<?xmlversion='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <!-- This ID was written based on the davies-template-bare-06.xml available on https://tools.ietf.org/tools/templates/ The template was designed for creating an Internet Draft using xml2rfc, which is available here: http://xml.resource.org . -->version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE rfc [<!-- declare nbsp and friends --><!ENTITY nbsp" ">" "> <!ENTITY zwsp "​"> <!ENTITY nbhy"‑">"‑"> <!ENTITY wj"⁠"> ]><?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?> <?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?> <!-- For a complete list and description of processing instructions (PIs), please see http://xml.resource.org/authoring/README.html. --> <?rfc strict="yes" ?> <?rfc toc="yes"?> <?rfc tocdepth="4"?> <!-- the number of levels of subsections in ToC. default: 3 --> <?rfc symrefs="yes"?> <?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?> <?rfc compact="yes" ?> <?rfc subcompact="no" ?> <?rfc iprnotified="no" ?> <!-- end of list of popular I-D processing instructions -->"⁠"> ]> <rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="true" updates="4210, 5912, 6712" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23" number="9480" ipr="trust200902" obsoletes=""submissionType="IETF"xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" tocDepth="4" symRefs="true" sortRefs="true"consensus="true"version="3"> <front> <title abbrev="CMP Updates">Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates</title> <seriesInfoname="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23"/> <!-- add 'role="editor"' below for the editors if appropriate --> <!-- Another author who claims to be an editor -->name="RFC" value="9480"/> <author fullname="Hendrik Brockhaus" initials="H."surname="Brockhaus" role="editor">surname="Brockhaus"> <organization abbrev="Siemens">Siemens</organization> <address> <postal> <street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street> <code>80333</code> <city>Munich</city> <country>Germany</country> </postal> <email>hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</email> <uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri> </address> </author> <author fullname="David von Oheimb" initials="D." surname="von Oheimb"> <organization abbrev="Siemens">Siemens</organization> <address> <postal> <street>Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1</street> <code>80333</code> <city>Munich</city> <country>Germany</country> </postal> <email>david.von.oheimb@siemens.com</email> <uri>https://www.siemens.com</uri> </address> </author> <author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray"> <organization abbrev="Entrust">Entrust</organization> <address> <postal> <street>1187 Park Place</street> <region>MN</region> <code>55379</code> <city>Minneapolis</city> <country>United States of America</country> </postal> <email>john.gray@entrust.com</email> <uri>https://www.entrust.com</uri> </address> </author> <dateyear="2022"/> <!-- If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, xml2rfc will fill in the current day for you. If only the current year is specified, xml2rfc will fill in the current day and month for you. If the year is not the current one, it is necessary to specify at least a month (xml2rfc assumes day="1" if not specified for the purpose of calculating the expiry date). With drafts it is normally sufficient to specify just the year. --> <area>Internet</area> <workgroup>LAMPS Working Group</workgroup> <!-- WG name at the upperleft corner of the doc, IETF is fine for individual submissions. If this element is not present, the default is "Network Working Group", which is used by the RFC Editor as a nod to the history of the IETF. -->year="2023" month="October"/> <area>sec</area> <workgroup>lamps</workgroup> <keyword>CMP</keyword> <abstract> <t>This document contains a set of updates to the syntaxand transferof Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version2.2 and its HTTP transfer mechanism. This document updatesRFCRFCs 4210,RFC5912, andRFC6712.</t> <t>The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, and well-known URI path segments.</t> <t>CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue andsignalingsignal the use of an explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as needed.</t> </abstract> </front> <middle> <section anchor="Introduction" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Introduction</name><t>[RFC Editor:</t> <t>Please perform the following substitution.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>RFCXXXX --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft</li> </ul> <t>Please update the following references to associated drafts in progress to reflect their final RFC assignments, if possible:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms</li> <li>I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile</li> <li>I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport</li> </ul> <t>]</t><t>While using <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">CMP</xref> in industrial andIoTInternet of Things environments and developing the <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile"target="RFC9483" format="default">Lightweight CMPProfile</xref>Profile</xref>, some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>format="default"/> to overcome these limitations.</t> <t>Amongothers,other updates, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, whichmeans to be flexible to react onallows more flexibility for future advances in cryptography.</t> <t>This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP endpoints on registration and certification authorities.</t><t>As the<t>The main content of <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref> stays unchanged, thisformat="default"/> remains unchanged. This document lists all sections that are updated, replaced, or added to the current text of the respective RFCs.</t> <t>The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to read because the original RFCs must be read along with this document to get the complete content. The working group decided to use this approach in order to keep the changes to <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>format="default"/> to the required minimum. This was meant to speed up the editorial process and to minimize the effort spent on reviewing thewholefull text of the original documents.</t> <t>However, <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis" format="default"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis" format="default"/> are intended to obsolete RFCs 4210 and 6712, respectively; these documents also include the changes listed in this document.</t> <section anchor="Convention_Terminology" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Convention and Terminology</name><t>The<t> The key words"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY","<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and"OPTIONAL""<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14BCP 14 <xreftarget="RFC2119" format="default"/>target="RFC2119"/> <xreftarget="RFC8174" format="default"/>target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shownhere.</t>here. </t> <t keepWithNext="true">Technical terminology is used in conformance with <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>,format="default"/>, <xref target="RFC4211"format="default">RFC 4211</xref>,format="default"/>, and <xref target="RFC5280"format="default">RFC 5280</xref>.format="default"/>. The following key words are used:</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal"indent="6">indent="7"> <dt>CA:</dt> <dd>Certification authority, which issues certificates.</dd> <dt>RA:</dt> <dd>Registration authority, an optional system component to which a CA delegates certificate managementfunctionsfunctions, such as authorization checks.</dd> <dt>KGA:</dt> <dd>Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of an EE. The KGA could beco-locatedcolocated with an RA or a CA.</dd> <dt>EE:</dt> <dd>End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject of the certificate.</dd> </dl> </section> </section> <section anchor="CMP-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)</name> <section anchor="CMP-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section1.1.1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210</name> <t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>.format="default"/>. They are always related to the base specification. Hence, references to the original sections in <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> are used whenever possible.