rfc9455.original   rfc9455.txt 
SIDR Operations Z. Yan Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Z. Yan
Internet-Draft CNNIC Request for Comments: 9455 CNNIC
Intended status: Best Current Practice R. Bush BCP: 238 R. Bush
Expires: 28 October 2023 IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc. Category: Best Current Practice IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
G.G. Geng ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Geng
Jinan University Jinan University
T. de Kock T. de Kock
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
J. Yao J. Yao
CNNIC CNNIC
April 2023 August 2023
Avoidance of ROA Containing Multiple IP Prefixes Avoiding Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) Containing Multiple IP
draft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations-08 Prefixes
Abstract Abstract
When using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), address When using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), address
space holders need to issue Route Origin Authorization (ROA) space holders need to issue Route Origin Authorization (ROA)
object(s) to authorize one or more Autonomous Systems (ASes) to object(s) to authorize one or more Autonomous Systems (ASes) to
originate routes to IP address prefix(es). This memo discusses originate BGP routes to IP address prefix(es). This memo discusses
operational problems which may arise from ROAs containing multiple IP operational problems that may arise from ROAs containing multiple IP
prefixes and recommends that each ROA contains a single IP prefix. prefixes and recommends that each ROA contain a single IP prefix.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 October 2023. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9455.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Problem Statement
4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Recommendations
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Normative References
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Acknowledgements
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In the RPKI, a ROA is a digitally signed object which identifies that In the RPKI, a ROA, which is a digitally signed object, identifies
a single AS has been authorized by the address space holder to that a single AS has been authorized by the address space holder to
originate routes to one or more IP prefixes within the related originate BGP routes to one or more IP prefixes within the related
address space [RFC6482]. address space [RFC6482].
Each ROA contains an "asID" field and an "ipAddrBlocks" field. The Each ROA contains an asID field and an ipAddrBlocks field. The asID
"asID" field contains a single AS number which is authorized to field contains a single AS number that is authorized to originate
originate routes to the given IP address prefix(es). The routes to the given IP address prefix(es). The ipAddrBlocks field
"ipAddrBlocks" field contains one or more IP address prefixes to contains one or more IP address prefixes to which the AS is
which the AS is authorized to originate the routes. authorized to originate the routes.
If the address space holder needs to authorize more than one AS to If the address space holder needs to authorize more than one AS to
advertise the same set of IP prefixes, multiple ROAs must be issued advertise the same set of IP prefixes, multiple ROAs must be issued
(one for each AS number [RFC6480]). Prior to this document, there (one for each AS number [RFC6480]). Prior to this document, there
was no guidance recommending the issuance of a separate ROA for each was no guidance recommending the issuance of a separate ROA for each
IP prefix or a single ROA containing multiple IP prefixes. IP prefix or a single ROA containing multiple IP prefixes.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Problem Statement 3. Problem Statement
An address space holder can issue a separate ROA for each of its An address space holder can issue a separate ROA for each of its
routing announcements. Alternatively, for a given asID, it can issue routing announcements. Alternatively, for a given asID, it can issue
a single ROA for multiple routing announcements, or even for all of a single ROA for multiple routing announcements, or even for all of
its routing announcements. Since a given ROA is either valid or its routing announcements. Since a given ROA is either valid or
invalid, the routing announcements for which that ROA was issued will invalid, the routing announcements for which that ROA was issued will
"share fate" when it comes to RPKI validation. Currently, no "share fate" when it comes to RPKI validation. Currently, no
guidance is offered in existing RFCs to recommend what kinds of ROA existing RFCs provide recommendations about what kinds of ROAs to
are issued: one per prefix, or one ROA for multiple routing issue: one per prefix or one for multiple routing announcements. The
announcements. The problem of fate-sharing was not discussed or problem of fate-sharing was not discussed or addressed.
addressed.
In the RPKI trust chain, the Certification Authority (CA) certificate In the RPKI trust chain, the Certification Authority (CA) certificate
issued by a parent CA to a delegate of some resources may be revoked issued by a parent CA to a delegatee of some resources may be revoked
by the parent at any time resulting in changes to resources specified by the parent at any time, which would result in changes to resources
in the [RFC3779] certificate extension. Any ROA object that includes specified in the certificate extensions defined in [RFC3779]. Any
resources which are a) no longer entirely contained in the new CA ROA object that includes resources that are a) no longer entirely
certificate, or b) contained in a new CA certificate that has not yet contained in the new CA certificate or b) contained in a new CA
been discovered by Relying Party (RP) software, will be rejected as certificate that has not yet been discovered by Relying Party (RP)
invalid. Since ROA invalidity affects all routes specified in that software will be rejected as invalid. Since ROA invalidity affects
ROA, unchanged resources with associated routes via that asID cannot all routes specified in that ROA, unchanged resources with associated
be separated from those affected by the change in the CA certificate routes via that asID cannot be separated from those affected by the
validity. They will fall under this invalid ROA even though there change in CA certificate validity. They will fall under this invalid
was no intention to change their validity. Had these resources been ROA even though there was no intent to change their validity. Had
in a separate ROA, there would have been no change to the issuing CA these resources been in a separate ROA, there would be no change to
certificate, and therefore no subsequent invalidity. the issuing CA certificate and therefore no subsequent invalidity.
