC editor).</t> <t>Other:</t> <t>6.12.5.2.1./6.12.5.2.2. Added text explaining link breakage wrt. RTL (came about re-analyzing behavior after question about hop count).</t> <t>Removed now unnecessary references for earlier rrc822Name otherName choice.</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27</name> <t>Too many revisions with too many fixes. Lets do a one-word change revision for a change now if it helps to accelerate the review process.</t> <t>Added "subjectAltName /" to make it unambiguous that AcpNodeName is indeed a SAN (from Russ).</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-26</name> <t>Russ Housley review of -25.</t> <t>1.1 Explicit reference for TLS 1.2 RFC.</t> <t>2. Changed term of "ACP Domain Information" to AcpNodeName (ASN.1) / acp-node-name (ABNF), also through rest of document.</t> <t>2. Improved CA behavior definition. changed IDevID/LDevID to IDevID/LDevID certificate to be more unambiguous.</t> <t>2. Changed definition of root CA to just refer to how its used in RFC7030 CA root key update, because thats the only thing relevant to ACP.</t> <t>6.1.1 Moved ECDH requirement to end of text as it was not related to the subject of the initial paragraps. Likewise reference to CABFORUM.</t> <t>6.1.1 Reduced cert key requirements to only be MUST for certs with 2048 RSA public key and P-256 curves. Reduced longer keys to SHOULD.</t> <t>6.1.2 Changed text for conversion from rfc822Name to otherName / AcpNode, removed all the explanations of benefits coming with rfc822Name *sob* *sob* *sob*.</t> <t>6.1.2.1 New ASN.1 definition for otherName / AcpNodeName.</t> <t>6.1.3 Fixed up text. re the handling of missing connectivity for CRLDP / OCSP.</t> <t>6.1.4 Fixed up text re. inability to use public CA to situation with otherName / AcpNodeName (no more ACME rfc822Name validation for us *sob* *sob* *sob*).</t> <t>12. Added ASN.1 registration requests to IANA section.</t> <t>Appenices. Minor changes for rfc822Name to otherName change.</t> <t>Various minor verbal fixes/enhancements.</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-25</name> <t>Crypto parameter discuss from Valery Smyslov and Paul Wouters and resulting changes.</t> <t>6.7.2 Moved Michael Richardson suggested diagnostic of signaling TA from IPsec section to this general requirements section and added explanation how this may be inappropriate if TA payload is considered secret by TA owner.</t> <t>6.7.3.1 Added traffic selectors for native IPsec. Improved text explanation.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2 removed misleading text about signaling TA when using intermediate certs.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2 Removed requirement for 'PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate' requirement on request of Valery Smyslov as it is not defined in RFC7296 and there are enough options mandated in RFC7296. Replaced with just informative text to educate readers who are not IPsec experts what the mandatory option in RFC7296 is that allows to signal certificates.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2 Added SHOULD requirement how to deal with CERTREQ so that 6.7.2 requirement for TA diagnostics will work in IKEv2 (ignoring CERTREQ is permitted by IKEv2). Added explanation how this will result in TA cert diagnostics.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2 Added requirement for IKEv2 to operate on link-local addresses for ACP so at to assume ACT cert as the only possible authenticator - to avoid potentialy failing section from multiple available certs on a router.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2 fixed PKIX- style OID to ASN.1 object AlgorithmIdentifier (Paul).</t> <t>6.7.3.2 Added IPsec traffic selectors for IPsec with GRE.</t> <t>6.7.5 Added notion that IPsec/GRE MAY be preferred over IPsec/native. Luckily IPsec/native uses tunneling, whereas IPsec/GRE uses transport mode, and there is a long discuss whether it is permitted to even build IPsec connectings that only support transports instead of always being able to fall back to tunnel mode. Added explanatory paragraph why ACP nodes may prefer GRE over native (wonder how that was missing..).</t> <t>9.1.1 Added section to explain need for secure channel peer diagnostics via signaling of TA. Four examples given.</t> <t>Paul Wouters mentioned that ipkcs7 had to be used in some interop cases with windows CA, but that is an issue of ACP Registrar having to convert into PKCS#7 to talk to a windows CA, and this spec is not concerned with that, except to know that it is feasible, so not mentioned in text anywhere, just tracking discussion here in changelog.</t> <t/> <t>Michael Richardson:</t> <t>3.1.3 Added point in support of rfc822address that CA may not support to sign certificates with new attributes (such as new otherName).</t> <t/> <t>Michael Richardson/Brian Carpenter fix:</t> <t>6.1.5.1/6.3 Fixed GRASP examples.</t> <t/> <t>Joe Halpern review:</t> <t>1. Enhanded introduction text for in-band and of out-of-band, explaining how ACP is an in-band network aiming to achieve all possible benefits of an out-of-band network.</t> <t>1. Comprehensive explanation for term Data-Plane as it is only logically following pre-established terminology on a fully autonomic node, when used for existing nodes augmented with ACP, Data-Plane has more functionality than usually associated with the term.</t> <t>2. Removed explanatory text for Data-Plane, referring to section 1.</t> <t>2. Reduced explanation in definition of in-band (management/signaling), out-of-band-signaling, now pointing to section 1.</t> <t>5. Rewrote a lot of the steps (overview) as this text was not reviewed for long time. Added references to normative section for each step to hopefully avoid feedback of not explaining terms used (really not possible to give good summary without using forward references).</t> <t>2. Separate out-of-band-management definition from virtual out-of-band-management definition (later one for ACP).</t> <t>2. Added definitions for RPI and RPL.</t> <t>6.1.1. added note about end-to-end authentication to distinguish channel security from overall ACP security model.</t> <t>6.5 Fixed bugs in channel selection signaling step description (Alice vs. Bob).</t> <t>6.7.1 Removed redundant channel selection explanation.</t> <t>6.10.3 remove locator/identifier terminology from zone addressing scheme description (unnecessary), removed explanations (now in 9.4), simplified text, clarified requirement for Node-ID to be unique, recommend to use primarily zone 0.</t> <t>6.10.3.1 Removed. Included a lot of insufficient suggestions for future stanards extensions, most of it was wrong or would need to be revisited by WG anyhow. Idea now (just here for comment): Announce via GRASP Zone-ID (e.g. from per-zone edge-node/registrar) into a zone of the ACP so all nodes supporting the scheme can automatically self-allocate the Zone-ID.</t> <t>6.11.1.1 (RPL overview), eliminated redundant text.</t> <t>6.11.1.1.1 New subsection to better structure overview.</t> <t>6.11.1.1.2 New subsection to better group overview, replaced TTL explanation (just the symptom) with hopefully better reconvergence text (intent of the profile) for the ACP RPL profile.</t> <t>6.11.1.1.6 Added text to explain simple choice for rank_factor.</t> <t>6.11.1.13 moved explanation for RPI up into 6.11.1.1.</t> <t>6.12.5.1 rewrote section for ACP Loopback Interface.</t> <t>9.4 New informative/informational section for partial or incremental adoption of ACP to help understand why there is the Zone interface sub-scheme, and how to use it.</t> <t/> <t>Unrelated fixes:</t> <t>Ask to RFC editor to add most important abbreviations to RFC editor abbreviation list.</t> <t>6.10.2 changed names in ACP addressing scheme table to be less suggestive of use.</t> <t>Russ Hously review:</t> <t>2. Fixed definition of "Enrollment", "Trust Anchor", "CA", and "root CA". Changed "Certificate Authority" to "Certification Authority" throughout the document (correct term according to X.509).</t> <t>6.1 Fixed explanation of mutual ACP trust.</t> <t>6.1.1 s/X509/X509v3/.</t> <t>6.1.2 created bulleted lists for explanations and justifications for choices of ACP certificate encoding. No semantic changes, just to make it easier to refer to the points in discussions (rfcdiff seems to have a bug showing text differences due to formatting changes).</t> <t>6.1.3 Moved content of rule #1 into previous rule #2 because certification chain validation does imply validation of lifetime. numbers of all rules reduced by 1, changed hopefully all references to the rule numbers in the document.</t> <t> Rule #3, Hopefully fixed linguistic problem self-contradiction of MUST by lower casing MUST in the explanation part and rewriting the condition when this is not applicable.</t> <t>6.1.4 Replaced redundant term "Trust Point" (TP) with Trust Anchor (TA"). Replaced throughout document Trust Anchor with abbreviation TA.</t> <t> Enhanced several sentences/rewrote paragraphs to make explanations clearer.</t> <t>6.6 Added explanation how ACP nodes must throttle their attempts for connection making purely on the result of their own connection attempts, not based on those connections where they are responder.</t> <t/> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-24</name> <t>Leftover from -23 review by Eric Vyncke:</t> <t>Swapping sections 9 and 10, section 9 was meant to be at end of document and summarize. Its not meant to be misinterpreted as introducing any new information. This did happen because section 10 was added after section 9.</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-23</name> <t>Note: big rfcdiff of TOC is an rfcdiff bug, changes really minimal.</t> <t>Review of IPsec security with Mcr and ipsec mailing list.</t> <t>6.7.1 - new section: Moved general considerations for secure channel protocols here, refined them.</t> <t>6.7.2 - new section: Moved common requirements for secure channel protocols here, refined them.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.1. - improved requirements text related to RFC8221, better explamations re. HW acceleration issues.</t> <t>6.7.3.1.2. - improved requirements text related to RFC8247, (some requirements still discussed to be redundant, will be finalized in next weeks.</t> <t/> <t>Eric Vyncke review of -21:</t> <t> Only noting most important changes, long list of smaller text/readability enhancements.</t> <t>2. - New explanation of "normative", "informational" section title tags. alphabetic reordering of terms, refined definitions for CA, CRL. root CA.</t> <t>6.1.1. - explanation when IDevID parameters may be copied into LDevID.</t> <t>6.1.2. - Fixed hex digits in ACP domain information to lower case.</t> <t>6.1.3.1. - New section on Realtime clock and Time Validation.</t> <t>6.3 - Added explanation that DTLS means >= version 1.2 (not only 1.2).</t> <t>6.7 - New text in this main section explaing relationship of ACP secure channels and ACP virtual interfaces - with forward references to virtual interface section.</t> <t>6.8.2 - reordered text and picture, no text change.</t> <t>6.10.7.2 - describe first how Registrar-ID can be allocted for all type of registrars, then refined text for how to potentially use MAC addresses on physical registrars.</t> <t>6.11.1.1 - Added text how this profile does not use Data-Plane artefacts (RPI) because hadware forwarding. This was previously hidden only later in the text.</t> <t>6.11.1.13. - Rewrote RPL Data-Plane artefact text. Provide decoder ring for abbreviations and all relevant RFCs.</t> <t>6.12.5.2. - Added more explicit text that secure channels are mapped into virtual interfaces, moved different type of interfaces used by ACP into separate subsections to be able to refer to them.</t> <t>7.2 - Rewrote/refined text for ACP on L2, prior text was confusing and did not well explain why ACP for L2/L3 switches can be implemented without any L2 (HW) changes. Also missing explanation of only running GRASP untagged when VLANs are used.</t> <t>8.1.1 - Added requirement for ACP Edge nodes to allow configurable filtering of IPv6 RPI headers.</t> <t>11. - (security section). Moved explanation of address stealing from 7.2 to here.</t> </section> <section numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-22</name> <t>Ben Kaduk review of -21:</t> <t>RFC822 encoding of ACP domain information:</t> <t>6.1.2 rewrote text for explaining / justifying use of rfc822name as identifier for node CP in certificate (was discussed in thread, but badly written in prior versions).</t> <t>6.1.2 Changed EBNF syntax to use "+" after rfcSELF because that is the known primary name to extensions separator in many email systems ("." was wrong in prior versions).</t> <t>6.1.2 Rewrote/improved explanations for use of rfc822name field to explain better why it is PKIX compliant and the right thing to do.</t> <t>Crypto parameters for IPsec:</t> <t>6.1 - Added explanation of why manual keying for ACP is not feasible for ACP. Surprisingly, that text did not exist. Referred to by IPsec text (6.7.1), but here is the right place to describe the reasoning.</t> <t>6.1.2 - Small textual refinement referring to requirements to authenticate peers (for the special cases of empty or '0' ACP address in ACP domain information field.</t> <t>6.3 - To better justify Bens proposed change of secure channel protocol being IPsec vs. GRASP objective being IKEv2, better explained how protocol indicated in GRASP objective-value is name of protocol used to negotiate secure channel, use example of IKEv2 to negotiate IPsec.</t> <t>6.7.1 - refinemenet similar to 6.3.</t> <t> - moved new paragraph from Bens pull request up from 6.7.1.1 to 6.7.1 as it equally applies to GRE encapped IPsec (looks nicer one level up).</t> <t>- created subsections 6.7.1.1 (IPsec/ESP) / 6.7.1.2 (IKEv2) to clearer distinguish between these two requirements blocks.</t> <t>- Refined the text in these two sections to hopefully be a good answer to Valery's concern of not randomnly mocking with existing requirements docs (rfc8247 / rfc8221).</t> <t>6.7.1.1.1 - IPsec/ESP requirements section:</t> <t>- MUST support rfc8221 mandatory EXCEPT for the superceeding requirements in this section. Previously, this was not quite clear from the text.</t> <t>- Hopefully persuasive explanations about the requirements levels for ENCR_AES_GCM_16, ENCR_AES_CBC, ENCR_AES_CCM_8 and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305: Restructured text for why not ENCR_AES_CBC (was in prior version, just not well structured), added new expanations for ENCR_AES_CCM_8 and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY130.</t> <t>- In simple terms, requirements for ENCR_AES_CBC, ENCR_AES_CCM_8, ENCR_CHACHACHA are SHOULD when they are implementable with rqual or faster performancce than ENCR_AES_GCM_16.</t> <t>- Removed text about "additional rfc8221" reqiurements MAY be used. Now the logic is that all other requirements apply. Hopefully we have written enough so that we prohibited downgrades.</t> <t>6.7.1.1.2 - RFC8247 requirements:</t> <t>- Added mandate to support rfc8247, added explanation that there is no "stripping down" requirement, just additional stronger requirements to mandate correct use of ACP certificartes during authentication.</t> <t>- refined text on identifying ACP by IPv6 address to be clearer: Identifying in the context of IKEv2 and cases for '0' in ACP domain information.</t> <t>- removed last two paragraphs about relationship to rfc8247, as his is now written in first paragraph of the section.</t> <t>End of Ben Kaduk review related fixes.</t> <t> Other:</t> <t>Forgot to update example of ACP domain information to use capitalized hex-digits as required by HEXDIG used.</t> <t>Added reference to RFC8316 (AN use-cases) to beginning of section 3 (ACP use cases).</t> <t>Small Enhanced IPsec parameters description / requirements fixes (from Michael Richardson).</t> </section> </section> </middle> <back> <references> <name>Normative References</name> <reference anchor="RFC1034" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034"> <front> <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/> <author initials="P.V." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P.V. Mockapetris"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1987" month="November"/> <abstract> <t>This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119"> <front> <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1997" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3810" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810"> <front> <title>Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3810"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3810"/> <author initials="R." surname="Vida" fullname="R. Vida" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Costa" fullname="L. Costa" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2004" month="June"/> <abstract> <t>This document updates RFC 2710, and it specifies Version 2 of the ulticast Listener Discovery Protocol (MLDv2). MLD is used by an IPv6 router to discover the presence of multicast listeners on directly attached links, and to discover which multicast addresses are of interest to those neighboring nodes. MLDv2 is designed to be interoperable with MLDv1. MLDv2 adds the ability for a node to report interest in listening to packets with a particular multicast address only from specific source addresses or from all sources except for specific source addresses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4191" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191"> <front> <title>Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4191"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4191"/> <author initials="R." surname="Draves" fullname="R. Draves"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2005" month="November"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes an optional extension to Router Advertisement messages for communicating default router preferences and more-specific routes from routers to hosts. This improves the ability of hosts to pick an appropriate router, especially when the host is multi-homed and the routers are on different links. The preference values and specific routes advertised to hosts require administrative configuration; they are not automatically derived from routing tables. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4193" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193"> <front> <title>Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4193"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4193"/> <author initials="R." surname="Hinden" fullname="R. Hinden"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Haberman" fullname="B. Haberman"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2005" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines an IPv6 unicast address format that is globally unique and is intended for local communications, usually inside of a site. These addresses are not expected to be routable on the global Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4291" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291"> <front> <title>IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4291"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4291"/> <author initials="R." surname="Hinden" fullname="R. Hinden"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Deering" fullname="S. Deering"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2006" month="February"/> <abstract> <t>This specification defines the addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes the IPv6 addressing model, text representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 node's required addresses.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4301" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301"> <front> <title>Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4301"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4301"/> <author initials="S." surname="Kent" fullname="S. Kent"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Seo" fullname="K. Seo"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2005" month="December"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes an updated version of the "Security Architecture for IP", which is designed to provide security services for traffic at the IP layer. This document obsoletes RFC 2401 (November 1998). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4861" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861"> <front> <title>Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4861"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4861"/> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Nordmark" fullname="E. Nordmark"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Simpson" fullname="W. Simpson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="H." surname="Soliman" fullname="H. Soliman"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2007" month="September"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies the Neighbor Discovery protocol for IP Version 6. IPv6 nodes on the same link use Neighbor Discovery to discover each other's presence, to determine each other's link-layer addresses, to find routers, and to maintain reachability information about the paths to active neighbors. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4862" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862"> <front> <title>IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4862"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4862"/> <author initials="S." surname="Thomson" fullname="S. Thomson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Jinmei" fullname="T. Jinmei"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2007" month="September"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies the steps a host takes in deciding how to autoconfigure its interfaces in IP version 6. The autoconfiguration process includes generating a link-local address, generating global addresses via stateless address autoconfiguration, and the Duplicate Address Detection procedure to verify the uniqueness of the addresses on a link. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234"> <front> <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/> <author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="D. Crocker" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="P. Overell"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2008" month="January"/> <abstract> <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5246" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246"> <front> <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/> <author initials="T." surname="Dierks" fullname="T. Dierks"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2008" month="August"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280"> <front> <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/> <author initials="D." surname="Cooper" fullname="D. Cooper"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="S. Santesson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Boeyen" fullname="S. Boeyen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="R. Housley"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Polk" fullname="W. Polk"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2008" month="May"/> <abstract> <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6347" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347"> <front> <title>Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6347"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6347"/> <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2012" month="January"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6550" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550"> <front> <title>RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6550"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6550"/> <author initials="T." surname="Winter" fullname="T. Winter" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Thubert" fullname="P. Thubert" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Brandt" fullname="A. Brandt"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Kelsey" fullname="R. Kelsey"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Levis" fullname="P. Levis"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pister" fullname="K. Pister"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Struik" fullname="R. Struik"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Alexander" fullname="R. Alexander"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) are a class of network in which both the routers and their interconnect are constrained. LLN routers typically operate with constraints on processing power, memory, and energy (battery power). Their interconnects are characterized by high loss rates, low data rates, and instability. LLNs are comprised of anything from a few dozen to thousands of routers. Supported traffic flows include point-to-point (between devices inside the LLN), point-to-multipoint (from a central control point to a subset of devices inside the LLN), and multipoint-to-point (from devices inside the LLN towards a central control point). This document specifies the IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), which provides a mechanism whereby multipoint-to-point traffic from devices inside the LLN towards a central control point as well as point-to-multipoint traffic from the central control point to the devices inside the LLN are supported. Support for point-to-point traffic is also available. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6551" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6551"> <front> <title>Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation in Low-Power and Lossy Networks</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6551"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6551"/> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Kim" fullname="M. Kim" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pister" fullname="K. Pister"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="N." surname="Dejean" fullname="N. Dejean"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Barthel" fullname="D. Barthel"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) have unique characteristics compared with traditional wired and ad hoc networks that require the specification of new routing metrics and constraints. By contrast, with typical Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) routing metrics using hop counts or link metrics, this document specifies a set of link and node routing metrics and constraints suitable to LLNs to be used by the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6552"> <front> <title>Objective Function Zero for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6552"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6552"/> <author initials="P." surname="Thubert" fullname="P. Thubert" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) specification defines a generic Distance Vector protocol that is adapted to a variety of network types by the application of specific Objective Functions (OFs). An OF states the outcome of the process used by a RPL node to select and optimize routes within a RPL Instance based on the Information Objects available; an OF is not an algorithm.</t> <t>This document specifies a basic Objective Function that relies only on the objects that are defined in the RPL and does not use any protocol extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6553" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6553"> <front> <title>The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) Option for Carrying RPL Information in Data-Plane Datagrams</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6553"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6553"/> <author initials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) includes routing information in data-plane datagrams to quickly identify inconsistencies in the routing topology. This document describes the RPL Option for use among RPL routers to include such routing information. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7030" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030"> <front> <title>Enrollment over Secure Transport</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7030"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7030"/> <author initials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Yee" fullname="P. Yee" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Harkins" fullname="D. Harkins" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2013" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document profiles certificate enrollment for clients using Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) messages over a secure transport. This profile, called Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), describes a simple, yet functional, certificate management protocol targeting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) clients that need to acquire client certificates and associated Certification Authority (CA) certificates. It also supports client-generated public/private key pairs as well as key pairs generated by the CA.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7296" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296"> <front> <title>Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7296"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7296"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="79"/> <author initials="C." surname="Kaufman" fullname="C. Kaufman"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Eronen" fullname="P. Eronen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2014" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). This document obsoletes RFC 5996, and includes all of the errata for it. It advances IKEv2 to be an Internet Standard.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7525" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525"> <front> <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7525"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7525"/> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/> <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Holz" fullname="R. Holz"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2015" month="May"/> <abstract> <t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged, including attacks on its most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides recommendations for improving the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. The recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7676" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7676"> <front> <title>IPv6 Support for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7676"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7676"/> <author initials="C." surname="Pignataro" fullname="C. Pignataro"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Bonica" fullname="R. Bonica"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Krishnan" fullname="S. Krishnan"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2015" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) can be used to carry any network- layer payload protocol over any network-layer delivery protocol. Currently, GRE procedures are specified for IPv4, used as either the payload or delivery protocol. However, GRE procedures are not specified for IPv6.</t> <t>This document specifies GRE procedures for IPv6, used as either the payload or delivery protocol.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174"> <front> <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2017" month="May"/> <abstract> <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8221" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221"> <front> <title>Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8221"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8221"/> <author initials="P." surname="Wouters" fullname="P. Wouters"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Migault" fullname="D. Migault"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Mattsson" fullname="J. Mattsson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2017" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document replaces RFC 7321, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)". The goal of this document is to enable ESP and AH to benefit from cryptography that is up to date while making IPsec interoperable.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8247" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8247"> <front> <title>Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8247"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8247"/> <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Wouters" fullname="P. Wouters"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Migault" fullname="D. Migault"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2017" month="September"/> <abstract> <t>The IPsec series of protocols makes use of various cryptographic algorithms in order to provide security services. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the IPsec Security Association (IPsec SA) parameters, such as which algorithms should be used. To ensure interoperability between different implementations, it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance to ensure that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This document updates RFC 7296 and obsoletes RFC 4307 in defining the current algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for IKEv2, and does minor cleaning up of the IKEv2 IANA registry. This document does not update the algorithms used for packet encryption using IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <xi:include href="http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8422.xml"/> <reference anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446"> <front> <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/> <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2018" month="August"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t> <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8610" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610"> <front> <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/> <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="H. Birkholz"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Vigano" fullname="C. Vigano"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Bormann" fullname="C. Bormann"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2019" month="June"/> <abstract> <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43.txt"> <front> <title>Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43"/> <author initials="M" surname="Pritikin" fullname="Max Pritikin"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M" surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael Richardson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M" surname="Behringer" fullname="Michael Behringer"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K" surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization/> </author> <date month="August" day="7" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic Control Plane. To do this a Secure Key Infrastructure is bootstrapped. This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509 certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online and offline. We call this process the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/ disconnected networks. Support for deployment models with less stringent security requirements is included. Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device. The established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-anima-grasp" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-grasp-15.txt"> <front> <title>A Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-grasp-15"/> <author initials="C" surname="Bormann" fullname="Carsten Bormann"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B" surname="Liu" fullname="Bing Liu"> <organization/> </author> <date month="July" day="13" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies the GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP), which enables autonomic nodes and autonomic service agents to dynamically discover peers, to synchronize state with each other, and to negotiate parameter settings with each other. GRASP depends on an external security environment that is described elsewhere. The technical objectives and parameters for specific application scenarios are to be described in separate documents. Appendices briefly discuss requirements for the protocol and existing protocols with comparable features.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="IKEV2IANA" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml"> <front> <title>Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters</title> <author fullname="IANA"> <organization/> </author> <date/> </front> </reference> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name> <!-- references whose text got removed over the versions of the doc: <?rfc include='reference.RFC.4122'?