rfc9101.original   rfc9101.txt 
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft NAT.Consulting Request for Comments: 9101 NAT.Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Category: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: October 10, 2021 Yubico ISSN: 2070-1721 Yubico
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
April 8, 2021 August 2021
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request
(JAR) (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34
Abstract Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request query parameter serialization, which means that authorization request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
means that (a) the communication through the user agents is not means that a) the communication through the user agents is not
integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, (b) the integrity protected and thus, the parameters can be tainted, b) the
source of the communication is not authenticated, and (c) the source of the communication is not authenticated, and c) the
communication through the user agents can be monitored. Because of communication through the user agents can be monitored. Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward. forward.
This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication, and
confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained. confidentiality properties of the authorization request are attained.
The request can be sent by value or by reference. The request can be sent by value or by reference.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9101.
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Requirements Language
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Request Object
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Request Object URI
3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Symbols and Abbreviated Terms
4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Request Object
5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Authorization Request
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference
5.2.1. URI Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2.1. URI Referencing the Request Object
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 12 5.2.2. Request Using the "request_uri" Request Parameter
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 12 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
6.1. JWE Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. JWE Encrypted Request Object
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2. JWS-Signed Request Object
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Authorization Server Response
8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. TLS Requirements
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. IANA Considerations
9.1. OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.1. OAuth Parameters Registration
9.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry . . . . . . 16 9.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry
9.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry . . . 17 9.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry
9.4. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.4. Media Type Registration
9.4.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.4.1. Registry Contents
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10. Security Considerations
10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10.1. Choice of Algorithms
10.2. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10.2. Request Source Authentication
10.3. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.3. Explicit Endpoints
10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri
10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server . . . . . . 20 10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server
10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite
10.5. Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.5. Downgrade Attack
10.6. TLS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.6. TLS Security Considerations
10.7. Parameter Mismatches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.7. Parameter Mismatches
10.8. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.8. Cross-JWT Confusion
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11. Privacy Considerations
11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11.1. Collection Limitation
11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11.2. Disclosure Limitation
11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11.2.1. Request Disclosure
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 23 11.2.2. Tracking Using Request Object URI
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12. References
13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12.1. Normative References
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 12.2. Informative References
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Acknowledgements
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Authors' Addresses
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization and is typically sent through user agents parameter serialization and is typically sent through user agents
such as web browsers. such as web browsers.
For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state", For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state",
and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request: and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request:
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
While it is easy to implement, the encoding in the URI does not allow While it is easy to implement, the encoding in the URI does not allow
application layer security to be used to provide confidentiality and application-layer security to be used to provide confidentiality and
integrity protection. While TLS is used to offer communication integrity protection. While TLS is used to offer communication
security between the Client and the user-agent as well as the user- security between the client and the user agent as well as the user
agent and the Authorization Server, TLS sessions are terminated in agent and the authorization server, TLS sessions are terminated in
the user-agent. In addition, TLS sessions may be terminated the user agent. In addition, TLS sessions may be terminated
prematurely at some middlebox (such as a load balancer). prematurely at some middlebox (such as a load balancer).
As the result, the Authorization Request of [RFC6749] has As a result, the authorization request of [RFC6749] has shortcomings
shortcomings in that: in that:
(a) the communication through the user agents is not integrity (a) the communication through the user agents is not integrity
protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity protected, and thus, the parameters can be tainted (integrity
protection failure) protection failure);
(b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source (b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source
authentication failure) authentication failure);
(c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored (c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored
(containment / confidentiality failure). (containment/confidentiality failure).
Due to these inherent weaknesses, several attacks against the Due to these inherent weaknesses, several attacks against the
protocol, such as Redirection URI rewriting, have been identified. protocol, such as redirection URI rewriting, have been identified.
The use of application layer security mitigates these issues. The use of application-layer security mitigates these issues.
The use of application layer security allows requests to be prepared The use of application-layer security allows requests to be prepared
by a trusted third party so that a client application cannot request by a trusted third party so that a client application cannot request
more permissions than previously agreed. more permissions than previously agreed upon.
Furthermore, passing the request by reference allows the reduction of Furthermore, passing the request by reference allows the reduction of
over-the-wire overhead. over-the-wire overhead.
The JWT [RFC7519] encoding has been chosen because of The JWT [RFC7519] encoding has been chosen because of:
(1) its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's (1) its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's
response format response format
(2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature (2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature
(3) its relative compactness compared to XML (3) its relative compactness compared to XML
(4) its development status as a Proposed Standard, along with the (4) its development status as a Proposed Standard, along with the
associated signing and encryption methods [RFC7515] [RFC7516] associated signing and encryption methods [RFC7515] [RFC7516]
(5) the relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and (5) the relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and
Encryption. Encryption.
The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as
additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0 additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0 [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON-encoded OAuth 2.0
authorization request parameters. Note that, in contrast to RFC authorization request parameters. Note that, in contrast to RFC
7519, the elements of the Claims Set are encoded OAuth Request 7519, the elements of the Claims Set are encoded OAuth request
Parameters [IANA.OAuth.Parameters], supplemented with only a few of parameters [IANA.OAuth.Parameters], supplemented with only a few of
the IANA-managed JSON Web Token Claims [IANA.JWT.Claims] - in the IANA-managed JSON Web Token Claims [IANA.JWT.Claims], in
particular "iss" and "aud". The JWT in the "request" parameter is particular, "iss" and "aud". The JWT in the "request" parameter is
integrity protected and source authenticated using JWS. integrity protected and source authenticated using JWS.
The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by
reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead
of the "request". of "request".
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query
parameters has several advantages: parameters has several advantages:
(a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the (a) Integrity protection. The request can be signed so that the
integrity of the request can be checked. integrity of the request can be checked.
(b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the (b) Source authentication. The request can be signed so that the
signer can be authenticated. signer can be authenticated.
(c) (confidentiality protection) The request can be encrypted so (c) Confidentiality protection. The request can be encrypted so
that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS
connection is terminated at one point or another (including at connection is terminated at one point or another (including at
and before user-agents). and before user agents).
(d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a trusted (d) Collection minimization. The request can be signed by a trusted
third party attesting that the authorization request is third party attesting that the authorization request is
compliant with a certain policy. For example, a request can be compliant with a certain policy. For example, a request can be
pre-examined by a trusted third party that all the personal data pre-examined by a trusted third party to confirm that all the
requested is strictly necessary to perform the process that the personal data requested is strictly necessary to perform the
end-user asked for, and signed by that trusted third party. The process that the end user asked for; the request would then be
authorization server then examines the signature and shows the signed by that trusted third party. The authorization server
conformance status to the end-user, who would have some then examines the signature and shows the conformance status to
assurance as to the legitimacy of the request when authorizing the end user who would have some assurance as to the legitimacy
it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip the of the request when authorizing it. In some cases, it may even
authorization dialogue under such circumstances. be desirable to skip the authorization dialogue under such
circumstances.
There are a few cases that request by reference is useful such as: There are a few cases where request by reference is useful, such as:
1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request. 1. when it is desirable to reduce the size of a transmitted request.
The use of application layer security increases the size of the The use of application-layer security increases the size of the
request, particularly when public key cryptography is used. request particularly when public-key cryptography is used.
2. When the client does not want to do the application level 2. when the client does not want to do the application-level
cryptography. The Authorization Server may provide an endpoint cryptography. The authorization server may provide an endpoint
to accept the Authorization Request through direct communication to accept the authorization request through direct communication
with the Client so that the Client is authenticated and the with the client, so that the client is authenticated and the
channel is TLS protected. channel is TLS protected.
This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
For the purposes of this specification, the following terms and For the purposes of this specification, the following terms and
definitions in addition to what is defined in OAuth 2.0 Framework definitions apply in addition to what is defined in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], JSON Web Signature [RFC7515], and JSON Web Encryption Framework [RFC6749], JSON Web Signature [RFC7515], and JSON Web
[RFC7519] apply. Encryption [RFC7516].
