| rfc9365v1.txt | rfc9365.txt | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Jeong, Ed. | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Jeong, Ed. | |||
| Request for Comments: 9365 Sungkyunkwan University | Request for Comments: 9365 Sungkyunkwan University | |||
| Category: Informational February 2023 | Category: Informational March 2023 | |||
| ISSN: 2070-1721 | ISSN: 2070-1721 | |||
| IPv6 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE): Problem | IPv6 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE): Problem | |||
| Statement and Use Cases | Statement and Use Cases | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document discusses the problem statement and use cases of | This document discusses the problem statement and use cases of | |||
| IPv6-based vehicular networking for Intelligent Transportation | IPv6-based vehicular networking for Intelligent Transportation | |||
| Systems (ITS). The main scenarios of vehicular communications are | Systems (ITS). The main scenarios of vehicular communications are | |||
| vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and | vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and | |||
| vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. First, this document | vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. First, this document | |||
| explains use cases using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking. Next, for | explains use cases using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking. Next, for | |||
| IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current | IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current | |||
| IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, Mobility Management, | IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, mobility management, | |||
| as well as security and privacy). | as well as security and privacy). | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is | This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is | |||
| published for informational purposes. | published for informational purposes. | |||
| This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force | This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force | |||
| (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has | (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has | |||
| received public review and has been approved for publication by the | received public review and has been approved for publication by the | |||
| skipping to change at line 133 ¶ | skipping to change at line 133 ¶ | |||
| 3GPP has standardized Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) | 3GPP has standardized Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) | |||
| communications to support V2X in LTE mobile networks (called LTE V2X) | communications to support V2X in LTE mobile networks (called LTE V2X) | |||
| and V2X in 5G mobile networks (called 5G V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP] | and V2X in 5G mobile networks (called 5G V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP] | |||
| [TR-22.886-3GPP] [TS-23.287-3GPP]. With C-V2X, vehicles can directly | [TR-22.886-3GPP] [TS-23.287-3GPP]. With C-V2X, vehicles can directly | |||
| communicate with each other without relay nodes (e.g., eNodeB in LTE | communicate with each other without relay nodes (e.g., eNodeB in LTE | |||
| and gNodeB in 5G). | and gNodeB in 5G). | |||
| Along with these WAVE standards and C-V2X standards, regardless of a | Along with these WAVE standards and C-V2X standards, regardless of a | |||
| wireless access technology under the IP stack of a vehicle, vehicular | wireless access technology under the IP stack of a vehicle, vehicular | |||
| networks can operate IP mobility with IPv6 [RFC8200] and Mobile IPv6 | networks can operate IP mobility with IPv6 [RFC8200], that is, Mobile | |||
| protocols, e.g., Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [RFC6275], Proxy Mobile IPv6 | IPv6 protocols, e.g., Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [RFC6275], Proxy Mobile | |||
| (PMIPv6) [RFC5213], Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) [RFC7333], | IPv6 (PMIPv6) [RFC5213], Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) | |||
| Network Mobility (NEMO) [RFC3963], and the Locator/ID Separation | [RFC7333], Network Mobility (NEMO) [RFC3963], and the Locator/ID | |||
| Protocol (LISP) [RFC9300]. In addition, ISO has approved a standard | Separation Protocol (LISP) [RFC9300]. In addition, ISO has approved | |||
| specifying the IPv6 network protocols and services to be used for | a standard specifying the IPv6 network protocols and services to be | |||
| Communications Access for Land Mobiles (CALM) [ISO-ITS-IPv6] | used for Communications Access for Land Mobiles (CALM) [ISO-ITS-IPv6] | |||
| [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1]. | [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1]. | |||
| This document describes use cases and a problem statement about | This document describes use cases and a problem statement about | |||
| IPv6-based vehicular networking for ITS, which is named IPv6 Wireless | IPv6-based vehicular networking for ITS, which is named IPv6 Wireless | |||
| Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE). First, it introduces the | Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE). First, it introduces the | |||
| use cases for using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking in ITS. Next, for | use cases for using V2V, V2I, and V2X networking in ITS. Next, for | |||
| IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current | IPv6-based vehicular networks, it makes a gap analysis of current | |||
| IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, mobility management, | IPv6 protocols (e.g., IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, mobility management, | |||
| as well as security and privacy) so that those protocols can be | as well as security and privacy) so that those protocols can be | |||
| tailored to IPv6-based vehicular networking. Thus, this document is | tailored to IPv6-based vehicular networking. Thus, this document is | |||
| skipping to change at line 165 ¶ | skipping to change at line 165 ¶ | |||
| addition, the following terms are defined below: | addition, the following terms are defined below: | |||
| Context-Awareness: A vehicle can be aware of spatial-temporal | Context-Awareness: A vehicle can be aware of spatial-temporal | |||
| mobility information (e.g., position, speed, direction, and | mobility information (e.g., position, speed, direction, and | |||
| acceleration/deceleration) of surrounding vehicles for both safety | acceleration/deceleration) of surrounding vehicles for both safety | |||
| and non-safety uses through sensing or communication [CASD]. | and non-safety uses through sensing or communication [CASD]. | |||
| Distributed Mobility Management (DMM): See [RFC7333] [RFC7429]. | Distributed Mobility Management (DMM): See [RFC7333] [RFC7429]. | |||
| Edge Computing Device (ECD): This is a computing device (or server) | Edge Computing Device (ECD): This is a computing device (or server) | |||
| at edge for vehicles and vulnerable road users. It co-locates | at the edge of the network for vehicles and vulnerable road users. | |||
| with or connects to an IP-RSU, which has a powerful computing | It co-locates with or connects to an IP Roadside Unit (IP-RSU), | |||
| capability for different kinds of computing tasks, such as image | which has a powerful computing capability for different kinds of | |||
| processing and classification. | computing tasks, such as image processing and classification. | |||
| Edge Network (EN): This is an access network that has an IP-RSU for | Edge Network (EN): This is an access network that has an IP-RSU for | |||
| wireless communication with other vehicles having an IP-OBU and | wireless communication with other vehicles having an IP On-Board | |||
| wired communication with other network devices (e.g., routers, IP- | Unit (IP-OBU) and wired communication with other network devices | |||
| RSUs, ECDs, servers, and MA). It may have a Global Navigation | (e.g., routers, IP-RSUs, ECDs, servers, and Mobility Anchors | |||
| Satellite System (GNSS), such as Global Positioning System (GPS), | (MAs)). It may use a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) | |||
| radio receiver for its position recognition and the localization | such as Global Positioning System (GPS) with a GNSS receiver for | |||
| service for the sake of vehicles. | its position recognition and the localization service for the sake | |||
| of vehicles. | ||||
| Evolved Node B (eNodeB): This is a base station entity that supports | ||||
| the Long Term Evolution (LTE) air interface. | ||||
| Internet Protocol On-Board Unit (IP-OBU): An IP-OBU denotes a | Internet Protocol On-Board Unit (IP-OBU): An IP-OBU denotes a | |||
| computer situated in a vehicle (e.g., car, bicycle, autobike, | computer situated in a vehicle (e.g., car, bicycle, electric bike, | |||
| motorcycle, and a similar one), which has a basic processing | motorcycle, or similar), which has a basic processing ability and | |||
| ability and can be driven by a low-power CPU (e.g., ARM). It has | can be driven by a low-power CPU (e.g., ARM). It has at least one | |||
| at least one IP interface that runs in IEEE 802.11-OCB and has an | IP interface that runs in IEEE 802.11-OCB and has an "OBU" | |||
| "OBU" transceiver. Also, it may have an IP interface that runs in | transceiver. Also, it may have an IP interface that runs in | |||
| Cellular V2X (C-V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP] [TR-22.886-3GPP] | Cellular V2X (C-V2X) [TS-23.285-3GPP] [TR-22.886-3GPP] | |||
| [TS-23.287-3GPP]. It can play the role of a router connecting | [TS-23.287-3GPP]. It can play the role of a router connecting | |||
| multiple computers (or in-vehicle devices) inside a vehicle. See | multiple computers (or in-vehicle devices) inside a vehicle. See | |||
| the definition of the term "IP-OBU" in [RFC8691]. | the definition of the term "IP-OBU" in [RFC8691]. | |||
| IP Roadside Unit (IP-RSU): An IP-RSU is situated along the road. It | IP Roadside Unit (IP-RSU): An IP-RSU is situated along the road. It | |||
| has at least two distinct IP-enabled interfaces. The wireless | has at least two distinct IP-enabled interfaces. The wireless | |||
| PHY/MAC layer of at least one of its IP-enabled interfaces is | PHY/MAC layer of at least one of its IP-enabled interfaces is | |||
| configured to operate in 802.11-OCB mode. An IP-RSU communicates | configured to operate in 802.11-OCB mode [IEEE-802.11-OCB]. An | |||
| with the IP-OBU over an 802.11 wireless link operating in OCB | IP-RSU communicates with the IP-OBU over an 802.11 wireless link | |||
| mode. Also, it may have a third IP-enabled wireless interface | operating in OCB mode. One of its IP-enabled interfaces is | |||
| running in 3GPP C-V2X in addition to the IP-RSU defined in | connected to the wired network for wired communication with other | |||
| [RFC8691]. An IP-RSU is similar to an Access Network Router | network devices (e.g., routers, IP-RSUs, ECDs, servers, and MAs). | |||
| (ANR), defined in [RFC3753], and a Wireless Termination Point | Also, it may have another IP-enabled wireless interface running in | |||
| (WTP), defined in [RFC5415]. See the definition of the term "IP- | 3GPP C-V2X in addition to the IP-RSU defined in [RFC8691]. An IP- | |||
| RSU" in [RFC8691]. | RSU is similar to an Access Network Router (ANR), defined in | |||
| [RFC3753], and a Wireless Termination Point (WTP), defined in | ||||
| [RFC5415]. See the definition of the term "IP-RSU" in [RFC8691]. | ||||
| Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR): It is a scanning device to | Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR): This is a method for measuring | |||
| measure a distance to an object by emitting pulsed laser light and | a distance to an object by emitting pulsed laser light and | |||
| measuring the reflected pulsed light. | measuring the reflected pulsed light. | |||
| Mobility Anchor (MA): This is a node that maintains IPv6 addresses | Mobility Anchor (MA): This is a node that maintains IPv6 addresses | |||
| and mobility information of vehicles in a road network to support | and mobility information of vehicles in a road network to support | |||
| their IPv6 address autoconfiguration and mobility management with | their IPv6 address autoconfiguration and mobility management with | |||
| a binding table. An MA has end-to-end (E2E) connections (e.g., | a binding table. An MA has end-to-end (E2E) connections (e.g., | |||
| tunnels) with IP-RSUs under its control for the address | tunnels) with IP-RSUs under its control for the IPv6 address | |||
| autoconfiguration and mobility management of the vehicles. This | autoconfiguration and mobility management of the vehicles. This | |||
| MA is similar to a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213] | MA is similar to a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213] | |||
| for network-based mobility management. | for network-based mobility management. | |||
| Next Generation Node B (gNodeB): This is a base station entity that | ||||
| supports the 5G New Radio (NR) air interface. | ||||
| Outside the Context of a BSS (OCB): This is a mode of operation in | Outside the Context of a BSS (OCB): This is a mode of operation in | |||
| which a station (STA) is not a member of a Basic Service Set (BSS) | which a station (STA) is not a member of a Basic Service Set (BSS) | |||
| and does not utilize IEEE Std 802.11 authentication, association, | and does not utilize IEEE Std 802.11 authentication, association, | |||
| or data confidentiality [IEEE-802.11-OCB]. | or data confidentiality [IEEE-802.11-OCB]. | |||
| 802.11-OCB: This refers to the mode specified in IEEE Std | 802.11-OCB: This refers to the mode specified in IEEE Std | |||
| 802.11-2016 [IEEE-802.11-OCB] when the MIB attribute | 802.11-2016 [IEEE-802.11-OCB] when the MIB attribute | |||
| dot11OCBActivited is 'true'. | dot11OCBActivated is 'true'. | |||
| Platooning: Moving vehicles can be grouped together to reduce air | Platooning: Moving vehicles can be grouped together to reduce air | |||
| resistance for energy efficiency and reduce the number of drivers | resistance for energy efficiency and reduce the number of drivers | |||
| such that only the lead vehicle has a driver, and the other | such that only the lead vehicle has a driver, and the other | |||
| vehicles are autonomous vehicles without a driver and closely | vehicles are autonomous vehicles without a driver and closely | |||
| follow the lead vehicle [Truck-Platooning]. | follow the lead vehicle [Truck-Platooning]. | |||
| Traffic Control Center (TCC): This is a system that manages road | Traffic Control Center (TCC): This is a system that manages road | |||
| infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSUs, MAs, traffic signals, and | infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSUs, MAs, traffic signals, and | |||
| loop detectors) and also maintains vehicular traffic statistics | loop detectors) and also maintains vehicular traffic statistics | |||
| (e.g., average vehicle speed and vehicle inter-arrival time per | (e.g., average vehicle speed and vehicle inter-arrival time per | |||
| road segment) and vehicle information (e.g., a vehicle's | road segment) and vehicle information (e.g., a vehicle's | |||
| identifier, position, direction, speed, and trajectory as a | identifier, position, direction, speed, and trajectory as a | |||
| navigation path). TCC is part of a vehicular cloud for vehicular | navigation path). TCC is part of a Vehicular Cloud for vehicular | |||
| networks. | networks. | |||
| Urban Air Mobility (UAM): This refers to using lower-altitude | Urban Air Mobility (UAM): This refers to using lower-altitude | |||
| aircraft to transport passengers or cargo in urban and suburban | aircraft to transport passengers or cargo in urban and suburban | |||
| areas. The carriers used for UAM can be manned or unmanned | areas. The carriers used for UAM can be manned or unmanned | |||
| vehicles, which can include traditional helicopters, electrical | vehicles, which can include helicopters, electric vertical take- | |||
| vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft (eVTOL), and unmanned aerial | off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles | |||
| vehicles (UAVs). | (UAVs). | |||
| Vehicle: A Vehicle in this document is a node that has an IP-OBU for | Vehicle: This is a node that has an IP-OBU for wireless | |||
| wireless communication with other vehicles and IP-RSUs. It has a | communication with other vehicles and IP-RSUs. It has a GNSS | |||
| GNSS radio navigation receiver for efficient navigation. Any | radio navigation receiver for efficient navigation. Any device | |||
| device having an IP-OBU and a GNSS receiver (e.g., smartphone and | having an IP-OBU and a GNSS receiver (e.g., smartphone and tablet | |||
| tablet PC) can be regarded as a vehicle in this document. | PC) can be regarded as a vehicle in this document. | |||
| Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET): This is a network that consists of | Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET): This is a network that consists of | |||
| vehicles interconnected by wireless communication. Two vehicles | vehicles interconnected by wireless communication. Two vehicles | |||
| in a VANET can communicate with each other using other vehicles as | in a VANET can communicate with each other using other vehicles as | |||
| relays even where they are out of one-hop wireless communication | relays even where they are out of one-hop wireless communication | |||
| range. | range. | |||
| Vehicular Cloud: This is a cloud infrastructure for vehicular | Vehicular Cloud: This is a cloud infrastructure for vehicular | |||
| networks, having compute nodes, storage nodes, and network | networks, having compute nodes, storage nodes, and network | |||
| forwarding elements (e.g., switch and router). | forwarding elements (e.g., switch and router). | |||
| Vehicle to Device (V2D): This is the wireless communication between | Vehicle to Device (V2D): This is the wireless communication between | |||
| a vehicle and a device (e.g., smartphone and IoT (Internet of | a vehicle and a device (e.g., smartphone and IoT (Internet of | |||
| Things) device). | Things) device). | |||
| Vehicle to Pedestrian (VSP): This is the wireless communication | Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P): This is the wireless communication | |||
| between a vehicle and a pedestrian's device (e.g., smartphone and | between a vehicle and a pedestrian's device (e.g., smartphone and | |||
| IoT device). | IoT device). | |||
| Vehicle to Infrastructure to Vehicle (V2I2V): This is the wireless | Vehicle to Infrastructure to Vehicle (V2I2V): This is the wireless | |||
| communication between a vehicle and another vehicle via an | communication between a vehicle and another vehicle via an | |||
| infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU). | infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU). | |||
| Vehicle to Infrastructure to Everything (V2I2X): This is the | Vehicle to Infrastructure to Everything (V2I2X): This is the | |||
| wireless communication between a vehicle and another entity (e.g., | wireless communication between a vehicle and another entity (e.g., | |||
| vehicle, smartphone, and IoT device) via an infrastructure node | vehicle, smartphone, and IoT device) via an infrastructure node | |||
| (e.g., IP-RSU). | (e.g., IP-RSU). | |||
| Vehicle to Everything (V2X): This is the wireless communication | Vehicle to Everything (V2X): This is the wireless communication | |||
| between a vehicle and any entity (e.g., vehicle, infrastructure | between a vehicle and any entity (e.g., vehicle, infrastructure | |||
| node, smartphone, and IoT device), including V2V, V2I, and V2D. | node, smartphone, and IoT device), including V2V, V2I, V2D, and | |||
| V2P. | ||||
| Vehicular Mobility Management (VMM): This is IPv6-based mobility | Vehicular Mobility Management (VMM): This is IPv6-based mobility | |||
| management for vehicular networks. | management for vehicular networks. | |||
| Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND): This is an IPv6 ND (Neighbor | Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND): This is an IPv6 ND (Neighbor | |||
| Discovery) extension for vehicular networks. | Discovery) extension for vehicular networks. | |||
| Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP): This is IPv6-based security | Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP): This is IPv6-based security | |||
| and privacy for vehicular networks. | and privacy for vehicular networks. | |||
| skipping to change at line 338 ¶ | skipping to change at line 348 ¶ | |||
| * Cooperative adaptive cruise control on a roadway | * Cooperative adaptive cruise control on a roadway | |||
| * Platooning on a highway | * Platooning on a highway | |||
| * Cooperative environment sensing | * Cooperative environment sensing | |||
| The above use cases are examples for using V2V networking, which can | The above use cases are examples for using V2V networking, which can | |||
| be extended to other terrestrial vehicles, river/sea ships, railed | be extended to other terrestrial vehicles, river/sea ships, railed | |||
| vehicles, or UAM end systems. | vehicles, or UAM end systems. | |||
| Context-Aware Safety Driving (CASD) navigators [CASD] can help | A Context-Aware Safety Driving (CASD) navigator [CASD] can help | |||
| drivers to drive safely by alerting them to dangerous obstacles and | drivers to drive safely as a context-aware navigation service [CNP] | |||
| situations. That is, a CASD navigator displays obstacles or | by alerting them to dangerous obstacles and situations. That is, a | |||
| neighboring vehicles relevant to possible collisions in real-time | CASD navigator displays obstacles or neighboring vehicles relevant to | |||
| through V2V networking. CASD provides vehicles with a class-based | possible collisions in real time through V2V networking. CASD | |||
| automatic safety action plan that considers three situations, namely, | provides vehicles with a class-based automatic safety action plan | |||
| the Line-of-Sight unsafe, Non-Line-of-Sight unsafe, and safe | that considers three situations, namely, the Line-of-Sight unsafe, | |||
| situations. This action plan can be put into action among multiple | Non-Line-of-Sight unsafe, and safe situations. This action plan can | |||
| vehicles using V2V networking. | be put into action among multiple vehicles using V2V networking. | |||
| A service for collision avoidance of in-air UAM end systems is one | A service for collision avoidance of in-air UAM end systems is one | |||
| possible use case in air vehicular environments [UAM-ITS]. This use | possible use case in air vehicular environments [UAM-ITS]. This use | |||
| case is similar to that of a context-aware navigator for terrestrial | case is similar to that of a context-aware navigator for terrestrial | |||
| vehicles. Through V2V coordination, those UAM end systems (e.g., | vehicles. Through V2V coordination, those UAM end systems (e.g., | |||
| drones) can avoid a dangerous situation (e.g., collision) in three- | drones) can avoid a dangerous situation (e.g., collision) in three- | |||
| dimensional space rather than two-dimensional space for terrestrial | dimensional space rather than two-dimensional space for terrestrial | |||
| vehicles. Also, a UAM end system (e.g., flying car), when only a few | vehicles. Also, a UAM end system (e.g., flying car), when only a few | |||
| meters off the ground, can communicate with terrestrial vehicles with | hundred meters off the ground, can communicate with terrestrial | |||
| wireless communication technologies (e.g., DSRC, LTE, and C-V2X). | vehicles with wireless communication technologies (e.g., DSRC, LTE, | |||
| Thus, V2V means any vehicle to any vehicle, whether the vehicles are | and C-V2X). Thus, V2V means any vehicle to any vehicle, whether the | |||
| ground level or not. | vehicles are ground level or not. | |||
| Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [CA-Cruise-Control] helps | Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [CA-Cruise-Control] helps | |||
| individual vehicles to adapt their speed autonomously through V2V | individual vehicles to adapt their speed autonomously through V2V | |||
| communication among vehicles according to the mobility of their | communication among vehicles according to the mobility of their | |||
| predecessor and successor vehicles on an urban roadway or a highway. | predecessor and successor vehicles on an urban roadway or a highway. | |||
| Thus, CACC can help adjacent vehicles to efficiently adjust their | Thus, CACC can help adjacent vehicles to efficiently adjust their | |||