> - No idea <?rfc include='reference.RFC.5082'?> - GTSM was considered for GRASP, text removed <?rfc include="reference.I-D.carpenter-anima-ani-objectives"?> <?rfc include="reference.I-D.richardson-anima-6join-discovery.xml"?> --> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-anima-prefix-management" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-prefix-management-07.txt"> <front> <title>Autonomic IPv6 Edge Prefix Management in Large-scale Networks</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-prefix-management-07"/> <author initials="S" surname="Jiang" fullname="Sheng Jiang"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="Z" surname="Du" fullname="Zongpeng Du"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="Q" surname="Sun" fullname="Qiong Sun"> <organization/> </author> <date month="December" day="18" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines two autonomic technical objectives for IPv6 prefix management at the edge of large-scale ISP networks, with an extension to support IPv4 prefixes. An important purpose of the document is to use it for validation of the design of various components of the autonomic networking infrastructure.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-star" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-star-11.txt"> <front> <title>Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-star-11"/> <author initials="Y" surname="Sheffer" fullname="Yaron Sheffer"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D" surname="Lopez" fullname="Diego Lopez"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="O" surname="Dios" fullname="Oscar de Dios"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A" surname="Pastor" fullname="Antonio Pastor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T" surname="Fossati" fullname="Thomas Fossati"> <organization/> </author> <date month="October" day="24" year="2019"/> <abstract> <t>Public-key certificates need to be revoked when they are compromised, that is, when the associated private key is exposed to an unauthorized entity. However the revocation process is often unreliable. An alternative to revocation is issuing a sequence of certificates, each with a short validity period, and terminating this sequence upon compromise. This memo proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short-term and automatically renewed (STAR) X.509 certificates. [RFC-Editor: please remove before publication] While the draft is being developed, the editor's version can be found at https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/tree/master/STAR.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38.txt"> <front> <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38"/> <author initials="E" surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="H" surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="N" surname="Modadugu" fullname="Nagendra Modadugu"> <organization/> </author> <date month="May" day="29" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1112" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1112"> <front> <title>Host extensions for IP multicasting</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1112"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1112"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="5"/> <author initials="S.E." surname="Deering" fullname="S.E. Deering"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1989" month="August"/> <abstract> <t>This memo specifies the extensions required of a host implementation of the Internet Protocol (IP) to support multicasting. Recommended procedure for IP multicasting in the Internet. This RFC obsoletes RFCs 998 and 1054. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1492" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1492"> <front> <title>An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called TACACS</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1492"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1492"/> <author initials="C." surname="Finseth" fullname="C. Finseth"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1993" month="July"/> <abstract> <t>This RFC documents the extended TACACS protocol use by the Cisco Systems terminal servers. This same protocol is used by the University of Minnesota's distributed authentication system. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1654" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1654"> <front> <title>A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1654"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1654"/> <author initials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Li" fullname="T. Li" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1994" month="July"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines an inter-autonomous system routing protocol for the Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1918" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918"> <front> <title>Address Allocation for Private Internets</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1918"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1918"/> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="5"/> <author initials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Moskowitz" fullname="B. Moskowitz"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Karrenberg" fullname="D. Karrenberg"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="G. J." surname="de Groot" fullname="G. J. de Groot"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Lear" fullname="E. Lear"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1996" month="February"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes address allocation for private internets. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2315" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315"> <front> <title>PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2315"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2315"/> <author initials="B." surname="Kaliski" fullname="B. Kaliski"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1998" month="March"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a general syntax for data that may have cryptography applied to it, such as digital signatures and digital envelopes. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2409" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2409"> <front> <title>The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2409"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2409"/> <author initials="D." surname="Harkins" fullname="D. Harkins"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Carrel" fullname="D. Carrel"> <organization/> </author> <date year="1998" month="November"/> <abstract> <t>This memo describes a hybrid protocol. The purpose is to negotiate, and provide authenticated keying material for, security associations in a protected manner. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2865" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865"> <front> <title>Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2865"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2865"/> <author initials="C." surname="Rigney" fullname="C. Rigney"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Willens" fullname="S. Willens"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Rubens" fullname="A. Rubens"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Simpson" fullname="W. Simpson"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2000" month="June"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a protocol for carrying authentication, authorization, and configuration information between a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links and a shared Authentication Server. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3164" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3164"> <front> <title>The BSD Syslog Protocol</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3164"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3164"/> <author initials="C." surname="Lonvick" fullname="C. Lonvick"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2001" month="August"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the observed behavior of the syslog protocol. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3315" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315"> <front> <title>Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3315"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3315"/> <author initials="R." surname="Droms" fullname="R. Droms" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Bound" fullname="J. Bound"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Volz" fullname="B. Volz"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Lemon" fullname="T. Lemon"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Perkins" fullname="C. Perkins"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Carney" fullname="M. Carney"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2003" month="July"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3411" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3411"> <front> <title>An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3411"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3411"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="62"/> <author initials="D." surname="Harrington" fullname="D. Harrington"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Presuhn" fullname="R. Presuhn"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Wijnen" fullname="B. Wijnen"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2002" month="December"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes an architecture for describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks. The architecture is designed to be modular to allow the evolution of the SNMP protocol standards over time. The major portions of the architecture are an SNMP engine containing a Message Processing Subsystem, a Security Subsystem and an Access Control Subsystem, and possibly multiple SNMP applications which provide specific functional processingURIs contain textual representation ofmanagement data. This document obsoletes RFC 2571. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3596" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3596"> <front> <title>DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3596"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3596"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="88"/> <author initials="S." surname="Thomson" fullname="S. Thomson"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Huitema" fullname="C. Huitema"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="V." surname="Ksinant" fullname="V. Ksinant"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Souissi" fullname="M. Souissi"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2003" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines the changes that need to be made to the Domain Name System (DNS) to support hosts runningIPversion 6 (IPv6). The changes include a resource record type to store an IPv6 address, a domain to support lookups based on an IPv6 address, and updated definitions of existing query types that return Internet addresses as part of additional section processing. The extensions are designed to be compatible with existing applications and, in particular, DNS implementations themselves. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3920" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3920"> <front> <title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3920"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3920"/> <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2004" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This memo defines the core features of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), a protocol for streaming Extensible Markup Language (XML) elements in order to exchange structured information in close to real time between any two network endpoints. While XMPP provides a generalized, extensible framework for exchanging XML data, it is used mainly for the purpose of building instant messaging and presence applications that meet the requirements of RFC 2779.addresses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC3954" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3954"> <front> <title>Cisco Systems NetFlow Services Export Version 9</title><seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3954"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3954"/> <author initials="B." surname="Claise" fullname="B. Claise" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2004" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies the data export format for version 9 of Cisco Systems' NetFlow services, for use by implementations on the network elements and/or matching collector programs. The version 9 export format uses templates to provide access to observations of IP packet flows in a flexible and extensible manner. A template defines a collection of fields, with corresponding descriptions of structure and semantics. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front>name="RFC" value="5954"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5954"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4007" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4007">anchor="RFC6347" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6347"> <front><title>IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4007"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4007"/> <author initials="S." surname="Deering" fullname="S. Deering"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Haberman" fullname="B. Haberman"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Jinmei" fullname="T. Jinmei"> <organization/> </author><title>Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2</title> <author initials="E."surname="Nordmark"surname="Rescorla" fullname="E.Nordmark"> <organization/>Rescorla"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="B." surname="Zill" fullname="B. Zill"> <organization/>initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2005" month="March"/>year="2012" month="January"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This document specifiesthe architectural characteristics, expected behavior, textual representation, and usage of IPv6 addressesversion 1.2 ofdifferent scopes. Accordingthe Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications toa decisioncommunicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on theIPv6 working group, this document intentionally avoids the syntaxTransport Layer Security (TLS) protocol andusageprovides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics ofunicast site-local addresses.the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6347"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6347"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4210" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210">anchor="RFC6550" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6550"> <front><title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management<title>RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol(CMP)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4210"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4210"/>for Low-Power and Lossy Networks</title> <authorinitials="C." surname="Adams" fullname="C. Adams"> <organization/>initials="T." surname="Winter" fullname="T. Winter" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Thubert" fullname="P. Thubert" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="T." surname="Kause" fullname="T. Kause"> <organization/>initials="A." surname="Brandt" fullname="A. Brandt"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="T." surname="Mononen" fullname="T. Mononen"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author><date year="2005" month="September"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP provides on-line interactions between PKI components, including an exchange between a Certification Authority (CA) and a client system. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4364" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364"> <front> <title>BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4364"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4364"/><authorinitials="E." surname="Rosen" fullname="E. Rosen"> <organization/>initials="R." surname="Kelsey" fullname="R. Kelsey"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Levis" fullname="P. Levis"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pister" fullname="K. Pister"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Struik" fullname="R. Struik"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Alexander" fullname="R. Alexander"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="February"/>year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract><t>This document describes a method by which a Service Provider may use an IP backbone to provide IP Virtual Private<t indent="0">Low-Power and Lossy Networks(VPNs) for its customers. This method uses(LLNs) are a"peer model",class of network in which both thecustomers' edgerouters(CE routers) sendand theirroutesinterconnect are constrained. LLN routers typically operate with constraints on processing power, memory, and energy (battery power). Their interconnects are characterized by high loss rates, low data rates, and instability. LLNs are comprised of anything from a few dozen to thousands of routers. Supported traffic flows include point-to-point (between devices inside theService Provider's edge routers (PE routers); there is no "overlay" visibleLLN), point-to-multipoint (from a central control point to a subset of devices inside thecustomer's routing algorithm,LLN), andCE routers at different sites do not peer with each other. Data packets are tunneled throughmultipoint-to-point (from devices inside the LLN towards a central control point). This document specifies the IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), which provides a mechanism whereby multipoint-to-point traffic from devices inside thebackbone, so thatLLN towards a central control point as well as point-to-multipoint traffic from thecore routers do not needcentral control point toknowtheVPN routes.devices inside the LLN are supported. Support for point-to-point traffic is also available. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6550"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6550"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4429" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429">anchor="RFC6551" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6551" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6551"> <front><title>Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)<title>Routing Metrics Used forIPv6</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4429"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4429"/>Path Calculation in Low-Power and Lossy Networks</title> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Kim" fullname="M. Kim" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pister" fullname="K. Pister"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="N."surname="Moore"surname="Dejean" fullname="N.Moore"> <organization/>Dejean"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Barthel" fullname="D. Barthel"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="April"/>year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract><t>Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection is an interoperable modification of<t indent="0">Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) have unique characteristics compared with traditional wired and ad hoc networks that require theexisting IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (RFC 2461)specification of new routing metrics andStateless Address Autoconfiguration (RFC 2462) processes. The intention isconstraints. By contrast, with typical Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) routing metrics using hop counts or link metrics, this document specifies a set of link and node routing metrics and constraints suitable tominimize address configuration delays in the successful case,LLNs toreduce disruption as far as possible inbe used by thefailure case, and to remain interoperable with unmodified hostsRouting Protocol for Low-Power androuters.Lossy Networks (RPL). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6551"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6551"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4541" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541">anchor="RFC6552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6552" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6552"> <front><title>Considerations<title>Objective Function Zero forInternet Group Managementthe Routing Protocol(IGMP)for Low-Power andMulticast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping Switches</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4541"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4541"/> <author initials="M." surname="Christensen" fullname="M. Christensen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Kimball" fullname="K. Kimball"> <organization/> </author>Lossy Networks (RPL)</title> <authorinitials="F." surname="Solensky" fullname="F. Solensky"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Thubert" fullname="P. Thubert" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="May"/>year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract><t>This memo describes the recommendations for Internet Group Management<t indent="0">The Routing Protocol(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) snooping switches. These are based on best current practices for IGMPv2, with further considerationsforIGMPv3-Low-Power andMLDv2-snooping. Additional areasLossy Networks (RPL) specification defines a generic Distance Vector protocol that is adapted to a variety ofrelevance, such as link layer topology changesnetwork types by the application of specific Objective Functions (OFs). An OF states the outcome of the process used by a RPL node to select andEthernet-specific encapsulation issues,optimize routes within a RPL Instance based on the Information Objects available; an OF is not an algorithm.</t> <t indent="0">This document specifies a basic Objective Function that relies only on the objects that arealso considered. This memo provides information fordefined in theInternet community.</t>RPL and does not use any protocol extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6552"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6552"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4604" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4604">anchor="RFC6553" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6553" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6553"> <front><title>Using Internet Group Management<title>The Routing ProtocolVersion 3 (IGMPv3)for Low-Power andMulticast Listener DiscoveryLossy Networks (RPL) Option for Carrying RPL Information in Data-Plane Datagrams</title> <author initials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">The Routing ProtocolVersion 2 (MLDv2)forSource-Specific Multicast</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4604"/>Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) includes routing information in data-plane datagrams to quickly identify inconsistencies in the routing topology. This document describes the RPL Option for use among RPL routers to include such routing information. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="4604"/>value="6553"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6553"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7030" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7030"> <front> <title>Enrollment over Secure Transport</title> <authorinitials="H." surname="Holbrook" fullname="H. Holbrook"> <organization/>initials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="B." surname="Cain" fullname="B. Cain"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Yee" fullname="P. Yee" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="B." surname="Haberman" fullname="B. Haberman"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Harkins" fullname="D. Harkins" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="August"/>year="2013" month="October"/> <abstract><t>The Internet Group<t indent="0">This document profiles certificate enrollment for clients using Certificate ManagementProtocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and the Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) are protocols that allow a host to inform its neighboring routers of its desire to receive IPv4 and IPv6 multicast transmissions, respectively. Source-specific multicast (SSM) isover CMS (CMC) messages over aform of multicast in whichsecure transport. This profile, called Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), describes areceiver is required to specify both the network-layer address of the source and the multicast destination address in ordersimple, yet functional, certificate management protocol targeting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) clients that need toreceive the multicast transmission. This document defines the notion of an "SSM-aware" router and host, and clarifies and (in some cases) modifies the behavior of IGMPv3 and MLDv2 on SSM-aware routersacquire client certificates andhosts to accommodate source-specific multicast. This document updatesassociated Certification Authority (CA) certificates. It also supports client-generated public/private key pairs as well as key pairs generated by theIGMPv3 and MLDv2 specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>CA.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7030"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7030"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4607" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4607">anchor="RFC7296" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7296"> <front><title>Source-Specific Multicast for IP</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4607"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4607"/><title>Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title> <authorinitials="H." surname="Holbrook" fullname="H. Holbrook"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Kaufman" fullname="C. Kaufman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="B." surname="Cain" fullname="B. Cain"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Eronen" fullname="P. Eronen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="August"/>year="2014" month="October"/> <abstract><t>IP version 4 (IPv4) addresses in the 232/8 (232.0.0.0 to 232.255.255.255) range are designated as source-specific multicast (SSM) destination addresses and are reserved for use by source-specific applications and protocols. For IP<t indent="0">This document describes version6 (IPv6),2 of theaddress prefix FF3x::/32Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE isreserveda component of IPsec used forsource-specific multicast use.performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). This documentdefines an extension to the Internet network service that applies to datagrams sent to SSM addressesobsoletes RFC 5996, anddefinesincludes all of thehost and router requirementserrata for it. It advances IKEv2 tosupport this extension. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>be an Internet Standard.</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC4610" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4610"> <front> <title>Anycast-RP Using Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM)</title><seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4610"/>name="STD" value="79"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="4610"/> <author initials="D." surname="Farinacci" fullname="D. Farinacci"> <organization/> </author>value="7296"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7296"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7525" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7525"> <front> <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title> <author initials="Y."surname="Cai"surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y.Cai"> <organization/>Sheffer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Holz" fullname="R. Holz"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2006" month="August"/>year="2015" month="May"/> <abstract><t>This specification allows Anycast-RP (Rendezvous Point)<t indent="0">Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are widely used tobeprotect data exchanged over application protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged, including attacks on its most commonly usedinside a domaincipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides recommendations for improving the security of deployed services thatruns Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) only. Other multicast protocols (such as Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP), which has been used traditionally to solve this problem)use TLS and DTLS. The recommendations arenot requiredapplicable tosupport Anycast-RP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>the majority of use cases.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7525"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7525"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4941" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941">anchor="RFC7676" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7676" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7676"> <front><title>Privacy Extensions<title>IPv6 Support forStateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4941"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4941"/>Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)</title> <authorinitials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Pignataro" fullname="C. Pignataro"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R."surname="Draves"surname="Bonica" fullname="R.Draves"> <organization/>Bonica"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Krishnan" fullname="S. Krishnan"><organization/><organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2007" month="September"/>year="2015" month="October"/> <abstract><t>Nodes use IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration<t indent="0">Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) can be used togenerate addresses using a combination of locally available information and information advertised by routers. Addressescarry any network- layer payload protocol over any network-layer delivery protocol. Currently, GRE procedures areformed by combining network prefixes with an interface identifier. On an interface that contains an embedded IEEE Identifier, the interface identifier is typically derived from it. On other interface types,specified for IPv4, used as either theinterface identifier is generated through other means,payload or delivery protocol. However, GRE procedures are not specified forexample, via random number generation. ThisIPv6.</t> <t indent="0">This documentdescribes an extension to IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration for interfaces whose interface identifier is derived from an IEEE identifier. Use of the extension causes nodes to generate global scope addresses from interface identifiers that change over time, even in cases where the interface contains an embedded IEEE identifier. Changing the interface identifier (and the global scope addresses generated from it) over time makes it more difficultspecifies GRE procedures foreavesdroppers and other information collectors to identify when different addressesIPv6, usedin different transactions actually correspond toas either thesame node. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>payload or delivery protocol.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7676"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7676"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC4985" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4985">anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174"> <front><title>Internet X.509 Public<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 KeyInfrastructure Subject Alternative Name for ExpressionWords</title> <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2017" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage ofService Name</title>the key words have the defined special meanings.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4985"/>name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="4985"/>value="8174"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8221" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8221"> <front> <title>Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)</title> <authorinitials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="S. Santesson"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Wouters" fullname="P. Wouters"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Migault" fullname="D. Migault"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Mattsson" fullname="J. Mattsson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2007" month="August"/>year="2017" month="October"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentdefines a new name formreplaces RFC 7321, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance forinclusion in the otherName fieldEncapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)". The goal ofan X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension that allows a certificate subjectthis document is tobe associated with the service nameenable ESP anddomain name components of a DNS Service Resource Record. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>AH to benefit from cryptography that is up to date while making IPsec interoperable.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8221"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8221"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC5790" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5790">anchor="RFC8247" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8247" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8247"> <front><title>Lightweight<title>Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for the InternetGroup ManagementKey Exchange Protocol Version3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Version2(MLDv2) Protocols</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5790"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5790"/>(IKEv2)</title> <authorinitials="H." surname="Liu" fullname="H. Liu"> <organization/>initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="W." surname="Cao" fullname="W. Cao"> <organization/>initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="H." surname="Asaeda" fullname="H. Asaeda"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Wouters" fullname="P. Wouters"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Migault" fullname="D. Migault"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2010" month="February"/>year="2017" month="September"/> <abstract><t>This document describes lightweight IGMPv3 and MLDv2<t indent="0">The IPsec series of protocols(LW- IGMPv3 and LW-MLDv2), which simplify the standard (full) versionsmakes use ofIGMPv3 and MLDv2.various cryptographic algorithms in order to provide security services. Theinteroperability with the full versions andInternet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate theprevious versionsIPsec Security Association (IPsec SA) parameters, such as which algorithms should be used. To ensure interoperability between different implementations, it is necessary to specify a set ofIGMPalgorithm implementation requirements andMLDusage guidance to ensure that there isalso taken into account. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This document updates RFC 7296 and obsoletes RFC 4307 in defining the current algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for IKEv2, and does minor cleaning up of the IKEv2 IANA registry. This document does not update the algorithms used for packet encryption using IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8247"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8247"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC5880" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880">anchor="RFC8422" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8422"> <front><title>Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5880"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5880"/><title>Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier</title> <authorinitials="D." surname="Katz" fullname="D. Katz"> <organization/>initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="D." surname="Ward" fullname="D. Ward"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Pegourie-Gonnard" fullname="M. Pegourie-Gonnard"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2010" month="June"/>year="2018" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This document describesa protocol intended to detect faults inkey exchange algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for thebidirectional path between two forwarding engines, including interfaces, data link(s), and toTransport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In particular, it specifies theextent possibleuse of Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement in a TLS handshake and theforwarding engines themselves, with potentially very low latency. It operates independentlyuse ofmedia, data protocols,the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) androuting protocols. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as authentication mechanisms.</t> <t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 4492.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8422"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8422"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC5905" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905">anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8446"> <front><title>Network Time<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5905"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5905"/> <author initials="D." surname="Mills" fullname="D. Mills"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Martin" fullname="J. Martin" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Burbank" fullname="J. Burbank"> <organization/> </author>1.3</title> <authorinitials="W." surname="Kasch" fullname="W. Kasch"> <organization/>initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2010" month="June"/>year="2018" month="August"/> <abstract><t>The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is widely used to synchronize computer clocks in the Internet. This<t indent="0">This documentdescribes NTP version 4 (NTPv4), which is backwards compatible with NTPspecifies version3 (NTPv3), described in RFC 1305, as well as previous versions1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.NTPv4 includes a modified protocol headerTLS allows client/server applications toaccommodatecommunicate over the InternetProtocol version 6 address family. NTPv4 includes fundamental improvementsinthe mitigation and discipline algorithms that extend the potential accuracy to the tens of microseconds with modern workstations and fast LANs. It includesadynamic server discovery scheme, soway thatin many cases, specific server configurationisnot required. It corrects certain errors in the NTPv3 designdesigned to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, andimplementationmessage forgery.</t> <t indent="0">This document updates RFCs 5705 andincludes an optional extension mechanism. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC5912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912">anchor="RFC8610" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8610"> <front><title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/><title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title> <authorinitials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman"> <organization/>initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="H. Birkholz"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="J. Schaad"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Vigano" fullname="C. Vigano"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Bormann" fullname="C. Bormann"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2010"year="2019" month="June"/> <abstract><t>The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This<t indent="0">This documentupdates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simplyproposes achangenotational convention tothe syntax. This documentexpress Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal isnotto provide anInternet Standards Track specification; it is publishedeasy and unambiguous way to express structures forinformational purposes.</t>protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6241" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241">anchor="RFC8990" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8990" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8990"> <front><title>Network Configuration<title>GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol(NETCONF)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6241"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241"/>(GRASP)</title> <authorinitials="R." surname="Enns" fullname="R. Enns" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="C" surname="Bormann" fullname="Carsten Bormann"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="Bjorklund" fullname="M. Bjorklund"initials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter" role="editor"><organization/><organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="J." surname="Schoenwaelder" fullname="J. Schoenwaelder"initials="B" surname="Liu" fullname="Bing Liu" role="editor"><organization/><organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date month="May" year="2021"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8990"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8990"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8995" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8995"> <front> <title>Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)</title> <author initials="M" surname="Pritikin" fullname="Max Pritikin"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="A." surname="Bierman" fullname="A. Bierman" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="M" surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael C. Richardson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M" surname="Behringer" fullname="Michael H. Behringer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="K" surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2011" month="June"/> <abstract> <t>Themonth="May" year="2021"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8995"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8995"/> </reference> </references> <references pn="section-13.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References</name> <reference anchor="AR8021" target="https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="AR8021"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IEEE</organization> </author> </front> <seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="802.1AR"/> </reference> <reference anchor="CABFORUM" target="https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-certificate-contents/" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="CABFORUM"> <front> <title>Certificate Contents for Baseline SSL</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">CA/Browser Forum</organization> </author> <date month="Nov" year="2019"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="FCC" target="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367699A1.docx" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="FCC"> <front> <title>June 15, 2020 T-Mobile NetworkConfigurationOutage Report</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">FCC</organization> </author> <date year="2020" month="October"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="PS Docket No." value="20-183"/> <refcontent>A Report of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Federal Communications Commission</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="IEEE-1588-2008" target="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1588-2008.html" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="IEEE-1588-2008"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol(NETCONF) defined in this document provides mechanisms to install, manipulate,for Networked Measurement anddelete the configuration of network devices. It uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encodingControl Systems</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IEEE</organization> </author> <date month="July" year="2008"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2008.4579760"/> <seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="1588-2008"/> </reference> <reference anchor="IEEE-802.1X" target="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1X-2010.html" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="IEEE-802.1X"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard forthe configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized as remote procedure calls (RPCs). This document obsoletes RFC 4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract>Local and metropolitan area networks--Port-Based Network Access Control</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IEEE</organization> </author> <date month="February" year="2010"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5409813"/> <seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="802.1X-2010"/> </reference> <reference anchor="LLDP" target="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AB-2016.html" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="LLDP"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks: Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IEEE</organization> </author> <date month="March" year="2016"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7433915"/> <seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="802.1AB-2016"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6335" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335">anchor="MACSEC" target="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AE-2006.html" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="MACSEC"> <front><title>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures<title>IEEE Standard forthe Management of the Service NameLocal andTransport Protocol Port Number Registry</title>Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control (MAC) Security</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IEEE</organization> </author> <date month="August" year="2006"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC6335"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6335"/>value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2006.245590"/> <seriesInfoname="BCP" value="165"/> <author initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Eggert" fullname="L. Eggert"> <organization/> </author>name="IEEE" value="802.1AE-2006"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig" quoteTitle="true" target="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00" derivedAnchor="NOC-AUTOCONFIG"> <front> <title>Autoconfiguration of NOC services in ACP networks via GRASP</title> <authorinitials="J." surname="Touch" fullname="J. Touch"> <organization/>fullname="Toerless Eckert" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Futurewei Technologies Inc.</organization> </author><author initials="M." surname="Westerlund" fullname="M. Westerlund"> <organization/><date month="July" day="2" year="2018"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00"/> <format type="TXT" target="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00.txt"/> <refcontent>Work in Progress</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="OP-TECH" target="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operational_technology&oldid=986363045" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="OP-TECH"> <front> <title>Operational technology</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Wikipedia</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2020"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1112" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1112" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC1112"> <front> <title>Host extensions for IP multicasting</title> <authorinitials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization/>initials="S.E." surname="Deering" fullname="S.E. Deering"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2011"year="1989" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This document defines the procedures that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) uses when handling assignment and other requests related to the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number registry. It also discusses the rationale and principles behind these procedures and how they facilitate<t indent="0">This memo specifies thelong-term sustainabilityextensions required ofthe registry.</t> <t>This document updates IANA's procedures by obsoleting the previous UDP and TCP port assignment procedures defined in Sections 8 and 9.1a host implementation of theIANA Allocation Guidelines, and it updates the IANA service name and port assignment procedures for UDP-Lite, the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), and the Stream Control TransmissionInternet Protocol(SCTP). It also updates the DNS SRV specification(IP) toclarify what a service name is and how it is registered.support multicasting. Recommended procedure for IP multicasting in the Internet. Thismemo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>RFC obsoletes RFCs 998 and 1054. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC6402" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402"> <front> <title>Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates</title><seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6402"/>name="STD" value="5"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="6402"/>value="1112"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1112"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC1492" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1492" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC1492"> <front> <title>An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called TACACS</title> <authorinitials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="J. Schaad"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Finseth" fullname="C. Finseth"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2011" month="November"/>year="1993" month="July"/> <abstract><t>This document contains a set of updates to<t indent="0">This RFC documents thebase syntax for CMC, a Certificate Managementextended TACACS protocolusinguse by theCryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).Cisco Systems terminal servers. Thisdocument updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273, and RFC 5274.</t> <t>The new items in this document are: new controls for future work in doing server side key generation, definition of a Subject Information Access value to identify CMC servers, andsame protocol is used by theregistrationUniversity ofa port number for TCP/IPMinnesota's distributed authentication system. This memo provides information for theCMC service to run on. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1492"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1492"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6407" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407">anchor="RFC1654" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1654" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC1654"> <front><title>The Group Domain of Interpretation</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6407"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6407"/> <author initials="B." surname="Weis" fullname="B. Weis"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Rowles" fullname="S. Rowles"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Hardjono" fullname="T. Hardjono"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2011" month="October"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol specified in RFC 3547. The GDOI provides group key management to support secure group communications according to the architecture specified in RFC 4046. The GDOI manages group security associations, which are used by IPsec and potentially other data security protocols. This<title>A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</title> <author initials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Li" fullname="T. Li" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="1994" month="July"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This documentreplaces RFC 3547.defines an inter-autonomous system routing protocol for the Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1654"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1654"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6554" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6554">anchor="RFC1918" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC1918"> <front><title>An IPv6 Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol<title>Address Allocation forLow-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6554"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6554"/>Private Internets</title> <authorinitials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization/>initials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization/>initials="B." surname="Moskowitz" fullname="B. Moskowitz"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D."surname="Culler"surname="Karrenberg" fullname="D.Culler"> <organization/>Karrenberg"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="V." surname="Manral" fullname="V. Manral"> <organization/>initials="G. J." surname="de Groot" fullname="G. J. de Groot"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Lear" fullname="E. Lear"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2012" month="March"/>year="1996" month="February"/> <abstract><t>In Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), memory constraints on routers may limit them to maintaining, at most, a few routes. In some configurations, it is necessary to use these memory-constrained routers to deliver datagrams to nodes within the LLN. The Routing Protocol<t indent="0">This document describes address allocation forLow-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) can be used in some deployments to store most, if not all, routes on one (e.g., the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) root) or a few routers and forward the IPv6 datagram using a source routing technique to avoid large routing tables on memory-constrained routers.private internets. This document specifiesa new IPv6 Routing header typean Internet Best Current Practices fordelivering datagrams within a RPL routing domain. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="5"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1918"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1918"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6724" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724">anchor="RFC2315" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2315"> <front><title>Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol<title>PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version6 (IPv6)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6724"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6724"/> <author initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Draves" fullname="R. Draves"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Matsumoto" fullname="A. Matsumoto"> <organization/> </author>1.5</title> <authorinitials="T." surname="Chown" fullname="T. Chown"> <organization/>initials="B." surname="Kaliski" fullname="B. Kaliski"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2012" month="September"/>year="1998" month="March"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This document describestwo algorithms, onea general syntax forsource address selectiondata that may have cryptography applied to it, such as digital signatures andone for destination address selection. The algorithms specify default behaviordigital envelopes. This memo provides information forallthe InternetProtocol version 6 (IPv6) implementations. They docommunity. It does notoverride choices made by applications or upper-layer protocols, nor do they preclude the developmentspecify an Internet standard ofmore advanced mechanisms for address selection. The two algorithms shareany kind.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2315"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2315"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC2409" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2409" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2409"> <front> <title>The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</title> <author initials="D." surname="Harkins" fullname="D. Harkins"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Carrel" fullname="D. Carrel"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="1998" month="November"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This memo describes acommon context, including an optional mechanism for allowing administratorshybrid protocol. The purpose is toprovide policy that can override the default behavior. In dual-stack implementations, the destination address selection algorithm can consider both IPv4negotiate, andIPv6 addresses -- depending on the available source addresses, the algorithm might prefer IPv6 addresses over IPv4 addresses, or vice versa.</t> <t>Default address selection as definedprovide authenticated keying material for, security associations inthis specification applies to all IPv6 nodes, including both hosts and routers. This document obsoletes RFC 3484.a protected manner. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2409"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2409"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6733" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733">anchor="RFC2865" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2865"> <front><title>Diameter Base Protocol</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6733"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6733"/><title>Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)</title> <authorinitials="V." surname="Fajardo" fullname="V. Fajardo" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Rigney" fullname="C. Rigney"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="J." surname="Arkko" fullname="J. Arkko"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Willens" fullname="S. Willens"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="J." surname="Loughney" fullname="J. Loughney"> <organization/>initials="A." surname="Rubens" fullname="A. Rubens"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="G." surname="Zorn" fullname="G. Zorn" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="W." surname="Simpson" fullname="W. Simpson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2012" month="October"/>year="2000" month="June"/> <abstract><t>The Diameter base protocol is intended to provide an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) framework for applications such as network access or IP mobility in both local and roaming situations. This<t indent="0">This documentspecifies the message format, transport, error reporting, accounting, and security services used by all Diameter applications. The Diameter basedescribes a protocolas defined in this document obsoletes RFC 3588for carrying authentication, authorization, andRFC 5719,configuration information between a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links andit must be supported by all new Diameter implementations.a shared Authentication Server. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2865"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2865"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6762" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762">anchor="RFC3164" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3164" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3164"> <front><title>Multicast DNS</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6762"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6762"/> <author initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization/> </author><title>The BSD Syslog Protocol</title> <authorinitials="M." surname="Krochmal" fullname="M. Krochmal"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Lonvick" fullname="C. Lonvick"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2013" month="February"/>year="2001" month="August"/> <abstract><t>As networked devices become smaller, more portable, and more ubiquitous, the ability to operate with less configured infrastructure is increasingly important. In particular, the ability to look up DNS resource record data types (including, but not limited to, host names) in the absence of a conventional managed DNS server is useful.</t> <t>Multicast DNS (mDNS) provides the ability to perform DNS-like operations on the local link in<t indent="0">This document describes theabsence of any conventional Unicast DNS server. In addition, Multicast DNS designates a portionobserved behavior of theDNS namespace to be freesyslog protocol. This memo provides information forlocal use, without the need to pay any annual fee, and withouttheneed to set up delegations or otherwise configure a conventional DNS server to answer for those names.</t> <t>The primary benefits of Multicast DNS names are that (i) they require little or no administration or configuration to set them up, (ii) they work when no infrastructure is present, and (iii) they work during infrastructure failures.</t>Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3164"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3164"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6763" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763">anchor="RFC3315" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3315"> <front><title>DNS-Based Service Discovery</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6763"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6763"/><title>Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)</title> <authorinitials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization/>initials="R." surname="Droms" fullname="R. Droms" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Bound" fullname="J. Bound"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Volz" fullname="B. Volz"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Lemon" fullname="T. Lemon"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Perkins" fullname="C. Perkins"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M."surname="Krochmal"surname="Carney" fullname="M.Krochmal"> <organization/>Carney"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2013" month="February"/>year="2003" month="July"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3315"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3315"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3411" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3411" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3411"> <front> <title>An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks</title> <author initials="D." surname="Harrington" fullname="D. Harrington"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Presuhn" fullname="R. Presuhn"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Wijnen" fullname="B. Wijnen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2002" month="December"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentspecifies how DNS resource records are named and structureddescribes an architecture for describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks. The architecture is designed tofacilitate service discovery. Given a typebe modular to allow the evolution of the SNMP protocol standards over time. The major portions ofservice thatthe architecture are an SNMP engine containing aclient is looking for, andMessage Processing Subsystem, adomain inSecurity Subsystem and an Access Control Subsystem, and possibly multiple SNMP applications whichthe client is looking for that service, this mechanism allows clients to discover a list of named instancesprovide specific functional processing ofthat desired service, using standard DNS queries.management data. Thismechanism is referred to as DNS-based Service Discovery, or DNS-SD.</t>document obsoletes RFC 2571. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="62"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3411"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3411"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6824" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824">anchor="RFC3596" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3596" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3596"> <front><title>TCP<title>DNS Extensionsfor Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6824"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6824"/>to Support IP Version 6</title> <authorinitials="A." surname="Ford" fullname="A. Ford"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Thomson" fullname="S. Thomson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C."surname="Raiciu"surname="Huitema" fullname="C.Raiciu"> <organization/>Huitema"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley"> <organization/>initials="V." surname="Ksinant" fullname="V. Ksinant"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="O." surname="Bonaventure" fullname="O. Bonaventure"> <organization/>initials="M." surname="Souissi" fullname="M. Souissi"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2013" month="January"/>year="2003" month="October"/> <abstract><t>TCP/IP communication is currently restricted to a single path per connection, yet multiple paths often exist between peers. The simultaneous use of these multiple paths for a TCP/IP session would improve resource usage within the network and, thus, improve user experience through higher throughput and improved resilience to network failure.</t> <t>Multipath TCP provides<t indent="0">This document defines theabilitychanges that need tosimultaneously use multiple paths between peers. This document presents a set of extensionsbe made totraditional TCPthe Domain Name System (DNS) to supportmultipath operation.hosts running IP version 6 (IPv6). Theprotocol offers the samechanges include a resource record typeof servicetoapplications as TCP (i.e., reliable bytestream), and it provides the components necessarystore an IPv6 address, a domain toestablish and use multiple TCP flows across potentially disjoint paths. This document definessupport lookups based on anExperimental Protocol for theIPv6 address, and updated definitions of existing query types that return Internetcommunity.</t>addresses as part of additional section processing. The extensions are designed to be compatible with existing applications and, in particular, DNS implementations themselves. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC6830" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830"> <front> <title>The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)</title><seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6830"/>name="STD" value="88"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="6830"/> <author initials="D." surname="Farinacci" fullname="D. Farinacci"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="V." surname="Fuller" fullname="V. Fuller"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Meyer" fullname="D. Meyer"> <organization/> </author>value="3596"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3596"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3954" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3954" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3954"> <front> <title>Cisco Systems NetFlow Services Export Version 9</title> <authorinitials="D." surname="Lewis" fullname="D. Lewis"> <organization/>initials="B." surname="Claise" fullname="B. Claise" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2013" month="January"/>year="2004" month="October"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentdescribes a network-layer-based protocol that enables separation of IP addresses into two new numbering spaces: Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs). No changes are required to either host protocol stacks or tospecifies the"core"data export format for version 9 of Cisco Systems' NetFlow services, for use by implementations on theInternet infrastructure.network elements and/or matching collector programs. TheLocator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) can be incrementally deployed, without a "flag day", and offers Traffic Engineering, multihoming, and mobility benefitsversion 9 export format uses templates toearly adopters, even when there are relatively few LISP-capable sites.</t> <t>Designprovide access to observations of IP packet flows in a flexible anddevelopmentextensible manner. A template defines a collection ofLISP was largely motivated by the problem statement produced by the October 2006 IAB Routingfields, with corresponding descriptions of structure andAddressing Workshop.semantics. Thisdocument defines an Experimental Protocolmemo provides information for the Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC7011" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011"> <front> <title>Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7011"/><seriesInfo name="RFC"value="7011"/>value="3954"/> <seriesInfoname="STD" value="77"/>name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3954"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4007" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4007" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4007"> <front> <title>IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture</title> <authorinitials="B." surname="Claise" fullname="B. Claise" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Deering" fullname="S. Deering"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B."surname="Trammell"surname="Haberman" fullname="B.Trammell" role="editor"> <organization/>Haberman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="P." surname="Aitken" fullname="P. Aitken"> <organization/>initials="T." surname="Jinmei" fullname="T. Jinmei"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Nordmark" fullname="E. Nordmark"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Zill" fullname="B. Zill"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2013" month="September"/>year="2005" month="March"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This document specifies theIP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) protocol, which serves as a means for transmitting Traffic Flow information over the network. In order to transmit Traffic Flow information from an Exporting Process to a Collecting Process, a common representation of flow dataarchitectural characteristics, expected behavior, textual representation, anda standard meansusage ofcommunicating them are required. ThisIPv6 addresses of different scopes. According to a decision in the IPv6 working group, this documentdescribes howintentionally avoids theIPFIX Datasyntax andTemplate Records are carried over a numberusage oftransport protocols from an IPFIX Exporting Process to an IPFIX Collecting Process. This document obsoletes RFC 5101.</t>unicast site-local addresses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4007"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4007"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7404" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7404">anchor="RFC4210" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4210"> <front><title>Using Only Link-Local Addressing inside an IPv6 Network</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7404"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7404"/><title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)</title> <authorinitials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization/>initials="C." surname="Adams" fullname="C. Adams"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="E." surname="Vyncke" fullname="E. Vyncke"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Kause" fullname="T. Kause"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Mononen" fullname="T. Mononen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2014" month="November"/>year="2005" month="September"/> <abstract><t>In an IPv6 network, it is possible to use only link-local addresses on infrastructure links between routers. This<t indent="0">This documentdiscusses the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to facilitatedescribes thedecision processInternet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP provides on-line interactions between PKI components, including an exchange between agiven network.</t>Certification Authority (CA) and a client system. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4210"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4210"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7426" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7426">anchor="RFC4364" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4364"> <front><title>Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7426"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7426"/><title>BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)</title> <author initials="E."surname="Haleplidis"surname="Rosen" fullname="E.Haleplidis" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pentikousis" fullname="K. Pentikousis" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Denazis" fullname="S. Denazis"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Hadi Salim" fullname="J. Hadi Salim"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Meyer" fullname="D. Meyer"> <organization/>Rosen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="O." surname="Koufopavlou" fullname="O. Koufopavlou"> <organization/>initials="Y." surname="Rekhter" fullname="Y. Rekhter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2015" month="January"/>year="2006" month="February"/> <abstract><t>Software-Defined Networking (SDN) refers to<t indent="0">This document describes anew approach for network programmability, that is, the capacity to initialize, control, change, and manage network behavior dynamically via open interfaces. SDN emphasizes the role of software in running networks through the introduction ofmethod by which a Service Provider may use anabstractionIP backbone to provide IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) forthe data forwarding plane and, by doing so, separates it from the control plane.its customers. Thisseparation allows faster innovation cycles at both planes as experience has already shown. However,method uses a "peer model", in which the customers' edge routers (CE routers) send their routes to the Service Provider's edge routers (PE routers); there isincreasing confusion asno "overlay" visible towhat exactly SDN is, whatthelayer structure is in an SDN architecture,customer's routing algorithm, andhow layers interfaceCE routers at different sites do not peer with each other.This document, a product ofData packets are tunneled through theIRTF Software-Defined Networking Research Group (SDNRG), addresses these questions and provides a concise reference forbackbone, so that theSDN research community based on relevant peer-reviewed literature,core routers do not need to know theRFC series, and relevant documents by other standards organizations.</t>VPN routes. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4364"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4364"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7435" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435" xml:base="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7435.xml">anchor="RFC4429" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4429"> <front><title>Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7435"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7435"/><title>Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for IPv6</title> <authorinitials="V." surname="Dukhovni" fullname="V. Dukhovni"> <organization/>initials="N." surname="Moore" fullname="N. Moore"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2014" month="December"/>year="2006" month="April"/> <abstract><t>This document defines the concept "Opportunistic Security" in the context of communications protocols. Protocol designs based on Opportunistic Security use encryption even when authentication<t indent="0">Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection isnot available,an interoperable modification of the existing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (RFC 2461) anduse authentication when possible, thereby removing barriersStateless Address Autoconfiguration (RFC 2462) processes. The intention is to minimize address configuration delays in thewidespread use of encryption onsuccessful case, to reduce disruption as far as possible in theInternet.</t>failure case, and to remain interoperable with unmodified hosts and routers. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4429"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4429"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7575" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575">anchor="RFC4541" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4541"> <front><title>Autonomic Networking: Definitions<title>Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) andDesign Goals</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7575"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7575"/>Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping Switches</title> <author initials="M."surname="Behringer"surname="Christensen" fullname="M.Behringer"> <organization/>Christensen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin"> <organization/>initials="K." surname="Kimball" fullname="K. Kimball"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="S." surname="Bjarnason" fullname="S. Bjarnason"> <organization/>initials="F." surname="Solensky" fullname="F. Solensky"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2006" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This memo describes the recommendations for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) snooping switches. These are based on best current practices for IGMPv2, with further considerations for IGMPv3- and MLDv2-snooping. Additional areas of relevance, such as link layer topology changes and Ethernet-specific encapsulation issues, are also considered. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4541"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4541"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC4604" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4604" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4604"> <front> <title>Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-Specific Multicast</title> <authorinitials="A." surname="Clemm" fullname="A. Clemm"> <organization/>initials="H." surname="Holbrook" fullname="H. Holbrook"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B."surname="Carpenter"surname="Cain" fullname="B.Carpenter"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Jiang" fullname="S. Jiang"> <organization/>Cain"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="L." surname="Ciavaglia" fullname="L. Ciavaglia"> <organization/>initials="B." surname="Haberman" fullname="B. Haberman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2015" month="June"/>year="2006" month="August"/> <abstract><t>Autonomic systems were first described<t indent="0">The Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and the Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) are protocols that allow a host to inform its neighboring routers of its desire to receive IPv4 and IPv6 multicast transmissions, respectively. Source-specific multicast (SSM) is a form of multicast in2001. The fundamental goalwhich a receiver isself-management, including self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing,required to specify both the network-layer address of the source andself-protection. This is achieved by an autonomic function having minimal dependencies on human administrators or centralized management systems. It usually implies distribution across network elements.</t> <t>Thisthe multicast destination address in order to receive the multicast transmission. This document definescommon language and outlines design goals (and what are not design goals) for autonomic functions. A high-level reference model illustrates how functional elements inthe notion of anAutonomic Network interact."SSM-aware" router and host, and clarifies and (in some cases) modifies the behavior of IGMPv3 and MLDv2 on SSM-aware routers and hosts to accommodate source-specific multicast. This documentis a product ofupdates theIRTF's Network Management Research Group.</t>IGMPv3 and MLDv2 specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4604"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4604"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7576" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7576">anchor="RFC4607" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4607" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4607"> <front><title>General Gap Analysis<title>Source-Specific Multicast forAutonomic Networking</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7576"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7576"/>IP</title> <authorinitials="S." surname="Jiang" fullname="S. Jiang"> <organization/>initials="H." surname="Holbrook" fullname="H. Holbrook"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B."surname="Carpenter"surname="Cain" fullname="B.Carpenter"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization/>Cain"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2015" month="June"/>year="2006" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This document provides a problem statement<t indent="0">IP version 4 (IPv4) addresses in the 232/8 (232.0.0.0 to 232.255.255.255) range are designated as source-specific multicast (SSM) destination addresses andgeneral gap analysisare reserved foran IP-based Autonomic Network that is mainly based on distributed network devices. The document provides backgrounduse byreviewing the current status of autonomic aspects of IP networks and the extent to which current network management depends on centralizationsource-specific applications andhuman administrators. Finally,protocols. For IP version 6 (IPv6), the address prefix FF3x::/32 is reserved for source-specific multicast use. This documentoutlinesdefines an extension to thegeneral features that are missing from currentInternet networkabilitiesservice that applies to datagrams sent to SSM addresses andare needed in the ideal Autonomic Network concept.</t> <t>This document is a product ofdefines theIRTF's Network Management Research Group.</t>host and router requirements to support this extension. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4607"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4607"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7585" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7585">anchor="RFC4610" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4610" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4610"> <front><title>Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access Identifier (NAI)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7585"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7585"/><title>Anycast-RP Using Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM)</title> <authorinitials="S." surname="Winter" fullname="S. Winter"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Farinacci" fullname="D. Farinacci"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="McCauley" fullname="M. McCauley"> <organization/>initials="Y." surname="Cai" fullname="Y. Cai"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2015" month="October"/>year="2006" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This document specifies a means<t indent="0">This specification allows Anycast-RP (Rendezvous Point) tofind authoritative RADIUS servers forbe used inside agiven realm. It isdomain that runs Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) only. Other multicast protocols (such as Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP), which has been usedin conjunction with either RADIUS over Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/TLS) or RADIUS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/DTLS).</t>traditionally to solve this problem) are not required to support Anycast-RP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4610"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4610"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7721" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721">anchor="RFC4985" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4985" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4985"> <front><title>Security and Privacy Considerations<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Alternative Name forIPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7721"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7721"/> <author initials="A." surname="Cooper" fullname="A. Cooper"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="F." surname="Gont" fullname="F. Gont"> <organization/> </author>Expression of Service Name</title> <authorinitials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="S. Santesson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2016" month="March"/>year="2007" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentdiscusses privacy and security considerationsdefines a new name form forseveral IPv6 address generation mechanisms, both standardized and non-standardized. It evaluates how different mechanisms mitigate different threats andinclusion in thetrade-offsotherName field of an X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension thatimplementors, developers,allows a certificate subject to be associated with the service name andusers face in choosing different addresses or address generation mechanisms.</t>domain name components of a DNS Service Resource Record. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4985"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4985"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7761" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761">anchor="RFC5790" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5790" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5790"> <front><title>Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):<title>Lightweight Internet Group Management ProtocolSpecification (Revised)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7761"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7761"/> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="83"/> <author initials="B." surname="Fenner" fullname="B. Fenner"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley"> <organization/> </author>Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) Protocols</title> <author initials="H."surname="Holbrook"surname="Liu" fullname="H.Holbrook"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="I." surname="Kouvelas" fullname="I. Kouvelas"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Parekh" fullname="R. Parekh"> <organization/>Liu"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="Z." surname="Zhang" fullname="Z. Zhang"> <organization/>initials="W." surname="Cao" fullname="W. Cao"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="L." surname="Zheng" fullname="L. Zheng"> <organization/>initials="H." surname="Asaeda" fullname="H. Asaeda"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2016" month="March"/>year="2010" month="February"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentspecifies Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM). PIM-SM is a multicast routing protocol that can use the underlying unicast routing information base or a separate multicast-capable routing information base. It builds unidirectional shared trees rooted at a Rendezvous Point (RP) per group,describes lightweight IGMPv3 andit optionally creates shortest-path trees per source.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 4601 by replacing it, addresses the errata filed against it, removesMLDv2 protocols (LW- IGMPv3 and LW-MLDv2), which simplify theoptional (*,*,RP), PIM Multicast Border Router featuresstandard (full) versions of IGMPv3 andauthentication using IPsec that lack sufficient deployment experience (see Appendix A),MLDv2. The interoperability with the full versions andmovesthePIM specification to Internet Standard.</t>previous versions of IGMP and MLD is also taken into account. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5790"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5790"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC7950" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950">anchor="RFC5880" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5880"> <front><title>The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7950"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7950"/><title>Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)</title> <authorinitials="M." surname="Bjorklund" fullname="M. Bjorklund" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Katz" fullname="D. Katz"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Ward" fullname="D. Ward"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2016" month="August"/>year="2010" month="June"/> <abstract><t>YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration data, state data, Remote Procedure Calls, and notifications for network management protocols. This<t indent="0">This document describesthe syntax and semantics of version 1.1 of the YANG language. YANG version 1.1 isamaintenance release of the YANG language, addressing ambiguities and defectsprotocol intended to detect faults in theoriginal specification. There are a small number of backward incompatibilities from YANG version 1. This document also specifies the YANG mappingsbidirectional path between two forwarding engines, including interfaces, data link(s), and to theNetwork Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t>extent possible the forwarding engines themselves, with potentially very low latency. It operates independently of media, data protocols, and routing protocols. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5880"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5880"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8028" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028">anchor="RFC5905" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5905"> <front><title>First-Hop Router Selection by Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8028"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8028"/><title>Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification</title> <authorinitials="F." surname="Baker" fullname="F. Baker"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Mills" fullname="D. Mills"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="B." surname="Carpenter" fullname="B. Carpenter"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Martin" fullname="J. Martin" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Burbank" fullname="J. Burbank"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Kasch" fullname="W. Kasch"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2016" month="November"/>year="2010" month="June"/> <abstract><t>This document describes expected IPv6 host behavior in a scenario that has more than one prefix, each allocated by an upstream network that is assumed to implement BCP 38 ingress filtering, when the host has multiple routers to choose from. It also applies to other scenarios such as the usage of stateful firewalls that effectively act as address-based filters. Host behavior<t indent="0">The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is widely used to synchronize computer clocks inchoosing a first-hop router may interactthe Internet. This document describes NTP version 4 (NTPv4), which is backwards compatible withsource address selectionNTP version 3 (NTPv3), described ina given implementation. However, the selectionRFC 1305, as well as previous versions of thesource address forprotocol. NTPv4 includes apacket is done before the first-hop router for that packet is chosen. Given that the network or host is, or appearsmodified protocol header tobe, multihomed with multiple provider-allocated addresses, thataccommodate thehost has elected to use a sourceInternet Protocol version 6 address family. NTPv4 includes fundamental improvements ina given prefix,the mitigation and discipline algorithms thatsome but not all neighboring routers are advertising that prefix in their Router Advertisement Prefix Information Options, this document specifiesextend the potential accuracy towhich routerthe tens of microseconds with modern workstations and fast LANs. It includes ahost should present its transmission.dynamic server discovery scheme, so that in many cases, specific server configuration is not required. Itupdates RFC 4861.</t>corrects certain errors in the NTPv3 design and implementation and includes an optional extension mechanism. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5905"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5905"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">anchor="RFC5912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5912"> <front><title>Guidelines<title>New ASN.1 Modules forWriting an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/> <author initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton"> <organization/> </author>the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title> <authorinitials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"> <organization/>initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="J. Schaad"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2017"year="2010" month="June"/> <abstract><t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses<t indent="0">The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, andto promote interoperability, their allocationsmany associated formats, areoften coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t> <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modificationsexpressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform toexisting values can be made, is needed.the 1988 version of ASN.1. This documentdefines a framework forupdates those ASN.1 modules to conform to thedocumentation2002 version ofthese guidelines by specification authors, in orderASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes toassure thatany of theprovided guidance forformats; this is simply a change to theIANA Considerationssyntax. This document isclearnot an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6120" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6120"> <front> <title>Extensible Messaging andaddressesPresence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title> <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2011" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an application profile of thevarious issuesExtensible Markup Language (XML) thatare likely inenables theoperationnear-real-time exchange ofa registry.</t> <t>This is the third editionstructured yet extensible data between any two or more network entities. This document defines XMPP's core protocol methods: setup and teardown ofthis document; itXML streams, channel encryption, authentication, error handling, and communication primitives for messaging, network availability ("presence"), and request-response interactions. This document obsoletes RFC5226.</t>3920. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6120"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6120"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8366" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366">anchor="RFC6241" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6241"> <front><title>A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8366"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8366"/><title>Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)</title> <authorinitials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="K. Watsen"> <organization/>initials="R." surname="Enns" fullname="R. Enns" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M."surname="Richardson"surname="Bjorklund" fullname="M.Richardson"> <organization/>Bjorklund" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Schoenwaelder" fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="T." surname="Eckert" fullname="T. Eckert"> <organization/>initials="A." surname="Bierman" fullname="A. Bierman" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2018" month="May"/>year="2011" month="June"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) defined in this documentdefines a strategy to securely assign a pledgeprovides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. It uses anowner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, byExtensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for thepledge's manufacturer. This artifact is knownconfiguration data asa "voucher".</t> <t>This document defines an artifact formatwell asa YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) structure. Other YANG-derived formats are possible. The voucher artifact is normally generated by the pledge's manufacturer (i.e.,theManufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA).</t> <t>Thisprotocol messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized as remote procedure calls (RPCs). This documentonly defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it.</t>obsoletes RFC 4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6241"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8316" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8316">anchor="RFC6335" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6335"> <front><title>Autonomic Networking Use Case<title>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures forDistributed Detectionthe Management of the ServiceLevel Agreement (SLA) Violations</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8316"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8316"/>Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry</title> <authorinitials="J." surname="Nobre" fullname="J. Nobre"> <organization/>initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L."surname="Granville"surname="Eggert" fullname="L.Granville"> <organization/>Eggert"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="A." surname="Clemm" fullname="A. Clemm"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Touch" fullname="J. Touch"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="A." surname="Gonzalez Prieto" fullname="A. Gonzalez Prieto"> <organization/>initials="M." surname="Westerlund" fullname="M. Westerlund"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2018" month="February"/>year="2011" month="August"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentdescribes an experimental use case that employs autonomic networking for the monitoring of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). The use case is for detecting violations of SLAs in a distributed fashion. It strives to optimize and dynamically adaptdefines theautonomic deployment of active measurement probes in a wayprocedures thatmaximizesthelikelihood of detecting service-level violations with a given resource budget to perform active measurements. This optimizationInternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) uses when handling assignment andadaptation should be done without any outside guidance or intervention.</t> <t>This document is a product ofother requests related to theIRTF Network Management Research Group (NMRG).Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number registry. Itis published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8368" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368"> <front> <title>Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration,also discusses the rationale andMaintenance (OAM)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8368"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8368"/> <author initials="T." surname="Eckert" fullname="T. Eckert" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2018" month="May"/> <abstract> <t>Operations, Administration,principles behind these procedures andMaintenance (OAM), as per BCP 161, for data networks is often subject tohow they facilitate theproblemlong-term sustainability ofcircular dependencies when relying on connectivity provided bythenetwork to be managed forregistry.</t> <t indent="0">This document updates IANA's procedures by obsoleting theOAM purposes.</t> <t>Provisioning while bringing up devicesprevious UDP andnetworks tends to be more difficult to automate than service provisioning later on. ChangesTCP port assignment procedures defined incore network functions impacting reachability cannot be automated becauseSections 8 and 9.1 ofongoing connectivity requirementsthe IANA Allocation Guidelines, and it updates the IANA service name and port assignment procedures for UDP-Lite, theOAM equipment itself,Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), andwidely used OAM protocols are not secure enough to be carried acrossthenetwork without security concerns.</t> <t>This document describes how to integrate OAM processes with an autonomic control plane in orderStream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). It also updates the DNS SRV specification toprovide stableclarify what a service name is andsecure connectivity for those OAM processes. This connectivityhow it isnot subject to the aforementioned circular dependencies.</t>registered. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="RFC8398" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8398"> <front> <title>Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 Certificates</title><seriesInfoname="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8398"/>name="BCP" value="165"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="8398"/> <author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="A. Melnikov" role="editor"> <organization/> </author>value="6335"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6335"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6402" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6402"> <front> <title>Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates</title> <authorinitials="W." surname="Chuang" fullname="W. Chuang" role="editor"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="J. Schaad"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2018" month="May"/>year="2011" month="November"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentdefinescontains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This document updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273, and RFC 5274.</t> <t indent="0">The newname formitems in this document are: new controls forinclusionfuture work inthe otherName fielddoing server side key generation, definition ofan X.509a SubjectAlternative NameInformation Access value to identify CMC servers, andIssuer Alternative Name extension that allowsthe registration of acertificate subjectport number for TCP/IP for the CMC service tobe associated with an internationalized email address.</t> <t>This document updates RFC 5280.</t>run on. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6402"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6402"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8402" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402">anchor="RFC6407" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6407"> <front><title>Segment Routing Architecture</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8402"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8402"/> <author initials="C." surname="Filsfils" fullname="C. Filsfils" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Previdi" fullname="S. Previdi" role="editor"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Ginsberg" fullname="L. Ginsberg"> <organization/> </author><title>The Group Domain of Interpretation</title> <author initials="B."surname="Decraene"surname="Weis" fullname="B.Decraene"> <organization/>Weis"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S."surname="Litkowski"surname="Rowles" fullname="S.Litkowski"> <organization/>Rowles"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="R." surname="Shakir" fullname="R. Shakir"> <organization/>initials="T." surname="Hardjono" fullname="T. Hardjono"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2018" month="July"/>year="2011" month="October"/> <abstract><t>Segment Routing (SR) leverages the source routing paradigm. A node steers a packet through an ordered list of instructions, called "segments". A segment can represent any instruction, topological or service based. A segment can have a semantic local to an SR node or global within an SR domain. SR provides a mechanism that allows a flow to be restricted to a specific topological path, while maintaining per-flow state only at the ingress node(s) to the SR domain.</t> <t>SR can be directly applied to the MPLS architecture with no change to the forwarding plane. A segment is encoded as an MPLS label. An ordered list of segments is encoded as a stack of labels. The segment to process is on the top of the stack. Upon completion of a segment, the related label is popped from the stack.</t> <t>SR can be applied to<t indent="0">This document describes theIPv6 architecture, with a new type of routing header. A segment is encoded as an IPv6 address. An ordered list of segments is encoded as an ordered listGroup Domain ofIPv6 addressesInterpretation (GDOI) protocol specified in RFC 3547. The GDOI provides group key management to support secure group communications according to therouting header. The active segment is indicated by the Destination Address (DA) of the packet.architecture specified in RFC 4046. Thenext active segment is indicatedGDOI manages group security associations, which are used bya pointer in the new routing header.</t>IPsec and potentially other data security protocols. This document replaces RFC 3547. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6407"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6407"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC8572" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572">anchor="RFC6554" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6554" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6554"> <front><title>Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)</title> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8572"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8572"/><title>An IPv6 Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)</title> <authorinitials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="K. Watsen"> <organization/>initials="J." surname="Hui" fullname="J. Hui"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="I." surname="Farrer" fullname="I. Farrer"> <organization/>initials="JP." surname="Vasseur" fullname="JP. Vasseur"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="M." surname="Abrahamsson" fullname="M. Abrahamsson"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Culler" fullname="D. Culler"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="V." surname="Manral" fullname="V. Manral"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <dateyear="2019" month="April"/>year="2012" month="March"/> <abstract><t>This document presents a technique<t indent="0">In Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), memory constraints on routers may limit them tosecurely provisionmaintaining, at most, anetworking device whenfew routes. In some configurations, it isbooting in a factory-default state. Variations in the solution enable itnecessary to use these memory-constrained routers to deliver datagrams to nodes within the LLN. The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) can be usedon both public and private networks. The provisioning steps are ablein some deployments toupdatestore most, if not all, routes on one (e.g., theboot image, commit an initial configuration,Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) root) or a few routers andexecute arbitrary scripts to address auxiliary needs. The updated device is subsequently ableforward the IPv6 datagram using a source routing technique toestablish secure connections with other systems. For instance,avoid large routing tables on memory-constrained routers. This document specifies adevice may establish NETCONF (RFC 6241) and/or RESTCONF (RFC 8040) connections with deployment-specific network management systems.</t>new IPv6 Routing header type for delivering datagrams within a RPL routing domain. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6554"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6554"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-10.txt">anchor="RFC6724" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6724"> <front><title>A Reference Model<title>Default Address Selection forAutonomic Networking</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-10"/> <author initials="M" surname="Behringer" fullname="Michael Behringer"> <organization/> </author>Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)</title> <authorinitials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter"> <organization/>initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization/>initials="R." surname="Draves" fullname="R. Draves"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="L" surname="Ciavaglia" fullname="Laurent Ciavaglia"> <organization/>initials="A." surname="Matsumoto" fullname="A. Matsumoto"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="J" surname="Nobre" fullname="Jeferson Nobre"> <organization/>initials="T." surname="Chown" fullname="T. Chown"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <datemonth="November" day="22" year="2018"/>year="2012" month="September"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This document describesa reference modeltwo algorithms, one forAutonomic Networkingsource address selection and one formanaged networks. It definesdestination address selection. The algorithms specify default behavior for all Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) implementations. They do not override choices made by applications or upper-layer protocols, nor do they preclude thebehaviourdevelopment of more advanced mechanisms for address selection. The two algorithms share a common context, including anautonomic node, how the various elements in an autonomic context work together, and how autonomic services can use the infrastructure.