2.1. Request Object 2.1. Request Object
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON A Request Object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims
encoded OAuth 2.0 authorization request parameters. Set holds the JSON-encoded OAuth 2.0 authorization request
parameters.
2.2. Request Object URI 2.2. Request Object URI
Absolute URI that references the set of parameters comprising an A Request Object URI is an absolute URI that references the set of
OAuth 2.0 authorization request. The contents of the resource parameters comprising an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. The
referenced by the URI are a Request Object (Section 2.1), unless the content of the resource referenced by the URI is a Request Object
URI was provided to the client by the same Authorization Server, in (Section 2.1), unless the URI was provided to the client by the same
which case the content is an implementation detail at the discretion authorization server, in which case the content is an implementation
the Authorization Server. The former is to ensure interoperability detail at the discretion of the authorization server. The content
in cases where the provider of the request_uri is a separate entity being a Request Object is to ensure interoperability in cases where
from the consumer, such as when a client provides a URI referencing a the provider of the "request_uri" is a separate entity from the
Request Object stored on the client's backend service and made consumer, such as when a client provides a URI referencing a Request
accessible via HTTPS. In the latter case where the Authorization Object stored on the client's backend service that is made accessible
Server is both provider and consumer of the URI, such as when it via HTTPS. In the latter case, where the authorization server is
offers an endpoint that provides a URI in exchange for a Request both provider and consumer of the URI, such as when it offers an
Object, this interoperability concern does not apply. endpoint that provides a URI in exchange for a Request Object, this
interoperability concern does not apply.
3. Symbols and abbreviated terms 3. Symbols and Abbreviated Terms
The following abbreviations are common to this specification. The following abbreviations are common to this specification.
JSON JavaScript Object Notation JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
JWT JSON Web Token JWT: JSON Web Token
JWS JSON Web Signature JWS: JSON Web Signature
JWE JSON Web Encryption JWE: JSON Web Encryption
URI Uniform Resource Identifier URI: Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator URL: Uniform Resource Locator
4. Request Object 4. Request Object
A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization
request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It MUST request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It MUST
contain all the parameters (including extension parameters) used to contain all the parameters (including extension parameters) used to
process the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request except the process the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request except the
"request" and "request_uri" parameters that are defined in this "request" and "request_uri" parameters that are defined in this
document. The parameters are represented as the JWT claims of the document. The parameters are represented as the JWT Claims of the
object. Parameter names and string values MUST be included as JSON object. Parameter names and string values MUST be included as JSON
strings. Since Request Objects are handled across domains and strings. Since Request Objects are handled across domains and
potentially outside of a closed ecosystem, per section 8.1 of potentially outside of a closed ecosystem, per Section 8.1 of
[RFC8259], these JSON strings MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629]. [RFC8259], these JSON strings MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629].
Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY include Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. The Request
any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC8259] object constitutes the Object MAY include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC8259]
JWT Claims Set defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The JWT Claims Set is then object constitutes the JWT Claims Set defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The
signed or signed and encrypted. JWT Claims Set is then signed or signed and encrypted.
To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a
JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request JWS-signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request
Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience) Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience)
as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT as members with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT
[RFC7519] specification. The value of "aud" should be the value of [RFC7519] specification. The value of "aud" should be the value of
the Authorization Server (AS) "issuer" as defined in RFC8414 the authorization server (AS) "issuer", as defined in RFC 8414
[RFC8414]. [RFC8414].
To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. When both signature and To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. When both signature and
encryption are being applied, the JWT MUST be signed then encrypted encryption are being applied, the JWT MUST be signed, then encrypted,
as described in Section 11.2 of [RFC7519]. The result is a Nested as described in Section 11.2 of [RFC7519]. The result is a Nested
JWT, as defined in [RFC7519]. JWT, as defined in [RFC7519].
The client determines the algorithms used to sign and encrypt Request The client determines the algorithms used to sign and encrypt Request
Objects. The algorithms chosen need to be supported by both the Objects. The algorithms chosen need to be supported by both the
client and the authorization server. The client can inform the client and the authorization server. The client can inform the
authorization server of the algorithms that it supports in its authorization server of the algorithms that it supports in its
dynamic client registration metadata [RFC7591], specifically, the dynamic client registration metadata [RFC7591], specifically, the
metadata values "request_object_signing_alg", metadata values "request_object_signing_alg",
"request_object_encryption_alg", and "request_object_encryption_enc". "request_object_encryption_alg", and "request_object_encryption_enc".
Likewise, the authorization server can inform the client of the Likewise, the authorization server can inform the client of the
algorithms that it supports in its authorization server metadata algorithms that it supports in its authorization server metadata
[RFC8414], specifically, the metadata values [RFC8414], specifically, the metadata values
"request_object_signing_alg_values_supported", "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported",
"request_object_encryption_alg_values_supported", and "request_object_encryption_alg_values_supported", and
"request_object_encryption_enc_values_supported". "request_object_encryption_enc_values_supported".
The Request Object MAY be sent by value as described in Section 5.1 The Request Object MAY be sent by value, as described in Section 5.1,
or by reference as described in Section 5.2. "request" and or by reference, as described in Section 5.2. "request" and
"request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in Request Objects. "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in Request Objects.
A Request Object (Section 2.1) has the media type [RFC2046] A Request Object (Section 2.1) has the media type [RFC2046]
"application/oauth-authz-req+jwt". Note that some existing "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt". Note that some existing
deployments may alternatively be using the type "application/jwt". deployments may alternatively be using the type "application/jwt".
The following is an example of the Claims in a Request Object before The following is an example of the Claims in a Request Object before
base64url [RFC7515] encoding and signing. Note that it includes the base64url [RFC7515] encoding and signing. Note that it includes the
extension parameters "nonce" and "max_age". extension parameters "nonce" and "max_age".
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IiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VUElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgK IiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VUElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgK
b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2 b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2
HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6 HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6
JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O
CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf
pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g
The following RSA public key, represented in JWK format, can be used The following RSA public key, represented in JSON Web Key (JWK)
to validate the Request Object signature in this and subsequent format, can be used to validate the Request Object signature in this
Request Object examples (with line wraps within values for display and subsequent Request Object examples (with line wraps within values
purposes only): for display purposes only):
{ {
"kty":"RSA", "kty":"RSA",
"kid":"k2bdc", "kid":"k2bdc",
"n":"x5RbkAZkmpRxia65qRQ1wwSMSxQUnS7gcpVTV_cdHmfmG2ltd2yabEO9XadD8 "n":"x5RbkAZkmpRxia65qRQ1wwSMSxQUnS7gcpVTV_cdHmfmG2ltd2yabEO9XadD8
pJNZubINPpmgHh3J1aD9WRwS05ucmFq3CfFsluLt13_7oX5yDRSKX7poXmT_5 pJNZubINPpmgHh3J1aD9WRwS05ucmFq3CfFsluLt13_7oX5yDRSKX7poXmT_5
ko8k4NJZPMAO8fPToDTH7kHYbONSE2FYa5GZ60CUsFhSonI-dcMDJ0Ary9lxI ko8k4NJZPMAO8fPToDTH7kHYbONSE2FYa5GZ60CUsFhSonI-dcMDJ0Ary9lxI
w5k2z4TAdARVWcS7sD07VhlMMshrwsPHBQgTatlkxyIHXbYdtak8fqvNAwr7O w5k2z4TAdARVWcS7sD07VhlMMshrwsPHBQgTatlkxyIHXbYdtak8fqvNAwr7O
lVEvM_Ipf5OfmdB8Sd-wjzaBsyP4VhJKoi_qdgSzpC694XZeYPq45Sw-q51iF lVEvM_Ipf5OfmdB8Sd-wjzaBsyP4VhJKoi_qdgSzpC694XZeYPq45Sw-q51iF
UlcOlTCI7z6jltUtnR6ySn6XDGFnzH5Fe5ypw", UlcOlTCI7z6jltUtnR6ySn6XDGFnzH5Fe5ypw",
skipping to change at page 9, line 31 skipping to change at line 393
5. Authorization Request 5. Authorization Request
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding the The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding the
following parameters to the query component of the authorization following parameters to the query component of the authorization
endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format: endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format:
request request
REQUIRED unless "request_uri" is specified. The Request Object REQUIRED unless "request_uri" is specified. The Request Object
(Section 2.1) that holds authorization request parameters stated (Section 2.1) that holds authorization request parameters stated
in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. If this parameter is present in Section 4 of [RFC6749] (OAuth 2.0). If this parameter is
in the authorization request, "request_uri" MUST NOT be present. present in the authorization request, "request_uri" MUST NOT be
present.
