<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
<!ENTITY nbsp " ">
<!ENTITY zwsp "​">
<!ENTITY nbhy "‑">
<!ENTITY wj "⁠">
]>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" docName="draft-ietf-opsawg-tlstm-update-15" number="9456"
ipr="trust200902" updates="6353" submissionType="IETF" category="std"
consensus="true" xml:lang="en"
tocInclude="true" tocDepth="4" symRefs="true" sortRefs="true" version="3">
<front>
<title abbrev="Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP">Updates to the TLS
Transport Model for SNMP</title>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" stream="IETF" value="draft-ietf-opsawg-tlstm-update-15"/> name="RFC" value="9456"/>
<author fullname="Kenneth Vaughn" initials="K." role="editor" surname="Vaughn">
<organization>Trevilon LLC</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1060 Highway 107 South</street>
<city>Del Rio</city>
<region>TN</region>
<code>37727</code>
<country>US</country>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 571 331 5670</phone>
<email>kvaughn@trevilon.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="November" year="2023"/>
<!-- Meta-data Declarations -->
<area>Operations and management</area>
<workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup> Management</area>
<workgroup>opsawg</workgroup>
<keyword>TLSTM</keyword>
<keyword>DTLS</keyword>
<keyword>security</keyword>
<keyword>SNMPv3</keyword>
<keyword>MIB</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This document updates RFC 6353 "Transport ("Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", (SNMP)")
to reflect changes necessary to support Transport Layer Security
Version
version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Version version
1.3 (DTLS 1.3), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS 1.3". This
document is compatible with (D)TLS 1.2 and is intended to be
compatible with future versions of SNMP and (D)TLS. </t>
<t>This document updates the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB as defined in RFC 6353.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="sect-1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Introduction</name>
<t>This document updates and clarifies how the rules of <xref target="RFC6353"
format="default"/> apply when using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) versions later than 1.2. This
document jointly refers to these two protocols as "(D)TLS". The update also
emphasizes the requirement in <xref target="RFC8996" format="default"/> requirement that
prohibits prohibiting the use of TLS versions prior to TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/> when using SNMP. Although the text of this
document specifically references SNMPv3 and (D)TLS 1.3, this document may be
applicable to future versions of these protocols and is backwards compatible with
(D)TLS 1.2.</t>
<section anchor="sect-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>The Internet-Standard Management Framework</name>
<t>For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to <xref target="RFC3410" sectionFormat="of" section="7"/>.</t>
<t>Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58
([<xref target="RFC2578" format="default"/>], [<xref target="RFC2579" format="default"/>], and [<xref target="RFC2580" format="default"/>]).</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-1.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Conventions </name>
<t> Within this document document, the terms "TLS", "DTLS", and "(D)TLS" apply to all
versions of the indicated protocols. The term "SNMP" means "SNMPv3" unless a
specific version number is indicated. Specific version numbers are used when
the text needs to emphasize version numbers.</t>
<t> For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document favors terminology as
defined in <xref target="STD62" format="default"/>, rather than favoring terminology that
is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is consistent with the IESG decision to
not require that the SNMP terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP
specifications when SNMP was advanced to a Full an Internet Standard. "Authentication" in this
document typically refers to the English meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of"
the message, not data source authentication or peer identity authentication. The terms
"manager" and "agent" are not used in this document because, in the <xref target="RFC3411"
format="default"/> architecture,
architecture defined in [<xref target="RFC3411"/>], all SNMP entities have the capability of acting as
manager, agent, or both both, depending on the SNMP application types supported in the
implementation. Where distinction is necessary, the application names of command
generator, command responder, notification originator, notification receiver, and proxy
forwarder are used. See <xref target="RFC3411" format="default">"SNMP Applications"</xref> "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks" [<xref target="RFC3411"/>]
for further information. </t>
<t> Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to refer to the two
ends of the TLS transport connection. The client actively opens the TLS connection, and
the server passively listens for the incoming TLS connection. An SNMP entity
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> act as a TLS client or server client, TLS server, or both, depending on the SNMP
applications supported. </t>
<t> Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a secure
association between two instances of the TLS Transport Model (TLSTM) that permits
the transmission of one or more SNMP messages within the lifetime of the session.