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00.txt"> <front> <title>Autoconfiguration of NOC services in ACP networks via GRASP</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig-00"/> <author initials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization/> </author> <date month="July" day="2" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines standardsoptional mechanism forthe autoconfiguration of crucial NOC services on ACP nodes via GRASP. It enables secure remote accessallowing administrators tozero-touch bootstrapped ANI devices via SSH/NETCONF with RADIUS/Diameter authentication and authorizationprovide policy that can override the default behavior. In dual-stack implementations, the destination address selection algorithm can consider both IPv4 andprovides lifecycle autoconfiguration for other crucial services suchIPv6 addresses -- depending on the available source addresses, the algorithm might prefer IPv6 addresses over IPv4 addresses, or vice versa.</t> <t indent="0">Default address selection assyslog, NTP (clock synchronization)defined in this specification applies to all IPv6 nodes, including both hosts andDNS for operational purposes.</t>routers. This document obsoletes RFC 3484. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6724"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6724"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="IEEE-1588-2008" target="http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/1588-2008.html">anchor="RFC6733" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6733"> <front><title> IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems </title><title>Diameter Base Protocol</title> <authorfullname="IEEE"> <organization>IEEE Standards Board</organization>initials="V." surname="Fajardo" fullname="V. Fajardo" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author><date month="December" year="2008"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="AR8021" target="http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-2009.html"> <front> <title> IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity </title><authorfullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group"> <organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization>initials="J." surname="Arkko" fullname="J. Arkko"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author><date month="December" year="2009"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="IEEE-802.1X" target="http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1X-2010.html"> <front> <title> IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control </title><authorfullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group"> <organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization>initials="J." surname="Loughney" fullname="J. Loughney"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author><date month="February" year="2010"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="MACSEC" target="https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AE-2006.html"> <front> <title> IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control (MAC) Security </title><authorfullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group"> <organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization>initials="G." surname="Zorn" fullname="G. Zorn" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <datemonth="June" year="2006"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="LLDP" target="https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AB-2016.html"> <front> <title> IEEE Standardyear="2012" month="October"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">The Diameter base protocol is intended to provide an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) framework forLocalapplications such as network access or IP mobility in both local andMetropolitan Area Networks: Stationroaming situations. This document specifies the message format, transport, error reporting, accounting, andMedia Access Control Connectivity Discovery </title> <author fullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group"> <organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization> </author> <date month="June" year="2016"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="CABFORUM" target="https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-certificate-contents/"> <front> <title> Certificate Contents for Baseline SSL </title> <author> <organization>CA/Browser Forum</organization> </author> <date month="Nov" year="2019"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="X.509" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509"> <front> <title>Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -security services used by all Diameter applications. TheDirectory: Public-keyDiameter base protocol as defined in this document obsoletes RFC 3588 andattribute certificate frameworks</title> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation X.509," value="ISO/IEC 9594-8"/> <author> <organization>International Telecommunication Union</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2016"/>RFC 5719, and it must be supported by all new Diameter implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front></reference> <reference anchor="X.520" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520"> <front> <title>Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected attribute types</title><seriesInfoname="ITU-T Recommendation X.520," value="ISO/IEC 9594-6"/> <author> <organization>International Telecommunication Union</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2016"/> </front>name="RFC" value="6733"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6733"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="ACPDRAFT" target="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30.pdf">anchor="RFC6762" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6762"> <front><title>An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-30"/> <author initials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization/> </author><title>Multicast DNS</title> <authorinitials="M" surname="Behringer" fullname="Michael Behringer"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <authorinitials="S" surname="Bjarnason" fullname="Steinthor Bjarnason"> <organization/>initials="M." surname="Krochmal" fullname="M. Krochmal"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author></front> <annotation>[RFC-Editor: Please remove this complete reference from<date year="2013" month="February"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">As networked devices become smaller, more portable, and more ubiquitous, theRFC] Referability to operate with less configured infrastructure is increasingly important. In particular, theIETF working group draft forability to look up DNS resource record data types (including, but not limited to, host names) in thefew sections removed from this document for various reasons. They captureabsence of a conventional managed DNS server is useful.</t> <t indent="0">Multicast DNS (mDNS) provides thestateability to perform DNS-like operations on the local link in the absence ofdiscussion about unresolved issues that may needany conventional Unicast DNS server. In addition, Multicast DNS designates a portion of the DNS namespace to berevisited in future work. </annotation> </reference> <reference anchor="FCC" target="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367699A1.docx"> <front> <title>FCC STAFF REPORT ON NATIONWIDE T-MOBILE NETWORK OUTAGE ON JUNE 15, 2020 (PS Docket No. 20-183)</title> <author> <organization>FCC</organization> </author> <date year="2020" /> </front> <annotation>The FCC's Public Safetyfree for local use, without the need to pay any annual fee, andHomeland Security Bureau issues a report onwithout the need to set up delegations or otherwise configure anationwide T-Mobile outageconventional DNS server to answer for those names.</t> <t indent="0">The primary benefits of Multicast DNS names are thatoccurred on June 15, 2020. Action by: Public Safety(i) they require little or no administration or configuration to set them up, (ii) they work when no infrastructure is present, andHomeland Security Bureau.</annotation>(iii) they work during infrastructure failures.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6762"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6762"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09.txt">anchor="RFC6763" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6763"> <front><title>ROLL Applicability Statement Template</title> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09"/><title>DNS-Based Service Discovery</title> <authorinitials="M" surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael Richardson"> <organization/>initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Krochmal" fullname="M. Krochmal"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <datemonth="May" day="3" year="2016"/>year="2013" month="February"/> <abstract><t>This<t indent="0">This documentis a template applicability statement for the Routing over Low-powerspecifies how DNS resource records are named andLossy Networks (ROLL) WG. This document is not for publication, but rather isstructured tobe used asfacilitate service discovery. Given atemplate.</t> </abstract> </front> </reference> </references> <section anchor="further" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Background and Futures (Informative)</name> <t>The following sections discuss additional background information about aspects of the normative parts of this document or associated mechanisms such as BRSKI (such as why specific choices were made by the ACP) and they provide discussion about possible future variationstype ofthe ACP.</t> <section anchor="address-spaces" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ACP Address Space Schemes</name> <t>This document defines the Zone, Vlongservice that a client is looking for, andManual sub address schemes primarily to support address prefix assignment via distributed, potentially uncoordinated ACP registrars as defineda domain in<xref target="acp-registrars" format="default"/>. This costs 48/46-bit identifier sowhich the client is looking for thatthese ACP registrar can assign non-conflicting address prefixes. This design does not leave enough bitsservice, this mechanism allows clients tosimultaneously support a large number of nodes (Node-ID) plusdiscover alarge prefixlist oflocal addresses for every node plus a large enough setnamed instances ofbits to identify a routing Zone. In result, Zone, Vlong 8/16 attempt to support all features, but via separate prefixes.</t> <t>In networksthatalways expectdesired service, using standard DNS queries. This mechanism is referred torely on a centralized PMSasdescribed above (<xref target="pms" format="default"/>), the 48/46-bitsDNS-based Service Discovery, or DNS-SD.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6763"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6763"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6824" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6824"> <front> <title>TCP Extensions forthe Registrar-ID could be saved. Such variations of the ACP addressing mechanisms could be introduced through future work in different ways. IfMultipath Operation with Multiple Addresses</title> <author initials="A." surname="Ford" fullname="A. Ford"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Raiciu" fullname="C. Raiciu"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="O." surname="Bonaventure" fullname="O. Bonaventure"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2013" month="January"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">TCP/IP communication is currently restricted to anew otherName was introduced, incompatible ACP variations could be created where every design aspectsingle path per connection, yet multiple paths often exist between peers. The simultaneous use ofthe ACP could be changed. Including all addressing choices. If insteadthese multiple paths for anew addressing sub-typeTCP/IP session wouldbe defined, it could be a backward compatible extension of this ACP specification. Information such asimprove resource usage within thesize ofnetwork and, thus, improve user experience through higher throughput and improved resilience to network failure.</t> <t indent="0">Multipath TCP provides the ability to simultaneously use multiple paths between peers. This document presents azone-prefix and the lengthset ofthe prefix assignedextensions to traditional TCP to support multipath operation. The protocol offers theACP node itself could be encoded via the extension fieldsame type of service to applications as TCP (i.e., reliable bytestream), and it provides theacp-node-name.</t> <t>Note that an explicitly defined "Manual" addressing sub-scheme is always beneficialcomponents necessary toprovideestablish and use multiple TCP flows across potentially disjoint paths. This document defines aneasy wayExperimental Protocol forACP nodes to prohibit incorrect manual configuration of any non-"Manual" ACP address spaces and therefore ensurethe Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6824"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6824"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6830" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6830"> <front> <title>The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)</title> <author initials="D." surname="Farinacci" fullname="D. Farinacci"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="V." surname="Fuller" fullname="V. Fuller"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Meyer" fullname="D. Meyer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Lewis" fullname="D. Lewis"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2013" month="January"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document describes a network-layer-based protocol that"Manual" operations will never impact correct routing for any non-"Manual" ACPenables separation of IP addressesassigned via ACP certificates.</t> </section> <section anchor="bootstrap" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>BRSKI Bootstrap (ANI)</name> <t>BRSKI describes how nodes with an IDevID certificate can securelyinto two new numbering spaces: Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) andzero-touch enroll with an LDevID certificateRouting Locators (RLOCs). No changes are required tosupport the ACP. BRSKI also leverages the ACPeither host protocol stacks or toenable zero-touch bootstrapthe "core" ofnew nodes across networks without any configuration requirements acrossthetransit nodes (e.g., no DHCP/DNS forwarding/server setup). This includes otherwise not configured networks as described in <xref target="secure-bootstrap" format="default"/>. Therefore, BRSKI in conjunction with ACP provides forInternet infrastructure. The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) can be incrementally deployed, without asecure"flag day", andzero-touch management solution for complete networks. Nodes supporting such an infrastructure (BRSKIoffers Traffic Engineering, multihoming, andACP)mobility benefits to early adopters, even when there arecalled ANI nodes (Autonomic Networking Infrastructure), see <xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/>. Nodes that do not support an IDevID certificate but only an (insecure) vendor specific Unique Device Identifier (UDI) or nodes whose manufacturer does not support a MASA could use some future security reduced versionrelatively few LISP-capable sites.</t> <t indent="0">Design and development ofBRSKI.</t> <t>When BRSKI is used to provision a domain certificate (which is called enrollment),LISP was largely motivated by theBRSKI registrar (acting as an enhanced EST server) must includeproblem statement produced by theotherName / AcpNodeName encoded ACP addressOctober 2006 IAB Routing anddomain name to the enrolling node (called pledge) via its response to the pledges EST CSR Attribute request that is mandatory in BRSKI.</t> <t>The Certification Authority inAddressing Workshop. This document defines anACP network must not change the otherName / AcpNodeName inExperimental Protocol for thecertificate. The ACP nodes can therefore find their ACP address and domain using this field inInternet community.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6830"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6830"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7011" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7011"> <front> <title>Specification of thedomain certificate, bothIP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol forthemselves, as wellthe Exchange of Flow Information</title> <author initials="B." surname="Claise" fullname="B. Claise" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Trammell" fullname="B. Trammell" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="P." surname="Aitken" fullname="P. Aitken"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2013" month="September"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) protocol, which serves as a means forother nodes.</t> <t>The use of BRSKI in conjunction withtransmitting Traffic Flow information over theACP can also helpnetwork. In order tofurther simplify maintenance and renewal of domain certificates. Insteadtransmit Traffic Flow information from an Exporting Process to a Collecting Process, a common representation ofrelying on CRL, the lifetimeflow data and a standard means ofcertificates can be made extremely small, for example incommunicating them are required. This document describes how theorder of hours. WhenIPFIX Data and Template Records are carried over anode fails to connect to the ACP within its certificate lifetime, it cannot connect to the ACPnumber of transport protocols from an IPFIX Exporting Process torenew its certificate across it (using just EST), but it can still renew its certificate asan"enrolled/expired pledge" via the BRSKI bootstrap proxy.IPFIX Collecting Process. Thisrequiresdocument obsoletes RFC 5101.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="77"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7011"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7011"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7404" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7404" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7404"> <front> <title>Using Only Link-Local Addressing inside an IPv6 Network</title> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Vyncke" fullname="E. Vyncke"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2014" month="November"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">In an IPv6 network, it is possible to use onlythatlink-local addresses on infrastructure links between routers. This document discusses theBRSKI registrar honors expired domain certificatesadvantages andthat the pledge attemptsdisadvantages of this approach toperform TLS authenticationfacilitate the decision process forBRSKI bootstrap using its expired domain certificate before falling back to attemptinga given network.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7404"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7404"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7426" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7426" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7426"> <front> <title>Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology</title> <author initials="E." surname="Haleplidis" fullname="E. Haleplidis" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Pentikousis" fullname="K. Pentikousis" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Denazis" fullname="S. Denazis"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Hadi Salim" fullname="J. Hadi Salim"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Meyer" fullname="D. Meyer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="O." surname="Koufopavlou" fullname="O. Koufopavlou"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2015" month="January"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Software-Defined Networking (SDN) refers touse its IDevID certificate for BRSKI. This mechanism could also render CRLs unnecessary because the BRSKI registrar in conjunction with the CA would not renew revoked certificates - onlya"Do-not-renew" list would be necessary on BRSKI registrars/CA.</t> <t>Innew approach for network programmability, that is, theabsence of BRSKI or less secure variants thereof, provisioning of certificates may involve one or more touches or non-standardized automation. Node vendors usually support provisioning of certificates into nodes via PKCS#7 (see <xref target="RFC2315" format="default"/>)capacity to initialize, control, change, andmay support this provisioning through vendor specific modelsmanage network behavior dynamically viaNETCONF (<xref target="RFC6241" format="default"/>). If such nodes also support NETCONF Zero-Touch (<xref target="RFC8572" format="default"/>) then this can be combined to zero-touch provisioningopen interfaces. SDN emphasizes the role ofdomain certificates into nodes. Unless there are equivalent integrationsoftware in running networks through the introduction ofNETCONF connections acrossan abstraction for theACPdata forwarding plane and, by doing so, separates it from the control plane. This separation allows faster innovation cycles at both planes asthere is in BRSKI, this combination would not support zero-touch bootstrap across a not configured network though.</t> </section> <section anchor="discovery" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ACP Neighbor discovery protocol selection</name> <t>This section discusses why GRASP DULL was chosenexperience has already shown. However, there is increasing confusion as to what exactly SDN is, what thediscovery protocol for L2 adjacent candidate ACP neighbors. The contenders considered where GRASP, mDNS or LLDP.</t> <section anchor="discovery-lldp" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>LLDP</name> <t>LLDPlayer structure is in an SDN architecture, andCisco's earlier Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) are example of L2 discovery protocols that terminate their messages on L2 ports. If those protocols would be chosen for ACP neighbor discovery, ACP neighbor discovery would therefore also terminate on L2 ports.how layers interface with each other. Thiswould prevent ACP construction over non-ACP capable but LLDP or CDP enabled L2 switches. LLDP has extensions using different MACdocument, a product of the IRTF Software-Defined Networking Research Group (SDNRG), addresses these questions andthis could have been an optionprovides a concise reference forACP discovery as well, buttheadditional required IEEE standardizationSDN research community based on relevant peer-reviewed literature, the RFC series, anddefinitionrelevant documents by other standards organizations.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7426"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7426"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7435" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7435"> <front> <title>Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most ofa profile for such a modified instancethe Time</title> <author initials="V." surname="Dukhovni" fullname="V. Dukhovni"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2014" month="December"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document defines the concept "Opportunistic Security" in the context ofLLDP seemedcommunications protocols. Protocol designs based on Opportunistic Security use encryption even when authentication is not available, and use authentication when possible, thereby removing barriers tobe more work thanthebenefitwidespread use of"reusingencryption on theexisting protocol" LLDP for this very simple purpose.</t> </section> <!-- discovery-lldp --> <section anchor="discovery-mdns" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>mDNSInternet.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7435"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7435"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7575" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7575"> <front> <title>Autonomic Networking: Definitions andL2 support</name> <t>Multicast DNNS (mDNS) <xref target="RFC6762" format="default"/> with DNS Service Discovery (DNS-SD) Resource Records (RRs) as definedDesign Goals</title> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Bjarnason" fullname="S. Bjarnason"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Clemm" fullname="A. Clemm"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Carpenter" fullname="B. Carpenter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Jiang" fullname="S. Jiang"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Ciavaglia" fullname="L. Ciavaglia"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2015" month="June"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Autonomic systems were first described in<xref target="RFC6763" format="default"/>2001. The fundamental goal isa key contender as an ACP discovery protocol. because it relies on link-local IP multicast, it does operates at the subnet level,self-management, including self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection. This isalso found in L2 switches. The authors of thisachieved by an autonomic function having minimal dependencies on human administrators or centralized management systems. It usually implies distribution across network elements.</t> <t indent="0">This document defines common language and outlines design goals (and what are notaware of mDNS implementation that terminate their mDNS messages on L2 ports instead of the subnet level. If mDNS was used as the ACP discovery mechanism on an ACP capable (L3)/L2 switch as outlineddesign goals) for autonomic functions. A high-level reference model illustrates how functional elements in<xref target="acp-l2-switches" format="default"/>, then this would be necessary to implement. Itan Autonomic Network interact. This document islikely that termination of mDNS messages could only be applied to all mDNS messages from such a port, which would then make it necessary to software forward any non-ACP related mDNS messages to maintain prior non-ACP mDNS functionality. Adding supporta product of the IRTF's Network Management Research Group.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7575"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7575"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7576" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7576" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7576"> <front> <title>General Gap Analysis forACP into such L2 switches with mDNS could therefore create regression problemsAutonomic Networking</title> <author initials="S." surname="Jiang" fullname="S. Jiang"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Carpenter" fullname="B. Carpenter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2015" month="June"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document provides a problem statement and general gap analysis forprior mDNS functionalityan IP-based Autonomic Network that is mainly based onthose nodes. With low performancedistributed network devices. The document provides background by reviewing the current status ofsoftware forwarding in many L2 switches, this could also makeautonomic aspects of IP networks and theACP riskyextent tosupportwhich current network management depends onsuch L2 switches.</t> </section> <!-- discovery-mdns --> <section anchor="discovery-comparison" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Why DULL GRASP</name> <t>LLDP was not considered because ofcentralization and human administrators. Finally, theabove mentioned issues. mDNS was not selected because ofdocument outlines theabove L2 mDNS considerationsgeneral features that are missing from current network abilities andbecauseare needed in the ideal Autonomic Network concept.</t> <t indent="0">This document is a product of thefollowing additional points:</t> <t>If mDNS was not already existing inIRTF's Network Management Research Group.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7576"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7576"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7585" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7585" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7585"> <front> <title>Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access Identifier (NAI)</title> <author initials="S." surname="Winter" fullname="S. Winter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="McCauley" fullname="M. McCauley"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2015" month="October"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies anode, it would be more workmeans toimplement than DULL GRASP, and if an existing implementation of mDNS was used, it would likely be more code space thanfind authoritative RADIUS servers for aseparate implementation of DULL GRASPgiven realm. It is used in conjunction with either RADIUS over Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/TLS) ora shared implementation of DULL GRASPRADIUS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (RADIUS/DTLS).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7585"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7585"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7721" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7721"> <front> <title>Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms</title> <author initials="A." surname="Cooper" fullname="A. Cooper"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="F." surname="Gont" fullname="F. Gont"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Thaler" fullname="D. Thaler"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2016" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document discusses privacy and security considerations for several IPv6 address generation mechanisms, both standardized and non-standardized. It evaluates how different mechanisms mitigate different threats andGRASP intheACP.</t> </section> <!-- discovery-comparison --> </section> <!-- discovery--> <section anchor="why-rpl" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Choice of routing protocol (RPL)</name> <t>This section motivates why RPLtrade-offs that implementors, developers, and users face in choosing different addresses or address generation mechanisms.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7721"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7721"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7761" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7761"> <front> <title>Protocol Independent Multicast -"IPv6 RoutingSparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocolfor Low-PowerSpecification (Revised)</title> <author initials="B." surname="Fenner" fullname="B. Fenner"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="H." surname="Holbrook" fullname="H. Holbrook"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="I." surname="Kouvelas" fullname="I. Kouvelas"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Parekh" fullname="R. Parekh"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="Z." surname="Zhang" fullname="Z. Zhang"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Zheng" fullname="L. Zheng"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2016" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document specifies Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM). PIM-SM is a multicast routing protocol that can use the underlying unicast routing information base or a separate multicast-capable routing information base. It builds unidirectional shared trees rooted at a Rendezvous Point (RP) per group, andLossy Networks (<xref target="RFC6550" format="default"/> was chosen asit optionally creates shortest-path trees per source.</t> <t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 4601 by replacing it, addresses thedefault (and in this specification only) routing protocol forerrata filed against it, removes theACP. The choiceoptional (*,*,RP), PIM Multicast Border Router features andabove explained profile was derived from a pre-standard implementation of ACPauthentication using IPsec thatwas successfully deployed in operational networks.</t> <t>Requirements for routing inlack sufficient deployment experience (see Appendix A), and moves theACP are: </t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Self-management: The ACP must build automatically, without human intervention. Therefore, routing protocol must also work completely automatically. RPLPIM specification to Internet Standard.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="83"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7761"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7761"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7950" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7950"> <front> <title>The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language</title> <author initials="M." surname="Bjorklund" fullname="M. Bjorklund" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2016" month="August"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">YANG is asimple, self-managing protocol, which does not require zones or areas; it is also self-configuring, sincedata modeling language used to model configurationis carried as part ofdata, state data, Remote Procedure Calls, and notifications for network management protocols. This document describes theprotocol (see Section 6.7.6syntax and semantics of<xref target="RFC6550" format="default"/>).</li> <li>Scale: The ACP builds over an entire domain, which could be a large enterprise or service provider network. The routing protocol must therefore support domainsversion 1.1 of100,000 nodes or more, ideally withouttheneed for zoning or separation into areas. RPL has this scale property. ThisYANG language. YANG version 1.1 isbased on extensive usea maintenance release ofdefault routing.</li> <li>Low resource consumption: The ACP supports traditional network infrastructure, thus runs in addition to traditional protocols. The ACP, and specificallytherouting protocol must have low resource consumption both in terms of memory and CPU requirements. Specifically, at edge nodes, where memoryYANG language, addressing ambiguities andCPUdefects in the original specification. There arescarce, consumption should be minimal. RPL buildsaDODAG, where the main resource consumption is at the rootsmall number of backward incompatibilities from YANG version 1. This document also specifies theDODAG. The closerYANG mappings to theedge of the network,Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7950"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7950"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8028" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8028"> <front> <title>First-Hop Router Selection by Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network</title> <author initials="F." surname="Baker" fullname="F. Baker"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Carpenter" fullname="B. Carpenter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2016" month="November"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document describes expected IPv6 host behavior in a scenario that has more than one prefix, each allocated by an upstream network that is assumed to implement BCP 38 ingress filtering, when theless state needshost has multiple routers tobe maintained. This adapts nicelychoose from. It also applies to other scenarios such as thetypical network design. Also, all changes below a common parent node are kept belowusage of stateful firewalls thatparent node.</li> <li>Support for unstructured address space: In the Autonomic Networking Infrastructure, node addresses are identifiers, and may not be assignedeffectively act as address-based filters. Host behavior in choosing atopological way. Also, nodesfirst-hop router maymove topologically, without changing their address. Therefore,interact with source address selection in a given implementation. However, therouting protocol must support completely unstructuredselection of the source addressspace. RPL is specifically madeformobile ad-hoc networks, with no assumptions on topologically aligned addressing.