request_uri request_uri
REQUIRED unless "request" is specified. The absolute URI as REQUIRED unless "request" is specified. The absolute URI, as
defined by RFC3986 [RFC3986] that is the Request Object URI defined by RFC 3986 [RFC3986], that is the Request Object URI
(Section 2.2) referencing the authorization request parameters (Section 2.2) referencing the authorization request parameters
stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. If this parameter is stated in Section 4 of [RFC6749] (OAuth 2.0). If this parameter
present in the authorization request, "request" MUST NOT be is present in the authorization request, "request" MUST NOT be
present. present.
client_id client_id
REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] "client_id". The value MUST match REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] "client_id". The value MUST match
the "request" or "request_uri" Request Object's (Section 2.1) the "request" or "request_uri" Request Object's (Section 2.1)
"client_id". "client_id".
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the HTTP redirection response or by other means available to it via the
user-agent. user agent.
For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the For example, the client directs the end user's user agent to make the
following HTTPS request: following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1 GET /authz?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity. The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MUST be one of the following: The Authorization Request Object MUST be one of the following:
(a) JWS signed (a) JWS signed
(b) JWS signed and JWE encrypted (b) JWS signed and JWE encrypted
The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object The client MAY send the parameters included in the Request Object
duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward duplicated in the query parameters as well for backward
compatibility etc. However, the authorization server supporting this compatibility, etc. However, the authorization server supporting
specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request this specification MUST only use the parameters included in the
object. Request Object.
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the The client sends the authorization request as a Request Object to the
Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value. authorization endpoint as the "request" parameter value.
The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the The following is an example of an authorization request using the
"request" parameter (with line wraps within values for display "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& https://server.example.com/authorize?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6 request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6
ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwKICAgICJhdWQiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBs ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwKICAgICJhdWQiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBs
ZS5jb20iLAogICAgInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsCiAg ZS5jb20iLAogICAgInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsCiAg
ICAiY2xpZW50X2lkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLAogICAgInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6 ICAiY2xpZW50X2lkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLAogICAgInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6
ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsCiAgICAic2NvcGUiOiAi ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsCiAgICAic2NvcGUiOiAi
b3BlbmlkIiwKICAgICJzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsCiAgICAibm9uY2Ui b3BlbmlkIiwKICAgICJzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsCiAgICAibm9uY2Ui
OiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VU OiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VU
ElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgKb5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC ElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgKb5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC
0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKz 0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKz
uKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3E uKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3E
YLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8OCMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W YLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8OCMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W
9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jfpnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3 9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jfpnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3
j1i7tLR_5Nz-g j1i7tLR_5Nz-g
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference
The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth The "request_uri" authorization request parameter enables OAuth
authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by authorization requests to be passed by reference rather than by
value. This parameter is used identically to the "request" value. This parameter is used identically to the "request"
parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from parameter, except that the Request Object value is retrieved from the
the resource identified by the specified URI rather than passed by resource identified by the specified URI rather than passed by value.
value.
The entire Request URI SHOULD NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There The entire Request URI SHOULD NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There
are two reasons for this restriction: are two reasons for this restriction:
1. Many phones in the market as of this writing still do not accept 1. Many phones on the market as of this writing still do not accept
large payloads. The restriction is typically either 512 or 1024 large payloads. The restriction is typically either 512 or 1024
ASCII characters. ASCII characters.
2. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL 2. On a slow connection such as a 2G mobile connection, a large URL
would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is would cause a slow response; therefore, the use of such is not
not advisable from the user experience point of view. advisable from the user-experience point of view.
The contents of the resource referenced by the "request_uri" MUST be The contents of the resource referenced by the "request_uri" MUST be
a Request Object and MUST be reachable by the Authorization Server a Request Object and MUST be reachable by the authorization server
unless the URI was provided to the client by the Authorization unless the URI was provided to the client by the authorization
Server. In the first case, the "request_uri" MUST be an "https" URI, server. In the first case, the "request_uri" MUST be an "https" URI,
as specified in Section 2.7.2 of RFC7230 [RFC7230]. In the second as specified in Section 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]. In the second case, it
case, it MUST be a URN, as specified in RFC8141 [RFC8141]. MUST be a URN, as specified in [RFC8141].
The following is an example of the contents of a Request Object The following is an example of the contents of a Request Object
resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line wraps resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line wraps
within values for display purposes only): within values for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6ICJzNkJoZF eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6ICJzNkJoZF
JrcXQzIiwKICAgICJhdWQiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLAog JrcXQzIiwKICAgICJhdWQiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLAog
ICAgInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsCiAgICAiY2xpZW50X2 ICAgInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsCiAgICAiY2xpZW50X2
lkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLAogICAgInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2Ns lkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLAogICAgInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2Ns
aWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsCiAgICAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwKICAgIC aWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsCiAgICAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwKICAgIC
JzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsCiAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1q JzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsCiAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1q
IiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VUElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgK IiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VUElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgK
b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2 b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2
HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6 HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6
JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O
CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf
pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g
5.2.1. URI Referencing the Request Object 5.2.1. URI Referencing the Request Object
The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or The client stores the Request Object resource either locally or
remotely at a URI the Authorization Server can access. Such facility remotely at a URI the authorization server can access. Such a
may be provided by the authorization server or a trusted third party. facility may be provided by the authorization server or a trusted
For example, the authorization server may provide a URL to which the third party. For example, the authorization server may provide a URL
client POSTs the request object and obtains the Request URI. This to which the client POSTs the Request Object and obtains the Request
URI is the Request Object URI, "request_uri". URI. This URI is the Request Object URI, "request_uri".
It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to
be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the be revealed only to the authorization server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime so that "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime so that
the URI is not guessable if publicly retrievable. For the guidance, the URI is not guessable if publicly retrievable. For the guidance,
refer to 5.1.4.2.2 of [RFC6819] and Good Practices for Capability refer to Section 5.1.4.2.2 of [RFC6819] and "Good Practices for
URLs [CapURLs]. It is RECOMMENDED that it be removed after a Capability URLs" [CapURLs]. It is RECOMMENDED that the "request_uri"
reasonable timeout unless access control measures are taken. be removed after a reasonable timeout unless access control measures
are taken.
The following is an example of a Request Object URI value (with line The following is an example of a Request Object URI value (with line
wraps within values for display purposes only). In this example, a wraps within values for display purposes only). In this example, a
trusted third-party service hosts the Request Object. trusted third-party service hosts the Request Object.
https://tfp.example.org/request.jwt/ https://tfp.example.org/request.jwt/
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter 5.2.2. Request Using the "request_uri" Request Parameter
The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization The client sends the authorization request to the authorization
Endpoint. endpoint.
The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the The following is an example of an authorization request using the
"request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for display "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Ftfp.example.org%2Frequest.jwt &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Ftfp.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%2FGkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM %2FGkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an Upon receipt of the Request, the authorization server MUST send an
HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced
Request Object, unless it is stored in a way so that it can retrieve Request Object unless the Request Object is stored in a way so that
it through other mechanism securely, and parse it to recreate the the server can retrieve it through other mechanisms securely and
Authorization Request parameters. parse it to recreate the authorization request parameters.