| speed in an interactive way through V2V networking in order to avoid | speed in an interactive way through V2V networking in order to avoid | |||
| a collision. | a collision. | |||
| Platooning [Truck-Platooning] allows a series (or group) of vehicles | Platooning [Truck-Platooning] allows a series (or group) of vehicles | |||
| (e.g., trucks) to follow each other very closely. Trucks can use V2V | (e.g., trucks) to follow each other very closely. Vehicles can use | |||
| communication in addition to forward sensors in order to maintain | V2V communication in addition to forward sensors in order to maintain | |||
| constant clearance between two consecutive vehicles at very short | constant clearance between two consecutive vehicles at very short | |||
| gaps (from 3 to 10 meters). Platooning can maximize the throughput | gaps (from 3 to 10 meters). Platooning can maximize the throughput | |||
| of vehicular traffic on a highway and reduce the gas consumption | of vehicular traffic on a highway and reduce the gas consumption | |||
| because the lead vehicle can help the following vehicles to | because the lead vehicle can help the following vehicles experience | |||
| experience less air resistance. | less air resistance. | |||
| Cooperative-environment-sensing use cases suggest that vehicles can | Cooperative-environment-sensing use cases suggest that vehicles can | |||
| share environmental information (e.g., air pollution, hazards, | share environmental information (e.g., air pollution, hazards, | |||
| obstacles, slippery areas by snow or rain, road accidents, traffic | obstacles, slippery areas by snow or rain, road accidents, traffic | |||
| congestion, and driving behaviors of neighboring vehicles) from | congestion, and driving behaviors of neighboring vehicles) from | |||
| various vehicle-mounted sensors, such as radars, LiDAR devices, and | various vehicle-mounted sensors, such as radars, LiDAR systems, and | |||
| cameras, with other vehicles and pedestrians. [Automotive-Sensing] | cameras, with other vehicles and pedestrians. [Automotive-Sensing] | |||
| introduces millimeter-wave vehicular communication for massive | introduces millimeter-wave vehicular communication for massive | |||
| automotive sensing. A lot of data can be generated by those sensors, | automotive sensing. A lot of data can be generated by those sensors, | |||
| and these data typically need to be routed to different destinations. | and these data typically need to be routed to different destinations. | |||
| In addition, from the perspective of driverless vehicles, it is | In addition, from the perspective of driverless vehicles, it is | |||
| expected that driverless vehicles can be mixed with driver-operated | expected that driverless vehicles can be mixed with driver-operated | |||
| vehicles. Through cooperative environment sensing, driver-operated | vehicles. Through cooperative environment sensing, driver-operated | |||
| vehicles can use environmental information sensed by driverless | vehicles can use environmental information sensed by driverless | |||
| vehicles for better interaction with the other vehicles and | vehicles for better interaction with the other vehicles and | |||
| environment. Vehicles can also share their intended maneuvering | environment. Vehicles can also share their intended maneuvering | |||
| information (e.g., lane change, speed change, ramp in-and-out, cut- | information (e.g., lane change, speed change, ramp in-and-out, cut- | |||
| in, and abrupt braking) with neighboring vehicles. Thus, this | in, and abrupt braking) with neighboring vehicles. Thus, this | |||
| information sharing can help the vehicles behave as more efficient | information sharing can help the vehicles behave as more efficient | |||
| traffic flows and minimize unnecessary acceleration and deceleration | traffic flows and minimize unnecessary acceleration and deceleration | |||
| to achieve the best ride comfort. | to achieve the best ride comfort. | |||
| To support applications of these V2V use cases, the required | To support applications of these V2V use cases, the required | |||
| functions of IPv6 include IPv6-based packet exchange in both control | functions of IPv6 include (a) IPv6-based packet exchange in both | |||
| and data planes, and secure, safe communication between two vehicles. | control and data planes and (b) secure, safe communication between | |||
| For the support of V2V under multiple radio technologies (e.g., DSRC | two vehicles. For the support of V2V under multiple radio | |||
| and 5G V2X), refer to Appendix A. | technologies (e.g., DSRC and 5G V2X), refer to Appendix A. | |||
| 3.2. V2I | 3.2. V2I | |||
| The use cases of V2I networking discussed in this section include: | The use cases of V2I networking discussed in this section include: | |||
| * Navigation service | * Navigation service | |||
| * Energy-efficient speed recommendation service | * Energy-efficient speed recommendation service | |||
| * Accident notification service | * Accident notification service | |||
| * Electric vehicle (EV) charging service | * Electric Vehicle (EV) charging service | |||
| * UAM navigation service with efficient battery charging | * UAM navigation service with efficient battery charging | |||
| A navigation service (for example, the Self-Adaptive Interactive | A navigation service (for example, the Self-Adaptive Interactive | |||
| Navigation Tool [SAINT]) that uses V2I networking interacts with a | Navigation Tool [SAINT]) that uses V2I networking interacts with a | |||
| TCC for the large-scale/long-range road traffic optimization and can | TCC for the large-scale/long-range road traffic optimization and can | |||
| guide individual vehicles along appropriate navigation paths in real | guide individual vehicles along appropriate navigation paths in real | |||
| time. The enhanced version of SAINT [SAINTplus] can give fast-moving | time. The enhanced version of SAINT [SAINTplus] can give fast-moving | |||
| paths to emergency vehicles (e.g., ambulance and fire engine) to let | paths to emergency vehicles (e.g., ambulance and fire engine) to let | |||
| them reach an accident spot while redirecting other vehicles near the | them reach an accident spot while redirecting other vehicles near the | |||
| skipping to change at line 438 ¶ | skipping to change at line 448 ¶ | |||
| vehicle that depends on its traffic environment and traffic signal | vehicle that depends on its traffic environment and traffic signal | |||
| scheduling [SignalGuru]. For example, when a vehicle approaches an | scheduling [SignalGuru]. For example, when a vehicle approaches an | |||
| intersection area and a red traffic light for the vehicle becomes | intersection area and a red traffic light for the vehicle becomes | |||
| turned on, it needs to reduce its speed to save fuel consumption. In | turned on, it needs to reduce its speed to save fuel consumption. In | |||
| this case, either a TCC or an ECD, which has the up-to-date | this case, either a TCC or an ECD, which has the up-to-date | |||
| trajectory of the vehicle and the traffic light schedule, can notify | trajectory of the vehicle and the traffic light schedule, can notify | |||
| the vehicle of an appropriate speed for fuel efficiency. | the vehicle of an appropriate speed for fuel efficiency. | |||
| [Fuel-Efficient] covers fuel-efficient route and speed plans for | [Fuel-Efficient] covers fuel-efficient route and speed plans for | |||
| platooned trucks. | platooned trucks. | |||
| The emergency communication between accident vehicles (or emergency | The emergency communication between vehicles in an accident (or | |||
| vehicles) and a TCC can be performed via either IP-RSU, 4G-LTE or 5G | emergency-response vehicles) and a TCC can be performed via either | |||
| networks. The First Responder Network Authority [FirstNet] is | IP-RSUs or 4G-LTE or 5G networks. The First Responder Network | |||
| provided by the US government to establish, operate, and maintain an | Authority [FirstNet] is provided by the US government to establish, | |||
| interoperable public safety broadband network for safety and security | operate, and maintain an interoperable public safety broadband | |||
| network services, e.g., emergency calls. The construction of the | network for safety and security network services, e.g., emergency | |||
| nationwide FirstNet network requires each state in the US to have a | calls. The construction of the nationwide FirstNet network requires | |||
| Radio Access Network (RAN) that will connect to the FirstNet's | each state in the US to have a Radio Access Network (RAN) that will | |||
| network core. The current RAN is mainly constructed using 4G-LTE for | connect to the FirstNet's network core. The current RAN is mainly | |||
| communication between a vehicle and an infrastructure node (i.e., | constructed using 4G-LTE for communication between a vehicle and an | |||
| V2I) [FirstNet-Report], but it is expected that DSRC-based vehicular | infrastructure node (i.e., V2I) [FirstNet-Report], but it is expected | |||
| networks [DSRC] will be available for V2I and V2V in the near future. | that DSRC-based vehicular networks [DSRC] will be available for V2I | |||
| An equivalent project in Europe is called Public Safety | and V2V in the near future. An equivalent project in Europe is | |||
| Communications Europe [PSCE], which is developing a network for | called Public Safety Communications Europe [PSCE], which is | |||
| emergency communications. | developing a network for emergency communications. | |||
| An EV charging service with V2I can facilitate the efficient battery | An EV charging service with V2I can facilitate the efficient battery | |||
| charging of EVs. In the case where an EV charging station is | charging of EVs. In the case where an EV charging station is | |||
| connected to an IP-RSU, an EV can be guided toward the deck of the EV | connected to an IP-RSU, an EV can be guided toward the deck of the EV | |||
| charging station or be notified that the charging station is out of | charging station or be notified that the charging station is out of | |||
| service through a battery charging server connected to the IP-RSU. | service through a battery charging server connected to the IP-RSU. | |||
| In addition to this EV charging service, other value-added services | In addition to this EV charging service, other value-added services | |||
| (e.g., firmware/software update over-the-air and media streaming) can | (e.g., firmware/software update over-the-air and media streaming) can | |||
| be provided to an EV while it is charging its battery at the EV | be provided to an EV while it is charging its battery at the EV | |||
| charging station. For a UAM navigation service, an efficient battery | charging station. For a UAM navigation service, an efficient battery | |||
| skipping to change at line 493 ¶ | skipping to change at line 503 ¶ | |||
| adaptation layer in the architecture that efficiently maps IPv6 to a | adaptation layer in the architecture that efficiently maps IPv6 to a | |||
| diversity of link-layer technologies. Augmentation is necessary to | diversity of link-layer technologies. Augmentation is necessary to | |||
| support wireless multihop V2I communications on a highway where RSUs | support wireless multihop V2I communications on a highway where RSUs | |||
| are sparsely deployed so that a vehicle can reach the wireless | are sparsely deployed so that a vehicle can reach the wireless | |||
| coverage of an IP-RSU through the multihop data forwarding of | coverage of an IP-RSU through the multihop data forwarding of | |||
| intermediate vehicles as packet forwarders. Thus, IPv6 needs to be | intermediate vehicles as packet forwarders. Thus, IPv6 needs to be | |||
| extended for multihop V2I communications. | extended for multihop V2I communications. | |||
| To support applications of these V2I use cases, the required | To support applications of these V2I use cases, the required | |||
| functions of IPv6 include IPv6 communication enablement with | functions of IPv6 include IPv6 communication enablement with | |||
| neighborhood discovery and IPv6 address management, reachability with | neighborhood discovery and IPv6 address management; reachability with | |||
| adapted network models and routing methods, transport-layer session | adapted network models and routing methods; transport-layer session | |||
| continuity, and secure, safe communication between a vehicle and an | continuity; and secure, safe communication between a vehicle and an | |||
| infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU) in the vehicular network. | infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU) in the vehicular network. | |||
| 3.3. V2X | 3.3. V2X | |||
| The use case of V2X networking discussed in this section is for a | The use case of V2X networking discussed in this section is for a | |||
| protection service for a vulnerable road user (VRU), e.g., a | protection service for a vulnerable road user (VRU), e.g., a | |||
| pedestrian or cyclist. Note that the application area of this use | pedestrian or cyclist. Note that the application area of this use | |||
| case is currently limited to a specific environment, such as | case is currently limited to a specific environment, such as | |||
| construction sites, plants, and factories, since not every VRU in a | construction sites, plants, and factories, since not every VRU in a | |||
| public area is equipped with a smart device (e.g., not every child on | public area is equipped with a smart device (e.g., not every child on | |||
| a road has a smartphone, smart watch, or tablet). | a road has a smartphone, smart watch, or tablet). | |||
| A VRU protection service, such as the Safety-Aware Navigation | A VRU protection service, such as the Safety-Aware Navigation | |||
| Application [SANA], using V2I2P networking can reduce the collision | Application [SANA], using V2I2P networking can reduce the collision | |||
| of a vehicle and a pedestrian carrying a smartphone equipped with a | of a vehicle and a pedestrian carrying a smartphone equipped with a | |||
| network device for wireless communication (e.g., Wi-Fi, DSRC, 4G/5G | network device for wireless communication (e.g., Wi-Fi, DSRC, 4G/5G | |||
| V2X, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)) with an IP-RSU. Vehicles and | V2X, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)) with an IP-RSU. Vehicles and | |||
| pedestrians can also communicate with each other via an IP-RSU. An | pedestrians can also communicate with each other via an IP-RSU. An | |||
| edge computing device behind the IP-RSU can collect the mobility | ECD behind the IP-RSU can collect the mobility information from | |||
| information from vehicles and pedestrians, compute wireless | vehicles and pedestrians, and then compute wireless communication | |||
| communication scheduling for the sake of them. This scheduling can | scheduling for the sake of them. This scheduling can save the | |||
| save the battery of each pedestrian's smartphone by allowing it to | battery of each pedestrian's smartphone by allowing it to work in | |||
| work in sleeping mode before communication with vehicles, considering | sleeping mode before communication with vehicles, considering their | |||
| their mobility. The location information of a VRU from a smart | mobility. The location information of a VRU from a smart device | |||
| device (e.g., smartphone) is multicasted only to the nearby vehicles. | (e.g., smartphone) is multicasted only to the nearby vehicles. The | |||
| The true identifiers of a VRU's smart device shall be protected, and | true identifiers of a VRU's smart device shall be protected, and only | |||
| only the type of the VRU, such as pedestrian, cyclist, or scooter, is | the type of the VRU, such as pedestrian, cyclist, or scooter, is | |||
| disclosed to the nearby vehicles. | disclosed to the nearby vehicles. | |||
| For Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), a vehicle can directly communicate | For Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), a vehicle can directly communicate | |||
| with a pedestrian's smartphone by V2X without IP-RSU relaying. | with a pedestrian's smartphone by V2X without IP-RSU relaying. | |||
| Light-weight mobile nodes, such as bicycles, may also communicate | Light-weight mobile nodes, such as bicycles, may also communicate | |||
| directly with a vehicle for collision avoidance using V2V. Note that | directly with a vehicle for collision avoidance using V2V. Note that | |||
| it is true that either a pedestrian or a cyclist may have a higher | it is true that either a pedestrian or a cyclist may have a higher | |||
| risk of being hit by a vehicle if they are not with a smartphone in | risk of being hit by a vehicle if they are not with a smartphone in | |||
| the current setting. For this case, other human-sensing technologies | the current setting. For this case, other human-sensing technologies | |||
| (e.g., moving-object detection in images and wireless signal-based | (e.g., moving-object detection in images and wireless signal-based | |||
| skipping to change at line 647 ¶ | skipping to change at line 657 ¶ | |||
| The three wireless networks of IP-RSU1, IP-RSU2, and IP-RSU3 can | The three wireless networks of IP-RSU1, IP-RSU2, and IP-RSU3 can | |||
| belong to three different subnets (i.e., Subnet1, Subnet2, and | belong to three different subnets (i.e., Subnet1, Subnet2, and | |||
| Subnet3), respectively. Those three subnets use three different | Subnet3), respectively. Those three subnets use three different | |||
| prefixes (i.e., Prefix1, Prefix2, and Prefix3). | prefixes (i.e., Prefix1, Prefix2, and Prefix3). | |||
| Multiple vehicles under the coverage of an IP-RSU share a prefix just | Multiple vehicles under the coverage of an IP-RSU share a prefix just | |||
| as mobile nodes share a prefix of a Wi-Fi access point in a wireless | as mobile nodes share a prefix of a Wi-Fi access point in a wireless | |||
| LAN. This is a natural characteristic in infrastructure-based | LAN. This is a natural characteristic in infrastructure-based | |||
| wireless networks. For example, in Figure 1, two vehicles (i.e., | wireless networks. For example, in Figure 1, two vehicles (i.e., | |||
| Vehicle2 and Vehicle5) can use Prefix1 to configure their IPv6 global | Vehicle2 and Vehicle5) can use Prefix1 to configure their IPv6 global | |||
| addresses for V2I communication. Alternatively, mobile nodes can | addresses for V2I communication. Alternatively, two vehicles can | |||
| employ a "Bring-Your-Own-Addresses (BYOA)" (or "Bring-Your-Own-Prefix | employ a "Bring Your Own Addresses (BYOA)" (or "Bring Your Own Prefix | |||
| (BYOP)") technique using their own IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) | (BYOP)") technique using their own IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) | |||
| [RFC4193] over the wireless network. | [RFC4193] over the wireless network. | |||
| In wireless subnets in vehicular networks (e.g., Subnet1 and Subnet2 | In wireless subnets in vehicular networks (e.g., Subnet1 and Subnet2 | |||
| in Figure 1), vehicles can construct a connected VANET (with an | in Figure 1), vehicles can construct a connected VANET (with an | |||
| arbitrary graph topology) and can communicate with each other via V2V | arbitrary graph topology) and can communicate with each other via V2V | |||
| communication. Vehicle1 can communicate with Vehicle2 via V2V | communication. Vehicle1 can communicate with Vehicle2 via V2V | |||
| communication, and Vehicle2 can communicate with Vehicle3 via V2V | communication, and Vehicle2 can communicate with Vehicle3 via V2V | |||
| communication because they are within the wireless communication | communication because they are within the wireless communication | |||
| range of each other. On the other hand, Vehicle3 can communicate | range of each other. On the other hand, Vehicle3 can communicate | |||
| skipping to change at line 675 ¶ | skipping to change at line 685 ¶ | |||
| Transmission Unit (MTU), frame format, link-local address, address | Transmission Unit (MTU), frame format, link-local address, address | |||
| mapping for unicast and multicast, stateless autoconfiguration, and | mapping for unicast and multicast, stateless autoconfiguration, and | |||
| subnet structure. | subnet structure. | |||
| An IPv6 mobility solution is needed for the guarantee of | An IPv6 mobility solution is needed for the guarantee of | |||
| communication continuity in vehicular networks so that a vehicle's | communication continuity in vehicular networks so that a vehicle's | |||
| TCP session can be continued or that UDP packets can be delivered to | TCP session can be continued or that UDP packets can be delivered to | |||
| a vehicle as a destination without loss while it moves from an IP- | a vehicle as a destination without loss while it moves from an IP- | |||
| RSU's wireless coverage to another IP-RSU's wireless coverage. In | RSU's wireless coverage to another IP-RSU's wireless coverage. In | |||
| Figure 1, assuming that Vehicle2 has a TCP session (or a UDP session) | Figure 1, assuming that Vehicle2 has a TCP session (or a UDP session) | |||
| with a correspondent node in the vehicular cloud, Vehicle2 can move | with a correspondent node in the Vehicular Cloud, Vehicle2 can move | |||
| from IP-RSU1's wireless coverage to IP-RSU2's wireless coverage. In | from IP-RSU1's wireless coverage to IP-RSU2's wireless coverage. In | |||
| this case, a handover for Vehicle2 needs to be performed by either a | this case, a handover for Vehicle2 needs to be performed by either a | |||
| host-based mobility management scheme (e.g., MIPv6 [RFC6275]) or a | host-based mobility management scheme (e.g., MIPv6 [RFC6275]) or a | |||
| network-based mobility management scheme (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213], | network-based mobility management scheme (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213], | |||
| NEMO [RFC3963] [RFC4885] [RFC4888], and AERO [AERO]). This document | NEMO [RFC3963] [RFC4885] [RFC4888], and AERO [AERO]). This document | |||
| describes issues in mobility management for vehicular networks in | describes issues in mobility management for vehicular networks in | |||
| Section 5.2. For improving TCP session continuity or successful UDP | Section 5.2. For improving TCP session continuity or successful UDP | |||
| packet delivery, the Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC8684] or QUIC protocol | packet delivery, the Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC8684] or QUIC protocol | |||
| [RFC9000] can also be used. IP-OBUs, however, may still experience | [RFC9000] can also be used. IP-OBUs, however, may still experience | |||
| more session time-out and re-establishment procedures due to lossy | more session time-out and re-establishment procedures due to lossy | |||
| skipping to change at line 714 ¶ | skipping to change at line 724 ¶ | |||
| for a vehicle and an EN. It is reasonable to consider interactions | for a vehicle and an EN. It is reasonable to consider interactions | |||
| between the internal network of a vehicle and that of another vehicle | between the internal network of a vehicle and that of another vehicle | |||
| or an EN. Note that it is dangerous if the internal network of a | or an EN. Note that it is dangerous if the internal network of a | |||
| vehicle is controlled by a malicious party. These dangers can | vehicle is controlled by a malicious party. These dangers can | |||
| include unauthorized driving control input and unauthorized driving | include unauthorized driving control input and unauthorized driving | |||
| information disclosure to an unauthorized third party. A malicious | information disclosure to an unauthorized third party. A malicious | |||
| party can be a group of hackers, a criminal group, and a competitor | party can be a group of hackers, a criminal group, and a competitor | |||
| for industrial espionage or sabotage. To minimize this kind of risk, | for industrial espionage or sabotage. To minimize this kind of risk, | |||
| an augmented identification and verification protocol, which has an | an augmented identification and verification protocol, which has an | |||
| extra means, shall be implemented based on a basic identity | extra means, shall be implemented based on a basic identity | |||
| verification process. These extra means can be certificate-based, | verification process. These extra means could include approaches | |||
| biometric, credit-based, and One-Time Password (OTP) approaches in | based on certificates, biometrics, credit, or One-Time Passwords | |||
| addition to a used approach [RFC8002]. The parties of the | (OTPs) in addition to Host Identity Protocol certificates [RFC8002]. | |||
| verification protocol can be from a built-in verification protocol in | The parties of the verification protocol can be from a built-in | |||
| the current vehicle, which is pre-installed by a vehicle vendor. The | verification protocol in the current vehicle, which is pre-installed | |||