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this sectionat the end ofafter the currentSection 1:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="1"/>:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210</t> <t>The following updates are made in this document:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>Add<li>Adding new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., registration authority and certification authority, to express the authorization of the entity identified in the certificate containing the respective extended key usage extensionto actthat acts as the indicated PKI management entity.</li><li>Extend<li>Extending the description of multiple protection to cover additional use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.</li> <li>Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Notethatthat, according to <xref target="RFC4211"format="default">RFC 4211</xref> section 2.1.format="default" sectionFormat="comma" section="2.1"/>, point99, the use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData structure. <xref target="RFC4211"format="default">RFC 4211</xref>format="default"/> offers the EncryptedKeystructure,structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of completeness andconsistencyconsistency, the type EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences in <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>.format="default"/>. This includes the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue,theCMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.</li> <li>Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatussupportingthat supports confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, e.g.,EdDSA,preparing for upcoming post quantum algorithms, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to use to compute the certHash.</li> <li>Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a root CA update, a certificate request template, or aCRLCertificate Revocation List (CRL) update.</li><li>Extend<li>Extending the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and error messages.</li><li>Delete<li>Deleting the mandatory algorithm profile in <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210 Appendix D.2</xref>format="default" sectionFormat="of" section="D.2"/> andreferreferring to <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms"target="RFC9481" sectionFormat="of" section="7" format="default">CMPAlgorithms Section 7</xref>.</li>Algorithms</xref>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="CMP-4.5" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage</name> <t>The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end entities.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this sectionat the end of the current Section 4:</t>after <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="4.4.3"/>:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">4.5. Extended Key Usage</t> <t>TheExtended Key Usageextended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for which the certified key pair may be used.It thereforeTherefore, it restricts the use of a certificate to specific applications.</t> <t>A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this delegation and enable an automated means for checking the authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.</t> <t>To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be issued by the delegating CA andMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the respective EKUs. This proves the authorization of this entity bythedelegating CA to act in the givenrolerole, as described below.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 } id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 } ]]></sourcecode> <t>Note: <xref target="RFC6402"format="default">RFC 6402 section 2.10</xref>section="2.10" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> specifies OIDs for aCMCCertificate Management over CMS (CMC) CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific tousing CMC or CMP as theany certificate managementprotocol,protocol (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs arere-usedreused by CMP.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="10"> <dt>CMP KGA:</dt> <dd>CMPKey Generation Authoritieskey generation authorities are CAs or are identified by the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This is a very sensitive service and needs specific authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate itself. The CA may delegate its authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used to authenticate the origin of the generated private key. The authorization may also be determined through local configuration of the end entity.</dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.1.1.5.1.1 - PKI Message Header</name><t>Section 5.1.1 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.1.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the PKI message header. This document introduces the new version33, indicating support of EnvelopedData as specified in <xreftarget="CMP-5.2.2" />.</t>target="CMP-5.2.2"/> and hashAlg as specified in <xref target="CMP-5.3.18"/>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1Syntaxsyntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description of pvno with the following text:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), cmp2021(3) }, sender GeneralName, recipient GeneralName, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String ]]></sourcecode> <t>The usage ofpvno valuesthe protocol version number (pvno) is described in Section7.</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="7"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.1.3" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section5.1.1.3.5.1.1.3 - CertProfile</name><t>Section 5.1.1 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.1.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces id-it-certProfile.</t> <t>Insert this section afterSection 5.1.1.2:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.1.1.2"/>:</t> <t>5.1.1.3. CertProfile</t> <t>This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles, e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate requesttemplate,template; see Section 5.3.19.16.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String ]]></sourcecode> <t>When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the valueMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain more elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given order.</t> <t>When used in a p10cr, the valueMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain multiple certificate profile names.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.1.3.1.5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information</name><t>Section 5.1.3.1 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.1.3.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes theMAC basedprotection of a PKIMessage based on message authentication code (MAC) using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.</t> <t>Replace the first paragraph with the following text:</t> <t>In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protectionAlgMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be one of the options described in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms"target="RFC9481" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>. The PasswordBasedMac is specified as follows (see also <xref target="RFC4211" format="default"></xref> and <xref target="RFC9045" format="default"></xref>):</t> <t>Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 2616):</t> <t>Note: It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the fields of PBMParameter remain constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with PasswordBasedMac computation.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.1.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection</name><t>Section 5.1.3.4 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.1.3.4" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the nested message. This document also enables using nested messagesalsofor batch-delivery transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body types.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection</t> <t>When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI managemententityentity, such as anRA MAYRA, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> forward that message along with adding its own protection (which is a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Additionally, multiple PKI messagesMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be aggregated. There are several use cases for such messages.