</li> <li>Modularity: To keepa packet is done before theinitial implementation small, yet allow laterfirst-hop router formore complex methods, itthat packet ishighly desirablechosen. Given that therouting protocol has a simple base functionality, but can import new functional modules if needed. RPL has this propertynetwork or host is, or appears to be, multihomed with multiple provider-allocated addresses, that theconcept of "objective function", which is a pluginhost has elected tomodify routing behavior.</li> <li>Extensibility: Since the Autonomic Networking Infrastructure isuse anew concept, it is likelysource address in a given prefix, and thatchangessome but not all neighboring routers are advertising that prefix inthe way of operation will happen over time. RPL allows for new objective functionstheir Router Advertisement Prefix Information Options, this document specifies tobe introduced later,whichallow changes to the way the routing protocol creates the DAGs.</li> <li>Multi-topology support:router a host should present its transmission. Itmay become necessary in the future to support more than one DODAG for different purposes, using different objective functions. RPL allowupdates RFC 4861.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8028"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8028"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8126"> <front> <title>Guidelines forthe creationWriting an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title> <author initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2017" month="June"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Many protocols make use ofseveral parallel DODAGs, should this be required. This could be used to create different topologiespoints of extensibility that use constants toreach different roots.</li> <li>No need for path optimization: RPL does not necessarily compute the optimal path between any two nodes. However, the ACP does not require this today, since it carries mainly non-delay-sensitive feedback loops. It is possibleidentify various protocol parameters. To ensure thatdifferent optimization schemes become necessary in the future, but RPL can be expanded (see point "Extensibility" above).</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="acp-grasp" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ACP Information Distribution and multicast</name> <t>IP multicast is not used bytheACP because the ANI (Autonomic Networking Infrastructure) itself doesvalues in these fields do notrequire IP multicast but only service announcement/discovery. Using IP multicast for that wouldhavemade it necessaryconflicting uses and todeveloppromote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by azero-touch auto configuring solution for ASM (Any Source Multicast -central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by theoriginal form of IP multicast definedInternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t> <t indent="0">To make assignments in<xref target="RFC1112" format="default"/>),a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under whichwouldnew values should bequite complexassigned, as well as when anddifficulthow modifications tojustify. One aspect of complexity where no attempt at a solution has been described in IETF documents is the automatic-selection of routers that shouldexisting values can bePIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) Rendezvous Points (RPs) (see <xref target="RFC7761" format="default"/>). The other aspects of complexity aremade, is needed. This document defines a framework for theimplementationdocumentation ofMLD (<xref target="RFC4604" format="default"/>), PIM-SM and Anycast-RP (see <xref target="RFC4610" format="default"/>). If those implementations already exist in a product, then they would be very likely tiedthese guidelines by specification authors, in order toaccelerated forwarding which consumes hardware resources,assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely inreturn is difficult to justify as a costthe operation ofperforming only service discovery.</t> <t>Some future ASA may need high performance in-network data replication. Thata registry.</t> <t indent="0">This is thecase when the usethird edition ofIP multicast is justified. Suchthis document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8316" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8316" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8316"> <front> <title>Autonomic Networking Use Case for Distributed Detection of Service Level Agreement (SLA) Violations</title> <author initials="J." surname="Nobre" fullname="J. Nobre"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Granville" fullname="L. Granville"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Clemm" fullname="A. Clemm"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Gonzalez Prieto" fullname="A. Gonzalez Prieto"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2018" month="February"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document describes anASA can thenexperimental useservice discovery from ACP GRASP, and then they do not need ASM but only SSM (Source Specific Multicast, see <xref target="RFC4607" format="default"/>)case that employs autonomic networking for theIP multicast replication. SSM itself can simply be enabledmonitoring of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). The use case is for detecting violations of SLAs in a distributed fashion. It strives to optimize and dynamically adapt theData-Plane (or evenautonomic deployment of active measurement probes inan update toa way that maximizes theACP)likelihood of detecting service-level violations with a given resource budget to perform active measurements. This optimization and adaptation should be done without anyother configuration than just enabling it on all nodes and only requiresoutside guidance or intervention.</t> <t indent="0">This document is asimpler versionproduct ofMLD (see <xref target="RFC5790" format="default"/>).</t> <t>LSP (Link State Protocol) based IGP routing protocols typically havethe IRTF Network Management Research Group (NMRG). It is published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8316"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8316"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8366" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8366"> <front> <title>A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols</title> <author initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="K. Watsen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Richardson" fullname="M. Richardson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Pritikin" fullname="M. Pritikin"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Eckert" fullname="T. Eckert"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2018" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document defines amechanismstrategy toflood information, and suchsecurely assign amechanism could be usedpledge toflood GRASP objectivesan owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, bydefining them to be information of that IGP.the pledge's manufacturer. Thiswould beartifact is known as apossible optimization in future variations of the ACP that do use"voucher".</t> <t indent="0">This document defines anLSP routing protocol. Note thoughartifact format as a YANG-defined JSON document thatsuchhas been signed using amechanism would not work easily for GRASP M_DISCOVERY messages whichCryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) structure. Other YANG-derived formats areintelligently (constrained) flooded not acrosspossible. The voucher artifact is normally generated by thewhole ACP, butpledge's manufacturer (i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)).</t> <t indent="0">This document onlyupdefines the voucher artifact, leaving it toa node where a responder is found. We do expect that many future services in ASA will have only few consuming ASA,other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8366"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8366"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8368" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8368"> <front> <title>Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)</title> <author initials="T." surname="Eckert" fullname="T. Eckert" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Behringer" fullname="M. Behringer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2018" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM), as per BCP 161, forthose cases, M_DISCOVERY is the more efficient method than flooding across the whole domain.</t> <t>Because the ACP uses RPL, one desirable future extensiondata networks is often subject touse RPLs existing notionthe problem ofDODAG, which are loop-free distribution trees,circular dependencies when relying on connectivity provided by the network tomake GRASP flooding more efficient bothbe managed forM_FLOODthe OAM purposes.</t> <t indent="0">Provisioning while bringing up devices andM_DISCOVERY. See <xref target="ACP_interfaces" format="default"/> how this willnetworks tends to bespecifically beneficial when using NBMA interfaces. This is not currently specifiedmore difficult to automate than service provisioning later on. Changes inthis documentcore network functions impacting reachability cannot be automated becauseit is not quite clear yet what exactlyof ongoing connectivity requirements for theimplicationsOAM equipment itself, and widely used OAM protocols are not secure enough tomake GRASP flooding depend on RPL DODAG convergence and how difficult it wouldbeto let GRASP flooding access the DODAG information.</t> </section> <section anchor="domain-usage" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>CAs, domains and routing subdomains</name> <t>There is a wide range of setting up different ACP solution by appropriately using CAs and the domain and rsub elements in the acp-node-name in the domain certificate. We summarize these options here as they have been explained in different parts ofcarried across the network without security concerns.</t> <t indent="0">This document describes how to integrate OAM processes with an autonomic control plane inbefore and discuss possibleorder to provide stable anddesirable extensions:</t> <t>An ACP domainsecure connectivity for those OAM processes. This connectivity isthe set of all ACP nodes that can authenticate each other as belongingnot subject to thesame ACP network using the ACP domain membership check (<xref target="certcheck" format="default"/>). GRASP inside the ACP is run across all transitively connected ACP nodesaforementioned circular dependencies.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8368"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8368"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8398" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8398" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8398"> <front> <title>Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 Certificates</title> <author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="A. Melnikov" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="W." surname="Chuang" fullname="W. Chuang" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2018" month="May"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document defines adomain.</t> <t>The rsub elementnew name form for inclusion in theacp-node-name permits the useotherName field ofaddresses from different ULA prefixes. One use case is to create multiple physical networks that initially may be separated with one ACP domain but different routing subdomains, so that all nodes can mutual trust their ACP certificates (not depending on rsub)an X.509 Subject Alternative Name andsoIssuer Alternative Name extension thatthey could connect later together into a contiguous ACP network.</t> <t>One instance of such a use case is an ACP for regions interconnected viaallows anon-ACP enabled core, for example duecertificate subject to be associated with an internationalized email address.</t> <t indent="0">This document updates RFC 5280.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8398"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8398"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8402" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8402"> <front> <title>Segment Routing Architecture</title> <author initials="C." surname="Filsfils" fullname="C. Filsfils" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Previdi" fullname="S. Previdi" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Ginsberg" fullname="L. Ginsberg"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B." surname="Decraene" fullname="B. Decraene"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Litkowski" fullname="S. Litkowski"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Shakir" fullname="R. Shakir"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2018" month="July"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Segment Routing (SR) leverages theabsencesource routing paradigm. A node steers a packet through an ordered list ofproduct support for ACP on the core nodes. ACP connect configurations as defined in this documentinstructions, called "segments". A segment canbe used to extend and interconnect those ACP islandsrepresent any instruction, topological or service based. A segment can have a semantic local tothe NOC and merge them intoan SR node or global within an SR domain. SR provides asingle ACP when later that product support gap is closed.</t> <t>Notemechanism thatRPL scales very well. It is not necessaryallows a flow touse multiple routing subdomainsbe restricted toscale ACP domains inaway that would be required if other routing protocols where used. They existspecific topological path, while maintaining per-flow state onlyas options forat theabove mentioned reasons.</t> <t>If different ACP domains are to be created that should not allow to connect to each other by default, these ACP domains simply needingress node(s) tohave different domain elements intheacp-node-name. These domain elementsSR domain.</t> <t indent="0">SR can bearbitrary, including subdomains of one another: Domains "example.com" and "research.example.com" are separate domains if both are domain elements indirectly applied to theacp-node-name of certificates.</t> <t>It is not necessaryMPLS architecture with no change tohave a separate CA for different ACP domains:the forwarding plane. A segment is encoded as anoperator can useMPLS label. An ordered list of segments is encoded as asingle CA to sign certificates for multiple ACP domains that are not allowed to connectstack of labels. The segment toeach other becauseprocess is on thechecks for ACP adjacencies includes comparisontop of thedomain part.</t> <t>If multiple independent networks choose the same domain name but had their own CA, these would not form a single ACP domain becausestack. Upon completion ofCA mismatch. Therefore, there is no problem in choosing domain names that are potentially also used by others. Nevertheless ita segment, the related label ishighly recommended to use domain names that onepopped from the stack.</t> <t indent="0">SR canhave high probability tobeunique. It is recommendedapplied touse domain names that startthe IPv6 architecture, with aDNS domain names owned by the assigning organization and unique within it. For example, "acp.example.com" if you own "example.com".</t> </section> <section anchor="intent" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Intent for the ACP</name> <t>Intentnew type of routing header. A segment isthe architecture componentencoded as an IPv6 address. An ordered list ofautonomic networks according to <xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model" format="default"/> that allows operators to issue policies to the network. Its applicability for usesegments isquite flexible and freeform, with potential applications including policies flooded across ACP GRASP and interpreted on every ACP node.</t> <t>One concern for future definitionsencoded as an ordered list ofIntent solutionsIPv6 addresses in the routing header. The active segment is indicated by theproblemDestination Address (DA) ofcircular dependencies when expressing Intent policies abouttheACP itself.</t> <t>For example, Intent could indicatepacket. The next active segment is indicated by a pointer in thedesirenew routing header.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8402"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8402"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8572" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8572"> <front> <title>Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)</title> <author initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="K. Watsen"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="I." surname="Farrer" fullname="I. Farrer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Abrahamsson" fullname="M. Abrahamsson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2019" month="April"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This document presents a technique tobuild an ACP across all domains that havesecurely provision acommon parent domain (without relying on the rsub/routing-subdomain solution definednetworking device when it is booting in a factory-default state. Variations inthis document). For example, ACP nodes with domain "example.com", "access.example.com", "core.example.com" and "city.core.example.com" should all establish one single ACP.</t> <t>If each domain has its own source of Intent, thentheIntent would simply havesolution enable it toallow adding the peer domains TAbe used on both public anddomain namesprivate networks. The provisioning steps are able to update theparameters for the ACP domain membership check (<xref target="certcheck" format="default"/>) so that nodes from those other domains are accepted as ACP peers.</t> <t>If this Intent wasboot image, commit an initial configuration, and execute arbitrary scripts tobe originated only from one domain, it could likely not be madeaddress auxiliary needs. The updated device is subsequently able towork because theestablish secure connections with otherdomains will not build any ACP connection amongst each other, whether they use the same or different CA duesystems. For instance, a device may establish NETCONF (RFC 6241) and/or RESTCONF (RFC 8040) connections with deployment-specific network management systems.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8572"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8572"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8684" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8684" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8684"> <front> <title>TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses</title> <author initials="A." surname="Ford" fullname="A. Ford"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Raiciu" fullname="C. Raiciu"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Handley" fullname="M. Handley"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="O." surname="Bonaventure" fullname="O. Bonaventure"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Paasch" fullname="C. Paasch"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2020" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">TCP/IP communication is currently restricted tothe ACP domain membership check.</t> <t>If the domainsa single path per connection, yet multiple paths often exist between peers. The simultaneous use of these multiple paths for a TCP/IP session would improve resource usage within thesame CA one could change the ACP setupnetwork and thus improve user experience through higher throughput and improved resilience topermit fornetwork failure.</t> <t indent="0">Multipath TCP provides theACPability tobe establishedsimultaneously use multiple paths betweentwo ACP nodes with different acp-domain-names, but only forpeers. This document presents a set of extensions to traditional TCP to support multipath operation. The protocol offers thepurposesame type ofdisseminating limited information, such as Intent, but notservice toset up full ACP connectivity, specifically not RPL routingapplications as TCP (i.e., a reliable bytestream), andpassing of arbitrary GRASP information. Unlessit provides theIntent policies permit thiscomponents necessary tohappenestablish and use multiple TCP flows acrossdomain boundaries.</t> <t>This typepotentially disjoint paths.</t> <t indent="0">This document specifies v1 ofapproach where the ACP first allows Intent to operateMultipath TCP, obsoleting v0 as specified in RFC 6824, through clarifications andonly then sets upmodifications primarily driven by deployment experience.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8684"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8684"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8739" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8739" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8739"> <front> <title>Support for Short-Term, Automatically Renewed (STAR) Certificates in therest of ACP connectivity based on Intent policy could also be usedAutomated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title> <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Lopez" fullname="D. Lopez"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="O." surname="Gonzalez de Dios" fullname="O. Gonzalez de Dios"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Pastor Perales" fullname="A. Pastor Perales"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2020" month="March"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">Public key certificates need toenable Intent policiesbe revoked when they are compromised, thatwould limit functionality across the ACP inside a domain, as long as no policy would disturbis, when thedistribution of Intent. For example,associated private key is exposed tolimit reachability acrossan unauthorized entity. However, theACPrevocation process is often unreliable. An alternative tocertain typerevocation is issuing a sequence ofnodes or locationscertificates, each with a short validity period, and terminating the sequence upon compromise. This memo proposes an Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) extension to enable the issuance ofnodes.</t> </section> <section anchor="reuse-acp" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Adopting ACP conceptsShort-Term, Automatically Renewed (STAR) X.509 certificates.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8739"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8739"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8981" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8981"> <front> <title>Temporary Address Extensions forother environments</name> <t>The ACP as specifiedStateless Address Autoconfiguration inthisIPv6</title> <author initials="F." surname="Gont" fullname="F. Gont"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Krishnan" fullname="S. Krishnan"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Draves" fullname="R. Draves"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date year="2021" month="February"/> <abstract> <t indent="0">This documentis very explicit about the choice of optionsdescribes an extension toallow interoperable implementations. The choices made may not be the best for all environments, but the concepts used by the ACP can be usedIPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration that causes hosts tobuild derived solutions:</t> <t>The ACP specifiesgenerate temporary addresses with randomized interface identifiers for each prefix advertised with autoconfiguration enabled. Changing addresses over time limits theusewindow ofULAtime during which eavesdroppers andderiving its prefix fromother information collectors may trivially perform address-based network-activity correlation when thedomain name so that nosame addressallocationisrequired to deploy the ACP. The ACP will equally work not using ULA but any other /48 IPv6 prefix. This prefix could simply be a configuration ofemployed for multiple transactions by theACP registrars (for example when using BRSKI) to enrollsame host. Additionally, it reduces thedomain certificates - insteadwindow ofthe ACP registrar deriving the /48 ULA prefix from the AN domain name.</t> <t>Some solutions may already have an auto-addressing scheme, for example derived from existing unique device identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses). In those cases it may not be desirable to assign addresses to devicesexposure of a host as being accessible viathe ACPan addressinformation fieldthat becomes revealed as a result of active communication. This document obsoletes RFC 4941.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8981"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8981"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8992" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8992" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8992"> <front> <title>Autonomic IPv6 Edge Prefix Management in Large-Scale Networks</title> <author initials="S" surname="Jiang" fullname="Sheng Jiang" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="Z" surname="Du" fullname="Zongpeng Du"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="Q" surname="Sun" fullname="Qiong Sun"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date month="May" year="2021"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8992"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8992"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8993" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8993" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8993"> <front> <title>A Reference Model for Autonomic Networking</title> <author initials="M" surname="Behringer" fullname="Michael H. Behringer" role="editor"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="B" surname="Carpenter" fullname="Brian Carpenter"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="T" surname="Eckert" fullname="Toerless Eckert"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="L" surname="Ciavaglia" fullname="Laurent Ciavaglia"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <author initials="J" surname="Nobre" fullname="Jéferson Campos Nobre"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date month="May" year="2021"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8993"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8993"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-roll-applicability-template" quoteTitle="true" target="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09" derivedAnchor="ROLL-APPLICABILITY"> <front> <title>ROLL Applicability Statement Template</title> <author initials="M" surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael Richardson"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/> </author> <date month="May" day="3" year="2016"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09"/> <format type="TXT" target="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template-09.txt"/> <refcontent>Work in Progress</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="SR" target="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Single-root_input/output_virtualization&oldid=978867619" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="SR"> <front> <title>Single-root input/output virtualization</title> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Wikipedia</organization> </author> <date month="September" year="2020"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" quoteTitle="true" target="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43" derivedAnchor="TLS-DTLS13"> <front> <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <author fullname="Eric Rescorla"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RTFM, Inc.</organization> </author> <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Arm Limited</organization> </author> <author fullname="Nagendra Modadugu"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Google, Inc.</organization> </author> <date month="April" day="30" year="2021"/> <abstract> <t indent="0"> This document specifies Version 1.3 of theway described in this document. The certificate may simply serveDatagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications toidentify the ACP domain, andcommunicate over theaddress field could be omitted. The only fix requiredInternet inthe remaininga waythe ACP operatethat is designed todefine another element in the domain certificate for the two peers to decide who is the Deciderprevent eavesdropping, tampering, andwho is the Follower during secure channel building. Note though that future work may leverage the acp address to authenticate "ownership" of the address by the device. If the address used by a devicemessage forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol isderived from some pre-existing permanent local ID (such as MAC address), then it would be useful to store that address inintentionally based on thecertificate usingTransport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with theformatexception ofthe access address information field or in a similar way.</t> <t>The ACP is defined as a separate VRF because it intends to support well managed networks with a wide varietyorder protection/non-replayability. Datagram semantics ofconfigurations. Therefore, reliable, configuration-indestructible connectivity cannot be achieved fromtheData-Plane itself. In solutions where all transit connectivity impacting functionsunderlying transport arefully automated (including security), indestructible and resilient, it would be possible to eliminate the need for the ACP to be a separate VRF. Considerpreserved by themost simple example systemDTLS protocol. This document obsoletes RFC 6347. </t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43"/> <format type="TXT" target="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43.txt"/> <refcontent>Work inwhich there is no separate Data-Plane, but the ACP is the Data-Plane. Add BRSKI,Progress</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="X.509" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="X.509"> <front> <title>Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key andit becomes a fully autonomic networkattribute certificate frameworks</title> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.509"/> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2016"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="X.520" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="X.520"> <front> <title>Information technology -except that it does not support automatic addressing for user equipment. This gap can then be closed for example by adding a solution derived from <xref target="I-D.ietf-anima-prefix-management" format="default"/>.</t> <t>TCP/TLS as the protocols to provide reliabilityOpen Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected attribute types</title> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.520"/> <author> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2016"/> </front> </reference> </references> </references> <section anchor="further" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-appendix.a"> <name slugifiedName="name-background-and-future-infor">Background andsecurity to GRASP in the ACP may not be the preferred choice in constrained networks. For example, CoAP/DTLS (Constrained Application Protocol) may be preferred where they are already used, allowing to reduce the additional code space footprint for the ACP on those devices. Hop-by-hop reliability for ACP GRASP messages could be made to support protocols like DTLS by addingFuture (Informative)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">The following sections provide background information about aspects of thesame typenormative parts ofnegotiation as defined inthis documentfor ACP secure channel protocol negotiation. End-to-end GRASP connections can beor associated mechanisms such as BRSKI (such as why specific choices were madeto select their transport protocol in future extensions of the ACP meant to better support constrained devicesbyindicatingthesupported transport protocols (e.g. TLS/DTLS) via GRASP parametersACP), and they discuss possible future variations of theGRASP objective through which the transport endpoint is discovered.</t> <t>The routing protocol RPL used forACP.</t> <section anchor="address-spaces" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-address-space-schemes">ACP Address Space Schemes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.1-1">This document defines the Zone, Vlong, and Manual Addressing Sub-Schemes primarily to support address prefix assignment via distributed, potentially uncoordinated ACP registrars as defined in <xref target="acp-registrars" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.11.7"/>. This costs a 48/46-bit identifier so that these ACP registrars can assign nonconflicting address prefixes. This design doesexplicitlynotoptimizeleave enough bits to simultaneously support a large number of nodes (Node-ID), plus a large prefix of local addresses forshortest paths and fastest convergence. Variationsevery node, plus a large enough set ofthe ACP may wantbits touseidentify adifferent routing protocol or introduce more advanced RPL profiles.</t> <t>Variations such as whatroutingprotocolzone. As a result, the Zone and Vlong 8/16 Addressing Sub-Schemes attempt touse, or whethersupport all features but via separate prefixes.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.1-2">In networks that expect always toinstantiate an ACP inrely on aVRF or (as suggested above)centralized PMS as described <xref target="pms" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.2.5"/>, theactual Data-Plane, can48/46-bits for the Registrar-ID could beautomatically chosen in implementations built to support multiple options by deriving them from future parameters insaved. Such variations of thecertificate. ParametersACP addressing mechanisms could be introduced through future work incertificates shoulddifferent ways. If a new otherName was introduced, incompatible ACP variations could belimited to those that would not need tocreated where every design aspect of the ACP could bechanged more often than certificateschanged, including all addressing choices. If instead a new addressing sub-scheme wouldneed tobeupdated anyhow; Or by ensuring that these parameters candefined, it could beprovisioned before the variation of an ACP is activated inanode. Using BRSKI,backward-compatible extension of thiscould be done for exampleACP specification. Information such asadditional follow-up signaling directly afterthecertificate enrollment, still leveraging the BRSKI TLS connectionsize of a zone prefix andtherefore not introducing any additional connectivity requirements.</t> <t>Last but not least, secure channel protocols including their encapsulations are easily addedthe length of the prefix assigned to the ACPsolutions. ACP hop-by-hop network layer secure channelsnode itself couldalsobereplaced by end-to-end security plus other means for infrastructure protection. Any future network OAM should always use end-to-end security anyhow and can leverageencoded via thedomain certificates andextension field of the acp-node-name.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.1-3">Note that an explicitly defined Manual Addressing Sub-Scheme istherefore not dependent on securityalways beneficial tobe providedprovide an easy way forbyACPsecure channels.</t>nodes to prohibit incorrect non-autonomic configuration of any non-"Manual" ACP address spaces and therefore ensure that such non-autonomic operations will never impact correct routing for any non-"Manual" ACP addresses assigned via ACP certificates.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="futures" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Further (future) options</name> <section anchor="auto-aggregation"anchor="bootstrap" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Auto-aggregation of routes</name> <t>Routing in the ACP accordingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-brski-bootstrap-ani">BRSKI Bootstrap (ANI)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.2-1">BRSKI describes how nodes with an IDevID certificate can securely and zero-touch enroll with an LDevID certificate tothis specification onlysupport the ACP. BRSKI also leverages thestandard RPL mechanismACP to enable zero-touch bootstrap ofroute optimization, e.g. keepingnew nodes across networks without any configuration requirements across the transit nodes (e.g., no DHCP, DNS forwarding, and/or server setup). This includes otherwise unconfigured networks as described in <xref target="secure-bootstrap" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3.2"/>. Therefore, BRSKI in conjunction with ACP provides for a secure and zero-touch management solution for complete networks. Nodes supporting such an infrastructure (BRSKI and ACP) are called ANI nodes (Autonomic Networking Infrastructure), see <xref target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/>. Nodes that do not support an IDevID certificate but onlyroutes that arean (insecure) vendor-specific Unique Device Identifier (UDI) or nodes whose manufacturer does nottowards the RPL root. Thissupport a MASA could use some future, reduced-security version of BRSKI.