| parties can also be from any verification authorities that have the | by a vehicle vendor. The parties can also be from any verification | |||
| database of authenticated users. The security properties provided by | authorities that have the database of authenticated users. The | |||
| a verification protocol can be identity-related information, such as | security properties provided by a verification protocol can be | |||
| the genuineness of an identity, the authenticity of an identity, and | identity-related information, such as the genuineness of an identity, | |||
| the ownership of an identity [RFC7427]. | the authenticity of an identity, and the ownership of an identity | |||
| [RFC7427]. | ||||
| The augmented identification and verification protocol with extra | The augmented identification and verification protocol with extra | |||
| means can support security properties such as the identification and | means can support security properties such as the identification and | |||
| verification of a vehicle, driver, and passenger. First, a credit- | verification of a vehicle, driver, and passenger. First, a credit- | |||
| based means is to let a vehicle classify the received messages sent | based method is when a vehicle classifies the messages it received | |||
| by another host to different severity levels for driving safety in | from another host into various levels based on their potential | |||
| order to calculate the credit for the sender. Based on accumulated | effects on driving safety in order to calculate the credit of that | |||
| credit, a correspondent node can verify the other party to see | sender. Based on accumulated credit, a correspondent node can verify | |||
| whether it is genuine or not. Second, a certificate-based method | the other party to see whether it is genuine or not. Second, a | |||
| includes a user certificate (e.g., X.509 certificate [RFC5280]) to | certificate-based method includes a user certificate (e.g., X.509 | |||
| authenticate a vehicle or its driver. Third, a biometric method | certificate [RFC5280]) to authenticate a vehicle or its driver. | |||
| includes a fingerprint, face, or voice to authenticate a driver or | Third, a biometric method includes a fingerprint, face, or voice to | |||
| passenger. Lastly, an OTP-based method lets another already- | authenticate a driver or passenger. Lastly, an OTP-based method lets | |||
| authenticated device (e.g., smartphone and tablet) of a driver or | another already-authenticated device (e.g., smartphone and tablet) of | |||
| passenger be used to authenticate a driver or passenger. | a driver or passenger be used to authenticate a driver or passenger. | |||
| +-----------------+ | +-----------------+ | |||
| (*)<........>(*) +----->| Vehicular Cloud | | (*)<........>(*) +----->| Vehicular Cloud | | |||
| (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | | | +-----------------+ | (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | | | +-----------------+ | |||
| +------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+ | +------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+ | |||
| | v | | v v | | | v | | v v | | |||
| | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | |||
| | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-RSU1| | Host3 | | | | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-RSU1| | Host3 | | | |||
| | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | |||
| | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ | | | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ | | |||
| skipping to change at line 794 ¶ | skipping to change at line 805 ¶ | |||
| (Mobile Network1) inside Vehicle1. Vehicle1 has two hosts (Host1 and | (Mobile Network1) inside Vehicle1. Vehicle1 has two hosts (Host1 and | |||
| Host2) and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another | Host2) and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another | |||
| internal network (Fixed Network1) inside EN1. EN1 has one host | internal network (Fixed Network1) inside EN1. EN1 has one host | |||
| (Host3), two routers (IP-RSU1 and Router2), and the collection of | (Host3), two routers (IP-RSU1 and Router2), and the collection of | |||
| servers (Server1 to ServerN) for various services in the road | servers (Server1 to ServerN) for various services in the road | |||
| networks, such as the emergency notification and navigation. | networks, such as the emergency notification and navigation. | |||
| Vehicle1's IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and EN1's IP-RSU1 (as a fixed | Vehicle1's IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and EN1's IP-RSU1 (as a fixed | |||
| router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for | router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for | |||
| V2I networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate | V2I networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate | |||
| with a server (Server1) in EN1 for a vehicular service through | with a server (Server1) in EN1 for a vehicular service through | |||
| Vehicle1's moving network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP- | Vehicle1's mobile network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP- | |||
| RSU1, and EN1's fixed network. | RSU1, and EN1's fixed network. | |||
| For the IPv6 communication between an IP-OBU and an IP-RSU or between | For the IPv6 communication between an IP-OBU and an IP-RSU or between | |||
| two neighboring IP-OBUs, they need to know the network parameters, | two neighboring IP-OBUs, they need to know the network parameters, | |||
| which include MAC layer and IPv6 layer information. The MAC layer | which include MAC layer and IPv6 layer information. The MAC layer | |||
| information includes wireless link-layer parameters, transmission | information includes wireless link-layer parameters, transmission | |||
| power level, and the MAC address of an external network interface for | power level, and the MAC address of an external network interface for | |||
| the internetworking with another IP-OBU or IP-RSU. The IPv6 layer | the internetworking with another IP-OBU or IP-RSU. The IPv6 layer | |||
| information includes the IPv6 address and network prefix of an | information includes the IPv6 address and network prefix of an | |||
| external network interface for the internetworking with another IP- | external network interface for the internetworking with another IP- | |||
| OBU or IP-RSU. | OBU or IP-RSU. | |||
| Through the mutual knowledge of the network parameters of internal | Through the mutual knowledge of the network parameters of internal | |||
| networks, packets can be transmitted between the vehicle's moving | networks, packets can be transmitted between the vehicle's mobile | |||
| network and the EN's fixed network. Thus, V2I requires an efficient | network and the EN's fixed network. Thus, V2I requires an efficient | |||
| protocol for the mutual knowledge of network parameters. Note that | protocol for the mutual knowledge of network parameters. Note that | |||
| from a security point of view, perimeter-based policy enforcement can | from a security point of view, perimeter-based policy enforcement | |||
| be applied to protect parts of the internal network of a vehicle. | [RFC9099] can be applied to protect parts of the internal network of | |||
| a vehicle. | ||||
| As shown in Figure 2, the addresses used for IPv6 transmissions over | As shown in Figure 2, the addresses used for IPv6 transmissions over | |||
| the wireless link interfaces for IP-OBU and IP-RSU can be link-local | the wireless link interfaces for IP-OBU and IP-RSU can be IPv6 link- | |||
| IPv6 addresses, ULAs, or global IPv6 addresses. When IPv6 addresses | local addresses, ULAs, or IPv6 global addresses. When IPv6 addresses | |||
| are used, wireless interface configuration and control overhead for | are used, wireless interface configuration and control overhead for | |||
| Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] and Multicast Listener | Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] and Multicast Listener | |||
| Discovery (MLD) [RFC2710] [RFC3810] should be minimized to support | Discovery (MLD) [RFC2710] [RFC3810] should be minimized to support | |||
| V2I and V2X communications for vehicles moving fast along roadways. | V2I and V2X communications for vehicles moving fast along roadways. | |||
| Let us consider the upload/download time of a ground vehicle when it | Let us consider the upload/download time of a ground vehicle when it | |||
| passes through the wireless communication coverage of an IP-RSU. For | passes through the wireless communication coverage of an IP-RSU. For | |||
| a given typical setting where 1 km is the maximum DSRC communication | a given typical setting where 1 km is the maximum DSRC communication | |||
| range [DSRC] and 100 km/h is the speed limit on highways for ground | range [DSRC] and 100 km/h is the speed limit on highways for ground | |||
| vehicles, the dwelling time can be calculated to be 72 seconds by | vehicles, the dwelling time can be calculated to be 72 seconds by | |||
| dividing the diameter of the 2 km (i.e., two times the DSRC | dividing the diameter of the 2 km (i.e., two times the DSRC | |||
| communication range where an IP-RSU is located in the center of the | communication range where an IP-RSU is located in the center of the | |||
| circle of wireless communication) by the speed limit of 100 km/h | circle of wireless communication) by the speed limit of 100 km/h | |||
| (i.e., about 28 m/s). For the 72 seconds, a vehicle passing through | (i.e., about 28 m/s). For the 72 seconds, a vehicle passing through | |||
| the coverage of an IP-RSU can upload and download data packets to/ | the coverage of an IP-RSU can upload and download data packets to/ | |||
| from the IP-RSU. For special cases, such as emergency vehicles | from the IP-RSU. For special cases, such as emergency vehicles | |||
| moving above the speed limit, the dwelling time is relatively shorter | moving above the speed limit, the dwelling time is relatively shorter | |||
| than that of other vehicles. For cases of airborne vehicles, | than that of other vehicles. For cases of airborne vehicles (i.e., | |||
| considering a higher flying speed and a higher altitude, the dwelling | aircraft), considering a higher flying speed and a higher altitude, | |||
| time can be much shorter. | the dwelling time can be much shorter. | |||
| 4.3. V2V-Based Internetworking | 4.3. V2V-Based Internetworking | |||
| This section discusses the internetworking between the moving | This section discusses the internetworking between the mobile | |||
| networks of two neighboring vehicles via V2V communication. | networks of two neighboring vehicles via V2V communication. | |||
| (*)<..........>(*) | (*)<..........>(*) | |||
| (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | | | (2001:db8:1:1::/64) | | | |||
| +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+ | +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+ | |||
| | v | | v | | | v | | v | | |||
| | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | |||
| | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-OBU2| | Host3 | | | | | Host1 | |IP-OBU1| | | |IP-OBU2| | Host3 | | | |||
| | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | | +-------+ +-------+ | | +-------+ +-------+ | | |||
| | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ | | | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ | | |||
| skipping to change at line 885 ¶ | skipping to change at line 897 ¶ | |||
| and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another internal | and two routers (IP-OBU1 and Router1). There exists another internal | |||
| network (Mobile Network2) inside Vehicle2. Vehicle2 has two hosts | network (Mobile Network2) inside Vehicle2. Vehicle2 has two hosts | |||
| (Host3 and Host4) and two routers (IP-OBU2 and Router2). Vehicle1's | (Host3 and Host4) and two routers (IP-OBU2 and Router2). Vehicle1's | |||
| IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and Vehicle2's IP-OBU2 (as a mobile | IP-OBU1 (as a mobile router) and Vehicle2's IP-OBU2 (as a mobile | |||
| router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for | router) use 2001:db8:1:1::/64 for an external link (e.g., DSRC) for | |||
| V2V networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate | V2V networking. Thus, a host (Host1) in Vehicle1 can communicate | |||
| with another host (Host3) in Vehicle2 for a vehicular service through | with another host (Host3) in Vehicle2 for a vehicular service through | |||
| Vehicle1's mobile network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP- | Vehicle1's mobile network, a wireless link between IP-OBU1 and IP- | |||
| OBU2, and Vehicle2's mobile network. | OBU2, and Vehicle2's mobile network. | |||
| As a V2V use case in Section 3.1, Figure 4 shows the linear network | As a V2V use case in Section 3.1, Figure 4 shows a linear network | |||
| topology of platooning vehicles for V2V communications where Vehicle3 | topology of platooning vehicles for V2V communications where Vehicle3 | |||
| is the lead vehicle with a driver, and Vehicle2 and Vehicle1 are the | is the lead vehicle with a driver, and Vehicle2 and Vehicle1 are the | |||
| following vehicles without drivers. From a security point of view, | following vehicles without drivers. From a security point of view, | |||
| before vehicles can be platooned, they shall be mutually | before vehicles can be platooned, they shall be mutually | |||
| authenticated to reduce possible security risks. | authenticated to reduce possible security risks. | |||
| (*)<..................>(*)<..................>(*) | (*)<..................>(*)<..................>(*) | |||
| | | | | | | | | |||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | |||
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |||
| skipping to change at line 952 ¶ | skipping to change at line 964 ¶ | |||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | |||
| Vehicle1 EN1 Vehicle3 | Vehicle1 EN1 Vehicle3 | |||
| <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link ===> Moving Direction | <----> Wired Link <....> Wireless Link ===> Moving Direction | |||
| (*) Antenna | (*) Antenna | |||
| Figure 5: Multihop Internetworking between Two Vehicle Networks | Figure 5: Multihop Internetworking between Two Vehicle Networks | |||
| via IP-RSU (V2I2V) | via IP-RSU (V2I2V) | |||
| As shown in Figure 5, multihop internetworking between two vehicles | As shown in Figure 5, multihop internetworking between two vehicles | |||
| is feasible via an infrastructure node (i.e., IP-RSU) with wireless | is feasible via an infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU) with wireless | |||
| connectivity among the mobile networks of two vehicles and the fixed | connectivity among the mobile networks of two vehicles and the fixed | |||
| network of an edge network (denoted as EN1) in the same VANET. For | network of an edge network (denoted as EN1) in the same VANET. For | |||
| example, Host1 in Vehicle1 can communicate with Host3 in Vehicle3 via | example, Host1 in Vehicle1 can communicate with Host3 in Vehicle3 via | |||
| IP-OBU1 in Vehicle1, IP-RSU1 in EN1, and IP-OBU3 in Vehicle3 in the | IP-OBU1 in Vehicle1, IP-RSU1 in EN1, and IP-OBU3 in Vehicle3 in the | |||
| VANET, as shown in the figure. | VANET, as shown in the figure. | |||
| For the reliability required in V2V networking, the ND optimization | For the reliability required in V2V networking, the ND optimization | |||
| defined in the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) [RFC6130] [RFC7466] | defined in the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) [RFC6130] [RFC7466] | |||
| improves the classical IPv6 ND in terms of tracking neighbor | improves the classical IPv6 ND in terms of tracking neighbor | |||
| information with up to two hops and introducing several extensible | information with up to two hops and introducing several extensible | |||
| Information Bases, which serves the MANET routing protocols, such as | Information Bases. This improvement serves the MANET routing | |||
| the different versions of Optimized Link State Routing Protocol | protocols, such as the different versions of Optimized Link State | |||
| (OLSR) [RFC3626] [RFC7181], Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) | Routing Protocol (OLSR) [RFC3626] [RFC7181], Open Shortest Path First | |||
| derivatives (e.g., [RFC5614]), and Dynamic Link Exchange Protocol | (OSPF) derivatives (e.g., [RFC5614]), and Dynamic Link Exchange | |||
| (DLEP) [RFC8175] with its extensions [RFC8629] [RFC8757]. In short, | Protocol (DLEP) [RFC8175] with its extensions [RFC8629] [RFC8757]. | |||
| the MANET ND mainly deals with maintaining extended network neighbors | In short, the MANET ND mainly deals with maintaining extended network | |||
| to enhance the link reliability. However, an ND protocol in | neighbors to enhance the link reliability. However, an ND protocol | |||
| vehicular networks shall consider more about the geographical | in vehicular networks shall consider more about the geographical | |||
| mobility information of vehicles as an important resource for serving | mobility information of vehicles as an important resource for serving | |||
| various purposes to improve the reliability, e.g., vehicle driving | various purposes to improve the reliability, e.g., vehicle driving | |||
| safety, intelligent transportation implementations, and advanced | safety, intelligent transportation implementations, and advanced | |||
| mobility services. For a more reliable V2V networking, some | mobility services. For a more reliable V2V networking, some | |||
| redundancy mechanisms should be provided in L3 in cases of the | redundancy mechanisms should be provided in L3 in cases of the | |||
| failure of L2. For different use cases, the optimal solution to | failure of L2. For different use cases, the optimal solution to | |||
| improve V2V networking reliability may vary. For example, a group of | improve V2V networking reliability may vary. For example, a group of | |||
| platooning vehicles may have stabler neighbors than freely moving | platooning vehicles may have stabler neighbors than freely moving | |||
| vehicles, as described in Section 3.1. | vehicles, as described in Section 3.1. | |||
| skipping to change at line 1009 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1021 ¶ | |||
| control plane (e.g., ND procedure and DAD) needs to support this | control plane (e.g., ND procedure and DAD) needs to support this | |||
| order of magnitude for application message exchanges. Also, | order of magnitude for application message exchanges. Also, | |||
| considering the communication range of DSRC (up to 1 km) and 100 km/h | considering the communication range of DSRC (up to 1 km) and 100 km/h | |||
| as the speed limit on highways (some countries can have much higher | as the speed limit on highways (some countries can have much higher | |||
| speed limits or even no limit, e.g., Germany), the lifetime of a link | speed limits or even no limit, e.g., Germany), the lifetime of a link | |||
| between a vehicle and an IP-RSU is in the order of a minute (e.g., | between a vehicle and an IP-RSU is in the order of a minute (e.g., | |||
| about 72 seconds), and the lifetime of a link between two vehicles is | about 72 seconds), and the lifetime of a link between two vehicles is | |||
| about a half minute. Note that if two vehicles are moving in the | about a half minute. Note that if two vehicles are moving in the | |||
| opposite directions in a roadway, the relative speed of this case is | opposite directions in a roadway, the relative speed of this case is | |||
| two times the relative speed of a vehicle passing through an IP-RSU. | two times the relative speed of a vehicle passing through an IP-RSU. | |||
| This relative speed leads the half of the link lifetime between the | This relative speed causes the lifetime of the wireless link between | |||
| vehicle and the IP-RSU. In reality, the DSRC communication range is | the vehicle and the IP-RSU to be halved. In reality, the DSRC | |||
| around 500 m, so the link lifetime will be half of the maximum time. | communication range is around 500 m, so the link lifetime will be | |||
| The time constraint of a wireless link between two nodes (e.g., | half of the maximum time. The time constraint of a wireless link | |||
| vehicle and IP-RSU) needs to be considered because it may affect the | between two nodes (e.g., vehicle and IP-RSU) needs to be considered | |||
| lifetime of a session involving the link. The lifetime of a session | because it may affect the lifetime of a session involving the link. | |||
| varies depending on the session's type, such as web surfing, a voice | The lifetime of a session varies depending on the session's type, | |||
| call over IP, a DNS query, or context-aware navigation (in | such as web surfing, a voice call over IP, a DNS query, or context- | |||
| Section 3.1). Regardless of a session's type, to guide all the IPv6 | aware navigation (in Section 3.1). Regardless of a session's type, | |||
| packets to their destination host(s), IP mobility should be supported | to guide all the IPv6 packets to their destination host(s), IP | |||
| for the session. In a V2V scenario (e.g., context-aware navigation), | mobility should be supported for the session. In a V2V scenario | |||
| the IPv6 packets of a vehicle should be delivered to relevant | (e.g., context-aware navigation [CNP]), the IPv6 packets of a vehicle | |||
| vehicles efficiently (e.g., multicasting). With this observation, | should be delivered to relevant vehicles efficiently (e.g., | |||
| IPv6 protocol exchanges need to be performed as quickly as possible | multicasting). With this observation, IPv6 protocol exchanges need | |||
| to support the message exchanges of various applications in vehicular | to be performed as quickly as possible to support the message | |||
| networks. | exchanges of various applications in vehicular networks. | |||
| Therefore, the time constraint of a wireless link has a major impact | Therefore, the time constraint of a wireless link has a major impact | |||
| on IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND). Mobility Management (MM) is also | on IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND). Mobility Management (MM) is also | |||
| vulnerable to disconnections that occur before the completion of | vulnerable to disconnections that occur before the completion of | |||
| identity verification and tunnel management. This is especially true | identity verification and tunnel management. This is especially true | |||
| given the unreliable nature of wireless communication. Meanwhile, | given the unreliable nature of wireless communication. Meanwhile, | |||
| the bandwidth of the wireless link determined by the lower layers | the bandwidth of the wireless link determined by the lower layers | |||
| (i.e., link and PHY layers) can affect the transmission time of | (i.e., PHY and link layers) can affect the transmission time of | |||
| control messages of the upper layers (e.g., IPv6) and the continuity | control messages of the upper layers (e.g., IPv6) and the continuity | |||
| of sessions in the higher layers (e.g., IPv6, TCP, and UDP). Hence, | of sessions in the higher layers (e.g., IPv6, TCP, and UDP). Hence, | |||
| the bandwidth selection according to the Modulation and Coding Scheme | the bandwidth selection according to the Modulation and Coding Scheme | |||
| (MCS) also affects the vehicular network connectivity. Note that | (MCS) also affects the vehicular network connectivity. Note that | |||
| usually the higher bandwidth gives the shorter communication range | usually the higher bandwidth gives the shorter communication range | |||
| and the higher packet error rate at the receiving side, which may | and the higher packet error rate at the receiving side, which may | |||
| reduce the reliability of control message exchanges of the higher | reduce the reliability of control message exchanges of the higher | |||
| layers (e.g., IPv6). This section presents key topics, such as | layers (e.g., IPv6). This section presents key topics, such as | |||
| neighbor discovery and mobility management for links and sessions in | neighbor discovery and mobility management for links and sessions in | |||
| IPv6-based vehicular networks. Note that the detailed discussion on | IPv6-based vehicular networks. Note that the detailed discussion on | |||
| skipping to change at line 1054 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1066 ¶ | |||
| to fulfill the use cases is left as potential future work. | to fulfill the use cases is left as potential future work. | |||
| 5.1. Neighbor Discovery | 5.1. Neighbor Discovery | |||
| IPv6 ND [RFC4861] [RFC4862] is a core part of the IPv6 protocol | IPv6 ND [RFC4861] [RFC4862] is a core part of the IPv6 protocol | |||