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and forwards the original message unchanged.</li> <li>The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwardingthem, thenthem; then, itMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate request, the RAMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the popo field to RAVerified. ItMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section5.3.19<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section= "5.3.19"/> for the value ofid-it)id-it), and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contentsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be in the same order as the message in PKIBody).</li> <li>A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch downstream (towards anRA,RA but not to the EE).ThisFor instance, this canfor instancebe used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI management entities.</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.2.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Replace Section5.2.2.5.2.2 - Encrypted Values</name><t>Section 5.2.2 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.2.2" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the use of EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.2.2. Encrypted Values</t> <t>Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, certificates, or revocation passphrase)areis sent in PKI messages, the EncryptedKey data structure is used.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } ]]></sourcecode> <t>See <xref target="RFC4211"format="default">CRMF</xref>format="default">Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)</xref> for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS</xref>format="default">Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</xref> for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use EnvelopedData.</t> <t>Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF</xref> is reused here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-the-wire compatible with the old syntax.</t> <t>To indicate support forEnvelopedDataEnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been introduced. Details on the usage ofpvno values isthe protocol version number (pvno) are described in Section7.</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="7"/>.</t> <t>The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">EnvelopedData is used as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content is encrypted only for one recipient.</li> <li>It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackagestructurestructure, as defined in <xref target="RFC5958"format="default">RFC 5958</xref>format="default"/>, that is wrapped in a SignedDatastructurestructure, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS section 5</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="5">CMS</xref> and <xref target="RFC8933"format="default"/>format="default"/>, and signed by the Key Generation Authority.</li> <li>It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the encryptedContent field.</li> </ul> <t>The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS section 6</xref>, MUSTsectionFormat="of" section="6">CMS</xref>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encrypted using a newly generated symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption keyMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key management techniques. </t> <t keepWithNext="true">The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender depends on the credential available at the recipient:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>Recipient's<li>recipient's certificatethat containswith an algorithm identifier and a public key that supports key transport and where any given key usage extensionasserting keyAgreement:allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be protected using the keyagreementtransport key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS section 6.2.2</xref>. This is the preferred technique.</li> <li>Recipient'ssectionFormat="of" section="6.2.1">CMS</xref>.</li> <li>recipient's certificatethat containswith an algorithm identifier and a public key that supports key agreement and where any given key usage extensionasserting keyEncipherment:allows keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be protected using the keytransportagreement key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS section 6.2.1</xref>.</li> <li>AsectionFormat="of" section="6.2.2">CMS</xref>.</li> <li>a password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be protected using the password-based key management technique, as specified in <xref target="RFC5652"format="default">CMS section 6.2.4</xref>.</li>sectionFormat="of" section="6.2.4">CMS</xref>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.2.9" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime</name> <t>The following subsectionpointpoints implementers to[RFC5280]<xref target="RFC5280"/> regarding usage of GeneralizedTime.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section afterSection 5.2.8.4:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.2.8.4"/>:</t> <t>5.2.9 GeneralizedTime</t> <t>GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type andSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used as specified in <xref target="RFC5280"format="default">RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5.2</xref>.</t>section="4.1.2.5.2" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.3.4.5.3.4 - Certification Response</name><t>Section 5.3.4 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.3.4" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the Certification Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead ofEncryptedValueEncryptedValue, as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above. Additionally, it clarifies the certReqId to be used in response to a p10cr message.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, --seeSee [RFC4211] forcommentcomments onencodingencoding. publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { certificate [0] CMPCertificate, encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey } ]]></sourcecode> <t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:</t> <t>A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo datastructurestructure, as specified in <xref target="RFC2986"format="default">PKCS#10</xref>format="default">PKCS #10</xref>, but no certReqId. Therefore, the certReqId in the correspondingcertification responseCertification Response (cp) messageMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set to -1.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:</t> <t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section5.2.2.</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2.2"/>.</t> <t>Note: To indicate support forEnvelopedDataEnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been introduced. Details on the usage of differentpvno valuesprotocol version numbers (pvno) are described in Section7.</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="7"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.18" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.3.18.5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content</name> <t>This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, certReqId INTEGER, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL } ]]></sourcecode> <t>The hashAlg fieldSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used only in exceptional cases where the signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlgMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash valueSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.3.19.2.5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types</name> <t>The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Types on referencingECelliptic curves.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this note at the end ofSection 5.3.19.2:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.19.2"/>:</t> <t>Note: In case severalECelliptic curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480"format="default">RFC 5480</xref>format="default"/> need to be given, one per named curve.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.3" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section5.3.19.3.5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types</name> <t>The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types on referencingECelliptic curves.