CAs have to carefully coordinate ROA updates with resource CAs have to carefully coordinate ROA updates with updates to a
certificate updates. This process may be automated if a single resource certificate. This process may be automated if a single
entity manages both the parent CA and the CA issuing the ROAs entity manages both the parent CA and the CA issuing the ROAs
(Scenario D in [RFC8211] Section 3). However, in other deployment (Scenario D in [RFC8211], Section 3.4). However, in other deployment
scenarios, this coordination becomes more complex. scenarios, this coordination becomes more complex.
As there is a single expiration time for the entire ROA, expiration As there is a single expiration time for the entire ROA, expiration
will affect all prefixes in the ROA. Thus, any changes to the ROA will affect all prefixes in the ROA. Thus, changes to the ROA for
for any of the prefixes must be synchronized with any changes to any of the prefixes must be synchronized with changes to other
other prefixes, especially time-limitations on authorization for a prefixes, especially when authorization for a prefix is time bounded.
prefix. Had these prefixes been in separately issued ROAs, the Had these prefixes been in separately issued ROAs, the validity
validity interval would be unique to each ROA, and invalidity would interval would be unique to each ROA, and invalidity would only be
only be affected by re-issuance of the specific parent CA certificate affected by reissuance of the specific issuing parent CA certificate.
which issued them.
A prefix could be allowed to be originated from an AS only for a A prefix could be allowed to originate from an AS only for a specific
specific period of time, for example if the IP prefix was leased out period of time, for example, if the IP prefix was leased out
temporarily. This would be more difficult to manage, and potentially temporarily. If a ROA with multiple IP prefixes was used, this would
be more error-prone if a ROA with multiple IP prefixes was used. be more difficult to manage, and potentially be more error-prone.
Similarly more complex routing may demand changes in asID or routes Similarly, more complex routing may require changes in asID or routes
for a subset of prefixes. Re-issuance of the ROA may cause change to for a subset of prefixes. Reissuance of a ROA might result in
validity for all routes in the affected ROA. If the time limited changes to the validity of previously received BGP routes covered by
resources are in separate ROAs, or for more complex routing if each the ROA's prefixes. There will be no change to the validity of
change in asID or routes for a given prefix is reflected in a change unaffected routes if a) the time-limited resources are in separate
to a discrete ROA, then no change to validity of unaffected routes ROAs, or b) for more complex routing, each change in asID or a change
will be caused. in routes for a given prefix is reflected in a change to a discrete
ROA.
The use of ROA with a single IP prefix can minimize these side- The use of ROA with a single IP prefix can minimize these side
effects. It avoids fate-sharing irrespective of the causes, where effects. It avoids fate-sharing irrespective of the cause, where the
the parent CA issuing each ROA remains valid and where each ROA parent CA issuing each ROA remains valid and where each ROA itself
itself remains valid. remains valid.
4. Recommendations 4. Recommendations
Unless the CA has good reasons to the contrary, issued ROA SHOULD Unless the CA has good reasons to the contrary, an issued ROA SHOULD
contain a single IP prefix. contain a single IP prefix.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Issuing separate ROAs for independent IP prefixes may increase the Issuing separate ROAs for independent IP prefixes may increase the
file fetch burden on RP during validation. file-fetch burden on the RP during validation.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document does not request any IANA action. This document has no IANA actions.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the following people for their review and
contributions to this document: George Michaelson, Tim Bruijnzeels,
Job Snijders, Di Ma, Geoff Huston, Tom Harrison, Rob Austein, Stephen
Kent, Christopher Morrow, Russ Housley, Ching-Heng Ku, Keyur Patel,
Cuiling Zhang and Kejun Dong. Thanks are also due to Warren Kumari
for the Security Area Directorate review.
This work was supported by the Beijing Nova Program of Science and
Technology under grant Z191100001119113.
This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
8. References
8.1. Normative References 7. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
skipping to change at page 5, line 43 skipping to change at line 198
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211, Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
8.2. Informative References Acknowledgements
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629, The authors wish to thank the following people for their reviews and
DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999, contributions to this document: George Michaelson, Tim Bruijnzeels,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>. Job Snijders, Di Ma, Geoff Huston, Tom Harrison, Rob Austein, Stephen
Kent, Christopher Morrow, Russ Housley, Ching-Heng Ku, Keyur Patel,
Cuiling Zhang, and Kejun Dong. Thanks are also due to Sean Turner
for the Security Area Directorate review.
This work was supported by the Beijing Nova Program of Science and
Technology under grant Z191100001119113.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Zhiwei Yan Zhiwei Yan
CNNIC CNNIC
No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing, 100190 Beijing
P.R. China 100190
China
Email: yanzhiwei@cnnic.cn Email: yanzhiwei@cnnic.cn
Randy Bush Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc. IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Guanggang Geng Guanggang Geng
Jinan University Jinan University
No.601, West Huangpu Avenue No.601, West Huangpu Avenue
Guangzhou Guangzhou
510632 510632
P.R. China China
Email: gggeng@jnu.edu.cn Email: gggeng@jnu.edu.cn
Ties de Kock Ties de Kock
RIPE NCC RIPE NCC
Stationsplein 11 Stationsplein 11
Amsterdam Amsterdam
Netherlands Netherlands
Email: tdekock@ripe.net Email: tdekock@ripe.net
Jiankang Yao Jiankang Yao
CNNIC CNNIC
No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing, 100190 Beijing
P.R. China 100190
China
Email: yaojk@cnnic.cn Email: yaojk@cnnic.cn
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