The TLS protocol also has an internal notion of a session session, and although these two
concepts of a session are related, when the term "session" is used used, this document
is referring to the TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the TLS protocol's
session. </t>
<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 BCP 14
<xref target="RFC2119"
format="default"/> target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default"/> target="RFC8174"/> when, and only
when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Changes from RFC 6353</name>
<t> This document updates <xref target="RFC6353"/>. The changes from <xref target="RFC6353"/>
are defined in the following clauses. subsections. </t>
<section anchor="sect-2.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>TLSTM Fingerprint</name>
<t><xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/> defines a fingerprint algorithm that
references the SnmpTLSFingerprint textual convention to include the one-octet TLS 1.2 hash algorithm identifier. TLS 1.3 replaced
the This one-octet hash algorithm identifier with a two-octet TLS 1.3 cipher suite
identifier. is only applicable to (D)TLS protocol versions prior to 1.3. The TLS community does not plan to ever add additional values to
the TLS 1.2 hash algorithm "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry <xref target="RFC5246"/>, because some might incorrectly infer that
using a new hash algorithm with TLS 1.2 would overcome the limitations of TLS
1.2. However, there is still a need within TLSTM to support new values as they
are developed.</t>
<t>This document updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint to clarify
that the one-octet identifier in the fingerprint algorithm identifier uses the values in the IANA SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry;
"SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry; this registry is consistent
with the IANA TLS
HashAlgorithm Registry "TLS HashAlgorithm" registry for its initial values
but can be extended as needed to support new hashing algorithms
without implying that the new values can be used by TLS version 1.2.
This change allows the reuse of the existing fingerprint
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
textual convention and minimizes the impact to <xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/>.</t>
<t> A "Y" in the "Recommended" column (<xref target="table_1"/>) indicates that the registered value
has been recommended through a formal Standards Action. Action <xref target="RFC8126"/>. Not all parameters
defined in Standards Track documents are necessarily marked as "Recommended".</t>
<t>An "N" in the "Recommended" column does not necessarily mean that it the value is flawed;
rather, it indicates that the item either has not been through the IETF consensus process,
has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases.</t>
<t>The initial values for the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms"
registry are defined below:</t>
<table anchor="table_1">
<name>SNMP-TLSTM Hash Algorithms</name>
<thead>
<tr>
<th align="center">Value</th>
<th align="center">Description</th>
<th align="center">Recommended</th>
<th align="center">Reference</th> align="center">References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>sha1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>sha224</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>sha256</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>sha384</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>sha512</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>reserved</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
<td>[RFC8447]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC8447"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>intrinsic</td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>[RFC8422]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC8422"/></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-223</td>
<td>reserved</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[RFC8447]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224-255</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>Reserved for Private Use</td>
<td></td>
<td>[RFC5246]</td>
<td><xref target="RFC5246"/></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<t>Values 0 through 2 <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used by implementations of this document but are
listed for historical consistency.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-2.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Security Level</name>
<t> The <xref target="RFC3411" format="default"/> architecture defined in [<xref target="RFC3411" format="default"/>] recognizes three levels of
security:</t>
<ul spacing="normal">
<li>without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)</li>
<li>with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)</li>
<li>with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)</li>
</ul>
<t>Cipher suites for (D)TLS 1.3 defined in <xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> provide both
authentication and privacy. Cipher suites defined in <xref target="RFC9150" format="default"/> for
(D)TLS 1.3 provide only authentication, without any privacy protection.
Implementations MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to force (D)TLS 1.3 to only allow cipher
suites that provide both authentication and privacy.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-2.3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>(D)TLS Version</name>
<t><xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/> states that TLSTM clients and servers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
request, offer, or use SSL 2.0. <xref target="RFC8996" format="default"/> prohibits the use
of (D)TLS versions prior to version 1.2. TLSTM <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be used with (D)TLS
version
versions 1.2 and later.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-3" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Additional Rules for TLS 1.3</name>
<t>This document specifies additional rules and clarifications for the use of TLS 1.3. These rules may
additionally apply to future versions of TLS.</t>
<section anchor="sect-3.1" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Zero Round Trip Round-Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT)</name>
<t> TLS 1.3 implementations for SNMP <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> enable the 0-RTT mode of session
resumption (either sending or accepting) and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> automatically resend
0-RTT data if it is rejected by the server. The reason 0-RTT is disallowed is that because there are
no "safe" SNMP messages that that, if replayed replayed, will be guaranteed to cause no harm at a the server side: all
incoming notification notifications or command responses are meant to be acted upon only once. See
Security considerations section <xref target="sect-5"/> ("<xref target="sect-5" format="title"/>") for further details. </t>
<t>TLS TM
<t>TLSTM clients and servers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> request, offer, or use the 0-RTT mode of TLS 1.3.
<xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> removed the renegotiation supported in TLS 1.2
<xref target="RFC5246" format="default"/>; for session resumption, it introduced a
zero-RTT (0-RTT) mode, saving a round-trip round trip at connection setup at the cost of increased
risk of replay attacks (it is possible for servers to guard against this attack by keeping
track of all the messages received). <xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> requires that a
profile be written for any application that wants to use 0-RTT, specifying which messages are
"safe to use" on with this mode. Within SNMP, there are no messages that are "safe to use" with this mode.</t>
<t>Renegotiation of sessions is not supported supported, as it is not supported by TLS 1.3. If a future version
of TLS supports renegotiation, this RFC should be updated to indicate whether there are any additional
requirements related to its use.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-3.2" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>TLS cipher suites, extensions Cipher Suites, Extensions, and protocol invariants</name> Protocol Invariants</name>
<t><xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> section 9 sectionFormat="of" section="9"/>
requires that, in the absence of
application profiles, certain cipher suites, TLS extensions, and TLS protocol invariants
are
be mandatory to implement. This document does not specify an application profile, hence profile; hence,
all the compliance requirements in <xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> apply.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-4" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>MIB Module Definition</name> Definitions</name>
<t>This SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module makes references to
<xref target="RFC1123" format="default"/>, <xref imports items from
[<xref target="RFC2578" format="default"/>,
<xref format="default"/>],
[<xref target="RFC2579" format="default"/>, <xref format="default"/>],
[<xref target="RFC2580" format="default"/>,
<xref format="default"/>],
[<xref target="RFC3411" format="default"/>, <xref format="default"/>], and
[<xref target="RFC3413" format="default"/>]. It also references
<xref target="RFC1123" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5246" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5280" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5591" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5890" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5952" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC5953" format="default"/>,
<xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/>, and
<xref target="STD58" format="default"/></t> format="default"/>.</t>
<sourcecode anchor="mib" name="snmp-tls-tm.mib" type="mib"><![CDATA[ name="SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB" type="mib" markers="true"><![CDATA[
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- RFC 2578 or any update thereof
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType,
AutonomousType
FROM SNMPv2-TC -- RFC 2579 or any update thereof
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF -- RFC 2580 or any update thereof
SnmpAdminString
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB -- RFC 3411 or any update thereof
snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName
FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB -- RFC 3413 or any update thereof
;
snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "202303010000Z" "202310310000Z"
ORGANIZATION "OPSA "Operations and Management Area Working Group" Group
<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>"
CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: opsawg@ietf.org
Mailing list subscription info:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
"Author: Kenneth Vaughn
Trevilon LLC
1060 Hwy 107 South
Del Rio, TN 37727
United States
Phone: +1 571 331 5670
Email: kvaughn@trevilon.com"
<mailto:kvaughn@trevilon.com>"
DESCRIPTION "
The
"This is the MIB module for the TLS Transport Model MIB
(TLSTM).
Copyright (c) 2010-2022 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms,
with or without modification, is permitted pursuant
to, and subject to the license terms contained in,
the Revised BSD License set forth in Section 4.c
of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."
REVISION "202303010000Z" "202310310000Z"
DESCRIPTION
"This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC XXXX; 9456; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices. This version: [ Note to RFC Editor:
please replace the above XXXX with version does the RFC number
of this document ]
1. following:
1) Updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint
to clarify the registry used for the one-octet
hash algorithm identifier.
2.
2) Capitalizes key words in conformance with
BCP 14
3. 14.
3) Replaces 'may not' with 'MUST NOT' to clarify
intent in several locations.
4.
4) Replaces 'may not' with a clarification within
the definition of SnmpTLSAddress" SnmpTLSAddress.
5) Applies cosmetic grammar improvements and
reformatting causing whitespace changes."
REVISION "201107190000Z"
DESCRIPTION
"This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC 6353; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices. The only change was to introduce
new wording to reflect require required changes for
IDNA
Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
(IDNA) addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress TC." textual
convention (TC)."
REVISION "201005070000Z"
DESCRIPTION
"This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC 5953; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices."
::= { mib-2 198 }
-- ************************************************
-- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 }
snmpTlstmIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 }
snmpTlstmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 2 }
snmpTlstmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 }
snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A node used to register hashing algorithm identifiers
recorded in the IANA SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry." 'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry."