</t> <t>Insert this note at the end ofSection 5.3.19.3:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.19.3"/>:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Note: In case severalECelliptic curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements as defined in <xref target="RFC5480"format="default">RFC 5480</xref>needformat="default"/> need to be given, one per named curve.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.9" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Replace Section5.3.19.9.5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase</name><t>Section 5.3.19.9 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.3.19.9" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport thisinformationinformation, as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase</t> <t>ThisMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate the request). See AppendixB<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="B"/> for further details on the use of this mechanism.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > ]]></sourcecode> <t>The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section5.2.2.</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2.2"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.14" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates</name> <t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-caCerts. The intended use is specified in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweighttarget="RFC9483" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMPProfile Section 4.3</xref>.</t>Profile</xref>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section afterSection 5.3.19.13:</t><xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.19.13"/>:</t> <tkeepWithNext="true">2.3.19.14keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.14. CA Certificates</t> <t>ThisMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get CA certificates.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate | < absent > ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.15" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update</name> <t>The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweighttarget="RFC9483" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP ProfileSection 4.3</xref>.</t></xref>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.14:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update</t> <t>ThisMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get an update of a root CA certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message. In contrast to the ckuannmessagemessage, this approach follows the request/response model.</t> <t>The EESHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate ifavailable, otherwiseavailable; otherwise, the public key value of the trustanchor.</t>anchor is given.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } ]]></sourcecode> <t>Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.19.16" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template</name> <t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified inthe<xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweighttarget="RFC9483" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMP ProfileSection 4.3</xref>.</t></xref>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.15:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template</t> <t>ThisMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get a template containing requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLenMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to certify.</t> <t>The id-regCtrl-algId controlMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used to identify a cryptographicalgorithm, seealgorithm (see <xref target="RFC5280"format="default">RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7</xref>,section="4.1.2.7" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/>) other than rsaEncryption. The algorithm fieldSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> identify a cryptographic algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the elliptic curve to beused,used; see <xref target="RFC5480" format="default"/>.</t> <t>The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen controlSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used for algorithm rsaEncryption andSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> contain the intended modulus bit length of the RSA key.</t> <t keepWithNext="true"/> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, keySpec Controls OPTIONAL } Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) ]]></sourcecode> <t>The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplateMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec fieldMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key lengthMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used.</t> <t>Note: TheControlscontrols ASN.1 type is defined in <xref target="RFC4211"format="default">CRMF Section 6</xref></t>sectionFormat="of" section="6">CRMF</xref>.</t> </section> <sectionanchor="CMP-5.3.17.17"anchor="CMP-5.3.19.17" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval</name> <t>The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified inthe<xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile">Lightweighttarget="RFC9483" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3">the Lightweight CMPProfile Section 4.3</xref>.Profile</xref>. Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.16:</t> <t>5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval</t> <t>ThisMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shallprovideonly provide those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated by the client.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList | < absent > CRLSource ::= CHOICE { dpn [0] DistributionPointName, issuer [1] GeneralNames } CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { source CRLSource, thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.21" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content</name> <t><xreftarget="RFC4210">Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210</xref>target="RFC4210" section="5.3.21" sectionFormat="of"/> describes the regular use of error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm requests and to error messages.</t> <t>Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following one:</t> <t>This data structureMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used by an EE, CA, or RA to convey errorinfoinformation and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of responses.</t> <t>Replace the second paragraph with the following text:</t> <t>This messageMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. If the client sends this request, the serverMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with a PKIConfirmresponse,response or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE will initiate polling as described in Section5.3.22.<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.3.22"/>. Otherwise, both sidesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat this message as the end of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress).</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-5.3.22" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response</name><t>Section 5.3.22 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="5.3.22" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes when and how polling messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of the terms'rReq''pReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">ReplaceSection 5.3.22<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3.22"/> with following text:</t> <t>This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } ]]></sourcecode> <t>In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status "waiting". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated with an error response messages with status "waiting". The following clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a CertStatus for an issued certificate.</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="%d"> <li>In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status "waiting" and in response to an error message with status "waiting". Its certReqIdMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be either the index of a CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or-1-1, referring to the complete response.</li> <li>In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if one or more of the still pending requested certificates are ready or the final response to some other type of request is available; otherwise, it will return a pollRep.</li> <li>If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another pollReq.