The following is an example of this fetch process. In this example, The following is an example of this fetch process. In this example,
a trusted third-party service hosts the Request Object. a trusted third-party service hosts the Request Object.
GET /request.jwt/GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM HTTP/1.1 GET /request.jwt/GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM HTTP/1.1
Host: tfp.example.org Host: tfp.example.org
The following is an example of the fetch response: The following is an example of the fetch response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 23:52:39 GMT Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 23:52:39 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.43 (tfp.example.org) Server: Apache/2.4.43 (tfp.example.org)
Content-type: application/oauth-authz-req+jwt Content-type: application/oauth-authz-req+jwt
Content-Length: 797 Content-Length: 797
Last-Modified: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 23:52:32 GMT Last-Modified: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 23:52:32 GMT
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6ICJzNkJoZF eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6ICJzNkJoZF
skipping to change at page 13, line 30 skipping to change at line 580
b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2 b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2
HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6 HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6
JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O
CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf
pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
6.1. JWE Encrypted Request Object 6.1. JWE Encrypted Request Object
If the request object is encrypted, the Authorization Server MUST If the Request Object is encrypted, the authorization server MUST
decrypt the JWT in accordance with the JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] decrypt the JWT in accordance with the JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516]
specification. specification.
The result is a signed request object. The result is a signed Request Object.
If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an If decryption fails, the authorization server MUST return an
"invalid_request_object" error to the client in response to the "invalid_request_object" error to the client in response to the
authorization request. authorization request.
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object 6.2. JWS-Signed Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST validate the signature of the JSON Web The authorization server MUST validate the signature of the JWS-
Signature [RFC7515] signed Request Object. If a "kid" Header signed [RFC7515] Request Object. If a "kid" Header Parameter is
Parameter is present, the key identified MUST be the key used, and present, the key identified MUST be the key used and MUST be a key
MUST be a key associated with the client. The signature MUST be associated with the client. The signature MUST be validated using a
validated using a key associated with the client and the algorithm key associated with the client and the algorithm specified in the
specified in the "alg" Header Parameter. Algorithm verification MUST "alg" Header Parameter. Algorithm verification MUST be performed, as
be performed, as specified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of [RFC8725]. specified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of [RFC8725].
If the key is not associated with the client or if signature If the key is not associated with the client or if signature
validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an validation fails, the authorization server MUST return an
"invalid_request_object" error to the client in response to the "invalid_request_object" error to the client in response to the
authorization request. authorization request.
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST extract the set of Authorization The authorization server MUST extract the set of authorization
Request parameters from the Request Object value. The Authorization request parameters from the Request Object value. The authorization
Server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object even if the server MUST only use the parameters in the Request Object, even if
same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The Client ID the same parameter is provided in the query parameter. The client ID
values in the "client_id" request parameter and in the Request Object values in the "client_id" request parameter and in the Request Object
"client_id" claim MUST be identical. The Authorization Server then "client_id" claim MUST be identical. The authorization server then
validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. validates the request, as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
If the Client ID check or the request validation fails, then the If the Client ID check or the request validation fails, then the
Authorization Server MUST return an error to the client in response authorization server MUST return an error to the client in response
to the authorization request, as specified in Section 5.2 of OAuth to the authorization request, as specified in Section 5.2 of
2.0 [RFC6749]. [RFC6749] (OAuth 2.0).
7. Authorization Server Response 7. Authorization Server Response
Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in The authorization server response is created and sent to the client
Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. as in Section 4 of [RFC6749] (OAuth 2.0).
In addition, this document uses these additional error values: In addition, this document uses these additional error values:
invalid_request_uri invalid_request_uri
The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request returns an error or The "request_uri" in the authorization request returns an error or
contains invalid data. contains invalid data.
invalid_request_object invalid_request_object
The request parameter contains an invalid Request Object. The request parameter contains an invalid Request Object.
request_not_supported request_not_supported
The Authorization Server does not support the use of the "request" The authorization server does not support the use of the "request"
parameter. parameter.
request_uri_not_supported request_uri_not_supported
The Authorization Server does not support the use of the The authorization server does not support the use of the
"request_uri" parameter. "request_uri" parameter.
8. TLS Requirements 8. TLS Requirements
Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST
support TLS following Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport support TLS, following "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"
[BCP195]. [RFC7525].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering, To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a cipher confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a cipher
suite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. suite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
HTTP clients MUST also verify the TLS server certificate, using DNS- HTTP clients MUST also verify the TLS server certificate, using DNS-
ID [RFC6125], to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and ID [RFC6125], to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and
guidelines defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the following guidelines defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the following
considerations: considerations:
o Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity * Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED. Certification in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED. Certification
authorities which issue server certificates MUST support the DNS- authorities that issue server certificates MUST support the DNS-ID
ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be present identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be present in
in server certificates. server certificates.
o DNS names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard * DNS names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard
character "*". character "*".
o Clients MUST NOT use CN-ID identifiers; a CN field may be present * Clients MUST NOT use CN-ID identifiers; a Common Name field (CN
in the server certificate's subject name, but MUST NOT be used for field) may be present in the server certificate's subject name but
authentication within the rules described in [BCP195]. MUST NOT be used for authentication within the rules described in
[RFC7525].
o SRV-ID and URI-ID as described in Section 6.5 of [RFC6125] MUST * SRV-ID and URI-ID as described in Section 6.5 of [RFC6125] MUST
NOT be used for comparison. NOT be used for comparison.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
9.1. OAuth Parameters Registration 9.1. OAuth Parameters Registration
Since the request object is a JWT, the core JWT claims cannot be used Since the Request Object is a JWT, the core JWT claims cannot be used
for any purpose in the request object other than for what JWT for any purpose in the Request Object other than for what JWT
dictates. Thus, they need to be registered as OAuth Authorization dictates. Thus, they have been registered as OAuth authorization
Request parameters to avoid future OAuth extensions using them with request parameters to avoid future OAuth extensions using them with
different meanings. different meanings.
This specification adds the following values to the "OAuth This specification adds the following values to the "OAuth
Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
[RFC6749]. [RFC6749].
o Name: "iss" Name: "iss"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.1 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "sub" Name: "sub"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.2 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "aud" Name: "aud"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.3 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "exp" Name: "exp"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.4 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "nbf" Name: "nbf"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.5 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "iat" Name: "iat"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.6 of
document. [RFC7519].
o Name: "jti" Name: "jti"
o Parameter Usage Location: authorization request Parameter Usage Location: authorization request
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519] and this Specification Document(s): This document and Section 4.1.7 of
document. [RFC7519].
9.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry 9.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry
This specification adds the following value to the "OAuth This specification adds the following value to the "OAuth
Authorization Server Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] Authorization Server Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC8414]. established by [RFC8414].
o Metadata Name: "require_signed_request_object" Metadata Name: "require_signed_request_object"
o Metadata Description: Indicates where authorization request needs Metadata Description: Indicates where authorization request needs to
to be protected as Request Object and provided through either be protected as Request Object and provided through either
"request" or "request_uri parameter". "request" or "request_uri parameter".
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 10.5 of this document. Specification Document(s): Section 10.5 of this document.
9.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry 9.3. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry
This specification adds the following value to the "OAuth Dynamic This specification adds the following value to the "OAuth Dynamic
Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC7591]. established by [RFC7591].
o Metadata Name: "require_signed_request_object" Metadata Name: "require_signed_request_object"
o Metadata Description: Indicates where authorization request needs Metadata Description: Indicates where authorization request needs to
to be protected as Request Object and provided through either be protected as Request Object and provided through either
"request" or "request_uri parameter". "request" or "request_uri parameter".
o Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 10.5 of this document. Specification Document(s): Section 10.5 of this document.