::= { snmpTlstmMIB 4 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects
-- ************************************************
snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the TDomain for the
SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain. The
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
The securityName prefix to be associated with the
snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'. This prefix MAY be used by
security models or other components to identify which secure
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
REFERENCE
"RFC
"TDomain, as defined in RFC 2579: Textual Conventions
for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 8 }
snmpDTLSUDPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the TDomain for the
SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain. The
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
The securityName prefix to be associated with the
snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'. This prefix MAY be used by
security models or other components to identify which secure
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
REFERENCE
"RFC
"TDomain, as defined in RFC 2579: Textual Conventions
for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 9 }
SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1a"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or a
US-ASCII-encoded hostname an
ASCII-encoded host name and port number.
An IPv4 address MUST be in dotted decimal format followed
by a colon ':' (US-ASCII (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal
port number in US-ASCII. ASCII.
An IPv6 address MUST be a colon-separated format (as
described in RFC 5952), surrounded by square brackets
('[',
US-ASCII ASCII character 0x5B, and ']', US-ASCII ASCII character
0x5D), followed by a colon ':' (US-ASCII (ASCII character 0x3A)
and a decimal port number in US-ASCII. ASCII.
A hostname host name MUST be in US-ASCII ASCII (as per RFC 1123);
internationalized hostnames host names MUST be encoded as A-labels as
specified in RFC 5890. The hostname host name is followed by a
colon ':' (US-ASCII (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port
number in US-ASCII. ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified
whenever possible.
Values of this textual convention are not guaranteed to be
directly usable as transport layer transport-layer addressing information,
potentially requiring additional processing, such as
run-time resolution. As such, applications that write
them MUST be prepared for handling errors if such values
are not
supported, supported or cannot be resolved (if resolution
occurs at the time of the management operation).
The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that
may have SnmpTLSAddress values MUST fully describe how
(and when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses
and vice versa.
This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in
object
definitions definitions, since it restricts addresses to a
specific format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used
either on its own or in conjunction with
TransportAddressType or TransportDomain as a pair.
When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an
index object, there may be issues with the limit of 128
sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58). It is
RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual
convention make explicit any limitations on index
component lengths that management software MUST observe.
This MAY be done either by either 1) including SIZE constraints
on the index components or by 2) specifying applicable
constraints in the conceptual row row's DESCRIPTION clause or
in the surrounding documentation."
REFERENCE
"RFC 1123: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and
Support
RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
(IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework
RFC 5952: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text
Representation"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))
SnmpTLSFingerprint ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1x:1x"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
other data of potentially arbitrary length.
An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet one-octet
hashing algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint
value. The
1-octet one-octet identifier value encoded is taken
from the IANA SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry. 'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry. The
remaining octets of the SnmpTLSFingerprint value are
filled using the results of the hashing algorithm.
Historically, the 1-octet one-octet hashing algorithm identifier
was based on the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry 'TLS HashAlgorithm' registry
(RFC 5246); however, this registry is no longer in use for
TLS 1.3 and above and are is not expected to have any new
registrations added to it. To allow the fingerprint
algorithm to support additional hashing algorithms that
might be used by later versions of (D)TLS, the octet value
encoded is now taken from the IANA SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry.
'SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms' registry. The initial values
within this registry are identical to the values in the TLS HashAlgorithm
'TLS HashAlgorithm' registry but can be extended to
support new hashing algorithms as needed.
This TEXTUAL-CONVENTION textual convention allows for a zero-length (blank)
SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the
fingerprint value MAY be optional. MIB definitions or
implementations MAY refuse to accept a zero-length value
as appropriate."
REFERENCE "https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
smi-numbers.xhtml"
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255))
-- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ snmpTlstmIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for this
certificate. The value of the tmSecurityName to use is
specified in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData' column. The
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData' column MUST contain a non-zero length
SnmpAdminString compliant value
non-zero-length SnmpAdminString-compliant value, or the
mapping described in this row MUST be considered a
failure."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a tmSecurityName.
The
local part local-part of the rfc822Name is passed unaltered unaltered, but
the
host-part domain of the name MUST be passed in lowercase.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
equivalent subjectAltName rfc822Name values and
tmSecurityName values values, except that the host-part domain of the
name MUST be passed in lowercase.