</li> <li>If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other response, then this will be treated as the final response to the original request.</li> </ol> <t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine describes polling for individual CertResponse elements.</t><sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ START | v Send ir | ip v Check status of returned <------------------------+ certs | | | +------------------------>|<------------------+ | | | | | | (issued) v (waiting) | | Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to | conf list for each certificate pending list | / | / | (conf list) / (empty conf list) | / ip | / +-----------------+ (empty pending list) / | pollRep END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait | ^ ^ | | | | | +-----------------+ +---------------+ (pending list)]]></sourcecode>]]></artwork> <t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two certificates in one request.</t><sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ Step End Entity PKI -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Format ir 2 -> ir -> 3 Handle ir 4 Manual intervention is required for bothcerts.certs 5 <- ip <- 6 Process ip 7 Format pollReq 8 -> pollReq -> 9 Check status of cert requests 10 Certificates not ready 11 Format pollRep 12 <- pollRep <- 13 Wait 14 Format pollReq 15 -> pollReq -> 16 Check status of cert requests 17 One certificate is ready 18 Format ip 19 <- ip <- 20 Handle ip 21 Format certConf 22 -> certConf -> 23 Handle certConf 24 Format ack 25 <- pkiConf <- 26 Format pollReq 27 -> pollReq -> 28 Check status of certificate 29 Certificate is ready 30 Format ip 31 <- ip <- 31 Handle ip 32 Format certConf 33 -> certConf -> 34 Handle certConf 35 Format ack 36 <- pkiConf <-]]></sourcecode>]]></artwork> <t keepWithNext="true">The following client-side state machine describes polling for a complete response message.</t><sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ Start | | Send request | +----------- Receive response ------------+ | | | ip/cp/kup/error with | other | status "waiting" | response | | v | +------> Polling | | | | | | Send pollReq | | | Receive response | | | | | pollRep | other response | +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+ | v Handle response | v End]]></sourcecode>]]></artwork> <t keepWithNext="true">In the following exchange, theend-entityend entity is sending a general message request, and the response is delayed by the server.</t><sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[ Step End Entity PKI -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Format genm 2 -> genm -> 3 Handle genm 4 delay in response is necessary 5 Format error message "waiting" with certReqId set to -1 6 <- error <- 7 Process error 8 Format pollReq 9 -> pollReq -> 10 Check status of original request general message response not ready 11 Format pollRep 12 <- pollRep <- 13 Wait 14 Format pollReq 15 -> pollReq -> 16 Check status of original request general message response is ready 17 Format genp 18 <- genp <- 19 Handle genp]]></sourcecode>]]></artwork> </section> <section anchor="CMP-7" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation</name><t>Section 7 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="7" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the use of CMPprotocolversions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP versioncmp2021cmp2021, which is introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and hashAlg.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the second paragraph with the following text:</t> <t>If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band means), then itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what version(s) the server supports, then itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send a PKIMessage using the highest version itsupports,supports with the following exception. Version cmp2021SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for the request being sent or for the expected response.</t> <t>Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-7.1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section7.1.1.7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers</name><t>Section 7.1.1 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>section="7.1.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999serverserver, as specified in <xref target="RFC2510"format="default">RFC 2510</xref>.format="default"/>. This document extends the section to clients with any higher version than cmp1999.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first sentence ofSection 7.1.1<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="7.1.1"/> with the following text:</t> <t>If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999, then itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the current transaction.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-8.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection</name> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the CA private key for CMP message protection.</t> <t>Insert this section afterSection 8.3<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="of" section="8.3"/> (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5731):</t> <t>8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection</t> <t>A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for otherpurposespurposes, such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way, exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this particularly critical keyisare reduced to a minimum.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-8.5" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret Information</name> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.</t> <t>Insert this section after the new Section 8.4:</t> <t>8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret Information</t> <t>Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random input. The use of inadequatepseudo-randompseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an example of predictable randomnumbersnumbers, see <xref target="CVE-2008-0166" format="default"/>; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in <xref target="MiningPsQs" format="default">Mining Your Ps and Qs</xref>. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. <xref target="ISO.20543-2019" format="default">ISO/IEC 20543:2019</xref>, <xreftarget="NIST.SP.800-90Ar1"target="NIST_SP_800_90Ar1" format="default">NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1</xref>, <xref target="AIS31" format="default">BSI AIS 31 V2.0</xref>, andothersother specifications offer valuable guidance in this area.</t> <t>If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically securerandom-numberrandom number generator(CSRNG)(CSRNG), it is safe to assume that the entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If no CSRNG is used, the entropy ofashared secret information depends on the details of the generation process and cannot be measured securely after it has been generated. If user-generated passwords are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated keys or trust anchors.</t> <t>If the entropy ofashared secret information protecting the delivery of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret information isre-usedreused for different key pairs, the security of the shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each individual key pair.</t> <t>For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm(a)that is (a) not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret information isre-usedreused for several key management operations, the entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy that at least matches the security strength of the key material being managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., ahuman generatedhuman-generated password. It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that such secret information be limited to a single PKI management operation. </t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-8.6" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</name> <t>The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.</t> <t>Insert this section after the new Section 8.5:</t> <t>8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages</t> <t>A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in configuration management of its clients,MUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include to-be-trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust store.