9.4. Media Type Registration 9.4. Media Type Registration
9.4.1. Registry Contents 9.4.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt" media This section registers the "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt" media
type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838]. It can be used to indicate that the
content is a JWT containing Request Object claims. content is a JWT containing Request Object claims.
o Type name: application Type name: application
o Subtype name: oauth-authz-req+jwt Subtype name: oauth-authz-req+jwt
o Required parameters: n/a Required parameters: N/A
o Optional parameters: n/a Optional parameters: N/A
o Encoding considerations: binary; A Request Object is a JWT; JWT Encoding considerations: binary; a Request Object is a JWT; JWT
values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some
of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') of which may be the empty string) separated by period (".")
characters. characters.
o Security considerations: See Section 10 of [[ this specification Security considerations: See Section 10 of RFC 9101
]] Interoperability considerations: N/A
o Interoperability considerations: n/a Published specification: Section 4 of RFC 9101
o Published specification: Section 4 of [[ this specification ]] Applications that use this media type: Applications that use Request
o Applications that use this media type: Applications that use Objects to make an OAuth 2.0 authorization request
Request Objects to make an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a Additional information:
o Additional information: Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
Magic number(s): n/a File extension(s): N/A
File extension(s): n/a Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a Person & email address to contact for further information:
Nat Sakimura <nat@nat.consulting>
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Intended usage: COMMON
Nat Sakimura, nat@nat.consulting Restrictions on usage: none
o Intended usage: COMMON Author: Nat Sakimura <nat@nat.consulting>
o Restrictions on usage: none Change controller: IETF
o Author: Nat Sakimura, nat@nat.consulting Provisional registration? No
o Change controller: IETF
o Provisional registration? No
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth In addition to all the security considerations discussed in OAuth 2.0
2.0 [RFC6819], the security considerations in [RFC7515], [RFC7516], [RFC6819], the security considerations in [RFC7515], [RFC7516],
[RFC7518], and [RFC8725] need to be considered. Also, there are [RFC7518], and [RFC8725] need to be considered. Also, there are
several academic papers such as [BASIN] that provide useful insight several academic papers such as [BASIN] that provide useful insight
into the security properties of protocols like OAuth. into the security properties of protocols like OAuth.
In consideration of the above, this document advises taking the In consideration of the above, this document advises taking the
following security considerations into account. following security considerations into account.
10.1. Choice of Algorithms 10.1. Choice of Algorithms
When sending the authorization request object through "request" When sending the Authorization Request Object through the "request"
parameter, it MUST either be signed using JWS [RFC7515] or signed parameter, it MUST be either signed using JWS [RFC7515] or signed and
then encrypted using JWS [RFC7515] and JWE [RFC7516] respectively, then encrypted using JWS [RFC7515] and JWE [RFC7516], respectively,
with then considered appropriate algorithms. with algorithms considered appropriate at the time.
10.2. Request Source Authentication 10.2. Request Source Authentication
The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified. The source of the authorization request MUST always be verified.
There are several ways to do it: There are several ways to do it:
(a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object. (a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object.
(b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the (b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the
correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption. Note correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption. Note,
however, that if public key encryption is used, no source however, that if public key encryption is used, no source
authentication is enabled by the encryption, as any party can authentication is enabled by the encryption, as any party can
encrypt content to the public key. encrypt to the public key.
(c) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In (c) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In
this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that this case, the authorization server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is the client uses the Request Object URI and only the client is
covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a covered by the TLS certificate. In general, this is not a
reliable method. reliable method.
(d) When an Authorization Server implements a service that returns a (d) When an authorization server implements a service that returns a
Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object, the Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object, the
Authorization Server MUST perform Client Authentication to authorization server MUST perform client authentication to
accept the Request Object and bind the Client Identifier to the accept the Request Object and bind the client identifier to the
Request Object URI it is providing. It MUST validate the Request Object URI it is providing. It MUST validate the
signature, per (a). Since Request Object URI can be replayed, signature, per (a). Since the Request Object URI can be
the lifetime of the Request Object URI MUST be short and replayed, the lifetime of the Request Object URI MUST be short
preferably one-time use. The entropy of the Request Object URI and preferably one-time use. The entropy of the Request Object
MUST be sufficiently large. The adequate shortness of the URI MUST be sufficiently large. The adequate shortness of the
validity and the entropy of the Request Object URI depends on validity and the entropy of the Request Object URI depends on
the risk calculation based on the value of the resource being the risk calculation based on the value of the resource being
protected. A general guidance for the validity time would be protected. A general guidance for the validity time would be
less than a minute and the Request Object URI is to include a less than a minute, and the Request Object URI is to include a
cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the time of the cryptographic random value of 128 bits or more at the time of
writing of this specification. the writing of this specification.
(e) When a trusted third-party service returns a Request Object URI (e) When a trusted third-party service returns a Request Object URI
in exchange for a Request Object, it MUST validate the in exchange for a Request Object, it MUST validate the
signature, per (a). In addition, the Authorization Server MUST signature, per (a). In addition, the authorization server MUST
be trusted by the third-party service and MUST know out-of-band be trusted by the third-party service and MUST know out-of-band
that the client is also trusted by it. that the client is also trusted by it.
10.3. Explicit Endpoints 10.3. Explicit Endpoints
Although this specification does not require them, research such as Although this specification does not require them, research such as
[BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the [BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the
intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the
sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the sequence in a tamper-evident manner so that the intent of the
initiator is unambiguous. The following endpoints defined in initiator is unambiguous. It is RECOMMENDED by this specification to
[RFC6749], [RFC6750], and [RFC8414] are RECOMMENDED by this use this practice for the following endpoints defined in [RFC6749],
specification to use this practice : [RFC6750], and [RFC8414]:
(a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources") (a) Protected resources ("protected_resources")
(b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint") (b) Authorization endpoint ("authorization_endpoint")
(c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri") (c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri")
(d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint") (d) Token endpoint ("token_endpoint")
Further, if dynamic discovery is used, then this practice also Further, if dynamic discovery is used, then this practice also
applies to the discovery related endpoints. applies to the discovery-related endpoints.
In [RFC6749], while Redirection URI is included in the Authorization In [RFC6749], while the redirection URI is included in the
Request, others are not. As a result, the same applies to authorization request, others are not. As a result, the same applies
Authorization Request Object. to the Authorization Request Object.
10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri 10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri
The introduction of "request_uri" introduces several attack The introduction of "request_uri" introduces several attack
possibilities. Consult the security considerations in Section 7 of possibilities. Consult the security considerations in Section 7 of
RFC3986 [RFC3986] for more information regarding risks associated [RFC3986] for more information regarding risks associated with URIs.
with URIs.
10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server 10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server
A set of malicious client can launch a DoS attack to the A set of malicious clients can launch a DoS attack to the
authorization server by pointing the "request_uri" to a URI that authorization server by pointing the "request_uri" to a URI that
returns extremely large content or extremely slow to respond. Under returns extremely large content or is extremely slow to respond.
such an attack, the server may use up its resource and start failing. Under such an attack, the server may use up its resource and start
failing.
Similarly, a malicious client can specify the "request_uri" value Similarly, a malicious client can specify a "request_uri" value that
that itself points to an authorization request URI that uses itself points to an authorization request URI that uses "request_uri"
"request_uri" to cause the recursive lookup. to cause the recursive lookup.
To prevent such attack to succeed, the server should (a) check that To prevent such an attack from succeeding, the server should a) check
the value of "request_uri" parameter does not point to an unexpected that the value of the "request_uri" parameter does not point to an
location, (b) check the media type of the response is "application/ unexpected location, b) check that the media type of the response is
oauth-authz-req+jwt", (c) implement a time-out for obtaining the "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt", c) implement a timeout for
content of "request_uri", and (d) not perform recursive GET on the obtaining the content of "request_uri", and d) not perform recursive
"request_uri". GET on the "request_uri".