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.2-2">When BRSKI isknown to scaleused tonetworks with 20,000 or more nodes. Thereprovision a domain certificate (which isno auto-aggregation of routes for /48 ULA prefixes (when using rsub incalled enrollment), theacp-node-name) and/or Zone-ID based prefixes.</t> <t>Automatic assignment of Zone-IDBRSKI registrar (acting as an enhanced EST server) must include the otherName / AcpNodeName encoded ACP address andauto-aggregation of routes could be achieved for example by configuring zone-boundaries, announcingdomain name to the enrolling node (called a pledge) viaGRASP intoits response to thezonespledge's EST CSR Attributes Request that is mandatory in BRSKI.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.2-3">The CA in an ACP network must not change thezone parameters (zone-ID and /48 ULA prefix) and auto-aggregating routes onotherName / AcpNodeName in thezone-boundaries. Nodes would assigncertificate. The ACP nodes can therefore find theirZone-IDACP addresses andpotentially even /48 prefix based ondomain using this field in theGRASP announcements.</t> </section> <section anchor="dp-dependency" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>More optionsdomain certificate, both foravoiding IPv6 Data-Plane dependencies</name> <t>As describedthemselves as well as for other nodes.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.2-4">The use of BRSKI in<xref target="general_addressing" format="default"/>,conjunction with the ACPdependscan also help to further simplify maintenance and renewal of domain certificates. Instead of relying on CRL, theData-Plane to establish IPv6 link-local addressinglifetime of certificates can be made extremely small, for example, oninterfaces. Usingthe order of hours. When aseparate MAC address fornode fails to connect to the ACPallowswithin its certificate lifetime, it cannot connect tofully isolatethe ACPfromto renew its certificate across it (using just EST), but it can still renew its certificate as an "enrolled/expired pledge" via theData-Plane in a wayBRSKI bootstrap proxy. This requires only thatis compatible with this specification. It is also an ideal option when using Single-root input/output virtualization (SR-IOV - see <eref target="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-root_input/output_virtualization"/>) in an implementation to isolatetheACP because different SR-IOV interfaces use different MAC addresses.</t> <t>When additional MAC address(es) are not available, separation ofBRSKI registrar honors expired domain certificates and that theACP could be done at different demux points. The same subnet interface could have a separate IPv6 interfacepledge attempts to perform TLS authentication forthe ACP and Data-Plane and therefore separate link-local addressesBRSKI bootstrap using its expired domain certificate before falling back to attempting to use its IDevID certificate forboth, whereBRSKI. This mechanism could also render CRLs unnecessary because theACP interface is non-configurable onBRSKI registrar in conjunction with theData-Plane. This tooCA wouldbe compatible with this specification andnotimpact interoperability.</t> <t>An option that would require additional specification is to userenew revoked certificates -- only adifferent Ethertype from 0x86DD (IPv6) to encapsulate IPv6 packets for the ACP. This"Do-not-renew" list would bea similar approach as used for IP authentication packets in <xref target="IEEE-802.1X" format="default"/> which usenecessary on theExtensible AuthenticationBRSKI registrar/CA.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.2-5">In the absence of BRSKI or less secure variants thereof, the provisioning of certificates may involve one or more touches or nonstandardized automation. Node vendors usually support the provisioning of certificates into nodes via PKCS #7 (see "<xref target="RFC2315" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5"/>" <xref target="RFC2315" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2315"/>) and may support this provisioning through vendor-specific models via NETCONF ("<xref target="RFC6241" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Network Configuration Protocolover Local Area Network (EAPoL) ethertype (0x88A2).</t> <t>Note that in the case(NETCONF)"/>" <xref target="RFC6241" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6241"/>). If such nodes also support NETCONF Zero Touch <xref target="RFC8572" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8572"/>, then this can be combined with zero-touch provisioning ofANI nodes, all the above considerations equally apply todomain certificates into nodes. Unless there is theencapsulationequivalent integration ofBRSKI packets including GRASP used for BRSKI.</t>NETCONF connections across the ACP as there is in BRSKI, this combination would not support zero-touch bootstrap across an unconfigured network, though.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="acp-api"anchor="discovery" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP APIs and operational models (YANG)</name> <t>Future work should define YANG (<xref target="RFC7950" format="default"/>) data model and/or node internal APIs to monitor and managetoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-neighbor-discovery-prot">ACP Neighbor Discovery Protocol Selection</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.3-1">This section discusses why GRASP DULL was chosen as theACP.</t> <t>Supportdiscovery protocol fortheL2-adjacent candidate ACPAdjacency Table (<xref target="adj-table" format="default"/>)neighbors. The contenders that were considered were GRASP, mDNS, andACP GRASP need to be included into such model/API.</t> </section>LLDP.</t> <sectionanchor="future-rpl"anchor="discovery-lldp" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>RPL enhancements</name> <figure anchor="dual-noc"> <name>Dual NOC</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ ..... USA ...... ..... Europe ...... NOC1 NOC2 | | | metric 100 | ACP1 --------------------------- ACP2 . | | . WAN | metric 10 metric 20 | . Core | | . ACP3 --------------------------- ACP4 . | metric 100 | | | . | | . Sites ACP10 ACP11 . ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>The profiletoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.3.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-lldp">LLDP</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.3.1-1">LLDP and Cisco's earlier Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) are examples of L2 discovery protocols that terminate their messages on L2 ports. If those protocols had been chosen forRPL specified inACP neighbor discovery, ACP neighbor discovery would also have terminated on L2 ports. This would have prevented ACP construction over non-ACP-capable, but LLDP- or CDP-enabled L2 switches. LLDP has extensions using different MAC addresses, and thisdocument builds only one spanning-tree path set to a root, typically a registrar in one NOC. In the presence of multiple NOCs, routing toward the non-root NOCs may be suboptimal. <xref target="dual-noc" format="default"/> showscould have been anextreme example. Assuming that node ACP1 becomesoption for ACP discovery as well, but theRPL root, traffic between ACP11additional required IEEE standardization andNOC2 will pass through ACP4-ACP3-ACP1-ACP2 insteaddefinition ofACP4-ACP2 because the RPL calculated DODAG/routes are shortest paths towards the RPL root.</t> <t>To overcome these limitations, extensions/modifications to the RPLa profilecan provide optimalityformultiple NOCs. This requires utilizing Data-Plane artifact including IPinIP encap/decap on ACP routers and processing of IPv6 RPI headers. Alternatively, (Src,Dst) routing table entries could be used.</t> <t>Floodingsuch a modified instance ofACP GRASP messages canLLDP seemed to befurther constrained and therefore optimized by flooding only via links that are partmore work than the benefit of "reusing theRPL DODAG.</t>existing protocol" LLDP for this very simple purpose.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="role-assignments"anchor="discovery-mdns" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Role assignments</name> <t>ACP connect is an explicit mechanism to "leak" ACP traffic explicitly (for exampletoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.3.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-mdns-and-l2-support">mDNS and L2 Support</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.3.2-1">Multicast DNS (mDNS) "<xref target="RFC6762" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Multicast DNS"/>" <xref target="RFC6762" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6762"/> with DNS Service Discovery (DNS-SD) Resource Records (RRs) as defined in "<xref target="RFC6763" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="DNS-Based Service Discovery"/>" <xref target="RFC6763" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6763"/> was aNOC). It is therefore also a possible security gap when it is easy to enablekey contender as an ACPconnectdiscovery protocol. Because it relies onarbitrary compromised ACP nodes.</t> <t>One simple solutionlink-local IP multicast, it operates at the subnet level and isto definealso found in L2 switches. The authors of this document are not aware of anextension inmDNS implementation that terminates its mDNS messages on L2 ports instead of on theACP certificates ACP information field indicatingsubnet level. If mDNS was used as thepermission forACPconnect to be configureddiscovery mechanism on an ACP-capable (L3)/L2 switch as outlined in <xref target="acp-l2-switches" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>, then this would be necessary to implement. It is likely thatACP node. Thistermination of mDNS messages couldsimilarlyonly bedoneapplied todecide whetherall mDNS messages from such anode is permittedport, which would then make it necessary tobe a registrar or not.</t> <t>Tying the permitted "roles" of an ACP nodesoftware forward any non-ACP-related mDNS messages tothemaintain prior non-ACP mDNS functionality. Adding support for ACPcertificate provides fairly strong protection against misconfiguration, but is still subject to code modifications.</t> <t>Another interesting roletoassign to certificates is thatsuch L2 switches with mDNS could therefore create regression problems for prior mDNS functionality on those nodes. With low performance ofa NOC node. This would allowsoftware forwarding in many L2 switches, this could also make the ACP risky tolimit certain type of connectionssupport on suchas OAM TLS connections to only NOC initiator or responders.</t>L2 switches.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="l3-transit"anchor="discovery-comparison" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Autonomic L3 transit</name> <t>In this specification,toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.3.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-why-dull-grasp">Why DULL GRASP?</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.3.3-1">LLDP was not considered because of theACP can only establish autonomic connectivity acrossabove mentioned issues. mDNS was not selected because of the above L2hopsmDNS considerations andonly explicitly configured options to tunnel across L3. Futurebecause of the following additional points.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.3.3-2">If mDNS was not already existing in a node, it would be more workshould specify mechanismstoautomatically tunnel ACP across L3 networks. A hub&spoke optionimplement than DULL GRASP, and if an existing implementation of mDNS was used, it wouldallow to tunnel across the Internet tolikely be more code space than acloudseparate implementation of DULL GRASP orcentral instancea shared implementation of DULL GRASP and GRASP in theACP, a peer-to-peer tunneling mechanism could tunnel ACP islands across an L3VPN infrastructure.</t>ACP.</t> </section> </section> <sectionanchor="future-diag"anchor="why-rpl" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Diagnostics</name> <t><xref target="diagnostics" format="default"/> describes diagnostics options that can be done without changingtoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-choice-of-routing-protocol-">Choice of Routing Protocol (RPL)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.4-1">This section motivates why RPL ("IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks <xref target="RFC6550" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>) was chosen as theexternal, interoperability affecting characteristicsdefault (and in this specification only) routing protocol for the ACP. The choice and above explained profile were derived from a pre-standard implementation of ACPimplementations.</t> <t>Even better diagnostics ofthat was successfully deployed in operational networks.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.4-2">The requirements for routing in the ACPoperationsare the following: </t> <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-a.4-3"> <li pn="section-a.4-3.1">Self-management: the ACP must build automatically, without human intervention. Therefore, the routing protocol must also work completely automatically. RPL ispossible with additional signaling extensions, such as:</t> <ol type="1" spacing="compact"> <li>Consider if LLDP should bearecommended functionality for ANI devices to improve diagnostics, and if so,simple, self-managing protocol, whichinformation elementsdoes not require zones or areas; itshould signal (noting that such informationisconveyed inalso self-configuring, since configuration is carried as part of the protocol (see <xref target="RFC6550" sectionFormat="of" section="6.7.6" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6550#section-6.7.6" derivedContent="RFC6550"/>).</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.2">Scale: the ACP builds over aninsecure manner). Includes potentially new information elements.</li> <li>In alternative to LLDP, A DULL GRASP diagnostics objectiveentire domain, which could bedefined to carry these information elements.</li> <li>The IDevID certificatea large enterprise or service provider network. The routing protocol must therefore support domains ofBRSKI pledges should be included in100,000 nodes or more, ideally without theselected insecure diagnostics option.need for zoning or separation into areas. RPL has this scale property. Thismay be undesirable when exposure of device informationisseen as too much of a security issue (ability to deduce possible attack vectors from device model for example).</li> <li>A richer setbased on extensive use ofdiagnostics information should be made available viadefault routing.</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.3">Low resource consumption: thesecuredACPchannels, using either single-hop GRASP orsupports traditional networkwide "topology discovery" mechanisms.</li> </ol> </section> <section anchor="compromised" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Avoiding and dealing with compromised ACP nodes</name> <t>Compromised ACP nodes pose the biggest riskinfrastructure, thus runs in addition to traditional protocols. The ACP, and specifically theoperationsrouting protocol, must have low resource consumption requirements, both in terms of memory and CPU. Specifically, at edge nodes, where memory and CPU are scarce, consumption should be minimal. RPL builds a DODAG, where thenetwork. The most common type of compromisemain resource consumption isleakageat the root ofcredentials to manage/configurethedevice andDODAG. The closer to theapplicationedge ofmalicious configuration includingthechange of access credentials, but notnetwork, thechange of software. Most of today's networking equipment should have secure boot/software infrastructure anyhow, so attacksless state needs to be maintained. This adapts nicely to the typical network design. Also, all changes below a common parent node are kept below thatintroduce malicious software shouldparent node.</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.4">Support for unstructured address space: in the ANI, node addresses are identifiers, they and may not be assigned in alot harder.</t> <t>The most important aspect of security design against these type of attackstopological way. Also, nodes may move topologically, without changing their address. Therefore, the routing protocol must support completely unstructured address space. RPL isto eliminate password based configuration access methods and instead relyspecifically made for mobile, ad hoc networks, with no assumptions oncertificate based credentials handed out onlytopologically aligned addressing.</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.5">Modularity: tonodes wherekeep the initial implementation small, yet allow for more complex methods later, it isclearhighly desirable that theprivate keys cannot leak. This limits unexpected propagationrouting protocol has a simple base functionality, but can import new functional modules if needed. RPL has this property with the concept ofcredentials.</t> <t>If password based credentials"Objective Function", which is a plugin toconfigure devices still needmodify routing behavior.</li> <li anchor="extens" pn="section-a.4-3.6">Extensibility: since the ANI is a new concept, it is likely that changes tobe supported, they must not be locally configurable, but only be remotely provisioned or verified (through protocols like RADIUS or Diameter), and there must be no local configuration permittingthe way of operation will happen over time. RPL allows for new Objective Functions tochange these authentication mechanisms, but ideally they shouldbeautoconfiguring across the ACP. See <xref target="I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig" format="default"/>.</t> <t>Without physical accessintroduced later, which allow changes to thecompromised device, attackers with accessway the routing protocol creates the DAGs.</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.7">Multi-topology support: it may become necessary in the future toconfigurationsupport more than one DODAG for different purposes, using different Objective Functions. RPL allow for the creation of several parallel DODAGs shouldnotthis beablerequired. This could be used tobreakcreate different topologies to reach different roots.</li> <li pn="section-a.4-3.8">No need for path optimization: RPL does not necessarily compute the optimal path between any two nodes. However, the ACPconnectivity, even when they can break or otherwise manipulate (spoof) the Data-Plane connectivity through configuration. To achieve this,does not require this today, since it carries mainly delay-insensitive feedback loops. It is possible that different optimization schemes will become necessaryto avoid providing configuration options forin theACP, such as enabling/disabling it on interfaces. For example, there couldfuture, but RPL can bean ACP configuration that locks down the current ACP config unless factory resetexpanded (see <xref target="extens" format="none" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="">"Extensibility"</xref> above).</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="acp-grasp" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-information-distributio">ACP Information Distribution and Multicast</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.5-1">IP multicast isdone.</t> <t>With such means, the valid administration hasnot used by thebest chances to maintain access toACPnodes, discover malicious configuration though ongoing configuration tracking from central locations for example, and to react accordingly.</t> <t>The primary reaction is withdrawal/change of credentials, terminate malicious existing management sessions and fixingbecause theconfiguration. Ensuring that management sessions using invalidated credentials are terminated automatically without recourse will likely require new work.</t> <t>Only when these steps areANI itself does notfeasiblerequire IP multicast but only service announcement/discovery. Using IP multicast for that would have made itbenecessary torevoke or expire the ACP certificate credentials and consider the node kicked off the networkdevelop a zero-touch autoconfiguring solution for ASM (Any Source Multicast -untilthesituation canoriginal form of IP multicast defined in "<xref target="RFC1112" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Host extensions for IP multicasting"/>" <xref target="RFC1112" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC1112"/>), which would befurther rectified, likely requiring direct physical accessquite complex and difficult tothe node.</t> <t>Without extensions, compromised ACP nodes can only be removed from the ACPjustify. One aspect of complexity where no attempt at a solution has been described in IETF documents is thespeedautomatic selection ofCRL/OCSP information refresh or expiry (and non-removal)routers that should be PIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) Rendezvous Points (RPs) (see "<xref target="RFC7761" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised)"/>" <xref target="RFC7761" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7761"/>). The other aspects ofshort lived certificates. Future extensions tocomplexity are theACP could for example use GRASP flooding distribution of triggered updates of CRL/OCSP or explicit removal indicationimplementation ofthe compromised nodes domain certificate.</t> </section> <section anchor="downgrade" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Detecting ACP secure channel downgrade attacks</name> <t>The following text proposesMLD ("<xref target="RFC4604" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-Specific Multicast"/>" <xref target="RFC4604" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4604"/>), PIM-SM, and Anycast-RP (see "<xref target="RFC4610" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Anycast-RP Using Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM)"/>" <xref target="RFC4610" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4610"/>). If those implementations already exist in amechanismproduct, then they would be very likely tied toprotect against downgrade attacks without introducing a new specialized UPFRONT GRASP secure channel mechanism. Instead, it relies on running GRASP after establishing a secure channel protocolaccelerated forwarding, which consumes hardware resources, and that in turn is difficult toverify ifjustify as a cost of performing only service discovery.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.5-2">Some future ASA may need high-performance, in-network data replication. That is theestablished secure channel option could have beencase when theresultuse ofa MITM downgrade attack:</t> <t>MITM attackersIP multicast is justified. Such an ASA canforce downgrade attacks for ACP secure channel selection by filtering/modifying DULL GRASP messages and/or actual secure channel data packets. For example, if at some point in time DTLS traffic could be easier decrypted than traffic of IKEv2, the MITM could filter all IKEv2 packets to force ACP nodes tothen useDTLS (assuming theservice discovery from ACPnodes in question supported both DTLSGRASP, andIKEv2).</t> <t>For cases where such MITM attacks arethen they do notcapable to inject malicious traffic (butneed ASM but onlyto decrypt the traffic), a downgrade attack could be discovered after a secure channel connection is established,SSM (see "<xref target="RFC4607" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Source-Specific Multicast for IP"/>" <xref target="RFC4607" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4607"/>) forexample by use of the following type of mechanism:</t> <t>Afterthesecure channel connection is established,IP multicast replication. SSM itself can simply be enabled in thetwo ACP peers negotiate viadata plane (or even in anappropriate (To Be Defined) GRASP negotiation which ACP secure channel protocol should have been selected between them (inupdate to theabsence ofACP) without any configuration other than just enabling it on all nodes, and it only requires aMITM attacker). This negotiation wouldsimpler version of MLD (see "<xref target="RFC5790" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Lightweight Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) Protocols"/>" <xref target="RFC5790" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5790"/>).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.5-3">IGP routing protocols based on LSP (Link State Protocol) typically have a mechanism tosignal the DULLflood information, and such a mechanism could be used to flood GRASPannounced ACP secure channel options by each peer followedobjectives byan announcementdefining them to be information ofthe preferred secure channel protocol by the ACP peerthatis the DeciderIGP. This would be a possible optimization inthe secure channel setup, e.g.future variations of the ACPpeer that is deciding which secure channel protocol to pick. If that chosen secure channel protocol is different from the onethatactually was chosen, then this mismatch isdo use anindicationLSP-based routing protocol. Note though thatthere issuch aMITM attacker or other similar issue (firewall prohibitingmechanism would not work easily for GRASP M_DISCOVERY messages, which are intelligently (constrained) flooded not across theuse of specific protocols) that caused a non-preferred secure channel protocol to be chosen. This discovery could then result in mitigation options such as logging and ensuing investigations.</t> </section> </section> </section> <!-- further considerations --> <section anchor="unfinished" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Unfinished considerations (To Be Removed From RFC)</name> <t>[RFC-Editor: Thiswholeappendix B. and its subsectionsACP, but only up tobe removed for the RFC.</t> <t>This appendix contains unfinished considerationsa node where a responder is found. We expect thatare removed from the RFC, they are maintainedmany future services inthis draft as a log ofthestate of discussionASA will have only a few consuming ASAs, andpoint of reference. Together with this appendix, alsofor those cases, thereferences pointing to it are marked to be removed fromM_DISCOVERY method is more efficient than flooding across theRFC because no consensus could be reached that a self-reference to a draft version ofwhole domain.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.5-4">Because theRFCACP uses RPL, one desirable future extension isan appropriate breadcrumb to pointtounfinished considerations.</t> <t>The authors planuse RPL's existing notion of DODAG, which are loop-free distribution trees, tomove these considerations into a new target informational draft, please lookmake GRASP flooding more efficient both fordraft-eckert-anima-acp-considerations.</t> <section anchor="ben-kaduk" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ConsiderationsM_FLOOD and M_DISCOVERY. See <xref target="ACP_interfaces" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.5"/> forimproving secure channel negotiation</name> <t>Proposed text from Benjamin Kaduk. Ithow this will be specifically beneficial when using NBMA interfaces. This issuggested to replace the text of appendix A.6not currently specified inprevious versions ofthisdraft (updocument because it is not quite clear yet what exactly the implications are toversion 29).</t> <t>The discovery procedure in this specification for low-level ACP channel support by layer-2 peers involves DULLmake GRASP flooding depend on RPL DODAG convergence andattempting (usually in parallel)how difficult it would be toestablish all supported channel types, learninglet GRASP flooding access thepeer ACP addressDODAG information.</t> </section> <section anchor="domain-usage" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-cas-domains-and-routing-sub">CAs, Domains, andcorrespondingly the assignmentRouting Subdomains</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-1">There is a wide range ofDecider and Follower roles,setting up different ACP solutions by appropriately using CAs andtearing down all channels other thantheone preferred bydomain and rsub elements in theDecider. This procedure,acp-node-name ingeneral, becomes resource intensive asthenumberdomain certificate. We summarize these options here as they have been explained in different parts of the document and discuss possiblesecure channels grows; even worse, under some threat models,and desirable extensions.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-2">An ACP domain is thesecurityset ofthe discovery result is only as strongall ACP nodes that can authenticate each other as belonging to theweakest supported secure channel protocol. Furthermore, the unilateral determination of "best" channel type bysame ACP network using theDecider does not result inACP domain membership check (<xref target="certcheck" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>). GRASP inside theoptimal outcome in all possible scenarios.</t> <t>This situationACP istolerable at present, with only two secure channels (DTLS and IPsec) defined, but long-term agilityrun across all transitively connected ACP nodes in a domain.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-3">The rsub element in thevein of [BCP201] will requireacp-node-name permits theintroductionuse ofan alternate discovery/negotiation procedure. While IKEv2addresses from different ULA prefixes. One use case is theIETF standard protocol for negotiating security associations, it currently does not have a defined mechanism flexible enough to negotiate the parameters needed for, e.g., an ACP DTLS channel, let alone for allowingcreation of multiple physical networks that initially may be separated with one ACPpeers to indicatedomain but different routing subdomains, so that all nodes can mutually trust theirpreference metrics for channel selection. Such a mechanism or mechanismsACP certificates (not depending on rsub) and so that they couldbe defined, but ifconnect later together into a contiguous ACPagility requires introducingnetwork.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-4">One instance of such anew channel type, for example MacSec, IKEv2 would again need to be extended in order to negotiateuse case is an ACPMacSec association. Making ACP channel agility dependent on updates to IKEv2 is likely to result in obstaclesfor regions interconnected via a non-ACP enabled core, for example, due todifferent timescalesthe absence ofevolution, since IKEv2 implementations help formproduct support for ACP on the coreof Internet-scale security infrastructure and must accordinglynodes. ACP connect configurations as defined in this document can berobustused to extend andthoroughly tested.</t> <t>Accordingly, a dedicatedinterconnect those ACPchannel negotiation mechanism is appropriate as a wayislands toprovide long-term algorithmthe NOC andsecure-channel protocol agility. Suchmerge them into amechanism is not currently defined, but one possible designsingle ACP when later that product support gap isas follows. A new DULL GRASP objectiveclosed.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-5">Note that RPL scales very well. It isdefinednot necessary toindicate the GRASP-over-TLS channel, which is by definition preferreduse multiple routing subdomains to scale ACP domains in a way that would be required if otherchannel types (including DTLS and IPsec). When both peers advertise supportrouting protocols where used. They exist only as options forGRASP-over-TLS, GRASP-over-TLS must runthe above mentioned reasons.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-6"> If ACP domains need tocompletion beforebe created that are not allowed to connect to each otherchannel typesby default, simply use different domain elements in the acp-node-name. These domain elements can be arbitrary, including subdomains of one another: domains "example.com" and "research.example.com" are separate domains if both areattempted. The GRASP-over-TLS channel performsdomain elements in the acp-node-name of certificates.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-7">It is not necessarynegotiation by establishing a TLS connection between the peers and using that connectiontosecurehave adedicated GRASP instanceseparate CA fornegotiating supported channel types and preference metrics. This providesdifferent ACP domains: an operator can use arich language for determining what secure channel protocolsingle CA tousesign certificates for multiple ACP domains that are not allowed to connect to each other because the checks for ACPlink while taking into accountadjacencies include thecapabilities and preferencescomparison of the domain part.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.6-8">If multiple, independent networks chose the same domain name but had their own CAs, these would not form a single ACPpeers, all protecteddomain because of CA mismatch. Therefore, there is no problem in choosing domain names that are potentially also used bythe securityothers. Nevertheless, it is highly recommended to use domain names that have a high probability of being unique. It is recommended to use domain names that start with a DNS domain name owned by theTLS channel.</t>assigning organization and unique within it, for example, "acp.example.com" if you own "example.com".</t> </section> <sectionanchor="verify-address"anchor="intent" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>ACP address verification</name> <t>The AcpNodeName of most ACP nodes contains intoc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-intent-for-the-acp">Intent for theacp-address fieldACP</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-1">Intent is theprimary ACP addressarchitecture component of Autonomic Networks according to <xref target="RFC8993" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8993"/> that allows operators to issue policies tobe used bythenodenetwork. Its applicability forend-to-end connectionsuse is quite flexible and freeform, with potential applications including policies flooded across ACPsecure channels. Nevertheless, thereGRASP and interpreted on every ACP node.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-2">One concern for future definitions of Intent solutions isno verificationthe problem ofancircular dependencies when expressing Intent policies about the ACPpeers address specified in this document. This section explainsitself.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-3">For example, Intent could indicate thecurrent understanding asdesire towhy this is not done.</t> <t>Not allbuild an ACPnodes willacross all domains that havean actual IPv6 addressa common parent domain (without relying on the rsub/routing-subdomain solution defined in this document): ACP nodes with theacp-address fielddomains "example.com", "access.example.com", "core.example.com", and "city.core.example.com" should all establish one single ACP.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-4">If each domain has its own source oftheir AcpNodeName. Those who do not include nodes that do not supportIntent, then the Intent would simply have to allow adding the peer domain's TA and domain names to the parameters for the ACPsecure channels, such as pre-existing NOC equipmentdomain membership check (<xref target="certcheck" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.2.3"/>) so that nodes from those other domains are accepted as ACP peers.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-5">If this Intent was to be originated onlyconnectsfrom one domain, it could likely not be made to work because the other domains will not build any ACPviaconnections amongst each other, whether they use the same or different CA due to the ACPconnect interfaces. Likewise, futuredomain membership check.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-6">If the domains use the same CA, one could change the ACP setup to permit the ACPnode type that may wanttohave their Node-ID notbedefined by anestablished between two ACP nodes with different acp-domain-names, but only for the purpose of disseminating limited information, such as Intent, but not to set up full ACP connectivity, specifically not RPL routing and passing of arbitrary GRASP information, unless the Intent policies permit this to happen across domain boundaries.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.7-7">This type of approach, where the ACPregistrar, but differently cannot havefirst allows Intent to operate and only then sets up the rest of ACPaddressconnectivity based on Intent policy, could also beprovided in their ACP certificate where itused to enable Intent policies that wouldbe defined bylimit functionality across theregistrar. In result, any scheme thatACP inside a domain, as long as no policy wouldrely on verification ofdisturb theacp-address indistribution of Intent, for example, to limit reachability across the ACPcertificate would only applytoa subsetcertain types of nodes or locations ofACPnodes.