Example rfc822Name Field: field: FooBar@Example.COM is mapped to
tmSecurityName: FooBar@example.com."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 }
snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a tmSecurityName after
first converting it to all lowercase (RFC 5280 does not
specify converting to lowercase, so this involves an extra
step). This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence
between subjectAltName dNSName values and the
tmSecurityName values."
REFERENCE
"RFC 5280 - 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile." Profile"
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 }
snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a tmSecurityName by
transforming the binary encoded binary-encoded address as follows:
1) for For IPv4, the value is converted into a
decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1').
2) for For IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a 32-
character all lowercase
32-character all-lowercase hexadecimal string
without any colon separators.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName iPAddress values and the tmSecurityName
values.
The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is the
maximum length supported by the View-Based View-based Access Control
Model (VACM). Using both an IPv6 address while the Transport Security Model's support for
transport prefixes value of
snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix is 'true' (see the SNMP-TSM-MIB's
snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object for details)
SNMP-TSM-MIB, as defined in RFC 5591) will result in
securityName lengths that exceed what the VACM can handle."
REFERENCE
"RFC 5591: Transport Security Model for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)"
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 }
snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps any of the following fields using the corresponding
mapping algorithms:
|------------+----------------------------|
| Type | Algorithm |
|------------+----------------------------|
| rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name |
| dNSName | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName |
| iPAddress | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress |
|------------+----------------------------|
The first matching subjectAltName value found contained in the certificate
that matches any of the above types MUST be used when
deriving the tmSecurityName. The mapping algorithm
specified in the 'Algorithm' column of the corresponding
row MUST be used to derive the tmSecurityName.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values. The
three sub-mapping algorithms produced by this combined
algorithm cannot produce conflicting results between
themselves."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }
snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName after
converting it to a UTF-8 encoding. The usage of
CommonNames is deprecated deprecated, and users are encouraged to use
subjectAltName mapping methods instead. This mapping
results in a 1:1 correspondence between certificate
CommonName values and tmSecurityName values."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 }
-- The snmpTlstmSession Group
snmpTlstmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an openSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an openSession() request failed to
open a session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 }
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new
connection from a client and has received at least one
SNMP message through it."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 }
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 }
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing message was dropped
because the session associated with the passed
tmStateReference was no longer (or was never) available."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an incoming session was not
established on a (D)TLS server because the presented
client certificate was invalid. Reasons for invalidation
include, but are not limited to, cryptographic validation
failures or lack of a suitable mapping row in the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 }
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing session was not
established on a (D)TLS client because the server
certificate presented by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was
invalid because no configured fingerprint or Certification
Authority (CA) was acceptable to validate it. This may
result because there was no entry in the
snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path could be found to a known CA." CA could
be found."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing session was not
established on a (D)TLS client because the server
certificate presented by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could
not be validated even if the fingerprint or expected
validation path was known. That is, a cryptographic
validation error occurred during certificate validation
processing.
Reasons for invalidation include, but are not limited to,
cryptographic validation failures."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 }
-- Configuration Objects
snmpTlstmConfig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 }
-- Certificate mapping
snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {snmpTlstmConfig 1}
{ snmpTlstmConfig 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
been modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS
client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName.
On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's
presented certificate MUST either MUST be validated based on an
established trust anchor, anchor or it MUST directly match a
fingerprint in this table. This table does not provide
any mechanisms for configuring the trust anchors; the
transfer of any needed trusted certificates for path
validation is expected to occur through an out-of-band
transfer.
Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by via
path validation or by directly matching a fingerprint in
this table), this table is consulted to determine the
appropriate tmSecurityName to identify with the remote
connection. This is done by considering each active row
from this table in prioritized order according to its
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value. Each row's
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value determines whether the
row is a match for the incoming connection:
1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
identifies the presented certificate, then consider
the row as a successful match.
2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA
certificate and that CA certificate was used to
validate the path to the presented certificate, then
consider the row as a successful match.
Once a matching row has been found, the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine
how the tmSecurityName to associate with the session
should be determined. See the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType'
column's DESCRIPTION clause for details on determining the
tmSecurityName value. If it is impossible to determine a
tmSecurityName from the row's data combined with the data
presented in the certificate, then additional rows MUST be
searched looking to look for another potential match. If a
resulting tmSecurityName mapped from a given row is not
compatible with the needed requirements of a
tmSecurityName (e.g., the VACM imposes a 32-octet-maximum
length and the certificate derived certificate-derived securityName could be
longer), then it MUST be considered an invalid match and
additional rows MUST be searched looking to look for another
potential match.