| suite. IPv6 ND is designed for link types including point-to-point, | suite. IPv6 ND is designed for link types including point-to-point, | |||
| multicast-capable (e.g., Ethernet), and Non-Broadcast Multiple Access | multicast-capable (e.g., Ethernet), and Non-Broadcast Multiple Access | |||
| (NBMA). It assumes the efficient and reliable support of multicast | (NBMA). It assumes the efficient and reliable support of multicast | |||
| and unicast from the link layer for various network operations, such | and unicast from the link layer for various network operations, such | |||
| as MAC Address Resolution (AR), DAD, MLD, and Neighbor Unreachability | as MAC Address Resolution (AR), DAD, MLD, and Neighbor Unreachability | |||
| Detection (NUD). | Detection (NUD) [RFC4861] [RFC4862] [RFC2710] [RFC3810]. | |||
| Vehicles move quickly within the communication coverage of any | Vehicles move quickly within the communication coverage of any | |||
| particular vehicle or IP-RSU. Before the vehicles can exchange | particular vehicle or IP-RSU. Before the vehicles can exchange | |||
| application messages with each other, they need IPv6 addresses to run | application messages with each other, they need IPv6 addresses to run | |||
| IPv6 ND. | IPv6 ND. | |||
| The requirements for IPv6 ND for vehicular networks are efficient DAD | The requirements for IPv6 ND for vehicular networks are efficient DAD | |||
| and NUD operations. An efficient DAD is required to reduce the | and NUD operations. An efficient DAD is required to reduce the | |||
| overhead of DAD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network, | overhead of DAD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network, | |||
| which can guarantee the uniqueness of a vehicle's global IPv6 | which can guarantee the uniqueness of a vehicle's global IPv6 | |||
| address. An efficient NUD is required to reduce the overhead of the | address. An efficient NUD is required to reduce the overhead of the | |||
| NUD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network, which can | NUD packets during a vehicle's travel in a road network, which can | |||
| guarantee the accurate neighborhood information of a vehicle in terms | guarantee the accurate neighborhood information of a vehicle in terms | |||
| of adjacent vehicles and RSUs. | of adjacent vehicles and IP-RSUs. | |||
| The legacy DAD assumes that a node with an IPv6 address can reach any | The legacy DAD assumes that a node with an IPv6 address can reach any | |||
| other node with the scope of its address at the time it claims its | other node with the scope of its address at the time it claims its | |||
| address, and can hear any future claim for that address by another | address, and can hear any future claim for that address by another | |||
| party within the scope of its address for the duration of the address | party within the scope of its address for the duration of the address | |||
| ownership. However, the partitioning and merging of VANETs makes | ownership. However, the partitioning and merging of VANETs makes | |||
| this assumption not valid frequently in vehicular networks. The | this assumption not valid frequently in vehicular networks. The | |||
| merging and partitioning of VANETs frequently occurs in vehicular | partitioning and merging of VANETs frequently occurs in vehicular | |||
| networks. This merging and partitioning should be considered for | networks. This partitioning and merging should be considered for | |||
| IPv6 ND, such as IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) | IPv6 ND, such as IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) | |||
| [RFC4862]. SLAAC is not compatible with merging and partitioning, | [RFC4862]. SLAAC is not compatible with the partitioning and | |||
| and additional work is needed for ND to operate properly under those | merging, and additional work is needed for ND to operate properly | |||
| circumstances. Due to the merging of VANETs, two IPv6 addresses may | under those circumstances. Due to the merging of VANETs, two IPv6 | |||
| conflict with each other though they were unique before the merging. | addresses may conflict with each other though they were unique before | |||
| An address lookup operation may be conducted by an MA or IP-RSU (as | the merging. An address lookup operation may be conducted by an MA | |||
| Registrar in RPL) to check the uniqueness of an IPv6 address that | or IP-RSU (as Registrar in RPL) to check the uniqueness of an IPv6 | |||
| will be configured by a vehicle as DAD. Also, the partitioning of a | address that will be configured by a vehicle as DAD. Also, the | |||
| VANET may make vehicles with the same prefix be physically | partitioning of a VANET may make vehicles with the same prefix be | |||
| unreachable. An address lookup operation may be conducted by an MA | physically unreachable. An address lookup operation may be conducted | |||
| or IP-RSU (as Registrar in RPL) to check the existence of a vehicle | by an MA or IP-RSU (as Registrar in RPL) to check the existence of a | |||
| under the network coverage of the MA or IP-RSU as NUD. Thus, SLAAC | vehicle under the network coverage of the MA or IP-RSU as NUD. Thus, | |||
| needs to prevent IPv6 address duplication due to the merging of | SLAAC needs to prevent IPv6 address duplication due to the merging of | |||
| VANETs, and IPv6 ND needs to detect unreachable neighboring vehicles | VANETs, and IPv6 ND needs to detect unreachable neighboring vehicles | |||
| due to the partitioning of a VANET. According to the merging and | due to the partitioning of a VANET. According to the partitioning | |||
| partitioning, a destination vehicle (as an IPv6 host) needs to be | and merging, a destination vehicle (as an IPv6 host) needs to be | |||
| distinguished as a host that is either on-link or not on-link even | distinguished as a host that is either on-link or not on-link even | |||
| though the source vehicle can use the same prefix as the destination | though the source vehicle can use the same prefix as the destination | |||
| vehicle [IPPL]. | vehicle [IPPL]. | |||
| To efficiently prevent IPv6 address duplication (due to the VANET | To efficiently prevent IPv6 address duplication (due to the VANET | |||
| partitioning and merging) from happening in vehicular networks, the | partitioning and merging) from happening in vehicular networks, the | |||
| vehicular networks need to support a vehicular-network-wide DAD by | vehicular networks need to support a vehicular-network-wide DAD by | |||
| defining a scope that is compatible with the legacy DAD. In this | defining a scope that is compatible with the legacy DAD. In this | |||
| case, two vehicles can communicate with each other when there exists | case, two vehicles can communicate with each other when there exists | |||
| a communication path over VANET or a combination of VANETs and IP- | a communication path over VANET or a combination of VANETs and IP- | |||
| skipping to change at line 1119 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1131 ¶ | |||
| For vehicular networks with high mobility and density, DAD needs to | For vehicular networks with high mobility and density, DAD needs to | |||
| be performed efficiently with minimum overhead so that the vehicles | be performed efficiently with minimum overhead so that the vehicles | |||
| can exchange driving safety messages (e.g., collision avoidance and | can exchange driving safety messages (e.g., collision avoidance and | |||
| accident notification) with each other with a short interval as | accident notification) with each other with a short interval as | |||
| suggested by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration | suggested by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration | |||
| (NHTSA) of the U.S. [NHTSA-ACAS-Report]. Since the partitioning and | (NHTSA) of the U.S. [NHTSA-ACAS-Report]. Since the partitioning and | |||
| merging of vehicular networks may require re-performing the DAD | merging of vehicular networks may require re-performing the DAD | |||
| process repeatedly, the link scope of vehicles may be limited to a | process repeatedly, the link scope of vehicles may be limited to a | |||
| small area, which may delay the exchange of driving safety messages. | small area, which may delay the exchange of driving safety messages. | |||
| Driving safety messages can include a vehicle's mobility information | Driving safety messages can include a vehicle's mobility information | |||
| (i.e., position, speed, direction, and acceleration/deceleration) | (e.g., position, speed, direction, and acceleration/deceleration) | |||
| that is critical to other vehicles. The exchange interval of this | that is critical to other vehicles. The exchange interval of this | |||
| message is recommended to be less than 0.5 seconds, which is required | message is recommended to be less than 0.5 seconds, which is required | |||
| for a driver to avoid an emergency situation, such as a rear-end | for a driver to avoid an emergency situation, such as a rear-end | |||
| crash. | crash. | |||
| ND time-related parameters, such as router lifetime and Neighbor | ND time-related parameters, such as router lifetime and Neighbor | |||
| Advertisement (NA) interval, need to be adjusted for vehicle speed | Advertisement (NA) interval, need to be adjusted for vehicle speed | |||
| and vehicle density. For example, the NA interval needs to be | and vehicle density. For example, the NA interval needs to be | |||
| dynamically adjusted according to a vehicle's speed so that the | dynamically adjusted according to a vehicle's speed so that the | |||
| vehicle can maintain its neighboring vehicles in a stable way, | vehicle can maintain its position relative to its neighboring | |||
| considering the collision probability with the NA messages sent by | vehicles in a stable way, considering the collision probability with | |||
| other vehicles. The ND time-related parameters can be an operational | the NA messages sent by other vehicles. The ND time-related | |||
| setting or an optimization point particularly for vehicular networks. | parameters can be an operational setting or an optimization point | |||
| Note that the link-scope multicast messages in the ND protocol may | particularly for vehicular networks. Note that the link-scope | |||
| cause a performance issue in vehicular networks. [RFC9119] suggests | multicast messages in the ND protocol may cause a performance issue | |||
| several optimization approaches for the issue. | in vehicular networks. [RFC9119] suggests several optimization | |||
| approaches for the issue. | ||||
| For IPv6-based safety applications (e.g., context-aware navigation, | For IPv6-based safety applications (e.g., context-aware navigation, | |||
| adaptive cruise control, and platooning) in vehicular networks, the | adaptive cruise control, and platooning) in vehicular networks, the | |||
| delay-bounded data delivery is critical. IPv6 ND needs to work to | delay-bounded data delivery is critical. IPv6 ND needs to work to | |||
| support those IPv6-based safety applications efficiently. | support those IPv6-based safety applications efficiently. | |||
| [VEHICULAR-ND] introduces a Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND) | [VEHICULAR-ND] introduces a Vehicular Neighbor Discovery (VND) | |||
| process as an extension of IPv6 ND for IP-based vehicular networks. | process as an extension of IPv6 ND for IP-based vehicular networks. | |||
| From the interoperability point of view, in IPv6-based vehicular | From the interoperability point of view, in IPv6-based vehicular | |||
| networking, IPv6 ND should have minimum changes from the legacy IPv6 | networking, IPv6 ND should have minimum changes from the legacy IPv6 | |||
| skipping to change at line 1196 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1209 ¶ | |||
| other. Suppose that a global-scope IPv6 prefix (or an IPv6 ULA | other. Suppose that a global-scope IPv6 prefix (or an IPv6 ULA | |||
| prefix) is assigned to VANETs in vehicular networks. Considering | prefix) is assigned to VANETs in vehicular networks. Considering | |||
| that two vehicles in the same VANET configure their IPv6 addresses | that two vehicles in the same VANET configure their IPv6 addresses | |||
| with the same IPv6 prefix, if they are not connected in one hop (that | with the same IPv6 prefix, if they are not connected in one hop (that | |||
| is, they have multihop network connectivity between them), then they | is, they have multihop network connectivity between them), then they | |||
| may not be able to communicate with each other. Thus, in this case, | may not be able to communicate with each other. Thus, in this case, | |||
| the concept of an on-link IPv6 prefix does not hold because two | the concept of an on-link IPv6 prefix does not hold because two | |||
| vehicles with the same on-link IPv6 prefix cannot communicate | vehicles with the same on-link IPv6 prefix cannot communicate | |||
| directly with each other. Also, when two vehicles are located in two | directly with each other. Also, when two vehicles are located in two | |||
| different VANETs with the same IPv6 prefix, they cannot communicate | different VANETs with the same IPv6 prefix, they cannot communicate | |||
| with each other. When these two VANETs converge to one VANET, the | with each other. On the other hand, when these two VANETs converge | |||
| two vehicles can communicate with each other in a multihop fashion, | to one VANET, the two vehicles can communicate with each other in a | |||
| for example, when they are Vehicle1 and Vehicle3, as shown in | multihop fashion, for example, when they are Vehicle1 and Vehicle3, | |||
| Figure 4. | as shown in Figure 4. | |||
| From the previous observation, a vehicular link model should consider | From the previous observation, a vehicular link model should consider | |||
| the frequent partitioning and merging of VANETs due to vehicle | the frequent partitioning and merging of VANETs due to vehicle | |||
| mobility. Therefore, the vehicular link model needs to use a prefix | mobility. Therefore, the vehicular link model needs to use a prefix | |||
| that is on-link and a prefix that is not on-link according to the | that is on-link and a prefix that is not on-link according to the | |||
| network topology of vehicles, such as a one-hop reachable network and | network topology of vehicles, such as a one-hop reachable network and | |||
| a multihop reachable network (or partitioned networks). If the | a multihop reachable network (or partitioned networks). If the | |||
| vehicles with the same prefix are reachable from each other in one | vehicles with the same prefix are reachable from each other in one | |||
| hop, the prefix should be on-link. On the other hand, if some of the | hop, the prefix should be on-link. On the other hand, if some of the | |||
| vehicles with the same prefix are not reachable from each other in | vehicles with the same prefix are not reachable from each other in | |||
| one hop due to either the multihop topology in the VANET or multiple | one hop due to either the multihop topology in the VANET or multiple | |||
| partitions, the prefix should be not on-link. In most cases in | partitions, the prefix should not be on-link. In most cases in | |||
| vehicular networks, due to the partitioning and merging of VANETs and | vehicular networks, due to the partitioning and merging of VANETs and | |||
| the multihop network topology of VANETs, prefixes that are not on- | the multihop network topology of VANETs, prefixes that are not on- | |||
| link will be used for vehicles as default. | link will be used for vehicles as default. | |||
| The vehicular link model needs to support multihop routing in a | The vehicular link model needs to support multihop routing in a | |||
| connected VANET where the vehicles with the same global-scope IPv6 | connected VANET where the vehicles with the same global-scope IPv6 | |||
| prefix (or the same IPv6 ULA prefix) are connected in one hop or | prefix (or the same IPv6 ULA prefix) are connected in one hop or | |||
| multiple hops. It also needs to support the multihop routing in | multiple hops. It also needs to support the multihop routing in | |||
| multiple connected VANETs through infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSU) | multiple connected VANETs through infrastructure nodes (e.g., IP-RSU) | |||
| where they are connected to the infrastructure. For example, in | where they are connected to the infrastructure. For example, in | |||
| Figure 1, suppose that Vehicle1, Vehicle2, and Vehicle3 are | Figure 1, suppose that Vehicle1, Vehicle2, and Vehicle3 are | |||
| configured with their IPv6 addresses based on the same global-scope | configured with their IPv6 addresses based on the same global-scope | |||
| IPv6 prefix. Vehicle1 and Vehicle3 can also communicate with each | IPv6 prefix. Vehicle1 and Vehicle3 can also communicate with each | |||
| other via either multihop V2V or multihop V2I2V. When Vehicle1 and | other via either multihop V2V or multihop V2I2V. When Vehicle1 and | |||
| Vehicle3 are connected in a VANET, it will be more efficient for them | Vehicle3 are connected in a VANET, it will be more efficient for them | |||
| to communicate with each other directly via VANET rather than | to communicate with each other directly via VANET rather than | |||
| indirectly via IP-RSUs. On the other hand, when Vehicle1 and | indirectly via IP-RSUs. On the other hand, when Vehicle1 and | |||
| Vehicle3 are farther apart than the direct communication range in | Vehicle3 are farther apart than the direct communication range in two | |||
| separate VANETs and under two different IP-RSUs, they can communicate | separate VANETs and under two different IP-RSUs, they can communicate | |||
| with each other through the relay of IP-RSUs via V2I2V. Thus, two | with each other through the relay of IP-RSUs via V2I2V. Thus, the | |||
| separate VANETs can merge into one network via IP-RSU(s). Also, | two separate VANETs can merge into one network via IP-RSU(s). Also, | |||
| newly arriving vehicles can merge two separate VANETs into one VANET | newly arriving vehicles can merge the two separate VANETs into one | |||
| if they can play the role of a relay node for those VANETs. | VANET if they can play the role of a relay node for those VANETs. | |||
| Thus, in IPv6-based vehicular networking, the vehicular link model | Thus, in IPv6-based vehicular networking, the vehicular link model | |||
| should have minimum changes for interoperability with standard IPv6 | should have minimum changes for interoperability with standard IPv6 | |||
| links efficiently to support IPv6 DAD, MLD, and NUD operations. | links efficiently to support IPv6 DAD, MLD, and NUD operations. | |||
| 5.1.2. MAC Address Pseudonym | 5.1.2. MAC Address Pseudonym | |||
| For the protection of drivers' privacy, a pseudonym of a MAC address | For the protection of drivers' privacy, a pseudonym of a MAC address | |||
| of a vehicle's network interface should be used so that the MAC | of a vehicle's network interface should be used so that the MAC | |||
| address can be changed periodically. However, although such a | address can be changed periodically. However, although such a | |||
| skipping to change at line 1294 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1307 ¶ | |||
| with lazy maintenance and stretched peer-to-peer (P2P) routing in the | with lazy maintenance and stretched peer-to-peer (P2P) routing in the | |||
| so-called storing mode. It is well-designed to reduce the | so-called storing mode. It is well-designed to reduce the | |||
| topological knowledge and routing state that needs to be exchanged. | topological knowledge and routing state that needs to be exchanged. | |||
| As a result, the routing protocol overhead is minimized, which allows | As a result, the routing protocol overhead is minimized, which allows | |||
| either highly constrained stable networks or less constrained, highly | either highly constrained stable networks or less constrained, highly | |||
| dynamic networks. Refer to Appendix B for the detailed description | dynamic networks. Refer to Appendix B for the detailed description | |||
| of RPL for multihop V2X networking. | of RPL for multihop V2X networking. | |||
| An address registration extension for 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power | An address registration extension for 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power | |||
| Wireless Personal Area Network) in [RFC8505] can support light-weight | Wireless Personal Area Network) in [RFC8505] can support light-weight | |||
| mobility for nodes moving through different parents. [RFC8505], as | mobility for nodes moving through different parents. The extension | |||
| opposed to [RFC4861], is stateful and proactively installs the ND | described in [RFC8505] is stateful and proactively installs the ND | |||
| cache entries, which saves broadcasts and provides deterministic | cache entries; this saves broadcasts and provides deterministic | |||
| presence information for IPv6 addresses. Mainly it updates the | presence information for IPv6 addresses. Mainly, it updates the | |||
| Address Registration Option (ARO) of ND defined in [RFC6775] to | Address Registration Option (ARO) of ND defined in [RFC6775] to | |||
| include a status field that can indicate the movement of a node and | include a status field (which can indicate the movement of a node) | |||
| optionally a Transaction ID (TID) field, i.e., a sequence number that | and optionally a Transaction ID (TID) field (which is a sequence | |||
| can be used to determine the most recent location of a node. Thus, | number that can be used to determine the most recent location of a | |||
| RPL can use the information provided by the Extended ARO (EARO) | node). Thus, RPL can use the information provided by the Extended | |||
| defined in [RFC8505] to deal with a certain level of node mobility. | ARO (EARO) defined in [RFC8505] to deal with a certain level of node | |||
| When a leaf node moves to the coverage of another parent node, it | mobility. When a leaf node moves to the coverage of another parent | |||
| should de-register its addresses to the previous parent node and | node, it should de-register its addresses with the previous parent | |||
| register itself with a new parent node along with an incremented TID. | node and register itself with a new parent node along with an | |||
| incremented TID. | ||||
| RPL can be used in IPv6-based vehicular networks, but it is primarily | RPL can be used in IPv6-based vehicular networks, but it is primarily | |||
| designed for low-power networks, which puts energy efficiency first. | designed for low-power networks, which puts energy efficiency first. | |||
| For using it in IPv6-based vehicular networks, there have not been | For using it in IPv6-based vehicular networks, there have not been | |||
| actual experiences and practical implementations, though it was | actual experiences and practical implementations, though it was | |||
| tested in IoT Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) scenarios. Another | tested in IoT Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) scenarios. Another | |||
| concern is that RPL may generate excessive topology discovery | concern is that RPL may generate excessive topology discovery | |||
| messages in a highly moving environment, such as vehicular networks. | messages in a highly moving environment, such as vehicular networks. | |||
| This issue can be an operational or optimization point for a | This issue can be an operational or optimization point for a | |||
| practitioner. | practitioner. | |||
| skipping to change at line 1344 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1358 ¶ | |||
| with accurate location information in adverse environments, such as a | with accurate location information in adverse environments, such as a | |||
| building area or a tunnel. The location precision can be improved | building area or a tunnel. The location precision can be improved | |||
| with assistance of the IP-RSUs or a cellular system with a GNSS | with assistance of the IP-RSUs or a cellular system with a GNSS | |||
| receiver for location information. | receiver for location information. | |||
| With a GNSS navigator, efficient mobility management can be performed | With a GNSS navigator, efficient mobility management can be performed | |||
| with the help of vehicles periodically reporting their current | with the help of vehicles periodically reporting their current | |||
| position and trajectory (i.e., navigation path) to the vehicular | position and trajectory (i.e., navigation path) to the vehicular | |||
| infrastructure (having IP-RSUs and an MA in TCC). This vehicular | infrastructure (having IP-RSUs and an MA in TCC). This vehicular | |||
| infrastructure can predict the future positions of the vehicles from | infrastructure can predict the future positions of the vehicles from | |||
| their mobility information (i.e., the current position, speed, | their mobility information (e.g., the current position, speed, | |||