</t> <t>Whenever an EE receives in a CMPmessage, e.g.,message a CA certificate to be used as a trust anchor (for example in the caPubs field of a certificate response or in a generalresponse (genp), a CA certificate for use as a trust anchor,response), itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> properly authenticate the message sender with existing trustanchorsanchor information without requiring the new trust anchors included in the message.</t> <t>Additionally, the EEMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the sender is an authorized source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-8.7" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Add Section 8.7 - AuthorizingrequestsRequests forcertificatesCertificates withspecificSpecific EKUs</name> <t>The following subsection addresses the security considerations to follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific EKUs.</t> <t>Insert this section after new Section 8.6:</t> <t>8.7. AuthorizingrequestsRequests forcertificatesCertificates withspecificSpecific EKUs</t> <t>When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself. Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate containing such an EKU.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-B" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase</name><t>Appendix B of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="B"/> describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above, the description is updated accordingly.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following text:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The OID and value specified in Section5.3.19.9 MAY<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.3.19.9"/> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be sent in a GenMsg message at anytime,time orMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in Section5.2.2<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2.2"/> may be sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics.</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following text:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in <xref target="RFC2985"format="default">RFC 2985</xref>format="default"/> or the valueHint field of EncryptedValueMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="CMP-C" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications</name><t>Appendix C of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="C"/> provides clarifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> above, the description is updated accordingly.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 2615):</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ -- ********** -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment -- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only tocertTemplate,certTemplate but -- * also to the altCertTemplate control. -- ********** -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER- -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only -- * one ofthese,these or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present -- * and MUST be signed. -- ********** ]]></sourcecode> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace thecomment within theASN.1 syntaxcoming after the definitionof POPOPrivKey with the following text:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue, encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData } -- ********** -- * When using CMP V2, thetype of "thisMessage"encrypted value MUST be transferred in -- * the thisMessage field that is given as BIT STRING inRFC 4211[RFC4211], -- *[RFC4211];but itshould be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification).requires EncryptedValue. Therefore, this-- *document makes -- * the behavioral clarification for CMP V2 of specifying-- *that the -- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encodedeitheras an -- *"EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * compatibility)EncryptedValue and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.This-- *allows the necessary conveyance and protection ofWhen using CMP V3, the encrypted value MUST be transferred -- *private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * with RFC4210 and [RFCXXXX].in the encryptedKey field, as specified in Section 5.2.2. -- ********** ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="CMP-D.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles</name><t>Appendix D.1 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="D.1"/> provides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified inAppendix DAppendices <xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="D"/> andAppendix E of<xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>.sectionFormat="bare" section="E"/> of <xref target="RFC4210"/>. This document updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with the following text:</t> <t>Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-D.2" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile</name> <t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="D.2" format="default"/> provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKIManagement Message Profilesmanagement message profiles, as specified in <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">CMP Appendix D.2</xref>.sectionFormat="of" section="D.2">CMP</xref>. This document redirects to the new algorithmprofileprofile, as specified inSection 7.1 of<xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms"target="RFC9481" section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" format="default">CMP Algorithms</xref>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">D.2. Algorithm Use Profile</t> <t>For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms" format="default">CMP Algorithms Section 7.1</xref>.</t>target="RFC9481" sectionFormat="of" section="7.1">CMP Algorithms</xref>.</t> </section> <section anchor="CMP-D.4" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme)</name><t>Appendix D.4 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="D.4" format="default"/> provides the initial registration/certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5201):</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG ]]></sourcecode> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the comment after the privateKey field of crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response message with the following text:</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1" ><![CDATA[ -- see AppendixC, RequestC (Request Message BehavioralClarificationsClarifications) -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue ]]></sourcecode> </section> </section> <section anchor="Trans-Updates" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)</name> <section anchor="Trans-1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update Section1.1 - Introduction</name> <t>To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the introduction of <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>format="default"/> is updated.</t> <t>Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:</t> <t>In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. Additionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at transferlevellevel, regardless of the message contents. Since this document extends the polling mechanism specified in the second version of CMP[RFC4210]<xref target="RFC4210"/> to cover all types of PKI management transactions, delays detected at application level may also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages.</t> </section> <section anchor="Trans-1.1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>New Section1.1.1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712</name> <t>The following subsection describes feature updates to <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>.format="default"/>. They are related to the base specification. Hence, references to the original sections in <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>format="default"/> are used whenever possible.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Insert this sectionat the end ofafter the currentSection 1:</t><xref target="RFC6712" sectionFormat="of" section="1"/>:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The following updates are made in this document:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.</li> <li>Extend the URI structure.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="Trans-3.6" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Replace Section3.6.3.6 - HTTP Request-URI</name><t>Section 3.6 of <xref<t><xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the URIs.