</t><t>The transport stack network layer address used</section> <section anchor="reuse-acp" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.8"> <name slugifiedName="name-adopting-acp-concepts-for-o">Adopting ACP Concepts for Other Environments</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-1">The ACPsecure channelsas specified in this document is very explicit about the choice of options to allow interoperable implementations. The choices made may not be the best for all environments, but the concepts used by theacp-address. For automatically established ACP secure channels, it is a link-local IPv6 address. For explicitly configuredACPsecure channels (to reach across noncan be used to build derived solutions.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-2">The ACPL3 network segments),specifies the use of ULA and the derivation of its prefix from the domain name so that no address allocation is required to deploy the ACP. The ACP will equally work using anyIPv4 orother /48 IPv6address routableprefix and not ULA. This prefix could simply be a configuration of the ACP registrars (for example, when using BRSKI) tothat remote destination.</t> <t>Whenenroll theacp-address is actually used acrossdomain certificates, instead of theACP,ACP registrar deriving the /48 ULA prefix from the AN domain name.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-3">Some solutions may already have an auto-addressing scheme, for example, derived from existing, unique device identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses). In those cases, itcan onlymay not beverified by a peer whendesirable to assign addresses to devices via thepeer hasACP address information field in the way described in this document. The certificateof the peer. Unless further higher layer mechanisms are developed on top ofmay simply serve to identify the ACP(for example via ASA),domain, and the address field could be omitted. The onlymechanism to access a peersfix required in the remaining way the ACPcertificateoperates isfor secure connectionsto define another element inwhichthe domain certificate for the two peerscertificates are exchanged and cryptographically verified, e.g. TLSto decide who is the Decider andDTLS. Initially, itwho isexpected thattheACP will carry many legacy network management control connections that unfortunately not end-to-end authenticated butFollower during secure channel building. Note though thatare solely protected by being carried acrossfuture work may leverage the ACPsecure channels. ACPaddressverification therefore cannot be used for such connections without additional higher layer components.</t> <t>Forto authenticate "ownership" of theremaining (TLS/DTLS) connections for whichaddressverification can be used,by themain question is: what additional benefit woulddevice. If the ACP addressverification provide?</t> <t>The main valueused by a device is derived from some preexisting, permanent local ID (such as MAC address), then it would be useful to store thattransport stack network layer address verification could provide for these typelocal ID also in the certificate.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-4">The ACP is defined as a separate VRF because it intends to support well-managed networks with a wide variety ofconnectionsconfigurations. Therefore, reliable, configuration-indestructible connectivity cannot be achieved from the data plane itself. In solutions where all functions that impact transit connectivity are fully automated (including security), indestructible, and resilient, it would bethe discovery of on-path transport proxies. For example, in case of BRSKI, pledges connectpossible toaneliminate the need for the ACPregistrar via an ASA implementingto be aTCP proxy becauseseparate VRF. Consider thepledge itself has at that pointmost simple example system intimewhich there is no separate data plane, but the ACPcertificate valid to build ACP secure channels and hence needs to rely on such a proxy. This is one example where such a TCP proxyisrequiredthe data plane. Add BRSKI, andnotit becomes aform of attack.</t> <t>In general, on path TCP proxies couldfully Autonomic Network -- except that it does not support automatic addressing for user equipment. This gap can then be closed, for example, by adding aform of attack, but it standssolution derived from "<xref target="RFC8992" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Autonomic IPv6 Edge Prefix Management in Large-Scale Networks"/>" <xref target="RFC8992" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8992"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-5">TCP/TLS as the protocols toreason, that an attacker that managesprovide reliability and security toenable a malicious TCP proxy could likely equally build a transparent proxy not changing the network layer addresses. Only whenGRASP in theattacker operates off-path would this optionACP may not bepossible. Such attacks could indeedthe preferred choice in constrained networks. For example, CoAP/DTLS (Constrained Application Protocol) may bepossible: An impairedpreferred where they are already used, which would reduce the additional code space footprint for the ACPnode could announce itself as another service instanceon those devices. Hop-by-hop reliability fora service whose utilization it wants to attack. ItACP GRASP messages couldthen attemptbe made tolooksupport protocols likea valid serverDTLS bysimply TCP proxyingadding theclientssame type of negotiation as defined in this document for ACP secure channel protocol negotiation. In future ACP extensions meant to better support constrained devices, end-to-end GRASP connections can be made toa valid server and then attackselect their transport protocol by indicating theconnections passingsupported transport protocols (e.g. TLS/DTLS) via GRASP parameters of the GRASP objective throughit (passive decrypting or passive fingerprint analysis). But likewhich theBRSKI proxy, this behavior could be perfectly legitimate and not an attack. For example, TCP has intransport endpoint is discovered.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-6">RPL, thepast often suffered from performance issues across difficult (high capacity, high loss) paths, and TCP proxies where and are beingrouting protocol usedsimply as a toolforisolatingthe ACP, explicitly does not optimize for shortest paths and fastest convergence. Variations of the ACP may want to use a different routing protocol or introduce more advanced RPL profiles.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-7">Variations suchpath segments (suchas which routing protocol to use, or whether to instantiate an ACP in aWAN), and providing caching and local-retransmit of in-transit packets, reducingVRF or (as suggested above) as theeffective path segment capacity.</t> <t>As explained elsewhereactual data plane, can be automatically chosen inthis document already, considerations forimplementations built to support multiple options by deriving them from future parameters in the certificate. Parameters in certificates should be limited to those that would not need to be changed more often than that certificates would need to be updated, or it should be ensured that thesetypeparameters can be provisioned before the variation ofattack are therefore outsidean ACP is activated in a node. Using BRSKI, this could be done, for example, as additional follow-up signaling directly after thescope ofcertificate enrollment, still leveraging theACPBRSKI TLS connection and therefore not introducing any additional connectivity requirements.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.8-8">Last butfundametalnot least, secure channel protocols including their encapsulations are easily added tofurther design ofACP solutions. ACP hop-by-hop network-layer secure channels could also be replaced by end-to-end security plus other means for infrastructure protection. Any future network OAM should always use end-to-end security. By leveraging theASA infrastructure. Beyond distinguishing whether a TCP proxydomain certificates, it would not bebeneficial or malicious,dependent on security provided by ACP secure channels.</t> </section> <section anchor="futures" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9"> <name slugifiedName="name-further-future-options">Further (Future) Options</name> <section anchor="auto-aggregation" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.1"> <name slugifiedName="name-auto-aggregation-of-routes">Auto-Aggregation of Routes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.1-1">Routing in theeven more fundamental question is howACP according todetermine from a multitude of service announcements which instance is the most trustworthy and functionally best. In the Internet/web,thisquestion is NOT solved insidespecification only leverages thenetwork but through off-net human interaction ("trust me,standard RPL mechanism of route optimization, e.g., keeping only thebest search engine is www.<insert-your-personal-recommendation>.com").</t> </section> <section anchor="public-ca" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Public CA considerations</name> <t>Public CAsroutes that areoutsidenot towards thescopeRPL root. This is known to scale to networks with 20,000 or more nodes. There is no auto-aggregation ofthis documentroutes for /48 ULA prefixes (when using rsub in thefollowing reasons. This appendix describes the current stateacp-node-name) and/or Zone-ID based prefixes.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.1-2">Automatic assignment ofunderstanding for those interested to consider utilizing public CAZone-ID and auto-aggregation of routes could be achieved, for example, by configuring zone boundaries, announcing via GRASP into theACP inzones thefuture.</t> <t>If public CA where to be used to enroll ACP nodeszone parameters (Zone-ID andact as TA, this would require a model in which/48 ULA prefix), and auto-aggregating routes on thepublic CAzone boundaries. Nodes wouldbe able to assertassign their Zone-ID and potentially even theownership of/48 prefix based on theinformation requestedGRASP announcements.</t> </section> <section anchor="dp-dependency" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.2"> <name slugifiedName="name-more-options-for-avoiding-i">More Options for Avoiding IPv6 Data Plane Dependencies</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.2-1">As described in <xref target="general_addressing" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.13.2"/>, thecertificate, especially the AcpNodeName, for example mitigated byACP depends on thedomain registrar(s). Duedata plane tothe use ofestablish IPv6 link-local addressing on interfaces. Using anew,separate MAC address for the ACPunique encoding ofallows theAcpNodeName, there is no mechanism for public CA to do so. More importantly though,full isolationbetween ACPsofdisjoint operated ACPs is achieved inthecurrentACPdesign through disjoint TA. A public CA isfrom the data plane ingeneral based onasingle (set of) TA shared across all certificates signed by the CA.</t> <t>Due to the factway thatthe ACP domain membership checkis compatible with this specification. It is alsovalidates that a peers domain namean ideal option when using single-root input/output virtualization (SR-IOV, see <xref target="SR" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SR"/>) inthe AcpNodeName matches that of the ACP node itself, it would be possiblean implementation touseisolate thesame TA across disjointACPdomains, but the security and attack implications of such an approach are beyond the scope of this document.</t> <t>Thebecause different SR-IOV interfaces useof ULA addresses in the AcpNodeName is another novel aspect for certificates from a possible public CA. Typically, ULA addressesdifferent MAC addresses.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.2-2">When additional MAC address(es) are notmeant to be signed by a public CA when carried in an address field, because there is no ownership of a particular ULA address in the scopeavailable, separation of theInternet, which is what public CA operate on. Nevertheless, the ULA addresses used by theACPare scoped tocould bevalid only within the confines ofdone at different demux points. The same subnet interface could have aspecificseparate IPv6 interface for the ACPas defined byand data plane and therefore separate link-local addresses for both, where thedomain name inACP interface is not configurable on theAcpNodeName. However,data plane. This too would be compatible with thisunderstanding hasspecification and notbeen reviewed or accepted by any bodies responsible for policies of public CA.</t> <t>Because in this specification, ACPs are isolated from each other primarily by their TA, when a public CAimpact interoperability.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.2-3">An option that wouldintendrequire additional specification is tosign ACP certificates and usinguse asingle TA to sign TA of ACP certificates fromdifferentoperators/domain, it could do so by ensuring that the domain name inEthertype from 0x86DD (IPv6) to encapsulate IPv6 packets for theAcpNodeName wasACP. This would be aglobally owned DNS ACP domain name ofsimilar approach as used for IP authentication packets in <xref target="IEEE-802.1X" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IEEE-802.1X"/>, which uses theorganization, and beyond that, it would need to validateExtensible Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPoL) Ethertype (0x88A2).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.2-4">Note that in theACP registrarcase of ANI nodes, all ofthat domain who is mitigatingtheenrollment is authorizedabove considerations equally apply tovouch fortheownershipencapsulation of BRSKI packets including GRASP used for BRSKI.</t> </section> <section anchor="acp-api" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.3"> <name slugifiedName="name-acp-apis-and-operational-mo">ACP APIs and Operational Models (YANG)</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.3-1">Future work should define a YANG data model <xref target="RFC7950" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7950"/> and/or node-internal APIs to monitor and manage theacp-address within the scope ofACP.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.3-2">Support for the ACPdomain name.</t>adjacency table (<xref target="adj-table" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6.3"/>) and ACP GRASP needs to be included in such model and/or API.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="hardening"anchor="future-rpl" numbered="true"toc="default"> <name>Hardening DULL GRASP considerations</name> <t>DULL GRASP suffers from similar type of DoS attacks as many link-local multicast discovery protocols,toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.4"> <name slugifiedName="name-rpl-enhancements">RPL Enhancements</name> <figure anchor="dual-noc" align="left" suppress-title="false" pn="figure-17"> <name slugifiedName="name-dual-noc">Dual NOC</name> <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt="" pn="section-a.9.4-1.1"> ..... USA ...... ..... Europe ...... NOC1 NOC2 | | | metric 100 | ACP1 --------------------------- ACP2 . | | . WAN | metric 10 metric 20 | . Core | | . ACP3 --------------------------- ACP4 . | metric 100 | | | . | | . Sites ACP10 ACP11 . </artwork> </figure> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.4-2">The profile forexample mDNS. Attackers onRPL specified in this document builds only one spanning-tree path set to asubnetroot, typically a registrar in one NOC. In the presence of multiple NOCs, routing toward the non-root NOCs may beable to inject malicious DULL GRASP messages that are indistinguishable from non-malicious DULL GRASP messages to create Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that force ACP nodes to attempt many unsuccessful ACP secure channel connections.</t> <t>Whensuboptimal. <xref target="dual-noc" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Figure 17"/> shows anACPextreme example. Assuming that nodesees multiple AN_ACP objectives for the same secure channel protocol on different transport addresses, it could prefer connecting viaACP1 becomes thewell-known transport address ifRPL root, traffic between ACP11 and NOC2 will pass through ACP4-ACP3-ACP1-ACP2 instead of ACP4-ACP2 because thesecure channel method has one, such as UDP port 500 for IKEv2. For protocols such as (ACP secure channel over) DTLS for which thereRPL-calculated DODAG and routes areno well defined port number, this heuristic does not provide benefits though.</t> <t>DoS attack with port numbers can also be eliminated by relying on well known-port numbers implied byshortest paths towards theGRASP method-name. For example, a future service nameRPL root.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.4-3">To overcome these limitations, extensions and/or modifications to the RPL profile can optimize for multiple NOCs. This requires utilizing data plane artifacts, including IP-in-IP encapsulation/decapsulation on ACP routers and processing of"DTLSacp"IPv6 RPI headers. Alternatively, (Src,Dst) routing table entries could bedefined toused.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.4-4">Flooding of ACP GRASP messages can beassociatedfurther constrained and therefore optimized by flooding only via links that are part of the RPL DODAG.</t> </section> <section anchor="role-assignments" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.5"> <name slugifiedName="name-role-assignments">Role Assignments</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.5-1">ACP connect is an explicit mechanism to "leak" ACP traffic explicitly (for example, in anewlyNOC). It is therefore also a possible security gap when it is easy tobe assigned well known UDP port forenable ACPover DTLS, and the port numberconnect on arbitrary compromised ACP nodes.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.5-2">One simple solution is to define an extension in theGRASP transport addressACP certificate's ACP informationwouldfield indicating the permission for ACP connect to beignored. Noteconfigured on thatthere is already a variety of ports assigned to specific protocols over DTLS by IANA, so especially for DTLS this would notACP node. This could similarly beuncommon.</t> </section> </section> <!-- unfinished considerations --> </back> </rfc> <!-- REMOVED this section in version 12 duedone tofeedback by working group (Michael Richardson). Let IETF feedbackdecideif this additional textwhether a node isnecessary <section anchor="up4291" title="RFC4291/RFC4193 Updates Considerations"> <t>This document may be consideredpermitted to beupdatinga registrar or not.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.5-3">Tying theIPv6 addressing architecture (<xref target="RFC4291"/>) and/orpermitted "roles" of an ACP node to theUnique Local IPv6 Unicast addresses (<xref target="RFC4193"/>) depending on how strict specific statements in those specs areACP certificate provides fairly strong protection against misconfiguration, but it is still subject tobe interpreted.code modifications.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.5-4">Another interesting role to assign to certificates is that of a NOC node. Thissection summarized and explainswould allow thenecessity and benefits of these changes. The normative partslimiting ofthis document cover the actual updates.</t> <t>ACP addresses (<xref target="addressing"/>) are used by network nodes supporting the ACP. They are assigned during bootstrapcertain types of connections, such as OAM TLS connections to only thenodesNOC initiators orinitial provisioning ofresponders.</t> </section> <section anchor="l3-transit" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.6"> <name slugifiedName="name-autonomic-l3-transit">Autonomic L3 Transit</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.6-1">In this specification, theACP. They are encoded inACP can only establish autonomic connectivity across L2 hops but requires non-autonomic configuration to tunnel across L3 paths. Future work should specify mechanisms to automatically tunnel ACP across L3 networks. A hub-and-spoke option would allow tunneling across theDomain CertificateInternet to a cloud or central instance of thenode and are primarily used internally within the node. InACP; a peer-to-peer tunneling mechanism could tunnel ACP islands across an L3VPN infrastructure.</t> </section> <section anchor="future-diag" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.7"> <name slugifiedName="name-diagnostics">Diagnostics</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.7-1"><xref target="diagnostics" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9.1"/> describes diagnostics options thatrole theycan bethoughtapplied without changing the external, interoperability-affecting characteristics ofas Loopback addresses.</t> <t>Each ACP domain assignsACPaddresses from one or more ULA prefixes. Within animplementations.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.7-2">Even better diagnostics of ACPnetwork, addressesoperations areassigned by nodes called registrars. A unique Registrar-ID(entifier)possible with additional signaling extensions, such as the following:</t> <ol type="1" spacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-a.9.7-3"> <li pn="section-a.9.7-3.1" derivedCounter="1.">Consider if LLDP should be a recommended functionality for ANI devices to improve diagnostics, and if so, which information elements it should signal (noting that such information isusedconveyed inACP addressesan insecure manner). This includes potentially new information elements.</li> <li pn="section-a.9.7-3.2" derivedCounter="2.">As an alternative toallow multiple registrarsLLDP, a DULL GRASP diagnostics objective could be defined to carry these information elements.</li> <li pn="section-a.9.7-3.3" derivedCounter="3.">The IDevID certificate of BRSKI pledges should be included in the selected insecure diagnostics option. This may be undesirable when exposure of device information is seen as too much of a security issue (the ability toassign addresses autonomically and uncoordinated from each other. Typically these Registrar-IDs are deriveddeduce possible attack vectors fromthe IEEE 802 48-bit MAC addressesdevice model, for example).</li> <li pn="section-a.9.7-3.4" derivedCounter="4.">A richer set ofregistrars.</t> <t>Indiagnostics information should be made available via the secured ACPZone Addressing Sub-Scheme (<xref target="zone-scheme"/>), the registrar assigns a unique 15-bit value to anchannels, using either single-hop GRASP or network-wide "topology discovery" mechanisms.</li> </ol> </section> <section anchor="compromised" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.8"> <name slugifiedName="name-avoiding-and-dealing-with-c">Avoiding and Dealing with Compromised ACPnode. TheNodes</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-1">Compromised ACPaddress has a 64-bit Node-ID(entifier) composed of the 48-bit Registrar-ID,nodes pose theregistrar assigned 15-bit Node-Number and 1 V(irtualization) bit that allows for an ACP nodebiggest risk tohave two addresses.</t> <t>The 64-bit Node-Identifier intheACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme matchesoperations of the64-bit Interface Identifier (IID) address part as specified in RFC4291 section 2.5.1. IIDsnetwork. The most common types of compromise areunique across ACP nodes, but all ACP nodes withthesame ULA prefix that useleakage of credentials to manage and/or configure theACP Zone Addressing Sub-Scheme will sharedevice and thesame subnet prefix (according toapplication of malicious configuration, including thedefinitionchange of access credentials, but not the change of software. Most of today's networking equipment should have secure boot/software infrastructure anyhow, so attacks thatterm in RFC4291). Each ACP node injectsintroduce malicious software should be a/127 route intolot harder.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-2">The most important aspect of security design against these types of attacks is to eliminate password-based configuration access methods and instead rely on certificate-based credentials handed out only to nodes where it is clear that theACP routing tableprivate keys cannot leak. This limits unexpected propagation of credentials.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-3">If password-based credentials tocover its two assigned addresses (V(irtual) bit being 0configure devices still need to be supported, they must not be locally configurable, but only be remotely provisioned or1). This approach is used because these ACP addresses are identifiersverified (through protocols like RADIUS or Diameter), and there must be no local configuration permitting the change of these authentication mechanisms, but ideally they should be autoconfiguring across the ACP. See <xref target="I-D.eckert-anima-noc-autoconfig" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="NOC-AUTOCONFIG"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-4">Without physical access to the compromised device, attackers with access to configuration should notlocators. Thebe able to break the ACPnodeconnectivity, even when they canconnect anywhere inbreak or otherwise manipulate (spoof) theACP domain without having to change its addresses. The lightweight, highly scaleable routing protocol RPLdata plane connectivity through configuration. To achieve this, it isusednecessary toallowavoid providing configuration options forlarge scalethe ACP, such as enabling/disabling it on interfaces. For example, there could be an ACPnetworks.</t> <t>It is possible,configuration thatthis scheme constitutes an update to RFC4191 becauselocks down thesame 64-bit subnet prefix is used across many ACP nodes. Thecurrent ACPZone Addressing Sub-Schemeconfiguration unless factory reset isvery similar todone.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-5">With such means, thecommon operational practices of assigning /128 Loopback addressesvalid administration has the best chances tonetwork nodesmaintain access to ACP nodes, to discover malicious configuration though ongoing configuration tracking fromthe same /48central locations, for example, and to react accordingly.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-6">The primary reaction is to withdraw or/64 subnet prefix.</t> <t>Inchange credentials, terminate malicious existing management sessions, and fix theACP Vlong Addressing Sub-Scheme (<xref target="Vlong"/>),configuration. Ensuring that management sessions using invalidated credentials are terminated automatically without recourse will likely require new work.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-7">Only when these steps are infeasible, would it be necessary to revoke or expire theaddress elements areACP certificate credentials and consider thesame as described fornode kicked off theZone Addressing Sub-Scheme, butnetwork until theV field is expanded from 1-bitsituation can be further rectified, likely requiring direct physical access to8 or 16-bits. The ACP node withthe node.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.8-8">Without extensions, compromised ACPVlong addressing therefore injects /120 or /112 prefixes intonodes can only be removed from the ACProuting table to cover its internal addresses.</t> <t>The goal forat the8speed of CRL/OCSP information refresh or16-bit addresses availableexpiry (and non-removal) of short-lived certificates. Future extensions toanthe ACPnode in this scheme is to assign them as required to software components, which in autonomic networking are called ASA (Autonomic Service Agents). It could equally be usedcould, forexisting software components such as VNFs (Virtual Networking Functions). The ACP interface would then beexample, use theout-of-band management interfaceGRASP flooding distribution ofsuch a VNF software component. It should especially be possible to use these software components in a varietytriggered updates ofcontexts to allow standardized modular system composition: Native applications (in some VRF context if available), containers, virtual machines or other future ones. To modularily compose a system with containers and virtual machines and avoid problems such as port space collisionCRL/OCSP orNAT, it is necessary not only to assign separate addresses to those contexts, but also to usethenotionexplicit removal indication ofvirtual interfaces between these contexts to compose the system.</t> <t>In practical terms,the compromised node's domain certificate.</t> </section> <section anchor="downgrade" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-a.9.9"> <name slugifiedName="name-detecting-acp-secure-channe">Detecting ACPshould be enabled to create from its /8 or /16 prefix one or more node internal virtual subnets and to start software components connected to those virtual subnets. Ideally, these software components should be ableSecure Channel Downgrade Attacks</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.9-1">The following text proposes a mechanism toauto configure their addressesprotect against downgrade attacks without introducing a new specialized GRASP secure channel mechanism. Instead, it relies onthese virtual interfaces. Future work hasrunning GRASP after establishing a secure channel protocol todetermine whether this address auto configuration for the virtual interface is best done with DHCPv6,verify ifSLAAC should be recommendedthe established secure channel option could have been the result of a MITM downgrade attack.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.9-2">MITM attackers can force downgrade attacks forthese /8 or /16 virtual interfaces, orACP secure channel selection by filtering and/or modifying DULL GRASP messages and/or actual secure channel data packets. For example, if at someadditional standardized method wouldpoint in time, DTLS traffic could berequired.</t> <t>Inmore easily decrypted than traffic of IKEv2, the MITM could filter all IKEv2 packets to force ACPVlong Addressing scheme,nodes to use DTLS (assuming that theNode-ID doesACP nodes in question supported both DTLS and IKEv2).</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.9-3">For cases where such MITM attacks are notmatchcapable of injecting malicious traffic (but only of decrypting theRFC4291/RFC4193 64-bith lengthtraffic), a downgrade attack could be discovered after a secure channel connection is established, for example, by using theInterface Identifier, so this addressing Sub-Scheme infollowing type of mechanism.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-a.9.9-4">After theACPsecure channel connection is established, the two ACP peers negotiate, via anupdate to both standards.</t> <t>This document also specifiesappropriate (to be defined) GRASP negotiation, which ACP secure channel protocol should have been selected between them (in theworkaround solutionabsence ofexposinga MITM attacker). This negotiation would signal the ACPon native interfaces in support of adoptionsecure channel options announced by DULL GRASP by each peer followed byexisting hardware and software solutions. A NOC based NMS host could for example be configured with a second native interface connecting toan announcement of the preferred secure channel protocol by the ACPnodepeer thatexposesis the Decider in the secure channel setup, i.e., the ACP peer that decides which secure channel protocol to use. If thatNMS host (called ACP edge node). The desired evolution ofchosen secure channel protocol is different from the one that actually was chosen, then thisworkaroundmismatch is an indication thatthose two functions would merge intothere is asingle node, for example by making the ACP routerMITM attacker or other similar issue (e.g., acontainer/virtual machine insidefirewall prohibiting theNMS host or vice versa. The addressing for those native interfaces allows for manually configured address prefixes but it coulduse of specific protocols) that caused a non-preferred secure channel protocol to befully autonomous if itchosen. This discovery couldleverage the Vlong addressing format. That wouldthen result ina non /64 IID boundary on those external interfaces (but instead in /112 or /120 subnet prefixes).</t> <t>Note that both in the internal as wellmitigation options such as logging and ensuing investigations.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="ack" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-appendix.b"> <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-1">This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at Cisco Systems, which started in early 2010. Many people contributed to this project and theworkaround external useidea ofACP addresses, all ACP addresses are meantthe Autonomic Control Plane, amongst whom (in alphabetical order): <contact fullname="Ignas Bagdonas"/>, <contact fullname="Parag Bhide"/>, <contact fullname="Balaji BL"/>, <contact fullname="Alex Clemm"/>, <contact fullname="Yves Hertoghs"/>, <contact fullname="Bruno Klauser"/>, <contact fullname="Max Pritikin"/>, <contact fullname="Michael Richardson"/>, and <contact fullname="Ravi Kumar Vadapalli"/>.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-2">Special thanks tobe used exclusively by components that are part of network control<contact fullname="Brian Carpenter"/>, <contact fullname="Elwyn Davies"/>, <contact fullname="Joel Halpern"/>, andOAM, but not<contact fullname="Sheng Jiang"/> fornetwork users such as normal hosts. This implies thattheir thorough reviews.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-3">Many thanks to <contact fullname="Ben Kaduk"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>, and <contact fullname="Eric Rescorla"/> forexample no requirementstheir thorough SEC AD reviews, <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/> and <contact fullname="Erik Kline"/> forprivacy addressing have been identifiedtheir reviews, and to <contact fullname="Valery Smyslov"/>, <contact fullname="Tero Kivinen"/>, <contact fullname="Paul Wouters"/>, and <contact fullname="Yoav Nir"/> forACP addresses.</t>review of IPsec and IKEv2 parameters and helping to understand those and other security protocol details better. Thanks to <contact fullname="Carsten Bormann"/> for CBOR/CDDL help.</t> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-4">Further input, review, or suggestions were received from <contact fullname="Rene Struik"/>, <contact fullname="Benoit Claise"/>, <contact fullname="William Atwood"/>, and <contact fullname="Yongkang Zhang"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-appendix.c"> <name slugifiedName="name-contributors">Contributors</name> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.c-1">For all things GRASP including validation code, ongoing document text support, and technical input:</t> <contact fullname="Brian Carpenter" initials="B. E." surname="Carpenter"> <organization abbrev="Univ. of Auckland" showOnFrontPage="true"/> <address> <postal> <street>School of Computer Science</street> <street>University of Auckland</street> <street>PB 92019</street> <city>Auckland</city> <code>1142</code> <country>New Zealand</country> </postal> <email>brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com</email> </address> </contact> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.c-2">For RPL contributions and all things BRSKI/bootstrap including validation code, ongoing document text support, and technical input:</t> <contact fullname="Michael C. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"> <organization abbrev="Sandelman" showOnFrontPage="true">Sandelman Software Works</organization> <address> <email>mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</email> <uri>http://www.sandelman.ca/mcr/</uri> </address> </contact> <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.c-3">For the RPL technology choices and text:</t> <contact initials="P" surname="Thubert" fullname="Pascal Thubert"> <organization abbrev="Cisco Systems" showOnFrontPage="true">Cisco Systems, Inc</organization> <address> <postal> <street>Building D</street> <street>45 Allee des Ormes - BP1200</street> <city>Mougins - Sophia Antipolis</city> <code>06254</code> <country>France</country> </postal> <phone>+33 497 23 26 34</phone> <email>pthubert@cisco.com</email> </address> </contact> </section> <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.d"> <name slugifiedName="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</name> <author role="editor" fullname="Toerless Eckert" surname="Eckert"> <organization abbrev="Futurewei USA" showOnFrontPage="true">Futurewei Technologies Inc. USA</organization> <address> <postal> <street>2330 Central Expy</street> <city>Santa Clara</city> <region>CA</region> <code>95050</code> <country>United States of America</country> </postal> <email>tte+ietf@cs.fau.de</email> </address> </author> <author role="editor" fullname="Michael H. Behringer" initials="M." surname="Behringer"> <address> <email>michael.h.behringer@gmail.com</email> </address> </author> <author fullname="Steinthor Bjarnason" initials="S." surname="Bjarnason"> <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Arbor Networks</organization> <address> <postal> <street>2727 South State Street, Suite 200</street> <city>Ann Arbor</city> <region>MI</region> <code>48104</code> <country>United States of America</country> </postal> <email>sbjarnason@arbor.net</email> </address> </author> </section>--></back> </rfc>