If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection
MUST be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over
it.
Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable acceptable, and
implementations SHOULD continue to the next highest numbered
next-highest-numbered row. It is RECOMMENDED that
administrators skip index values to leave room for the
insertion of future rows (for example, use values of 10
and 20 when creating initial rows).
Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with
subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames so
that tmSecurityNames.
This allows all child certificates of a single root CA
certificate can allow all child
certificate's subjectAltName to map include a subjectAltName that maps directly
to a tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation. However,
this table is flexible flexible, to allow for situations where
existing deployed certificate infrastructures do not provide
adequate subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames.
Certificates MAY also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using
the CommonName portion of the Subject field. However, the
usage of the CommonName field is deprecated deprecated, and thus this
usage is NOT RECOMMENDED. Direct mapping from each
individual certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is
also possible but requires one entry in the table per
tmSecurityName and requires more management operations to
completely configure a device."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 3 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable that specifies a
mapping for an incoming (D)TLS certificate to a
tmSecurityName to use for a connection."
INDEX { snmpTlstmCertToTSNID }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID Unsigned32,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType AutonomousType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OCTET STRING,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique, prioritized index for the given entry. Lower
numbers indicate a higher priority."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE(1..255)) (SIZE (1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate. The results
of a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted
CA in the certificate validation path or to the certificate
itself is dictated by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType'
column."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AutonomousType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName
from a certificate. Details for mapping of a particular
type SHALL be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the OBJECT-
IDENTITY
OBJECT-IDENTITY that describes the mapping. If a mapping succeeds
succeeds, it will return a tmSecurityName for use by the
TLSTM model and processing stops. will stop.
If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the
needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., the VACM
imposes a 32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived
certificate-derived securityName could be longer), then
future rows MUST be searched for additional
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches to look for a
mapping that succeeds.
Suitable values for assigning to this object that are
defined within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree."
DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) (SIZE (0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information
for a given mapping specified by the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType' column. Only some mapping
systems will make use of this column. The value in this
column MUST be ignored for any mapping type that does not
require that data be present in this column."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
to any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be
used to create or remove rows from this table.
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
instance of the snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus 'snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus' column is
notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint',
'snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType', and snmpTlstmCertToTSNData 'snmpTlstmCertToTSNData'
columns have been set.
The following objects MUST NOT be modified while the
value of this object is active(1):
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 }
-- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the
-- SNMP-TARGET-MIB
snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the
snmpTlstmParamsTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 }
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
been modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 }
snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
connection is being set up using an entry in the
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate
to use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 }
snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a
locally held certificate for a given
snmpTargetParamsEntry. The values in this row SHOULD be
ignored if the connection that needs to be established, as
indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB infrastructure, is not a certificate
certificate-based and (D)TLS based (D)TLS-based connection. The
connection SHOULD NOT be established if the certificate
fingerprint stored in this entry does not point to a valid
locally held certificate or if it points to an unusable
certificate (such as might happen when the certificate's
expiration date has been reached)."
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName }
::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This object stores the hash of the public portion of a
locally held X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate,
its public key, and the corresponding private key will be
used when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS
client."
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
to any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be
used to create or remove rows from this table.
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
instance of the snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus 'snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus' column is
notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint 'snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint'
column has been set.
The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object MUST NOT be
modified while the value of this object is active(1).
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the
snmpTlstmAddrTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 }
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not
been modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 }
snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
connection is being set up using an entry in the
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the
correct server has been reached. This verification can
use either 1) a certificate fingerprint, fingerprint or 2) an
identity authenticated via certification path validation.
If there is an active row in this table corresponding to
the entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to
establish the
connection, connection and the row's snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint' column has a non-empty
value, then the server's presented certificate is compared
with the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity
'snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity' column is ignored). If the
fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded. If
the fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST
be closed.
If the server's presented certificate has passed
certification path validation [RFC5280] (RFC 5280) to a configured
trust anchor, anchor and an active row exists with a zero-length
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity
'snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity' column contains the expected
host name. This expected host name is then compared
against the server's certificate as follows:
- Implementations MUST support matching the expected
host name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName
extension field and MAY support checking the name
against the CommonName portion of the subject
distinguished name.