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Replace the text of the section with the following text:</t> <t keepWithNext="true">3.6. HTTP Request-URI</t> <t>Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS transferMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as defined in <xref target="RFC8615"format="default">RFC 8615</xref>format="default"/> and the registered name 'cmp' to ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally,OPTIONAL<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> path segmentsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be added after the registered application name as part of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel <name>couldcould, forexampleexample, support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles. Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile"target="RFC9483" format="default">Lightweight CMP Profile</xref>, could indicate PKI management operations using an operationLabel <operation>. Avalidvalid, full CMP URI can look like this:</t> <ul empty="true" spacing="compact"> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp</li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/<operation></li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name></li> <li>http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>/<operation></li> </ul> </section> </section> <section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>IANA Considerations</name> <section anchor="IANA-ASN1" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912</name> <t>This document updates the ASN.1 modules of <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210 Appendix F</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="F" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC5912"format="default">RFC 5912 Section 9</xref>.section="9" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/> as shown in Appendixes <xref target="ASN.1_1988_Modules" format="counter"/> and <xref target="ASN.1_2002_Modules" format="counter"/> of this document, respectively. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02)werehave been registered in theSMI"SMI Security for PKIX ModuleIdentifierIdentifier" registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules.</t> </section> <section anchor="IANA-4210" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210</name> <t>This documentcontains an update toupdates the IANA Consideration sections of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> by adding this content.</t><t>In<section anchor="IANA-EKU" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry</name> <t>IANA has registered the following new entry in theSMI-numbers registry"SMI Security for PKIX Extended KeyPurpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)"Purpose" registry (seehttps://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>, as defined in <xref target="RFC7299"format="default">RFC 7299</xref> one addition has been performed.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">One new entry has been added:</t>format="default"/>:</t> <table anchor="IANA_new_EKU" align="left"> <name>Addition to the SMI Security for PKIX Extended KeyPurpose Identifiers Registry</name>Purpose</name> <thead> <tr> <th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left">32</td> <td align="left">id-kp-cmKGA</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> </tbody> </table><t>In</section> <section anchor="IANA-CMP-IT" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types</name> <t>IANA has registered the following new entries in theSMI-numbers registry"SMI Security for PKIX CMP InformationTypes (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)"Types" registry (seehttps://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RFC7299"format="default">RFC 7299</xref> seven additions have been performed.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Seven new entries have been added:</t>format="default"/>:</t> <table anchor="IANA_new_id-it" align="left"><name>Addition<name>Additions to the PKIX CMP Information Types Registry</name> <thead> <tr> <th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left">17</td> <td align="left">id-it-caCerts</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">18</td> <td align="left">id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">19</td> <td align="left">id-it-certReqTemplate</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">20</td> <td align="left">id-it-rootCaCert</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">21</td> <td align="left">id-it-certProfile</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">22</td> <td align="left">id-it-crlStatusList</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">23</td> <td align="left">id-it-crls</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> </tbody> </table><t>In</section> <section anchor="IANA-CRMF" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls</name> <t>IANA has registered the following new entries in theSMI-numbers registry"SMI Security for PKIX CRMF RegistrationControls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)"Controls" registry (seehttps://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers" brackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RFC7299"format="default">RFC 7299</xref> two additions have been performed.</t> <t keepWithNext="true">Two new entries have been added:</t>format="default"/>:</t> <table anchor="IANA_new_id-regCtrl" align="left"> <name>Addition to the PKIX CRMF Registration Controls Registry</name> <thead> <tr> <th align="left">Decimal</th> <th align="left">Description</th> <th align="left">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="left">11</td> <td align="left">id-regCtrl-algId</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left">12</td> <td align="left">id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen</td> <tdalign="left">[RFCXXXX]</td>align="left">RFC 9480</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> </section> <section anchor="IANA-6712" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712</name> <t>This document contains an update to the IANAConsiderationConsiderations sections of <xref target="RFC6712" format="default"/> by adding this content.</t><t>This document defines a new entry with<section anchor="IANA-URI" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Well-Known URIs</name> <t>IANA has registered the followingcontentnew entry in the "Well-Known URIs" registry (seehttps://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/)<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris" brackets="angle"/>), as defined in <xref target="RFC8615"format="default">RFC 8615</xref>.</t> <ul empty="true"format="default"/>:</t> <dl newline="false" spacing="compact"><li>URI Suffix: cmp</li> <li>Change Controller: IETF</li> <li>References: [RFCXXXX] <xref target="I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport" format="default"/></li> <li>Related Information: CMP<dt>URI Suffix:</dt> <dd>cmp</dd> <dt>Change Controller:</dt> <dd>IETF</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>[RFC9480] <xref target="RFC9482" format="default"/></dd> <dt>Status:</dt> <dd>permanent</dd> <dt>Related Information:</dt> <dd>CMP has asub-registryregistry at[https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/]</li> </ul><eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp" brackets="angle"/></dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="IANA-URI-CMP" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry</name> <t>This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (athttps://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/)<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp" brackets="angle"/>) with a newregistry"CMP Well-Known URI Path Segments" registry containing three columns: Path Segment, Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the Specification Required <xref target="RFC8615"format="default">RFC 8615</xref>format="default"/> process. The initialcontentsentry of this registry is:</t><ul empty="true"<dl newline="false" spacing="compact"><li>Path Segment: p</li> <li>Description: Indicates<dt>Path Segment:</dt> <dd>p</dd> <dt>Description:</dt> <dd>Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g., a CA or certificate profilename</li> <li>References: [RFCXXXX]name</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>[RFC9480] <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport" format="default"/></li> </ul>target="RFC9482" format="default"/></dd> </dl> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="Security" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Security Considerations</name> <t>The security considerations of <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC 4210</xref>format="default"/> are extended in <xref target="CMP-8.4" format="default"/> to <xref target="CMP-8.6" format="default"/>. No security considerations updates of <xref target="RFC6712"format="default">RFC 6712</xref>format="default"/> were required.