| direction, and trajectory) for efficient mobility management (e.g., | direction, and trajectory) for efficient mobility management (e.g., | |||
| proactive handover). For a better proactive handover, link-layer | proactive handover). For a better proactive handover, link-layer | |||
| parameters, such as the signal strength of a link-layer frame (e.g., | parameters, such as the signal strength of a link-layer frame (e.g., | |||
| Received Channel Power Indicator (RCPI) [VIP-WAVE]), can be used to | Received Channel Power Indicator (RCPI) [VIP-WAVE]), can be used to | |||
| determine the moment of a handover between IP-RSUs along with | determine the moment of a handover between IP-RSUs along with | |||
| mobility information. | mobility information. | |||
| By predicting a vehicle's mobility, the vehicular infrastructure | By predicting a vehicle's mobility, the vehicular infrastructure | |||
| needs to better support IP-RSUs to perform efficient SLAAC, data | needs to better support IP-RSUs to perform efficient SLAAC, data | |||
| forwarding, horizontal handover (i.e., handover in wireless links | forwarding, horizontal handover (i.e., handover in wireless links | |||
| skipping to change at line 1377 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1391 ¶ | |||
| subnets of multiple IP-RSUs share the same prefix, an efficient | subnets of multiple IP-RSUs share the same prefix, an efficient | |||
| vehicular-network-wide DAD is required. On the other hand, for a | vehicular-network-wide DAD is required. On the other hand, for a | |||
| mobility management scheme with a unique prefix per mobile node | mobility management scheme with a unique prefix per mobile node | |||
| (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213]), DAD is not required because the IPv6 | (e.g., PMIPv6 [RFC5213]), DAD is not required because the IPv6 | |||
| address of a vehicle's external wireless interface is guaranteed to | address of a vehicle's external wireless interface is guaranteed to | |||
| be unique. There is a trade-off between the prefix usage efficiency | be unique. There is a trade-off between the prefix usage efficiency | |||
| and DAD overhead. Thus, the IPv6 address autoconfiguration for | and DAD overhead. Thus, the IPv6 address autoconfiguration for | |||
| vehicular networks needs to consider this trade-off to support | vehicular networks needs to consider this trade-off to support | |||
| efficient mobility management. | efficient mobility management. | |||
| Even though the SLAAC with classic ND costs a DAD during mobility | Even though SLAAC with classic ND costs DAD overhead during mobility | |||
| management, the SLAAC with [RFC8505] and/or AERO/OMNI does not cost a | management, SLAAC with the registration extension specified in | |||
| DAD. SLAAC for vehicular networks needs to consider the minimization | [RFC8505] and/or with AERO/OMNI does not cost DAD overhead. SLAAC | |||
| of the cost of DAD with the help of an infrastructure node (e.g., IP- | for vehicular networks needs to consider the minimization of the cost | |||
| RSU and MA). Using an infrastructure prefix over VANET allows direct | of DAD with the help of an infrastructure node (e.g., IP-RSU and MA). | |||
| routability to the Internet through the multihop V2I toward an IP- | Using an infrastructure prefix over VANET allows direct routability | |||
| RSU. On the other hand, a BYOA does not allow such direct | to the Internet through the multihop V2I toward an IP-RSU. On the | |||
| routability to the Internet since the BYOA is not topologically | other hand, a BYOA does not allow such direct routability to the | |||
| correct, that is, not routable in the Internet. In addition, a | Internet since the BYOA is not topologically correct, that is, not | |||
| vehicle configured with a BYOA needs a tunnel home (e.g., IP-RSU) | routable in the Internet. In addition, a vehicle configured with a | |||
| connected to the Internet, and the vehicle needs to know which | BYOA needs a tunnel home (e.g., IP-RSU) connected to the Internet, | |||
| neighboring vehicle is reachable inside the VANET toward the tunnel | and the vehicle needs to know which neighboring vehicle is reachable | |||
| home. There is non-negligible control overhead to set up and | inside the VANET toward the tunnel home. There is non-negligible | |||
| maintain routes to such a tunnel home [RFC4888] over the VANET. | control overhead to set up and maintain routes to such a tunnel home | |||
| [RFC4888] over the VANET. | ||||
| For the case of a multihomed network, a vehicle can follow the first- | For the case of a multihomed network, a vehicle can follow the first- | |||
| hop router selection rule described in [RFC8028]. For example, an | hop router selection rule described in [RFC8028]. For example, an | |||
| IP-OBU inside a vehicle may connect to an IP-RSU that has multiple | IP-OBU inside a vehicle may connect to an IP-RSU that has multiple | |||
| routers behind. In this scenario, because the IP-OBU can have | routers behind. In this scenario, because the IP-OBU can have | |||
| multiple prefixes from those routers, the default router selection, | multiple prefixes from those routers, the default router selection, | |||
| source address selection, and packet redirect process should follow | source address selection, and packet redirect process should follow | |||
| the guidelines in [RFC8028]. That is, the vehicle should select its | the guidelines in [RFC8028]. That is, the vehicle should select its | |||
| default router for each prefix by preferring the router that | default router for each prefix by preferring the router that | |||
| advertised the prefix. | advertised the prefix. | |||
| skipping to change at line 1428 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1443 ¶ | |||
| 6. Security Considerations | 6. Security Considerations | |||
| This section discusses security and privacy for IPv6-based vehicular | This section discusses security and privacy for IPv6-based vehicular | |||
| networking. Security and privacy are paramount in V2I, V2V, and V2X | networking. Security and privacy are paramount in V2I, V2V, and V2X | |||
| networking along with neighbor discovery and mobility management. | networking along with neighbor discovery and mobility management. | |||
| Vehicles and infrastructure must be authenticated to each other by a | Vehicles and infrastructure must be authenticated to each other by a | |||
| password, a key, and/or a fingerprint in order to participate in | password, a key, and/or a fingerprint in order to participate in | |||
| vehicular networking. For the authentication in vehicular networks, | vehicular networking. For the authentication in vehicular networks, | |||
| the vehicular cloud needs to support a Public Key Infrastructure | the Vehicular Cloud needs to support a Public Key Infrastructure | |||
| (PKI) efficiently, as either a dedicated or a co-located component | (PKI) efficiently, as either a dedicated or a co-located component | |||
| inside a TCC. To provide safe interaction between vehicles or | inside a TCC. To provide safe interaction between vehicles or | |||
| between a vehicle and infrastructure, only authenticated nodes (i.e., | between a vehicle and infrastructure, only authenticated nodes (i.e., | |||
| vehicle and infrastructure nodes) can participate in vehicular | vehicle and infrastructure nodes) can participate in vehicular | |||
| networks. Also, in-vehicle devices (e.g., ECUs) and a driver/ | networks. Also, in-vehicle devices (e.g., ECUs) and a driver/ | |||
| passenger's mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablet PCs) in a | passenger's mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablet PCs) in a | |||
| vehicle need to securely communicate with other in-vehicle devices | vehicle need to securely communicate with other in-vehicle devices, | |||
| and another driver/passenger's mobile devices in another vehicle, or | another driver/passenger's mobile devices in another vehicle, or | |||
| other servers behind an IP-RSU. Even though a vehicle is perfectly | other servers behind an IP-RSU. Even though a vehicle is perfectly | |||
| authenticated by another entity and legitimate to use the data | authenticated by another entity and legitimate to use the data | |||
| generated by another vehicle, it may be hacked for running malicious | generated by another vehicle, it may be hacked by malicious | |||
| applications to track and collect its and other vehicles' | applications that track and collect its and other vehicles' | |||
| information. In this case, an attack mitigation process may be | information. In this case, an attack mitigation process may be | |||
| required to reduce the aftermath of malicious behaviors. Note that | required to reduce the aftermath of malicious behaviors. Note that | |||
| when driver/passenger's mobile devices are connected to a vehicle's | when a driver/passenger's mobile devices are connected to a vehicle's | |||
| internal network, the vehicle may be more vulnerable to possible | internal network, the vehicle may be more vulnerable to possible | |||
| attacks from external networks due to the exposure of its in-flight | attacks from external networks due to the exposure of its in-flight | |||
| traffic packets. [SEC-PRIV] discusses several types of threats for | traffic packets. [SEC-PRIV] discusses several types of threats for | |||
| Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP). | Vehicular Security and Privacy (VSP). | |||
| For secure V2I communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between | For secure V2I communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between | |||
| a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a fixed router (i.e., | a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a fixed router (i.e., | |||
| IP-RSU) in an EN needs to be established, as shown in Figure 2 | IP-RSU) in an EN needs to be established, as shown in Figure 2 | |||
| [RFC4301] [RFC4302] [RFC4303] [RFC4308] [RFC7296]. Also, for secure | [RFC4301] [RFC4302] [RFC4303] [RFC4308] [RFC7296]. Also, for secure | |||
| V2V communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between a mobile | V2V communication, a secure channel (e.g., IPsec) between a mobile | |||
| router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU) | router (i.e., IP-OBU) in a vehicle and a mobile router (i.e., IP-OBU) | |||
| in another vehicle needs to be established, as shown in Figure 3. | in another vehicle needs to be established, as shown in Figure 3. | |||
| For secure V2I/V2V communication, an element in a vehicle (e.g., an | For secure V2I/V2V communication, an element in a vehicle (e.g., an | |||
| in-vehicle device and a driver/passenger's mobile device) needs to | in-vehicle device and a driver/passenger's mobile device) needs to | |||
| establish a secure connection (e.g., TLS) with another element in | establish a secure connection (e.g., TLS) with another element in | |||
| another vehicle or another element in a vehicular cloud (e.g., a | another vehicle or another element in a Vehicular Cloud (e.g., a | |||
| server). Note that any key management approach can be used for the | server). Note that any key management approach can be used for the | |||
| secure communication, and particularly for IPv6-based vehicular | secure communication, and particularly for IPv6-based vehicular | |||
| networks, a new or enhanced key management approach resilient to | networks, a new or enhanced key management approach resilient to | |||
| wireless networks is required. | wireless networks is required. | |||
| IEEE Std 1609.2 [WAVE-1609.2] specifies security services for | IEEE Std 1609.2 [WAVE-1609.2] specifies security services for | |||
| applications and management messages, but this WAVE specification is | applications and management messages, but this WAVE specification is | |||
| optional. Thus, if the link layer does not support the security of a | optional. Thus, if the link layer does not support the security of a | |||
| WAVE frame, either the network layer or the transport layer needs to | WAVE frame, either the network layer or the transport layer needs to | |||
| support security services for the WAVE frames. | support security services for the WAVE frame. | |||
| 6.1. Security Threats in Neighbor Discovery | 6.1. Security Threats in Neighbor Discovery | |||
| For the classical IPv6 ND (i.e., the legacy ND), DAD is required to | For the classical IPv6 ND (i.e., the legacy ND), DAD is required to | |||
| ensure the uniqueness of the IPv6 address of a vehicle's wireless | ensure the uniqueness of the IPv6 address of a vehicle's wireless | |||
| interface. This DAD can be used as a flooding attack that uses the | interface. This DAD can be used as a flooding attack that uses the | |||
| DAD-related ND packets disseminated over the VANET or vehicular | DAD-related ND packets disseminated over the VANET or vehicular | |||
| networks. [RFC6959] introduces threats enabled by IP source address | networks. [RFC6959] introduces threats enabled by IP source address | |||
| spoofing. This possibility indicates that vehicles and IP-RSUs need | spoofing. This possibility indicates that vehicles and IP-RSUs need | |||
| to filter out suspicious ND traffic in advance. [RFC8928] introduces | to filter out suspicious ND traffic in advance. [RFC8928] introduces | |||
| skipping to change at line 1497 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1512 ¶ | |||
| the true owner of a received ND message, which requires using the CGA | the true owner of a received ND message, which requires using the CGA | |||
| ND option in the ND protocol. This CGA can protect vehicles against | ND option in the ND protocol. This CGA can protect vehicles against | |||
| DAD flooding by DAD filtering based on the verification for the true | DAD flooding by DAD filtering based on the verification for the true | |||
| owner of the received DAD message. For a general protection of the | owner of the received DAD message. For a general protection of the | |||
| ND mechanism, the RSA Signature ND option can also be used to protect | ND mechanism, the RSA Signature ND option can also be used to protect | |||
| the integrity of the messages by public key signatures. For a more | the integrity of the messages by public key signatures. For a more | |||
| advanced authentication mechanism, a distributed blockchain-based | advanced authentication mechanism, a distributed blockchain-based | |||
| approach [Vehicular-BlockChain] can be used. However, for a scenario | approach [Vehicular-BlockChain] can be used. However, for a scenario | |||
| where a trustable router or an authentication path cannot be | where a trustable router or an authentication path cannot be | |||
| obtained, it is desirable to find a solution in which vehicles and | obtained, it is desirable to find a solution in which vehicles and | |||
| infrastructures can authenticate each other without any support from | infrastructure nodes can authenticate each other without any support | |||
| a third party. | from a third party. | |||
| When applying the classical IPv6 ND process to VANET, one of the | When applying the classical IPv6 ND process to VANET, one of the | |||
| security issues is that an IP-RSU (or an IP-OBU) as a router may | security issues is that an IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) as a router may receive | |||
| receive deliberate or accidental DoS attacks from network scans that | deliberate or accidental DoS attacks from network scans that probe | |||
| probe devices on a VANET. In this scenario, the IP-RSU can be | devices on a VANET. In this scenario, the IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) can be | |||
| overwhelmed by processing the network scan requests so that the | overwhelmed by processing the network scan requests so that the | |||
| capacity and resources of the IP-RSU are exhausted, causing the | capacity and resources of the IP-RSU (or IP-OBU) are exhausted, | |||
| failure of receiving normal ND messages from other hosts for network | causing the failure of receiving normal ND messages from other hosts | |||
| address resolution. [RFC6583] describes more about the operational | for network address resolution. [RFC6583] describes more about the | |||
| problems in the classical IPv6 ND mechanism that can be vulnerable to | operational problems in the classical IPv6 ND mechanism that can be | |||
| deliberate or accidental DoS attacks and suggests several | vulnerable to deliberate or accidental DoS attacks and suggests | |||
| implementation guidelines and operational mitigation techniques for | several implementation guidelines and operational mitigation | |||
| those problems. Nevertheless, for running IPv6 ND in VANET, those | techniques for those problems. Nevertheless, for running IPv6 ND in | |||
| issues can be more acute since the movements of vehicles can be so | VANET, those issues can be acuter since the movements of vehicles can | |||
| diverse that there is a wider opportunity for rogue behaviors, and | be so diverse that there is a wider opportunity for rogue behaviors, | |||
| the failure of networking among vehicles may lead to grave | and the failure of networking among vehicles may lead to grave | |||
| consequences. | consequences. | |||
| Strong security measures shall protect vehicles roaming in road | Strong security measures shall protect vehicles roaming in road | |||
| networks from the attacks of malicious nodes that are controlled by | networks from the attacks of malicious nodes that are controlled by | |||
| hackers. For safe driving applications (e.g., context-aware | hackers. For safe driving applications (e.g., context-aware | |||
| navigation, cooperative adaptive cruise control, and platooning), as | navigation, cooperative adaptive cruise control, and platooning), as | |||
| explained in Section 3.1, the cooperative action among vehicles is | explained in Section 3.1, the cooperative action among vehicles is | |||
| assumed. Malicious nodes may disseminate wrong driving information | assumed. Malicious nodes may disseminate wrong driving information | |||
| (e.g., location, speed, and direction) for disturbing safe driving. | (e.g., location, speed, and direction) for disturbing safe driving. | |||
| For example, a Sybil attack, which tries to confuse a vehicle with | For example, a Sybil attack, which tries to confuse a vehicle with | |||
| multiple false identities, may disturb a vehicle from taking a safe | multiple false identities, may disturb a vehicle from taking a safe | |||
| maneuver. Since cybersecurity issues in vehicular networks may cause | maneuver. Since cybersecurity issues in vehicular networks may cause | |||
| physical vehicle safety issues, it may be necessary to consider those | physical vehicle safety issues, it may be necessary to consider those | |||
| physical security concerns when designing protocols in IPWAVE. | physical safety concerns when designing protocols in IPWAVE. | |||
| To identify malicious vehicles among vehicles, an authentication | To identify malicious vehicles among vehicles, an authentication | |||
| method may be required. A Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) (or a | method may be required. A Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) (or a | |||
| vehicle manufacturer certificate) and a user certificate (e.g., X.509 | vehicle manufacturer certificate) and a user certificate (e.g., X.509 | |||
| certificate [RFC5280]) along with an in-vehicle device's identifier | certificate [RFC5280]) along with an in-vehicle device's identifier | |||
| generation can be used to efficiently authenticate a vehicle or its | generation can be used to efficiently authenticate a vehicle or its | |||
| driver (having a user certificate) through a road infrastructure node | driver (having a user certificate) through a road infrastructure node | |||
| (e.g., IP-RSU) connected to an authentication server in the vehicular | (e.g., IP-RSU) connected to an authentication server in the Vehicular | |||
| cloud. This authentication can be used to identify the vehicle that | Cloud. This authentication can be used to identify the vehicle that | |||
| will communicate with an infrastructure node or another vehicle. In | will communicate with an infrastructure node or another vehicle. In | |||
| the case where a vehicle has an internal network (called a moving | the case where a vehicle has an internal network (called a mobile | |||
| network) and elements in the network (e.g., in-vehicle devices and a | network) and elements in the network (e.g., in-vehicle devices and a | |||
| user's mobile devices), as shown in Figure 2, the elements in the | user's mobile devices), as shown in Figure 2, the elements in the | |||
| network need to be authenticated individually for safe | network need to be authenticated individually for safe | |||
| authentication. Also, Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates | authentication. Also, Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates | |||
| [RFC8446] [RFC5280] can be used for an element's authentication to | [RFC8446] [RFC5280] can be used for an element's authentication to | |||
| allow secure E2E vehicular communications between an element in a | allow secure E2E vehicular communications between an element in a | |||
| vehicle and another element in a server in a vehicular cloud or | vehicle and another element in a server in a Vehicular Cloud or | |||
| between an element in a vehicle and another element in another | between an element in a vehicle and another element in another | |||
| vehicle. | vehicle. | |||
| 6.2. Security Threats in Mobility Management | 6.2. Security Threats in Mobility Management | |||
| For mobility management, a malicious vehicle can construct multiple | For mobility management, a malicious vehicle can construct multiple | |||
| virtual bogus vehicles and register them with IP-RSUs and MA. This | virtual bogus vehicles and register them with IP-RSUs and MAs. This | |||
| registration makes the IP-RSUs and MA waste their resources. The IP- | registration makes the IP-RSUs and MAs waste their resources. The | |||
| RSUs and MA need to determine whether a vehicle is genuine or bogus | IP-RSUs and MAs need to determine whether a vehicle is genuine or | |||
| in mobility management. Also, the confidentiality of control packets | bogus in mobility management. Also, for the confidentiality of | |||
| and data packets among IP-RSUs and MA, the E2E paths (e.g., tunnels) | control packets and data packets between IP-RSUs and MAs, the E2E | |||
| needs to be protected by secure communication channels. In addition, | paths (e.g., tunnels) need to be protected by secure communication | |||
| to prevent bogus IP-RSUs and MA from interfering with the IPv6 | channels. In addition, to prevent bogus IP-RSUs and MAs from | |||
| mobility of vehicles, mutual authentication among them needs to be | interfering with the IPv6 mobility of vehicles, mutual authentication | |||
| performed by certificates (e.g., TLS certificate). | among the IP-RSUs, MAs, and vehicles needs to be performed by | |||
| certificates (e.g., TLS certificate). | ||||
| 6.3. Other Threats | 6.3. Other Threats | |||
| For the setup of a secure channel over IPsec or TLS, the multihop V2I | For the setup of a secure channel over IPsec or TLS, the multihop V2I | |||
| communications over DSRC or 5G V2X (or LTE V2X) is required on a | communications over DSRC or 5G V2X (or LTE V2X) is required on a | |||
| highway. In this case, multiple intermediate vehicles as relay nodes | highway. In this case, multiple intermediate vehicles as relay nodes | |||
| can help to forward association and authentication messages toward an | can help to forward association and authentication messages toward an | |||
| IP-RSU (gNodeB or eNodeB) connected to an authentication server in | IP-RSU (or gNodeB/eNodeB) connected to an authentication server in | |||
| the vehicular cloud. In this kind of process, the authentication | the Vehicular Cloud. In this kind of process, the authentication | |||
| messages forwarded by each vehicle can be delayed or lost, which may | messages forwarded by each vehicle can be delayed or lost, which may | |||
| increase the construction time of a connection or cause some vehicles | increase the construction time of a connection or cause some vehicles | |||
| to not be able to be authenticated. | to not be able to be authenticated. | |||
| Even though vehicles can be authenticated with valid certificates by | Even though vehicles can be authenticated with valid certificates by | |||
| an authentication server in the vehicular cloud, the authenticated | an authentication server in the Vehicular Cloud, the authenticated | |||
| vehicles may harm other vehicles. To deal with this kind of security | vehicles may harm other vehicles. To deal with this kind of security | |||
| issue, for monitoring suspicious behaviors, vehicles' communication | issue, for monitoring suspicious behaviors, vehicles' communication | |||