- The '*' (ASCII 0x2a) 0x2A) wildcard character is allowed in
the dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in common
name,
CommonName, if used to store the host name), but
only as the
left-most leftmost (least significant) DNS label
in that value. This wildcard matches any left-most leftmost
DNS label in the server name. That is, the subject
*.example.com matches the server names a.example.com
and b.example.com, b.example.com but does not match example.com or
a.b.example.com. Implementations MUST support
wildcards in certificates as specified above, above but MAY
provide a configuration option to disable them.
- If the locally configured name is an
internationalized domain name, conforming
implementations MUST convert it to the ASCII
Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing
comparisons, as specified in Section 7 of [RFC5280]. RFC 5280.
If the expected host name fails these conditions conditions, then the
connection MUST be closed.
If there is no row in this table corresponding to the
entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be
authorized by another, implementation-dependent means,
then the connection MAY still proceed."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 }
snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's
fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry. The values
in this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that needs
to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS based (D)TLS-based connection. If an
snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry,
then the presented server certificate MUST match or the
connection MUST NOT be established. If a row in this
table does not exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row,
then the connection SHOULD still proceed if some other certificate
validation
certification path validation algorithm (e.g., RFC 5280)
can be used."
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity SnmpAdminString,
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate. This
object should store the hash of the public X.509
certificate that the remote server should present during
the (D)TLS connection setup. The fingerprint of the
presented certificate and this hash value MUST match
exactly, or the connection MUST NOT be established."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The reference identity to check against the identity
presented by the remote system."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access
to any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object may be
used to create or remove rows from this table.
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set
this object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
instance of the snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus 'snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus' column is
notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint 'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint'
column has been set.
Rows MUST NOT be active if the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
'snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint' column is blank and the
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to
'*' '*', since this
would insecurely accept any presented certificate.
The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object MUST NOT be
modified while the value of this object is active(1).
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an
SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured
fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it. This may
be because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or
because no path could be found to a known Certification
Authority. CA could be found.
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
notification."
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 }
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates}
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an
SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the
fingerprint or expected validation path was known.
That is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during
certificate validation processing.
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
notification."
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 }
snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 }
-- ************************************************
-- Compliance statements
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB"
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB."
MODULE
MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup,
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup,
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup,
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup }
::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 }
-- ************************************************
-- Units of conformance
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmSessionOpens,
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses,
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts,
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses,
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates,
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining statistical
information of an SNMP engine that implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model."
TLSTM."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 }
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining incoming
connection certificate mappings to tmSecurityNames of an
SNMP engine that implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model." TLSTM."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 }
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmParamsCount,
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint,
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType,
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus,
snmpTlstmAddrCount,
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity,
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType,
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining outgoing
connection certificates to use when opening connections as
a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 }
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
NOTIFICATIONS {
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown,
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notifications"
"Notifications."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 }
END
]]> </sourcecode>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-5" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Security Considerations</name>
<t> This document updates a transport model that permits SNMP to utilize (D)TLS security
services. The security threats and how the TLS transport model TLSTM mitigates these threats are
covered throughout this document and in <xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/>. Security
considerations for TLS are described in Section 10
Section <xref target="RFC8446" section="10" sectionFormat="bare"/> and Appendix E
Appendix <xref target="RFC8446" section="E" sectionFormat="bare"/> of TLS 1.3
<xref
target="RFC8446" format="default"/>. target="RFC8446"/>. Security considerations for DTLS are described in Section 11 <xref target="RFC9147" sectionFormat="bare" section="11"/> of
DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147" format="default"/>.</t> target="RFC9147"/>.</t>
<t>Implementations should consider the latest recommendations on the use of (DTLS), such as
that
those documented in <xref target="RFC9325" format="default"/>.</t>
<t> SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network
itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec), there is no control as to who
on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the
objects in this MIB module.</t>
<t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that only SNMPv3 messages using the Transport Security
Model (TSM) or another secure-transport aware secure-transport-aware security model be sent over the TLSTM transport.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-6" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>IANA is asked to create has created a new registry called "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" within the SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry in the Structure "Structure of Management Information
(SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) Group and to update the
proposed URL reference in the above MIB (listed as
"https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml"
under SnmpTLSFingerprint), if needed, to accurately reflect its