10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite 10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite
The value of "request_uri" is not signed thus it can be tampered by The value of "request_uri" is not signed; thus, it can be tampered
Man-in-the-browser attacker. Several attack possibilities rise with by a man-in-the-browser attacker. Several attack possibilities
because of this, e.g., (a) attacker may create another file that the arise because of this. For example, a) an attacker may create
rewritten URI points to making it possible to request extra scope (b) another file that the rewritten URI points to, making it possible to
attacker launches a DoS attack to a victim site by setting the value request extra scope, or b) an attacker may launch a DoS attack on a
of "request_uri" to be that of the victim. victim site by setting the value of "request_uri" to be that of the
victim.
To prevent such attack to succeed, the server should (a) check that To prevent such an attack from succeeding, the server should a) check
the value of "request_uri" parameter does not point to an unexpected that the value of the "request_uri" parameter does not point to an
location, (b) check the media type of the response is "application/ unexpected location, b) check that the media type of the response is
oauth-authz-req+jwt", and (c) implement a time-out for obtaining the "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt", and c) implement a timeout for
content of "request_uri". obtaining the content of "request_uri".
10.5. Downgrade Attack 10.5. Downgrade Attack
Unless the protocol used by client and the server is locked down to Unless the protocol used by the client and the server is locked down
use OAuth JAR, it is possible for an attacker to use RFC6749 requests to use an OAuth JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR), it is
to bypass all the protection provided by this specification. possible for an attacker to use RFC 6749 requests to bypass all the
protection provided by this specification.
To prevent it, this specification defines a new client metadata and To prevent this kind of attack, this specification defines new client
server metadata "require_signed_request_object" whose value is a metadata and server metadata values, both named
boolean. "require_signed_request_object", whose values are both booleans.
When the value of it as a client metadata is "true", then the server When the value of it as client metadata is "true", then the server
MUST reject the authorization request from the client that does not MUST reject the authorization request from the client that does not
conform to this specification. It MUST also reject the request if conform to this specification. It MUST also reject the request if
the request object uses "alg":"none" when this client metadata value the Request Object uses an "alg" value of "none" when this server
is "true". If omitted, the default value is "false". metadata value is "true". If omitted, the default value is "false".
When the value of it as a server metadata is "true", then the server When the value of it as server metadata is "true", then the server
MUST reject the authorization request from any client that does not MUST reject the authorization request from any client that does not
conform to this specification. It MUST also reject the request if conform to this specification. It MUST also reject the request if
the request object uses "alg":"none" when this server metadata value the Request Object uses an "alg" value of "none". If omitted, the
is "true". If omitted, the default value is "false". default value is "false".
Note that even if "require_signed_request_object" metadata values are Note that even if "require_signed_request_object" metadata values are
not present, the client MAY use signed request objects, provided that not present, the client MAY use signed Request Objects, provided that
there are signing algorithms mutually supported by the client and the there are signing algorithms mutually supported by the client and the
server. Use of signing algorithm metadata is described in Section 4. server. Use of signing algorithm metadata is described in Section 4.
10.6. TLS Security Considerations 10.6. TLS Security Considerations
Current security considerations can be found in Recommendations for Current security considerations can be found in "Recommendations for
Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195]. This supersedes the TLS version Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)" [RFC7525]. This supersedes the TLS version
recommendations in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. recommendations in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
10.7. Parameter Mismatches 10.7. Parameter Mismatches
Given that OAuth parameter values are being sent in two different Given that OAuth parameter values are being sent in two different
places, as normal OAuth parameters and as Request Object claims, places, as normal OAuth parameters and as Request Object claims,
implementations must guard against attacks that could use mismatching implementations must guard against attacks that could use mismatching
parameter values to obtain unintended outcomes. That is the reason parameter values to obtain unintended outcomes. That is the reason
that the two Client ID values MUST match, the reason that only the that the two client ID values MUST match, the reason that only the
parameter values from the Request Object are to be used, and the parameter values from the Request Object are to be used, and the
reason that neither "request" nor "request_uri" can appear in a reason that neither "request" nor "request_uri" can appear in a
Request Object. Request Object.
10.8. Cross-JWT Confusion 10.8. Cross-JWT Confusion
As described in Section 2.8 of [RFC8725], attackers may attempt to As described in Section 2.8 of [RFC8725], attackers may attempt to
use a JWT issued for one purpose in a context that it was not use a JWT issued for one purpose in a context that it was not
intended for. The mitigations described for these attacks can be intended for. The mitigations described for these attacks can be
applied to Request Objects. applied to Request Objects.
One way that an attacker might attempt to repurpose a Request Object One way that an attacker might attempt to repurpose a Request Object
is to try to use it as a client authentication JWT, as described in is to try to use it as a client authentication JWT, as described in
Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]. A simple way to prevent this is to never Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]. A simple way to prevent this is to never
use the Client ID as the "sub" value in a Request Object. use the client ID as the "sub" value in a Request Object.
Another way to prevent cross-JWT confusion is to use explicit typing, Another way to prevent cross-JWT confusion is to use explicit typing,
as described in Section 3.11 of [RFC8725]. One would explicitly type as described in Section 3.11 of [RFC8725]. One would explicitly type
a Request Object by including a "typ" Header Parameter with the value a Request Object by including a "typ" Header Parameter with the value
"oauth-authz-req+jwt" (which is registered in Section 9.4.1. Note "oauth-authz-req+jwt" (which is registered in Section 9.4.1). Note,
however, that requiring explicitly typed Requests Objects at existing however, that requiring explicitly typed Request Objects at existing
authorization servers will break most existing deployments, as authorization servers will break most existing deployments, as
existing clients are already commonly using untyped Request Objects, existing clients are already commonly using untyped Request Objects,
especially with OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. However, requiring especially with OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. However, requiring
explicit typing would be a good idea for new OAuth deployment explicit typing would be a good idea for new OAuth deployment
profiles where compatibility with existing deployments is not a profiles where compatibility with existing deployments is not a
consideration. consideration.
Finally, yet another way to prevent cross-JWT confusion is to use a Finally, yet another way to prevent cross-JWT confusion is to use a
key management regime in which keys used to sign Request Objects are key management regime in which keys used to sign Request Objects are
identifiably distinct from those used for other purposes. Then, if identifiably distinct from those used for other purposes. Then, if
an adversary attempts to repurpose the Request Object in another an adversary attempts to repurpose the Request Object in another
context, a key mismatch will occur, thwarting the attack. context, a key mismatch will occur, thwarting the attack.
11. Privacy Considerations 11. Privacy Considerations
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization containing personal data, both the client and the authorization
Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. RFC 6973 Privacy server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. "Privacy Considerations
Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] gives excellent for Internet Protocols" [RFC6973] gives excellent guidance on the
guidance on the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provisions
The provision listed in it should be followed. listed in it should be followed.
Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Most of the provisions would apply to "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Framework" [RFC6749] and "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework:
Token Usage [RFC6750] and are not specific to this specification. In Bearer Token Usage" [RFC6750] and are not specific to this
what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are specification. In what follows, only the provisions specific to this
noted. specification are noted.
11.1. Collection limitation 11.1. Collection Limitation
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of containing personal data, the client SHOULD limit the collection of
personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law
and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s). and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s).
It is often hard for the user to find out if the personal data asked It is often hard for the user to find out if the personal data asked
for is strictly necessary. A trusted third-party service can help for is strictly necessary. A trusted third-party service can help
the user by examining the Client request and comparing to the the user by examining the client request, comparing it to the
proposed processing by the Client and certifying the request. After proposed processing by the client, and certifying the request. After
the certification, the Client, when making an Authorization Request, the certification, the client, when making an authorization request,
can submit Authorization Request to the trusted third-party service can submit an authorization request to the trusted third-party
to obtain the Request Object URI. This process is two steps: service to obtain the Request Object URI. This process has two
steps:
(1) (Certification Process) The trusted third-party service examines (1) (Certification Process) The trusted third-party service examines
the business process of the client and determines what claims the business process of the client and determines what claims
they need: This is the certification process. Once the client they need; this is the certification process. Once the client
is certified, then they are issued a client credential to is certified, they are issued a client credential to
authenticate against to push request objects to the trusted authenticate against to push Request Objects to the trusted
third-party service to get the "request_uri". third-party service to get the "request_uri".