| activities can be recorded in either a centralized approach through a | activities can be recorded in either a centralized approach through a | |||
| logging server (e.g., TCC) in the vehicular cloud or a decentralized | logging server (e.g., TCC) in the Vehicular Cloud or a decentralized | |||
| approach (e.g., an edge computing device and blockchain [Bitcoin]) by | approach (e.g., an ECD and blockchain [Bitcoin]) by the help of other | |||
| the help of other vehicles and infrastructure. | vehicles and infrastructure. | |||
| There are trade-offs between centralized and decentralized approaches | There are trade-offs between centralized and decentralized approaches | |||
| in logging of vehicles' behaviors (e.g., location, speed, direction, | in logging of vehicles' behaviors (e.g., location, speed, direction, | |||
| acceleration, deceleration, and lane change) and communication | acceleration/deceleration, and lane change) and communication | |||
| activities (e.g., transmission time, reception time, and packet | activities (e.g., transmission time, reception time, and packet | |||
| types, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, QUIC, HTTP, and HTTPS). A centralized | types, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, QUIC, HTTP, and HTTPS). A centralized | |||
| approach is more efficient than a decentralized approach in terms of | approach is more efficient than a decentralized approach in terms of | |||
| logging data collection and processing in a central server in the | log data collection and processing in a central server in the | |||
| vehicular cloud. However, the centralized approach may cause a | Vehicular Cloud. However, the centralized approach may cause a | |||
| higher delay than a decentralized approach in terms of the analysis | higher delay than a decentralized approach in terms of the analysis | |||
| of the logging data and counteraction in a local edge computing | of the log data and counteraction in a local ECD or a distributed | |||
| device or a distributed database like a blockchain. The centralized | database like a blockchain. The centralized approach stores log data | |||
| approach stores logging data collected from VANET into a remote | collected from VANET into a remote logging server in a Vehicular | |||
| logging server in a vehicular cloud as a central cloud, so it takes | Cloud as a central cloud, so it takes time to deliver the log data to | |||
| time to deliver the logging data to a remote logging server. On the | a remote logging server. On the other hand, the decentralized | |||
| other hand, the decentralized approach stores the logging data into a | approach stores the log data into a nearby edge computing device as a | |||
| nearby edge computing device as a local logging server or a nearby | local logging server or a nearby blockchain node, which participates | |||
| blockchain node, which participates in a blockchain network. On the | in a blockchain network. On the stored log data, an analyzer needs | |||
| stored logging data, an analyzer needs to perform a machine learning | to perform a machine learning technique (e.g., deep learning) and | |||
| technique (e.g., deep learning) and seek suspicious behaviors of the | seek suspicious behaviors of the vehicles. If such an analyzer is | |||
| vehicles. If such an analyzer is located either within or near the | located either within or near the edge computing device, it can | |||
| edge computing device, it can access the logging data with a short | access the log data with a short delay, analyze it quickly, and | |||
| delay, analyze it quickly, and generate feedback to allow for a quick | generate feedback to allow for a quick counteraction against such | |||
| counteraction against such malicious behaviors. On the other hand, | malicious behaviors. On the other hand, if the Vehicular Cloud with | |||
| if the vehicular cloud with the logging data is far away from a | the log data is far away from a problematic VANET with malicious | |||
| problematic VANET with malicious behaviors, the centralized approach | behaviors, the centralized approach takes a longer time with the | |||
| takes a longer time with the analysis of the logging data and the | analysis of the log data and the decision-making on malicious | |||
| decision-making on malicious behaviors than the decentralized | behaviors than the decentralized approach. If the log data is | |||
| approach. If the logging data is encrypted by a secret key, it can | encrypted by a secret key, it can be protected from the observation | |||
| be protected from the observation of a hacker. The secret key | of a hacker. The secret key sharing among legal vehicles, ECDs, and | |||
| sharing among legal vehicles, edge computing devices, and vehicular | Vehicular Clouds should be supported efficiently. | |||
| clouds should be supported efficiently. | ||||
| Logging information can release privacy breakage of a vehicle. The | Log data can release privacy breakage of a vehicle. The log data can | |||
| logging information can contain the MAC address and IPv6 address for | contain the MAC address and IPv6 address for a vehicle's wireless | |||
| a vehicle's wireless network interface. If the unique MAC address of | network interface. If the unique MAC address of the wireless network | |||
| the wireless network interface is used, a hacker can track the | interface is used, a hacker can track the vehicle with that MAC | |||
| vehicle with that MAC address and can track the privacy information | address and can track the privacy information of the vehicle's driver | |||
| of the vehicle's driver (e.g., location information). To prevent | (e.g., location information). To prevent this privacy breakage, a | |||
| this privacy breakage, a MAC address pseudonym can be used for the | MAC address pseudonym can be used for the MAC address of the wireless | |||
| MAC address of the wireless network interface, and the corresponding | network interface, and the corresponding IPv6 address should be based | |||
| IPv6 address should be based on such a MAC address pseudonym. By | on such a MAC address pseudonym. By solving a privacy issue of a | |||
| solving a privacy issue of a vehicle's identity in logging, vehicles | vehicle's identity in logging, vehicles may observe each other's | |||
| may observe each other's activities to identify any misbehavior | activities to identify any misbehaviors without privacy breakage. | |||
| without privacy breakage. Once identifying a misbehavior, a vehicle | Once identifying a misbehavior, a vehicle shall have a way to either | |||
| shall have a way to either isolate itself from others or isolate a | isolate itself from others or isolate a suspicious vehicle by | |||
| suspicious vehicle by informing other vehicles. | informing other vehicles. | |||
| For completely secure vehicular networks, we shall embrace the | For completely secure vehicular networks, we shall embrace the | |||
| concept of "zero-trust" for vehicles where no vehicle is trustable | concept of "zero-trust" for vehicles where no vehicle is trustable | |||
| and verifying every message (such as IPv6 control messages including | and verifying every message (such as IPv6 control messages including | |||
| ND, DAD, NUD, and application-layer messages) is necessary. In this | ND, DAD, NUD, and application-layer messages) is necessary. In this | |||
| way, vehicular networks can defend against many possible | way, vehicular networks can defend against many possible | |||
| cyberattacks. Thus, we need to have an efficient zero-trust | cyberattacks. Thus, we need to have an efficient zero-trust | |||
| framework or mechanism for vehicular networks. | framework or mechanism for vehicular networks. | |||
| For the non-repudiation of the harmful activities from malicious | For the non-repudiation of the harmful activities from malicious | |||
| skipping to change at line 1672 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1687 ¶ | |||
| interrupt the E2E communications between two vehicles (or between a | interrupt the E2E communications between two vehicles (or between a | |||
| vehicle and an IP-RSU) for a long-living transport-layer session. | vehicle and an IP-RSU) for a long-living transport-layer session. | |||
| However, if this pseudonym is performed without strong E2E | However, if this pseudonym is performed without strong E2E | |||
| confidentiality (using either IPsec or TLS), there will be no privacy | confidentiality (using either IPsec or TLS), there will be no privacy | |||
| benefit from changing MAC and IPv6 addresses because an adversary can | benefit from changing MAC and IPv6 addresses because an adversary can | |||
| observe the change of the MAC and IPv6 addresses and track the | observe the change of the MAC and IPv6 addresses and track the | |||
| vehicle with those addresses. Thus, the MAC address pseudonym and | vehicle with those addresses. Thus, the MAC address pseudonym and | |||
| the IPv6 address update should be performed with strong E2E | the IPv6 address update should be performed with strong E2E | |||
| confidentiality. | confidentiality. | |||
| The privacy exposure to the TCC and via V2I is mostly about the | The privacy exposure to the TCC via V2I is mostly about the location | |||
| location information of vehicles and may also include other in- | information of vehicles and may also include other in-vehicle | |||
| vehicle activities, such as transactions of credit cards. The | activities, such as transactions of credit cards. The assumed, | |||
| assumed, trusted actors are the owner of a vehicle, an authorized | trusted actors are the owner of a vehicle, an authorized vehicle | |||
| vehicle service provider (e.g., navigation service provider), and an | service provider (e.g., navigation service provider), and an | |||
| authorized vehicle manufacturer for providing after-sales services. | authorized vehicle manufacturer for providing after-sales services. | |||
| In addition, privacy concerns for excessively collecting vehicle | In addition, privacy concerns for excessively collecting vehicle | |||
| activities from roadway operators, such as public transportation | activities from roadway operators, such as public transportation | |||
| administrators and private contractors, may also pose threats on | administrators and private contractors, may also pose threats on | |||
| violating privacy rights of vehicles. It might be interesting to | violating privacy rights of vehicles. It might be interesting to | |||
| find a solution from a technological point of view along with public | find a solution from a technological point of view along with public | |||
| policy development for the issue. | policy development for the issue. | |||
| The "multicasting" of the location information of a VRU's smartphone | The "multicasting" of the location information of a VRU's smartphone | |||
| means IPv6 multicasting. There is a possible security attack related | means IPv6 multicasting. There is a possible security attack related | |||
| to this multicasting. Attackers can use "fake identifiers" as source | to this multicasting. Attackers can use "fake identifiers" as source | |||
| IPv6 addresses of their devices to generate IPv6 packets and | IPv6 addresses of their devices to generate IPv6 packets and | |||
| multicast them to nearby vehicles in order to cause confusion that | multicast them to nearby vehicles in order to cause confusion that | |||
| those vehicles are surrounded by other vehicles or pedestrians. As a | those vehicles are surrounded by other vehicles or pedestrians. As a | |||
| result, navigation services (e.g., Google Maps [Google-Maps] and Waze | result, navigation services (e.g., Google Maps [Google-Maps] and Waze | |||
| [Waze]) can be confused with fake road traffic by those vehicles or | [Waze]) can be confused with fake road traffic by those vehicles or | |||
| smartphones with "fake identifiers" [Fake-Identifier-Attack]. This | smartphones with "fake identifiers" [Fake-Identifier-Attack]. This | |||
| attack with "fake identifiers" should be detected and handled by | attack with "fake identifiers" should be detected and handled by | |||
| vehicular networks. To cope with this attack, both legal vehicles | vehicular networks. To cope with this attack, both legal vehicles | |||
| and legal VRUs' smartphones can be registered with a traffic control | and legal VRUs' smartphones can be registered with a TCC and their | |||
| center (called TCC) and their locations can be tracked by the TCC. | locations can be tracked by the TCC. With this tracking, the TCC can | |||
| With this tracking, the TCC can tell the road traffic conditions | tell the road traffic conditions caused by those vehicles and | |||
| caused by those vehicles and smartphones. In addition, to prevent | smartphones. In addition, to prevent hackers from tracking the | |||
| hackers from tracking the locations of those vehicles and | locations of those vehicles and smartphones, either a MAC address | |||
| smartphones, either a MAC address pseudonym [MAC-ADD-RAN] or secure | pseudonym [MAC-ADD-RAN] or secure IPv6 address generation [RFC7721] | |||
| IPv6 address generation [RFC7721] can be used to protect the privacy | can be used to protect the privacy of those vehicles and smartphones. | |||
| of those vehicles and smartphones. | ||||
| 7. IANA Considerations | 7. IANA Considerations | |||
| This document has no IANA actions. | This document has no IANA actions. | |||
| 8. References | 8. References | |||
| 8.1. Normative References | 8.1. Normative References | |||
| [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, | [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, | |||
| skipping to change at line 1735 ¶ | skipping to change at line 1749 ¶ | |||
| 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6275>. | 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6275>. | |||
| [RFC8691] Benamar, N., Härri, J., Lee, J., and T. Ernst, "Basic | [RFC8691] Benamar, N., Härri, J., Lee, J., and T. Ernst, "Basic | |||
| Support for IPv6 Networks Operating Outside the Context of | Support for IPv6 Networks Operating Outside the Context of | |||
| a Basic Service Set over IEEE Std 802.11", RFC 8691, | a Basic Service Set over IEEE Std 802.11", RFC 8691, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC8691, December 2019, | DOI 10.17487/RFC8691, December 2019, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8691>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8691>. | |||
| 8.2. Informative References | 8.2. Informative References | |||
| [AERO] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Automatic Extended Route | ||||
| Optimization (AERO)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, | ||||
| draft-templin-intarea-aero-11, 10 January 2023, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-templin- | ||||
| intarea-aero-11>. | ||||
| [Automotive-Sensing] | ||||
| Choi, J., Va, V., Gonzalez-Prelcic, N., Daniels, R., Bhat, | ||||
| C., and R. Heath, "Millimeter-Wave Vehicular Communication | ||||
| to Support Massive Automotive Sensing", IEEE | ||||
| Communications Magazine, Volume 54, Issue 12, pp. 160-167, | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM, December 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM>. | ||||
| [Bitcoin] Nakamoto, S., "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash | ||||
| System", <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>. | ||||
| [CA-Cruise-Control] | ||||
| California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology | ||||
| (PATH), "Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control", | ||||
| <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and- | ||||
| automated-vehicles/cooperative-adaptive-cruise-control>. | ||||
| [CASD] Shen, Y., Jeong, J., Oh, T., and S. H. Son, "CASD: A | ||||
| Framework of Context-Awareness Safety Driving in Vehicular | ||||
| Networks", 30th International Conference on Advanced | ||||
| Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA), | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/WAINA.2016.74, March 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/WAINA.2016.74>. | ||||
| [CBDN] Kim, J., Kim, S., Jeong, J., Kim, H., Park, J., and T. | ||||
| Kim, "CBDN: Cloud-Based Drone Navigation for Efficient | ||||
| Battery Charging in Drone Networks", IEEE Transactions on | ||||
| Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume 20, Issue 11, | ||||
| pp. 4174-4191, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058, November | ||||
| 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058>. | ||||
| [CNP] Mugabarigira, B., Shen, Y., Jeong, J., Oh, T., and H. | ||||
| Jeong, "Context-Aware Navigation Protocol for Safe Driving | ||||
| in Vehicular Cyber-Physical Systems", IEEE Transactions on | ||||
| Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume 24, Issue 1, | ||||
| pp. 128-138, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2022.3210753, January 2023, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2022.3210753>. | ||||
| [DFC] Jeong, J., Shen, Y., Kim, S., Choe, D., Lee, K., and Y. | ||||
| Kim, "DFC: Device-free human counting through WiFi fine- | ||||
| grained subcarrier information", IET Communications, | ||||
| Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 337-350, DOI 10.1049/cmu2.12043, | ||||
| February 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1049/cmu2.12043>. | ||||
| [DSRC] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for | ||||
| Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between | ||||
| Roadside and Vehicle Systems - 5 GHz Band Dedicated Short | ||||
| Range Communications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC) | ||||
| and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", | ||||
| ASTM E2213-03(2010), DOI 10.1520/E2213-03R10, September | ||||
| 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1520/E2213-03R10>. | ||||
| [EU-2008-671-EC] | ||||
| European Union, "COMMISSION DECISION of 5 August 2008 on | ||||
| the harmonised use of radio spectrum in the 5 875-5 905 | ||||
| MHz frequency band for safety-related applications of | ||||
| Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)", EU 2008/671/EC, | ||||
| August 2008, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- | ||||
| content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008D0671&rid=7>. | ||||
| [Fake-Identifier-Attack] | ||||
| ABC News, "Berlin artist uses handcart full of smartphones | ||||
| to trick Google Maps' traffic algorithm into thinking | ||||
| there is traffic jam", February 2020, | ||||
| <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-04/man-creates-fake- | ||||
| traffic-jam-on-google-maps-by-carting-99-phones/11929136>. | ||||
| [FCC-ITS-Modification] | ||||
| Federal Communications Commission, "FCC Modernizes 5.9 GHz | ||||
| Band to Improve Wi-Fi and Automotive Safety", November | ||||
| 2020, <https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-modernizes-59-ghz- | ||||
| band-improve-wi-fi-and-automotive-safety-0>. | ||||
| [FirstNet] FirstNet Authority, "First Responder Network Authority | | ||||
| FirstNet", <https://www.firstnet.gov/>. | ||||
| [FirstNet-Report] | ||||
| FirstNet, "FY 2017: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Advancing | ||||
| Public Safety Broadband Communications", FirstNet FY 2017, | ||||
| December 2017, <https://www.firstnet.gov/system/tdf/ | ||||
| FirstNet-Annual-Report- | ||||
| FY2017.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=449>. | ||||
| [FPC-DMM] Matsushima, S., Bertz, L., Liebsch, M., Gundavelli, S., | ||||
| Moses, D., and C. E. Perkins, "Protocol for Forwarding | ||||
| Policy Configuration (FPC) in DMM", Work in Progress, | ||||
| Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmm-fpc-cpdp-14, 22 September | ||||
| 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf- | ||||
| dmm-fpc-cpdp-14>. | ||||
| [Fuel-Efficient] | ||||
| van de Hoef, S., Johansson, K., and D. Dimarogonas, "Fuel- | ||||
| Efficient En Route Formation of Truck Platoons", IEEE | ||||
| Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume | ||||
| 19, Issue 1, pp. 102-112, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021, | ||||
| January 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021>. | ||||
| [Google-Maps] | ||||
| Google, "Google Maps", <https://www.google.com/maps/>. | ||||
| [Identity-Management] | ||||
| Wetterwald, M., Hrizi, F., and P. Cataldi, "Cross-layer | ||||
| identities management in ITS stations", 10th IEEE | ||||
| International Conference on ITS Telecommunications, | ||||
| November 2010, | ||||
| <https://www.eurecom.fr/fr/publication/3205>. | ||||
| [IEEE-802.11-OCB] | ||||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology - | ||||
| Telecommunications and information exchange between | ||||
| systems Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific | ||||
| requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control | ||||
| (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995, IEEE Std 802.11-2016, | ||||
| December 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995>. | ||||
| [IEEE-802.11p] | ||||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology-- Local | ||||
| and metropolitan area networks-- Specific requirements-- | ||||
| Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and | ||||
| Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 6: Wireless | ||||
| Access in Vehicular Environments", | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475, IEEE Std 802.11p-2010, | ||||
| July 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475>. | ||||
| [In-Car-Network] | ||||
| Lim, H., Volker, L., and D. Herrscher, "Challenges in a | ||||
| future IP/Ethernet-based in-car network for real-time | ||||
| applications", Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation | ||||
| Conference, pp. 7-12, DOI 10.1145/2024724.2024727, June | ||||
| 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2024724.2024727>. | ||||
| [IPPL] Nordmark, E., "IP over Intentionally Partially Partitioned | ||||
| Links", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- | ||||
| intarea-ippl-00, 30 March 2017, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea- | ||||
| ippl-00>. | ||||
| [ISO-ITS-IPv6] | ||||
| ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems - | ||||
| Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6 | ||||
| Networking", ISO 21210:2012, June 2012, | ||||
| <https://www.iso.org/standard/46549.html>. | ||||
| [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1] | ||||
| ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems - | ||||
| Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6 | ||||
| Networking - Amendment 1", ISO 21210:2012/AMD 1:2017, | ||||
| September 2017, <https://www.iso.org/standard/65691.html>. | ||||
| [LIFS] Wang, J., Xiong, J., Jiang, H., Jamieson, K., Chen, X., | ||||
| Fang, D., and C. Wang, "Low Human-Effort, Device-Free | ||||
| Localization with Fine-Grained Subcarrier Information", | ||||
| IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, Volume 17, Issue | ||||
| 11, pp. 2550-2563, DOI 10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746, November | ||||
| 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746>. | ||||
| [MAC-ADD-RAN] | ||||
| Zúñiga, J. C., Bernardos, CJ., Ed., and A. Andersdotter, | ||||
| "MAC address randomization", Work in Progress, Internet- | ||||
| Draft, draft-ietf-madinas-mac-address-randomization-04, 22 | ||||
| October 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | ||||
| draft-ietf-madinas-mac-address-randomization-04>. | ||||
| [NHTSA-ACAS-Report] | ||||
| National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), | ||||
| "Automotive Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) Program | ||||
| Final Report", DOT HS 809 080, August 2000, | ||||
| <https://one.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/pub/ACAS/ | ||||
| ACAS_index.htm>. | ||||
| [OMNI] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Transmission of IP Packets over | ||||
| Overlay Multilink Network (OMNI) Interfaces", Work in | ||||
| Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-omni-25, | ||||
| 15 February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | ||||
| draft-templin-intarea-omni-25>. | ||||
| [PARCELS] Templin, F. L., Ed., "IP Parcels", Work in Progress, | ||||
| Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-parcels-51, 15 | ||||
| February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | ||||
| draft-templin-intarea-parcels-51>. | ||||
| [PSCE] European Commission, "PSCEurope Public Safety | ||||
| Communications Europe", <https://www.psc-europe.eu/>. | ||||
| [RCM-USE-CASES] | ||||
| Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing MAC Address | ||||
| Use Cases", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- | ||||
| madinas-use-cases-03, 6 October 2022, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas- | ||||