location. Registrations)" group. The description of this registry should be:
iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmpTlstmMIB.snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms
(1.3.6.1.2.1.198.4). IANA is also asked to either 1) create the
snmp-tlstm-reg-review@ietf.org email address that appears later
within this section or 2) update the email address to an appropriate
address.</t>
"iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmpTlstmMIB.snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms
(1.3.6.1.2.1.198.4)".</t>
<t>The registry should have has the following fields: value, description,
recommended, Value, Description,
Recommended, and reference. References. The range of values is zero to 255,
with initial assignments shown in Section 2.1. <xref target="sect-2.1"/>. The "recommended" "Recommended"
column indicates "Y" for hashing algorithms that are standards
track Standards
Track and are deemed to be acceptable for widely applicable
current use and "N" for hashing algorithms that
reflect meanings that are not recommended (e.g., they do not
provide sufficient security for modern systems, they are not
standards track,
Standards Track, and they have limited applicability). A
blank field indicates that no recommendation is made (e.g.,
because the value is reserved unassigned or left for private use).</t>
<t>This registry is expected to be updated infrequently and, infrequently; as such,
its values are limited to one octet.</t>
<t>The policy for updates to the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry
is Expert Review. Review <xref target="RFC8126"/>. Registry requests should be sent to the
<snmp-tlstm-reg-review@ietf.org>
<eref brackets="angle" target="mailto:snmp-tlstm-reg-review@ietf.org"/> mailing list. Registration requests
sent to the mailing list for review SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use an appropriate
subject (e.g., "Request 'Request to register value in SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry"). "SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithms" registry'). In addition, designated experts should
consult with the tls-reg-review@ietf.org
<eref brackets="angle" target="mailto:tls-reg-review@ietf.org"/> mailing list to make sure
that any new hash algorithms are considered for inclusion in this
registry. </t>
<t>Designated experts SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ascertain the existence of suitable
documentation that defines a hash algorithm and SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also verify
that the request does not conflict with or duplicate other entries in the
registry. The experts should also provide a recommendation as to how
the recommended "Recommended" column of the registry should be updated. Only
publicly available specifications that represent current industry-
accepted practices should receive an assignment of "Y" in the
recommneded
"Recommended" column; all other specific assignments in the registry
should receive an assignment of "N". Assignments that are inspecific nonspecific (e.g.,
reserved values) SHOULD not <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> receive an assigned value for the
recommended column. </t>
"Recommended" column.</t>
<t>Within the three-week review period, the designated experts will
either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this
decision to the review list and IANA. Denials SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include an
explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the
request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days three weeks can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the <iesg@ietf.org> <eref brackets="angle" target="mailto:iesg@ietf.org"/> mailing list) for resolution.</t>
<t>IANA MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only accept registry updates from the designated experts
and SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. While future additions to the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm
Registry "TLS HashAlgorithm"
registry (i.e., the registry from which the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm
Registry "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms"
registry was spawned) are not expected, any future addition additions to the
IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry MUST
"TLS HashAlgorithm" registry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be consistent with the values
assigned in the IANA SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry.</t> "SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithms" registry.</t>
<t>It is suggested that multiple designated experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review reviews of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert,
expert, that Expert SHOULD expert <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> defer to the judgment of the other Experts.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sect-7" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>This document is based on <xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/>.
This document was reviewed by the following people who helped provide
useful comments: Michaela Vanderveen, Joe Clarke, Jurgen Schonwalder,
and Tom Petch. </t> experts.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references>
<name>References</name>
<references>
<name>Normative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1123.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1123.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3410.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5952.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5952.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6353.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6353.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/>
<referencegroup anchor="STD58"> anchor="STD58" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std58">
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2578.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2578.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2579.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2579.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2580.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2580.xml"/>
</referencegroup>
<referencegroup anchor="STD62"> anchor="STD62"
target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std62">
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3411.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3411.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3412.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3412.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3413.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3413.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3414.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3414.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3415.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3415.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3416.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3416.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3417.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3417.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3418.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3418.xml"/>
</referencegroup>
</references>
<references>
<name>Informative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5591.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5953.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5953.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8422.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8447.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8422.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8996.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8447.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8996.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9150.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9325.xml"/> href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9150.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9325.xml"/>
</references>
</references>
<section anchor="acks" numbered="false" toc="default">
<name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>This document is based on <xref target="RFC6353" format="default"/>.
This document was reviewed by the following people, who helped provide
useful comments: <contact fullname="Michaela Vanderveen"/>, <contact fullname="Joe Clarke"/>, <contact fullname="Jürgen Schönwälder"/>,
and <contact fullname="Tom Petch"/>. </t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>