(2) (Translation Process) The client uses the client credential that (2) (Translation Process) The client uses the client credential that
it got to push the request object to the trusted third-party it got to push the Request Object to the trusted third-party
service to get the "request_uri". The trusted third-party service to get the "request_uri". The trusted third-party
service also verifies that the Request Object is consistent with service also verifies that the Request Object is consistent with
the claims that the client is eligible for, per prior step. the claims that the client is eligible for, per the prior step.
Upon receiving such Request Object URI in the Authorization Request, Upon receiving such a Request Object URI in the authorization
the Authorization Server first verifies that the authority portion of request, the authorization server first verifies that the authority
the Request Object URI is a legitimate one for the trusted third- portion of the Request Object URI is a legitimate one for the trusted
party service. Then, the Authorization Server issues HTTP GET third-party service. Then, the authorization server issues an HTTP
request to the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the GET request to the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the
Authorization Server MUST verify the server identity represented in authorization server MUST verify that the server identity represented
the TLS certificate is legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, in the TLS certificate is legitimate for the Request Object URI.
the Authorization Server can obtain the Request Object, which Then, the authorization server can obtain the Request Object, which
includes the "client_id" representing the Client. includes the "client_id" representing the client.
The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that The Consent screen MUST indicate the client and SHOULD indicate that
the request has been vetted by the trusted third-party service for the request has been vetted by the trusted third-party service for
adherence to the Collection Limitation principle. the adherence to the collection limitation principle.
11.2. Disclosure Limitation 11.2. Disclosure Limitation
11.2.1. Request Disclosure 11.2.1. Request Disclosure
This specification allows extension parameters. These may include This specification allows extension parameters. These may include
potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameters may
leak through various means but most notably through referrer and leak through various means but most notably through referrer and
browser history, if the authorization request contains a potentially browser history, if the authorization request contains a potentially
sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the sensitive parameter, the client SHOULD encrypt the Request Object
request object. using JWE [RFC7516].
Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object Where the Request Object URI method is being used, if the Request
contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the Object contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the
"request_uri" SHOULD be used only once, have a short validity period, "request_uri" SHOULD be used only once and have a short validity
and MUST have large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable period, and it MUST have sufficient entropy for the applicable
security policy unless the Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516] security policies unless the Request Object itself is encrypted using
Encrypted. The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of JWE [RFC7516]. The adequate shortness of the validity and the
the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the entropy of the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation
value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for the based on the value of the resource being protected. A general
validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI guidance for the validity time would be less than a minute, and the
is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the Request Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128
time of the writing of this specification. bits or more at the time of the writing of this specification.
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI 11.2.2. Tracking Using Request Object URI
Even if the protected resource does not include a personally Even if the protected resource does not include personally
identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the
user through the Request Object URI if persistent static per-user user through the Request Object URI if persistent static per-user
Request Object URIs are used. A third party may observe it through Request Object URIs are used. A third party may observe it through
browser history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using browser history, etc. and start correlating the user's activity using
it. In a way, it is a data disclosure as well and should be avoided. it. In a way, it is a data disclosure as well and should be avoided.
Therefore, per-user persistent Request Object URIs should be avoided. Therefore, per-user persistent Request Object URIs should be avoided.
Single-use Request Object URIs are one alternative. Single-use Request Object URIs are one alternative.
12. Acknowledgements 12. References
The following people contributed to the creation of this document in
the OAuth working group and other IETF roles. (Affiliations at the
time of the contribution are used.)
Annabelle Backman (Amazon), Dirk Balfanz (Google), Sergey Beryozkin,
Ben Campbell (as AD), Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Roman Danyliw
(as AD), Martin Duke (as AD), Vladimir Dzhuvinov (Connect2id), Lars
Eggert (as AD), Joel Halpern (as GENART), Benjamin Kaduk (as AD),
Stephen Kent (as SECDIR), Murray Kucherawy (as AD), Warren Kumari (as
OPSDIR), Watson Ladd (as SECDIR), Torsten Lodderstedt (yes.com), Jim
Manico, Axel Nennker (Deutsche Telecom), Hannes Tschofenig (ARM),
James H. Manger (Telstra), Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), John Panzer
(Google), Francesca Palombini (as AD), David Recordon (Facebook),
Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke Shepard (Facebook), Filip Skokan
(Auth0), Eric Vyncke (as AD), and Robert Wilton (as AD).
The following people contributed to creating this document through
the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Breno de Medeiros (Google), Hideki
Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE).
13. Revision History
Note to the RFC Editor: Please remove this section from the final
RFC.
-34
o Addressed additional IESG comments by Murray Kucherawy and
Francesca Palombini.
-33
o Addressed IESG comments prior to 8-Apr-21 telechat. Thanks to
Martin Duke, Lars Eggert, Benjamin Kaduk, Francesca Palombini, and
Eric Vyncke for their reviews.
-32
o Removed outdated JSON reference.
-31
o Addressed SecDir review comments by Watson Ladd.
-30
o Changed the MIME Type from "oauth.authz.req+jwt" to "oauth-authz-
req+jwt", per advice from the designated experts.
-29
o Uniformly use the Change Controller "IETF".
-28
o Removed unused references, as suggested by Roman Danyliw.
-27
o Edits by Mike Jones to address IESG and working group review
comments, including:
o Added Security Considerations text saying not to use the Client ID
as the "sub" value to prevent Cross-JWT Confusion.
o Added Security Considerations text about using explicit typing to
prevent Cross-JWT Confusion.
o Addressed Eric Vyncke's review comments.
o Addressed Robert Wilton's review comments.
o Addressed Murray Kucherawy's review comments.
o Addressed Benjamin Kaduk's review comments.
o Applied spelling and grammar corrections.
-20
o BK comments
o Section 3 Removed WAP
o Section 4. Clarified authorization request object parameters,
removed extension parameters from examples
o Section 4. Specifies application/oauth.authz.req+jwt as mime-type
fore request objects
o Section 5.2.1 Added reference to Capability URLs
o Section 5.2.3. Added entropy fragment to example request
o Section 8. Replaced "subjectAltName dnsName" with "DNS-ID"
o Section 9. Registers authorization request parameters in JWT
Claims Registry.
o Section 9. Registers application/oauth.authz.req in IANA mime-
types registry
o Section 10.1. Clarified encrypted request objects are "signed
then encrypted" to maintain consistency
o Section 10.2. Clarifies trust between AS and TFP
o Section 10.3. Clarified endpoints subject to the practice
o Section 10.4 Replaced "redirect_uri" to "request_uri"
o Section 10.4. Added reference to RFC 3986 for risks
o Section 10.4.1.d Deleted "do" to maintain grammar flow
o Section 10.4.1, 10.4.2 Replaced "application/jose" to
"application/jwt"
o Section 12.1. Extended description for submitting authorization
request to TFP to obtain request object
o Section 12.2.2. Replaced per-user Request Object URI with static
per-user Request URIs
o Section 13. Combined OAuth WG contributors together
o Section Whole doc Replaced application/jwt with application/
oauth.authz.req+jwt
-19
o AD comments
o Section 5.2.1. s/Requiest URI/Request URI/
o Section 8 s/[BCP195] ./[BCP195]./
o Section 10.3. s/sited/cited/
o Section 11. Typo. s/Curent/Current/
-17
o #78 Typos in content-type
-16
o Treated remaining Ben Campbell comments.
-15
o Removed further duplication
-14
o #71 Reiterate dynamic params are included.
o #70 Made clear that AS must return error.
o #69 Inconsistency of the need to sign.
o Fixed Mimetype.
o #67 Inconsistence in requiring HTTPS in request URI.
o #66 Dropped ISO 29100 reference.
o #25 Removed Encrypt only option.
o #59 Same with #25.