| use-cases-03>. | ||||
| [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast | [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast | |||
| Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, | Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, | DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>. | |||
| [RFC3626] Clausen, T., Ed. and P. Jacquet, Ed., "Optimized Link | [RFC3626] Clausen, T., Ed. and P. Jacquet, Ed., "Optimized Link | |||
| State Routing Protocol (OLSR)", RFC 3626, | State Routing Protocol (OLSR)", RFC 3626, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC3626, October 2003, | DOI 10.17487/RFC3626, October 2003, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3626>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3626>. | |||
| skipping to change at line 1885 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2098 ¶ | |||
| [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. | [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. | |||
| Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 | Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 | |||
| (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October | (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October | |||
| 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. | 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. | |||
| [RFC7333] Chan, H., Ed., Liu, D., Seite, P., Yokota, H., and J. | [RFC7333] Chan, H., Ed., Liu, D., Seite, P., Yokota, H., and J. | |||
| Korhonen, "Requirements for Distributed Mobility | Korhonen, "Requirements for Distributed Mobility | |||
| Management", RFC 7333, DOI 10.17487/RFC7333, August 2014, | Management", RFC 7333, DOI 10.17487/RFC7333, August 2014, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7333>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7333>. | |||
| [RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in | ||||
| the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427, | ||||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7427>. | ||||
| [RFC7429] Liu, D., Ed., Zuniga, JC., Ed., Seite, P., Chan, H., and | [RFC7429] Liu, D., Ed., Zuniga, JC., Ed., Seite, P., Chan, H., and | |||
| CJ. Bernardos, "Distributed Mobility Management: Current | CJ. Bernardos, "Distributed Mobility Management: Current | |||
| Practices and Gap Analysis", RFC 7429, | Practices and Gap Analysis", RFC 7429, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC7429, January 2015, | DOI 10.17487/RFC7429, January 2015, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7429>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7429>. | |||
| [RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in | ||||
| the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427, | ||||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7427>. | ||||
| [RFC7466] Dearlove, C. and T. Clausen, "An Optimization for the | [RFC7466] Dearlove, C. and T. Clausen, "An Optimization for the | |||
| Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery | Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery | |||
| Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 7466, DOI 10.17487/RFC7466, March | Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 7466, DOI 10.17487/RFC7466, March | |||
| 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7466>. | 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7466>. | |||
| [RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy | [RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy | |||
| Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", | Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", | |||
| RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016, | RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>. | |||
| skipping to change at line 1971 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2184 ¶ | |||
| "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address | "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address | |||
| Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981, | Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021, | DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>. | |||
| [RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based | [RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based | |||
| Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, | Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, | DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>. | |||
| [RFC9099] Vyncke, É., Chittimaneni, K., Kaeo, M., and E. Rey, | ||||
| "Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks", | ||||
| RFC 9099, DOI 10.17487/RFC9099, August 2021, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9099>. | ||||
| [RFC9119] Perkins, C., McBride, M., Stanley, D., Kumari, W., and JC. | [RFC9119] Perkins, C., McBride, M., Stanley, D., Kumari, W., and JC. | |||
| Zúñiga, "Multicast Considerations over IEEE 802 Wireless | Zúñiga, "Multicast Considerations over IEEE 802 Wireless | |||
| Media", RFC 9119, DOI 10.17487/RFC9119, October 2021, | Media", RFC 9119, DOI 10.17487/RFC9119, October 2021, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9119>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9119>. | |||
| [IPPL] Nordmark, E., "IP over Intentionally Partially Partitioned | ||||
| Links", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- | ||||
| intarea-ippl-00, 30 March 2017, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea- | ||||
| ippl-00>. | ||||
| [RFC9300] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., Lewis, D., and A. | [RFC9300] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., Lewis, D., and A. | |||
| Cabellos, Ed., "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol | Cabellos, Ed., "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol | |||
| (LISP)", RFC 9300, DOI 10.17487/RFC9300, October 2022, | (LISP)", RFC 9300, DOI 10.17487/RFC9300, October 2022, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9300>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9300>. | |||
| [AERO] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Automatic Extended Route | [SAINT] Jeong, J., Jeong, H., Lee, E., Oh, T., and D. H. C. Du, | |||
| Optimization (AERO)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, | "SAINT: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation Tool for | |||
| draft-templin-intarea-aero-11, 10 January 2023, | Cloud-Based Vehicular Traffic Optimization", IEEE | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-templin- | Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Volume 65, Issue 6, | |||
| intarea-aero-11>. | pp. 4053-4067, DOI 10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958, June 2016, | |||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958>. | ||||
| [OMNI] Templin, F. L., Ed., "Transmission of IP Packets over | [SAINTplus] | |||
| Overlay Multilink Network (OMNI) Interfaces", Work in | Shen, Y., Lee, J., Jeong, H., Jeong, J., Lee, E., and D. | |||
| Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-omni-11, | H. C. Du, "SAINT+: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation | |||
| 10 January 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | Tool+ for Emergency Service Delivery Optimization", IEEE | |||
| draft-templin-intarea-omni-11>. | Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume | |||
| 19, Issue 4, pp. 1038-1053, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881, | ||||
| June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881>. | ||||
| [UAM-ITS] Templin, F., Ed., "Urban Air Mobility Implications for | [SANA] Hwang, T. and J. Jeong, "SANA: Safety-Aware Navigation | |||
| Intelligent Transportation Systems", Work in Progress, | Application for Pedestrian Protection in Vehicular | |||
| Internet-Draft, draft-templin-ipwave-uam-its-04, 4 January | Networks", Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series | |||
| 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft- | (LNISA, Volume 9502), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12, | |||
| templin-ipwave-uam-its-04>. | December 2015, | |||
| <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12>. | ||||
| [PARCELS] Templin, F. L., Ed., "IP Parcels", Work in Progress, | [Scrambler-Attack] | |||
| Internet-Draft, draft-templin-intarea-parcels-19, 10 | Bloessl, B., Sommer, C., Dressier, F., and D. Eckhoff, | |||
| January 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | "The scrambler attack: A robust physical layer attack on | |||
| draft-templin-intarea-parcels-19>. | location privacy in vehicular networks", 2015 | |||
| International Conference on Computing, Networking and | ||||
| Communications (ICNC), DOI 10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376, | ||||
| February 2015, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376>. | ||||
| [FPC-DMM] Matsushima, S., Bertz, L., Liebsch, M., Gundavelli, S., | [SEC-PRIV] Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Jung, H., Park, J., and T. Oh, | |||
| Moses, D., and C. E. Perkins, "Protocol for Forwarding | "Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based | |||
| Policy Configuration (FPC) in DMM", Work in Progress, | Vehicular Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, | |||
| Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmm-fpc-cpdp-14, 22 September | draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-06, 25 July 2022, | |||
| 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | |||
| dmm-fpc-cpdp-14>. | security-privacy-06>. | |||
| [WIRELESS-ND] | [SignalGuru] | |||
| Thubert, P., Ed., "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery on Wireless | Koukoumidis, E., Peh, L., and M. Martonosi, "SignalGuru: | |||
| Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | leveraging mobile phones for collaborative traffic signal | |||
| thubert-6man-ipv6-over-wireless-12, 11 October 2022, | schedule advisory", MobiSys '11: Proceedings of the 9th | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thubert-6man- | international conference on Mobile systems, applications, | |||
| ipv6-over-wireless-12>. | and services, pp. 127-140, DOI 10.1145/1999995.2000008, | |||
| June 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/1999995.2000008>. | ||||
| [MAC-ADD-RAN] | [TR-22.886-3GPP] | |||
| Zúñiga, J. C., Bernardos, CJ., Ed., and A. Andersdotter, | 3GPP, "Study on enhancement of 3GPP support for 5G V2X | |||
| "MAC address randomization", Work in Progress, Internet- | services", 3GPP TS 22.886 16.2.0, December 2018, | |||
| Draft, draft-ietf-madinas-mac-address-randomization-04, 22 | <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | |||
| October 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3108>. | |||
| draft-ietf-madinas-mac-address-randomization-04>. | ||||
| [RCM-USE-CASES] | [Truck-Platooning] | |||
| Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing MAC Address | California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology | |||
| Use Cases", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- | (PATH), "Truck Platooning", | |||
| madinas-use-cases-03, 6 October 2022, | <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and- | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas- | automated-vehicles/truck-platooning>. | |||
| use-cases-03>. | ||||
| [VEHICULAR-ND] | [TS-23.285-3GPP] | |||
| Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Kwon, J., and S. Cespedes, | 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for V2X services", 3GPP | |||
| "Vehicular Neighbor Discovery for IP-Based Vehicular | TS 23.285 16.2.0, December 2019, | |||
| Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong- | <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | |||
| ipwave-vehicular-neighbor-discovery-14, 25 July 2022, | SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3078>. | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | ||||
| vehicular-neighbor-discovery-14>. | [TS-23.287-3GPP] | |||
| 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to | ||||
| support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services", 3GPP | ||||
| TS 23.287 16.2.0, March 2020, | ||||
| <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | ||||
| SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3578>. | ||||
| [UAM-ITS] Templin, F., Ed., "Urban Air Mobility Implications for | ||||
| Intelligent Transportation Systems", Work in Progress, | ||||
| Internet-Draft, draft-templin-ipwave-uam-its-04, 4 January | ||||
| 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft- | ||||
| templin-ipwave-uam-its-04>. | ||||
| [Vehicular-BlockChain] | ||||
| Dorri, A., Steger, M., Kanhere, S., and R. Jurdak, | ||||
| "BlockChain: A Distributed Solution to Automotive Security | ||||
| and Privacy", IEEE Communications Magazine, Volume 55, | ||||
| Issue 12, pp. 119-125, DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879, | ||||
| December 2017, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879>. | ||||
| [VEHICULAR-MM] | [VEHICULAR-MM] | |||
| Jeong, J., Ed., Mugabarigira, B., Shen, Y., and H. Jung, | Jeong, J., Ed., Mugabarigira, B., Shen, Y., and H. Jung, | |||
| "Vehicular Mobility Management for IP-Based Vehicular | "Vehicular Mobility Management for IP-Based Vehicular | |||
| Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong- | Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong- | |||
| ipwave-vehicular-mobility-management-08, 25 July 2022, | ipwave-vehicular-mobility-management-09, 4 February 2023, | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | |||
| vehicular-mobility-management-08>. | vehicular-mobility-management-09>. | |||
| [SEC-PRIV] Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Jung, H., Park, J., and T. Oh, | [VEHICULAR-ND] | |||
| "Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based | Jeong, J., Ed., Shen, Y., Kwon, J., and S. Cespedes, | |||
| Vehicular Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, | "Vehicular Neighbor Discovery for IP-Based Vehicular | |||
| draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-06, 25 July 2022, | Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jeong- | |||
| ipwave-vehicular-neighbor-discovery-15, 4 February 2023, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-ipwave- | |||
| security-privacy-06>. | vehicular-neighbor-discovery-15>. | |||
| [DSRC] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for | ||||
| Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between | ||||
| Roadside and Vehicle Systems - 5 GHz Band Dedicated Short | ||||
| Range Communications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC) | ||||
| and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", | ||||
| ASTM E2213-03(2010), DOI 10.1520/E2213-03R10, September | ||||
| 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1520/E2213-03R10>. | ||||
| [EU-2008-671-EC] | ||||
| European Union, "COMMISSION DECISION of 5 August 2008 on | ||||
| the harmonised use of radio spectrum in the 5 875-5 905 | ||||
| MHz frequency band for safety-related applications of | ||||
| Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)", EU 2008/671/EC, | ||||
| August 2008, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- | ||||
| content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008D0671&rid=7>. | ||||
| [IEEE-802.11p] | ||||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology-- Local | ||||
| and metropolitan area networks-- Specific requirements-- | ||||
| Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and | ||||
| Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 6: Wireless | ||||
| Access in Vehicular Environments", | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475, IEEE Std 802.11p-2010, | ||||
| July 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5514475>. | ||||
| [IEEE-802.11-OCB] | [VIP-WAVE] Cespedes, S., Lu, N., and X. Shen, "VIP-WAVE: On the | |||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology - | Feasibility of IP Communications in 802.11p Vehicular | |||
| Telecommunications and information exchange between | Networks", IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation | |||
| systems Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific | Systems, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp. 82-97, | |||
| requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control | DOI 10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387, March 2013, | |||
| (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", | <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387>. | |||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995, IEEE Std 802.11-2016, | ||||
| December 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995>. | ||||
| [WAVE-1609.0] | [WAVE-1609.0] | |||
| IEEE, "IEEE Guide for Wireless Access in Vehicular | IEEE, "IEEE Guide for Wireless Access in Vehicular | |||
| Environments (WAVE) - Architecture", | Environments (WAVE) - Architecture", | |||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433, IEEE Std 1609.0-2013, | DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433, IEEE Std 1609.0-2013, | |||
| March 2014, | March 2014, | |||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433>. | <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2014.6755433>. | |||
| [WAVE-1609.2] | [WAVE-1609.2] | |||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular | IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular | |||
| skipping to change at line 2124 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2335 ¶ | |||
| April 2016, | April 2016, | |||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7458115>. | <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7458115>. | |||
| [WAVE-1609.4] | [WAVE-1609.4] | |||
| IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular | IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular | |||
| Environments (WAVE) - Multi-Channel Operation", | Environments (WAVE) - Multi-Channel Operation", | |||
| DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228, IEEE Std 1609.4-2016, | DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228, IEEE Std 1609.4-2016, | |||
| March 2016, | March 2016, | |||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228>. | <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7435228>. | |||
| [ISO-ITS-IPv6] | ||||
| ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems - | ||||
| Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6 | ||||
| Networking", ISO 21210:2012, June 2012, | ||||
| <https://www.iso.org/standard/46549.html>. | ||||
| [ISO-ITS-IPv6-AMD1] | ||||
| ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent transport systems - | ||||
| Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) - IPv6 | ||||
| Networking - Amendment 1", ISO 21210:2012/AMD 1:2017, | ||||
| September 2017, <https://www.iso.org/standard/65691.html>. | ||||
| [TS-23.285-3GPP] | ||||
| 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for V2X services", 3GPP | ||||
| TS 23.285 16.2.0, December 2019, | ||||
| <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | ||||
| SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3078>. | ||||
| [TR-22.886-3GPP] | ||||
| 3GPP, "Study on enhancement of 3GPP support for 5G V2X | ||||
| services", 3GPP TS 22.886 16.2.0, December 2018, | ||||
| <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | ||||
| SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3108>. | ||||
| [TS-23.287-3GPP] | ||||
| 3GPP, "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to | ||||
| support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services", 3GPP | ||||
| TS 23.287 16.2.0, March 2020, | ||||
| <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ | ||||
| SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3578>. | ||||
| [VIP-WAVE] Cespedes, S., Lu, N., and X. Shen, "VIP-WAVE: On the | ||||
| Feasibility of IP Communications in 802.11p Vehicular | ||||
| Networks", IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation | ||||
| Systems, Volume 14, Issue 1, | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387, March 2013, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2012.2206387>. | ||||
| [Identity-Management] | ||||
| Wetterwald, M., Hrizi, F., and P. Cataldi, "Cross-layer | ||||
| identities management in ITS stations", 10th IEEE | ||||
| International Conference on ITS Telecommunications, | ||||
| November 2010, | ||||
| <https://www.eurecom.fr/fr/publication/3205>. | ||||
| [SAINT] Jeong, J., Jeong, H., Lee, E., Oh, T., and D. H. C. Du, | ||||
| "SAINT: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation Tool for | ||||
| Cloud-Based Vehicular Traffic Optimization", IEEE | ||||
| Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Volume 65, Issue 6, | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958, June 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2015.2476958>. | ||||
| [SAINTplus] | ||||
| Shen, Y., Lee, J., Jeong, H., Jeong, J., Lee, E., and D. | ||||
| H. C. Du, "SAINT+: Self-Adaptive Interactive Navigation | ||||
| Tool+ for Emergency Service Delivery Optimization", IEEE | ||||
| Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume | ||||
| 19, Issue 4, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881, June 2017, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2710881>. | ||||
| [SANA] Hwang, T. and J. Jeong, "SANA: Safety-Aware Navigation | ||||
| Application for Pedestrian Protection in Vehicular | ||||
| Networks", Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series | ||||
| (LNISA, Volume 9502), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12, | ||||
| December 2015, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27293-1_12>. | ||||
| [CASD] Shen, Y., Jeong, J., Oh, T., and S. H. Son, "CASD: A | ||||
| Framework of Context-Awareness Safety Driving in Vehicular | ||||
| Networks", 30th International Conference on Advanced | ||||
| Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA), | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/WAINA.2016.74, March 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/WAINA.2016.74>. | ||||
| [CA-Cruise-Control] | ||||
| California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology | ||||
| (PATH), "Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control", | ||||
| <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and- | ||||
| automated-vehicles/cooperative-adaptive-cruise-control>. | ||||
| [Truck-Platooning] | ||||
| California Partners for Advanced Transportation Technology | ||||
| (PATH), "Automated Truck Platooning", | ||||
| <https://path.berkeley.edu/research/connected-and- | ||||
| automated-vehicles/truck-platooning>. | ||||
| [FirstNet] "FirstNet Authority: The future of public safety | ||||
| communications", <https://www.firstnet.gov/>. | ||||
| [PSCE] European Comission, "PSCEurope Public Safety | ||||
| Communications Europe", <https://www.psc-europe.eu/>. | ||||
| [FirstNet-Report] | ||||
| FirstNet, "FY 2017: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Advancing | ||||
| Public Safety Broadband Communications", FirstNet FY 2017, | ||||
| December 2017, <https://www.firstnet.gov/system/tdf/ | ||||
| FirstNet-Annual-Report- | ||||
| FY2017.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=449>. | ||||
| [SignalGuru] | ||||
| Koukoumidis, E., Peh, L., and M. Martonosi, "SignalGuru: | ||||
| leveraging mobile phones for collaborative traffic signal | ||||
| schedule advisory", MobiSys '11: Proceedings of the 9th | ||||
| international conference on Mobile systems, applications, | ||||
| and services, pp. 127-140, DOI 10.1145/1999995.2000008, | ||||
| June 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/1999995.2000008>. | ||||
| [Fuel-Efficient] | ||||
| van de Hoef, S., Johansson, K., and D. Dimarogonas, "Fuel- | ||||
| Efficient En Route Formation of Truck Platoons", IEEE | ||||
| Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume | ||||
| 19, Issue 1, pp. 102-112, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021, | ||||
| January 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2017.2700021>. | ||||
| [Automotive-Sensing] | ||||
| Choi, J., Va, V., Gonzalez-Prelcic, N., Daniels, R., Bhat, | ||||
| C., and R. Heath, "Millimeter-Wave Vehicular Communication | ||||
| to Support Massive Automotive Sensing", IEEE | ||||
| Communications Magazine, Volume 54, Issue 12, pp. 160-167, | ||||
| DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM, December 2016, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2016.1600071CM>. | ||||
| [NHTSA-ACAS-Report] | ||||
| National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), | ||||
| "Automotive Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) Program | ||||
| Final Report", DOT HS 809 080, August 2000, | ||||
| <https://one.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/pub/ACAS/ | ||||
| ACAS_index.htm>. | ||||
| [CBDN] Kim, J., Kim, S., Jeong, J., Kim, H., Park, J., and T. | ||||
| Kim, "CBDN: Cloud-Based Drone Navigation for Efficient | ||||
| Battery Charging in Drone Networks", IEEE Transactions on | ||||