-13
o add TLS Security Consideration section
o replace RFC7525 reference with BCP195
o moved front tag in FETT reference to fix XML structure
o changes reference from SoK to FETT
-12
o fixes #62 - Alexey Melnikov Discuss
o fixes #48 - OPSDIR Review : General - delete semicolons after list
items
o fixes #58 - DP Comments for the Last Call
o fixes #57 - GENART - Remove "non-normative ... " from examples.
o fixes #45 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - are attacks discovered
or already opened
o fixes #49 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - Inconsistent colons
after initial sentence of list items.
o fixes #53 - OPSDIR Review : 6.2 JWS Signed Request Object -
Clarify JOSE Header
o fixes #42 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - readability of 'and' is
confusing
o fixes #50 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - Clarify
'signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted'
o fixes #39 - OPSDIR Review : Abstract - Explain/Clarify JWS and JWE
o fixed #50 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - Clarify
'signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted'
o fixes #43 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'properties' sounds
awkward and are not exactly 'properties'
o fixes #56 - OPSDIR Review : 12 Acknowledgements - 'contribution
is' => 'contribution are'
o fixes #55 - OPSDIR Review : 11.2.2 Privacy Considerations - ' It
is in a way' => 'In a way, it is'
o fixes #54 - OPSDIR Review : 11 Privacy Considerations - 'and not
specific' => 'and are not specific'
o fixes #51 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - 'It is
fine' => 'It is recommended'
o fixes #47 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'over- the- wire' =>
'over-the-wire'
o fixes #46 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'It allows' => 'The use
of application security' for
o fixes #44 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'has' => 'have'
o fixes #41 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - missing 'is' before
'typically sent'
o fixes #38 - OPSDIR Review : Section 11 - Delete 'freely
accessible' regarding ISO 29100
-11
o s/bing/being/
o Added history for -10
-10
o #20: KM1 -- some wording that is awkward in the TLS section.
o #21: KM2 - the additional attacks against OAuth 2.0 should also
have a pointer
o #22: KM3 -- Nit: in the first line of 10.4:
o #23: KM4 -- Mention RFC6973 in Section 11 in addition to ISO 29100
o #24: SECDIR review: Section 4 -- Confusing requirements for
sign+encrypt
o #25: SECDIR review: Section 6 -- authentication and integrity need
not be provided if the requestor encrypts the token?
o #26: SECDIR Review: Section 10 -- why no reference for JWS
algorithms?
o #27: SECDIR Review: Section 10.2 - how to do the agreement between
client and server "a priori"?
o #28: SECDIR Review: Section 10.3 - Indication on "large entropy"
and "short lifetime" should be indicated
o #29: SECDIR Review: Section 10.3 - Typo
o #30: SECDIR Review: Section 10.4 - typos and missing articles
o #31: SECDIR Review: Section 10.4 - Clearer statement on the lack
of endpoint identifiers needed
o #32: SECDIR Review: Section 11 - ISO29100 needs to be moved to
normative reference
o #33: SECDIR Review: Section 11 - Better English and Entropy
language needed
o #34: Section 4: Typo
o #35: More Acknowledgment
o #36: DP - More precise qualification on Encryption needed.
-09
o Minor Editorial Nits.
o Section 10.4 added.
o Explicit reference to Security consideration (10.2) added in
section 5 and section 5.2.
o , (add yourself) removed from the acknowledgment.
-08
o Applied changes proposed by Hannes on 2016-06-29 on IETF OAuth
list recorded as https://bitbucket.org/Nat/oauth-jwsreq/
issues/12/.
o TLS requirements added.
o Security Consideration reinforced.
o Privacy Consideration added.
o Introduction improved.
-07
o Changed the abbrev to OAuth JAR from oauth-jar.
o Clarified sig and enc methods.
o Better English.
o Removed claims from one of the example.
o Re-worded the URI construction.
o Changed the example to use request instead of request_uri.
o Clarified that Request Object parameters take precedence
regardless of request or request_uri parameters were used.
o Generalized the language in 4.2.1 to convey the intent more
clearly.
o Changed "Server" to "Authorization Server" as a clarification.
o Stopped talking about request_object_signing_alg.
o IANA considerations now reflect the current status.
o Added Brian Campbell to the contributors list. Made the lists
alphabetic order based on the last names. Clarified that the
affiliation is at the time of the contribution.
o Added "older versions of " to the reference to IE URI length
limitations.
o Stopped talking about signed or unsigned JWS etc.
o 1.Introduction improved.
-06
o Added explanation on the 512 chars URL restriction.
o Updated Acknowledgements.
-05
o More alignment with OpenID Connect.
-04
o Fixed typos in examples. (request_url -> request_uri, cliend_id ->
client_id)
o Aligned the error messages with the OAuth IANA registry.
o Added another rationale for having request object.
-03
o Fixed the non-normative description about the advantage of static
signature.
o Changed the requirement for the parameter values in the request
itself and the request object from 'MUST MATCH" to 'Req Obj takes
precedence.
-02
o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers.
-01
o Copy Edits.
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015.
[IANA.MediaTypes] 12.1. Normative References
IANA, "Media Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
skipping to change at page 33, line 42 skipping to change at line 1142
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8141] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Klensin, "Uniform Resource Names [RFC8141] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Klensin, "Uniform Resource Names
(URNs)", RFC 8141, DOI 10.17487/RFC8141, April 2017, (URNs)", RFC 8141, DOI 10.17487/RFC8141, April 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8141>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8141>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 [RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
14.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing [BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing
the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication", the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication",
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust
Principles Volume 21 Issue 6, Pages 817-846, November Principles, Volume 21, Issue 6, pp. 817-846, November
2013, 2013,
<https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/ <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/
papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>. papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>.
[CapURLs] Tennison, J., "Good Practices for Capability URLs", [CapURLs] Tennison, J., Ed., "Good Practices for Capability URLs",
W3C Working Draft, February 2014, W3C First Public Working Draft, 18 February 2014,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/>. <https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/>.
[IANA.JWT.Claims] [IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT)",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters", IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M.B., de Medeiros, B.,
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
Foundation Standards, February 2014, errata set 1", OpenID Foundation Standards, 8 November
2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 [RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819, Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
skipping to change at page 35, line 31 skipping to change at line 1235
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and [RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best [RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>.
Acknowledgements
The following people contributed to the creation of this document in
the OAuth Working Group and other IETF roles. (Affiliations at the
time of the contribution are used.)
Annabelle Backman (Amazon), Dirk Balfanz (Google), Sergey Beryozkin,
Ben Campbell (as AD), Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Roman Danyliw
(as AD), Martin Duke (as AD), Vladimir Dzhuvinov (Connect2id), Lars
Eggert (as AD), Joel Halpern (as GENART), Benjamin Kaduk (as AD),
Stephen Kent (as SECDIR), Murray Kucherawy (as AD), Warren Kumari (as
OPSDIR), Watson Ladd (as SECDIR), Torsten Lodderstedt (yes.com), Jim
Manico, James H. Manger (Telstra), Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), Axel
Nennker (Deutsche Telecom), John Panzer (Google), Francesca Palombini
(as AD), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook), Filip Skokan (Auth0), Hannes Tschofenig (ARM),
Éric Vyncke (as AD), and Robert Wilton (as AD).
The following people contributed to creating this document through
the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Breno de Medeiros (Google), Hideki
Nara (TACT), and Justin Richer (MITRE).
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura Nat Sakimura
NAT.Consulting NAT.Consulting
2-22-17 Naka 2-22-17 Naka
Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004 Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004
Japan Japan
Phone: +81-42-580-7401 Phone: +81-42-580-7401
Email: nat@nat.consulting Email: nat@nat.consulting
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: https://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley John Bradley
Yubico Yubico
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM Casilla 177
Talagante
RM
Chile Chile
Phone: +1.202.630.5272 Phone: +1.202.630.5272
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: rfc9101@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
One Microsoft Way One Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington 98052 Redmond, Washington 98052
United States of America United States of America
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
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