| Intelligent Transportation Systems, Volume 20, Issue 11, | ||||
| pp. 4174-4191, DOI 10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058, November | ||||
| 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2883058>. | ||||
| [LIFS] Wang, J., Xiong, J., Jiang, H., Jamieson, K., Chen, X., | ||||
| Fang, D., and C. Wang, "Low Human-Effort, Device-Free | ||||
| Localization with Fine-Grained Subcarrier Information", | ||||
| IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, Volume 17, Issue | ||||
| 11, pp. 2550-2563, DOI 10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746, November | ||||
| 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2812746>. | ||||
| [DFC] Jeong, J., Shen, Y., Kim, S., Choe, D., Lee, K., and Y. | ||||
| Kim, "DFC: Device-free human counting through WiFi fine- | ||||
| grained subcarrier information", IET Communications, | ||||
| Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 337-350, DOI 10.1049/cmu2.12043, | ||||
| January 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1049/cmu2.12043>. | ||||
| [In-Car-Network] | ||||
| Lim, H., Volker, L., and D. Herrscher, "Challenges in a | ||||
| future IP/Ethernet-based in-car network for real-time | ||||
| applications", Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation | ||||
| Conference, pp. 7-12, DOI 10.1145/2024724.2024727, June | ||||
| 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2024724.2024727>. | ||||
| [Scrambler-Attack] | ||||
| Bloessl, B., Sommer, C., Dressier, F., and D. Eckhoff, | ||||
| "The scrambler attack: A robust physical layer attack on | ||||
| location privacy in vehicular networks", 2015 | ||||
| International Conference on Computing, Networking and | ||||
| Communications (ICNC), DOI 10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376, | ||||
| February 2015, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069376>. | ||||
| [Bitcoin] Nakamoto, S., "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash | ||||
| System", <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>. | ||||
| [Vehicular-BlockChain] | ||||
| Dorri, A., Steger, M., Kanhere, S., and R. Jurdak, | ||||
| "BlockChain: A Distributed Solution to Automotive Security | ||||
| and Privacy", IEEE Communications Magazine, Volume 55, | ||||
| Issue 12, pp. 119-125, DOI 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879, | ||||
| December 2017, | ||||
| <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700879>. | ||||
| [FCC-ITS-Modification] | ||||
| Federal Communications Commission, "Use of the 5.850-5.925 | ||||
| GHz Band, First Report and Order, Further Notice of | ||||
| Proposed Rulemaking, and Order of Proposed Modification, | ||||
| FCC 19-138", November 2020, <https://www.fcc.gov/document/ | ||||
| fcc-modernizes-59-ghz-band-improve-wi-fi-and-automotive- | ||||
| safety-0>. | ||||
| [Fake-Identifier-Attack] | ||||
| ABC News, "Berlin artist uses handcart full of smartphones | ||||
| to trick Google Maps' traffic algorithm into thinking | ||||
| there is traffic jam", February 2020, | ||||
| <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-04/man-creates-fake- | ||||
| traffic-jam-on-google-maps-by-carting-99-phones/11929136>. | ||||
| [Google-Maps] | ||||
| Google, "Google Maps", <https://www.google.com/maps/>. | ||||
| [Waze] Google, "Waze", <https://www.waze.com/>. | [Waze] Google, "Waze", <https://www.waze.com/>. | |||
| [WIRELESS-ND] | ||||
| Thubert, P., Ed., "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery on Wireless | ||||
| Networks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | ||||
| thubert-6man-ipv6-over-wireless-12, 11 October 2022, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thubert-6man- | ||||
| ipv6-over-wireless-12>. | ||||
| Appendix A. Support of Multiple Radio Technologies for V2V | Appendix A. Support of Multiple Radio Technologies for V2V | |||
| Vehicular networks may consist of multiple radio technologies, such | Vehicular networks may consist of multiple radio technologies, such | |||
| as DSRC and 5G V2X. Although a Layer 2 solution can provide support | as DSRC and 5G V2X (or LTE V2X). Although a Layer 2 solution can | |||
| for multihop communications in vehicular networks, the scalability | provide support for multihop communications in vehicular networks, | |||
| issue related to multihop forwarding still remains when vehicles need | the scalability issue related to multihop forwarding still remains | |||
| to disseminate or forward packets toward destinations that are | when vehicles need to disseminate or forward packets toward | |||
| multiple hops away. In addition, the IPv6-based approach for V2V as | destinations that are multiple hops away. In addition, the | |||
| a network-layer protocol can accommodate multiple radio technologies | IPv6-based approach for V2V as a network-layer protocol can | |||
| as MAC protocols, such as DSRC and 5G V2X. Therefore, the existing | accommodate multiple radio technologies as MAC protocols, such as | |||
| IPv6 protocol can be augmented through the addition of a virtual | DSRC and 5G V2X (or LTE V2X). Therefore, the existing IPv6 protocol | |||
| interface (e.g., OMNI [OMNI] and DLEP [RFC8175]) and/or protocol | can be augmented through the addition of a virtual interface (e.g., | |||
| changes in order to support both wireless single-hop/multihop V2V | OMNI [OMNI] and DLEP [RFC8175]) and/or protocol changes in order to | |||
| communications and multiple radio technologies in vehicular networks. | support both wireless single-hop/multihop V2V communications and | |||
| In such a way, vehicles can communicate with each other by V2V | multiple radio technologies in vehicular networks. In such a way, | |||
| communications to share either an emergency situation or road hazard | vehicles can communicate with each other by V2V communications to | |||
| information on a highway having multiple kinds of radio technologies. | share either an emergency situation or road hazard information on a | |||
| highway having multiple radio technologies. | ||||
| Appendix B. Support of Multihop V2X Networking | Appendix B. Support of Multihop V2X Networking | |||
| The multihop V2X networking can be supported by RPL (IPv6 Routing | The multihop V2X networking can be supported by RPL (IPv6 Routing | |||
| Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [RFC6550] and Overlay | Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [RFC6550] and Overlay | |||
| Multilink Network Interface [OMNI] with AERO [AERO]. | Multilink Network Interface [OMNI] with AERO [AERO]. | |||
| RPL defines an IPv6 routing protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks | RPL defines an IPv6 routing protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks | |||
| (LLNs) as being mostly designed for home automation routing, building | (LLNs) as being mostly designed for home automation routing, building | |||
| automation routing, industrial routing, and urban LLN routing. It | automation routing, industrial routing, and urban LLN routing. It | |||
| skipping to change at line 2382 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2407 ¶ | |||
| only optimizes the routes to and from the root, allowing peer-to-peer | only optimizes the routes to and from the root, allowing peer-to-peer | |||
| (P2P) paths to be stretched. Although RPL installs its routes | (P2P) paths to be stretched. Although RPL installs its routes | |||
| proactively, it only maintains them lazily, that is, in reaction to | proactively, it only maintains them lazily, that is, in reaction to | |||
| actual traffic or as a slow background activity. Additionally, RPL | actual traffic or as a slow background activity. Additionally, RPL | |||
| leverages the concept of an OF, which allows adapting the activity of | leverages the concept of an OF, which allows adapting the activity of | |||
| the routing protocol to use cases, e.g., type, speed, and quality of | the routing protocol to use cases, e.g., type, speed, and quality of | |||
| the radios. RPL does not need to converge and provides connectivity | the radios. RPL does not need to converge and provides connectivity | |||
| to most nodes most of the time. The default route toward the root is | to most nodes most of the time. The default route toward the root is | |||
| maintained aggressively and may change while a packet progresses | maintained aggressively and may change while a packet progresses | |||
| without causing loops, so the packet will still reach the root. | without causing loops, so the packet will still reach the root. | |||
| There are two modes for routing in RPL, such as non-storing mode and | There are two modes for routing in RPL: non-storing mode and storing | |||
| storing mode. In non-storing mode, a node inside the mesh or swarm | mode. In non-storing mode, a node inside the mesh or swarm that | |||
| that changes its point(s) of attachment to the graph informs the root | changes its point(s) of attachment to the graph informs the root with | |||
| with a single unicast packet flowing along the default route, and the | a single unicast packet flowing along the default route, and the | |||
| connectivity is restored immediately; this mode is preferable for use | connectivity is restored immediately; this mode is preferable for use | |||
| cases where Internet connectivity is dominant. On the other hand, in | cases where Internet connectivity is dominant. On the other hand, in | |||
| storing mode, the routing stretch is reduced for better P2P | storing mode, the routing stretch is reduced for better P2P | |||
| connectivity, and the Internet connectivity is restored more slowly | connectivity, and the Internet connectivity is restored more slowly | |||
| during the time for the DV operation to operate hop-by-hop. While an | during the time for the DV operation to operate hop-by-hop. While an | |||
| RPL topology can quickly scale up and down and fit the needs of | RPL topology can quickly scale up and down and fit the needs of | |||
| mobility of vehicles, the total performance of the system will also | mobility of vehicles, the total performance of the system will also | |||
| depend on how quickly a node can form an address, join the mesh | depend on how quickly a node can form an address, join the mesh | |||
| (including Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)), and | (including Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)), and | |||
| manage its global mobility to become reachable from another node | manage its global mobility to become reachable from another node | |||
| skipping to change at line 2411 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2436 ¶ | |||
| multihop V2V communication between vehicles in multiple forwarding | multihop V2V communication between vehicles in multiple forwarding | |||
| hops via intermediate vehicles with OMNI links. It also supports | hops via intermediate vehicles with OMNI links. It also supports | |||
| multihop V2I communication between a vehicle and an infrastructure | multihop V2I communication between a vehicle and an infrastructure | |||
| access point by multihop V2V communication. The OMNI interface | access point by multihop V2V communication. The OMNI interface | |||
| supports an NBMA link model where multihop V2V and V2I communications | supports an NBMA link model where multihop V2V and V2I communications | |||
| use each mobile node's ULAs without need for any DAD or MLD | use each mobile node's ULAs without need for any DAD or MLD | |||
| messaging. | messaging. | |||
| In the OMNI protocol, an OMNI virtual interface can have a ULA | In the OMNI protocol, an OMNI virtual interface can have a ULA | |||
| [RFC4193] indeed, but wireless physical interfaces associated with | [RFC4193] indeed, but wireless physical interfaces associated with | |||
| the OMNI virtual interface are using any prefix. The ULA supports | the OMNI virtual interface can use any prefixes. The ULA supports | |||
| both V2V and V2I multihop forwarding within the vehicular network | both V2V and V2I multihop forwarding within the vehicular network | |||
| (e.g., via a VANET routing protocol) while each vehicle can | (e.g., via a VANET routing protocol) while each vehicle can | |||
| communicate with Internet correspondents using global IPv6 addresses | communicate with Internet correspondents using IPv6 global addresses | |||
| via OMNI interface encapsulation over the wireless interface. | via OMNI interface encapsulation over the wireless interface. | |||
| For the control traffic overhead for running both vehicular ND and a | For the control traffic overhead for running both vehicular ND and a | |||
| VANET routing protocol, the AERO/OMNI approach may avoid this issue | VANET routing protocol, the AERO/OMNI approach may avoid this issue | |||
| by using MANET routing protocols only (i.e., no multicast of IPv6 ND | by using MANET routing protocols only (i.e., no multicast of IPv6 ND | |||
| messaging) in the wireless underlay network while applying efficient | messaging) in the wireless underlay network while applying efficient | |||
| unicast IPv6 ND messaging in the OMNI overlay on an as-needed basis | unicast IPv6 ND messaging in the OMNI overlay on an as-needed basis | |||
| for router discovery and NUD. This greatly reduces the overhead for | for router discovery and NUD. This greatly reduces the overhead for | |||
| VANET-wide multicasting while providing agile accommodation for | VANET-wide multicasting while providing agile accommodation for | |||
| dynamic topology changes. | dynamic topology changes. | |||
| skipping to change at line 2444 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2469 ¶ | |||
| In the host-based mobility scheme (e.g., MIPv6), an IP-RSU plays the | In the host-based mobility scheme (e.g., MIPv6), an IP-RSU plays the | |||
| role of a home agent. On the other hand, in the network-based | role of a home agent. On the other hand, in the network-based | |||
| mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6), an MA plays the role of a mobility | mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6), an MA plays the role of a mobility | |||
| management controller, such as a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in | management controller, such as a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) in | |||
| PMIPv6, which also serves vehicles as a home agent, and an IP-RSU | PMIPv6, which also serves vehicles as a home agent, and an IP-RSU | |||
| plays the role of an access router, such as a Mobile Access Gateway | plays the role of an access router, such as a Mobile Access Gateway | |||
| (MAG) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213]. The host-based mobility scheme needs | (MAG) in PMIPv6 [RFC5213]. The host-based mobility scheme needs | |||
| client functionality in the IPv6 stack of a vehicle as a mobile node | client functionality in the IPv6 stack of a vehicle as a mobile node | |||
| for mobility signaling message exchange between the vehicle and home | for mobility signaling message exchange between the vehicle and home | |||
| agent. On the other hand, the network-based mobility scheme does not | agent. On the other hand, the network-based mobility scheme does not | |||
| need such client functionality for a vehicle because the network | need such client functionality of a vehicle because the network | |||
| infrastructure node (e.g., MAG in PMIPv6) as a proxy mobility agent | infrastructure node (e.g., MAG in PMIPv6) as a proxy mobility agent | |||
| handles the mobility signaling message exchange with the home agent | handles the mobility signaling message exchange with the home agent | |||
| (e.g., LMA in PMIPv6) for the sake of the vehicle. | (e.g., LMA in PMIPv6) for the sake of the vehicle. | |||
| There are a scalability issue and a route optimization issue in the | There are a scalability issue and a route optimization issue in the | |||
| network-based mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6) when an MA covers a | network-based mobility scheme (e.g., PMIPv6) when an MA covers a | |||
| large vehicular network governing many IP-RSUs. In this case, a | large vehicular network governing many IP-RSUs. In this case, a | |||
| distributed mobility scheme (e.g., DMM [RFC7429]) can mitigate the | distributed mobility scheme (e.g., DMM [RFC7429]) can mitigate the | |||
| scalability issue by distributing multiple MAs in the vehicular | scalability issue by distributing multiple MAs in the vehicular | |||
| network such that they are positioned closer to vehicles for route | network such that they are positioned closer to vehicles for route | |||
| skipping to change at line 2475 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2500 ¶ | |||
| using the concept of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] | using the concept of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] | |||
| [FPC-DMM]. Note that Forwarding Policy Configuration (FPC) in | [FPC-DMM]. Note that Forwarding Policy Configuration (FPC) in | |||
| [FPC-DMM], which is a flexible mobility management system, can manage | [FPC-DMM], which is a flexible mobility management system, can manage | |||
| the separation of data plane and control plane in DMM. In SDN, the | the separation of data plane and control plane in DMM. In SDN, the | |||
| control plane and data plane are separated for the efficient | control plane and data plane are separated for the efficient | |||
| management of forwarding elements (e.g., switches and routers) where | management of forwarding elements (e.g., switches and routers) where | |||
| an SDN controller configures the forwarding elements in a centralized | an SDN controller configures the forwarding elements in a centralized | |||
| way, and they perform packet forwarding according to their forwarding | way, and they perform packet forwarding according to their forwarding | |||
| tables that are configured by the SDN controller. An MA as an SDN | tables that are configured by the SDN controller. An MA as an SDN | |||
| controller needs to efficiently configure and monitor its IP-RSUs and | controller needs to efficiently configure and monitor its IP-RSUs and | |||
| vehicles for mobility management, location management, and security | vehicles for mobility management and security services. | |||
| services. | ||||
| Appendix D. Support of MTU Diversity for IP-Based Vehicular Networks | Appendix D. Support of MTU Diversity for IP-Based Vehicular Networks | |||
| The wireless and/or wired-line links in paths between both mobile | The wireless and/or wired-line links in paths between both mobile | |||
| nodes and fixed network correspondents may configure a variety of | nodes and fixed network correspondents may configure a variety of | |||
| Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs), where all IPv6 links are required | Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs), where all IPv6 links are required | |||
| to support a minimum MTU of 1280 octets and may support larger MTUs. | to support a minimum MTU of 1280 octets and may support larger MTUs. | |||
| Unfortunately, determining the path MTU (i.e., the minimum link MTU | Unfortunately, determining the path MTU (i.e., the minimum link MTU | |||
| in the path) has proven to be inefficient and unreliable due to the | in the path) has proven to be inefficient and unreliable due to the | |||
| uncertain nature of the loss-oriented ICMPv6 messaging service used | uncertain nature of the loss-oriented ICMPv6 messaging service used | |||
| skipping to change at line 2498 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2522 ¶ | |||
| reliable path MTU determination service for TCP [RFC4821] and UDP | reliable path MTU determination service for TCP [RFC4821] and UDP | |||
| [RFC8899]; however, the MTUs discovered are always limited by the | [RFC8899]; however, the MTUs discovered are always limited by the | |||
| most restrictive link MTU in the path (often 1500 octets or smaller). | most restrictive link MTU in the path (often 1500 octets or smaller). | |||
| The AERO/OMNI service addresses the MTU issue by introducing a new | The AERO/OMNI service addresses the MTU issue by introducing a new | |||
| layer in the Internet architecture known as the "OMNI Adaptation | layer in the Internet architecture known as the "OMNI Adaptation | |||
| Layer (OAL)". The OAL allows end systems that configure an OMNI | Layer (OAL)". The OAL allows end systems that configure an OMNI | |||
| interface to utilize a full 65535-octet MTU by leveraging the IPv6 | interface to utilize a full 65535-octet MTU by leveraging the IPv6 | |||
| fragmentation and reassembly service during encapsulation to produce | fragmentation and reassembly service during encapsulation to produce | |||
| fragment sizes that are assured of traversing the path without loss | fragment sizes that are assured of traversing the path without loss | |||
| due to a size restriction. (This allows end systems to send packets | due to a size restriction. Thus, this allows end systems to send | |||
| that are often much larger than the actual path MTU.) | packets that are often much larger than the actual path MTU. | |||
| Performance studies over the course of many decades have proven that | Performance studies over the course of many decades have proven that | |||
| applications will see greater performance by sending smaller numbers | applications will see greater performance by sending smaller numbers | |||
| of large packets (as opposed to larger numbers of small packets) even | of large packets (as opposed to larger numbers of small packets) even | |||
| if fragmentation is needed. The OAL further supports even larger | if fragmentation is needed. The OAL further supports even larger | |||
| packet sizes through the IP Parcels construct [PARCELS], which | packet sizes through the IP Parcels construct [PARCELS], which | |||
| provides "packets-in-packet" encapsulation for a total size up to 4 | provides "packets-in-packet" encapsulation for a total size up to 4 | |||
| MB. Together, the OAL and IP Parcels will provide a revolutionary | MB. Together, the OAL and IP Parcels will provide a revolutionary | |||
| new capability for greater efficiency in both mobile and fixed | new capability for greater efficiency in both mobile and fixed | |||
| networks. On the other hand, due to the highly dynamic nature of | networks. On the other hand, due to the highly dynamic nature of | |||
| skipping to change at line 2548 ¶ | skipping to change at line 2572 ¶ | |||
| Program Fund, Grant # 2019-199458 (3696), and by ANID Chile Basal | Program Fund, Grant # 2019-199458 (3696), and by ANID Chile Basal | |||
| Project FB0008. | Project FB0008. | |||
| Contributors | Contributors | |||
| This document is a group work of the IPWAVE working group, greatly | This document is a group work of the IPWAVE working group, greatly | |||
| benefiting from inputs and texts by Rex Buddenberg (Naval | benefiting from inputs and texts by Rex Buddenberg (Naval | |||
| Postgraduate School), Thierry Ernst (YoGoKo), Bokor Laszlo (Budapest | Postgraduate School), Thierry Ernst (YoGoKo), Bokor Laszlo (Budapest | |||
| University of Technology and Economics), Jose Santa Lozanoi | University of Technology and Economics), Jose Santa Lozanoi | |||
| (Universidad of Murcia), Richard Roy (MIT), Francois Simon (Pilot), | (Universidad of Murcia), Richard Roy (MIT), Francois Simon (Pilot), | |||
| Sri Gundavelli (Cisco), Erik Nordmark, Dirk von Hugo (Deutsche | Sri Gundavelli (Cisco), Erik Nordmark (Zededa), Dirk von Hugo | |||
| Telekom), Pascal Thubert (Cisco), Carlos Bernardos (UC3M), Russ | (Deutsche Telekom), Pascal Thubert (Cisco), Carlos Bernardos (UC3M), | |||
| Housley (Vigil Security), Suresh Krishnan (Kaloom), Nancy Cam-Winget | Russ Housley (Vigil Security), Suresh Krishnan (Cisco), Nancy Cam- | |||
| (Cisco), Fred L. Templin (The Boeing Company), Jung-Soo Park (ETRI), | Winget (Cisco), Fred L. Templin (The Boeing Company), Jung-Soo Park | |||
| Zeungil (Ben) Kim (Hyundai Motors), Kyoungjae Sun (Soongsil | (ETRI), Zeungil (Ben) Kim (Hyundai Motors), Kyoungjae Sun (Soongsil | |||
| University), Zhiwei Yan (CNNIC), YongJoon Joe (LSware), Peter E. Yee | University), Zhiwei Yan (CNNIC), YongJoon Joe (LSware), Peter E. Yee | |||
| (Akayla), and Erik Kline. The authors sincerely appreciate their | (Akayla), and Erik Kline (Aalyria). The authors sincerely appreciate | |||
| contributions. | their contributions. | |||
| The following are coauthors of this document: | The following are coauthors of this document: | |||
| Nabil Benamar | Nabil Benamar | |||
| Department of Computer Sciences, | Department of Computer Sciences, | |||
| High School of Technology of Meknes | High School of Technology of Meknes | |||
| Moulay Ismail University | Moulay Ismail University | |||
| Morocco | Morocco | |||
| Phone: +212 6 70 83 22 36 | Phone: +212 6 70 83 22 36 | |||
| Email: benamar73@gmail.com | Email: benamar73@gmail.com | |||
| End of changes. 109 change blocks. | ||||
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