</t> </section><section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration on structuring and writing this document we got from <xref target="RFC6402" format="default"/> which updates CMC. Special thank also goes to Russ Housley, Lijun Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on improving this document.</t> <t>We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedback.</t> </section></middle> <back><!-- References split into informative and normative --> <!-- There are 2 ways to insert reference entries from the citation libraries: 1. define an ENTITY at the top, and use "ampersand character"RFC2629; here (as shown) 2. simply use a PI "less than character"?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?> here (for I-Ds: include="reference.I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis.xml") Both are cited textually in the same manner: by using xref elements. If you use the PI option, xml2rfc will, by default, try to find included files in the same directory as the including file. You can also define the XML_LIBRARY environment variable with a value containing a set of directories to search. These can be either in the local filing system or remote ones accessed by http (http://domain/dir/... ).--><displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis" to="PKIX-CMP"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis" to="HTTP-CMP"/> <references> <name>References</name> <references> <name>Normative References</name><!--?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"?--> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2510.xml"/><xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2985.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2986.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2510.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3629.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2985.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4210.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2986.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4211.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3629.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4210.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5480.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4211.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5652.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5958.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5480.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6402.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5652.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6712.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5958.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6402.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8615.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6712.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8933.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9045.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8615.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8933.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9045.xml"/> <reference anchor="RFC9481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481"> <front> <title>Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms</title> <author initials='H' surname='Brockhaus' fullname='Hendrik Brockhaus'> <organization /> </author> <author initials='H' surname='Aschauer' fullname='Hans Aschauer'> <organization /> </author> <author initials='M' surname='Ounsworth' fullname='Mike Ounsworth'> <organization /> </author> <author initials='J' surname='Gray' fullname='John Gray'> <organization /> </author> <date year='2023' month='October'/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9481"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9481"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9482" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482"> <front> <title> Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate Management Protocol </title> <author initials="M." surname="Sahni" fullname="Mohit Sahni" role="editor"> <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Tripathi" fullname="Saurabh Tripathi" role="editor"> <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2023"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9482"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9482"/> </reference> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name><!--?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"?--><xi:includehref="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile.xml"/> <!-- A reference written by an organization not a person. --> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2202.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis.xml"/> <xi:includehref="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7299.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-nist/reference.NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.xml"/>href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis.xml"/> <referenceanchor="IEEE.802.1AR_2018" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794">anchor="RFC9483" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483"> <front><title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity</title> <author> <organization>IEEE</organization><title>Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile</title> <author initials='H' surname='Brockhaus' fullname='Hendrik Brockhaus'> <organization /> </author> <author initials='S' surname='Fries' fullname='Steffen Fries'> <organization /> </author> <author initials='D' surname='von Oheimb' fullname='David von Oheimb'> <organization /> </author> <dateday="2" month="August" year="2018"/>year='2023' month='October'/> </front> <seriesInfoname="IEEE" value="802.1AR-2018"/>name="RFC" value="9483"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794"/>value="10.17487/RFC9483"/> </reference> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2202.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7299.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-nist/reference.NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.xml"/> <reference anchor="CVE-2008-0166" target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166"> <front> <title>National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166</title> <author> <organization>National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST)</organization> </author> <dateday="13"month="May" year="2008"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="MiningPsQs" target="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/technical-sessions/presentation/heninger"> <front> <title>Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices</title> <author><organization>Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium</organization><organization></organization> </author> <author fullname="Nadia Heninger"> <organization>UC San Diego</organization> </author> <author fullname="Zakir Durumeric"> <organization>University of Michigan</organization> </author> <author fullname="Eric Wustrow"> <organization>University of Michigan</organization> </author> <author fullname="J. Alex Halderman"> <organization>University of Michigan</organization> </author> <date month="August" year="2012"/> </front> <refcontent>Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="ISO.20543-2019"> <front> <title>Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408</title><seriesInfo name="ISO" value="Draft Standard 20543-2019"/><author> <organization>International Organization for Standardization (ISO)</organization> </author> <date month="October" year="2019"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="20543:2019"/> </reference> <reference anchor="AIS31" target="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_classes_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf"> <front> <title>A proposal for: Functionality classes for random numbergenerators, versiongenerators - Version 2.0</title><author> <organization>Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> <!-- <organization>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> --> <!-- <organization>Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)</organization> --> </author><author initials="W" surname="Killmann" fullname="Wolfgang Killmann"> <organization>T-Systems GEI GmbH</organization> </author> <author initials="W" surname="Schindler" fullname="Werner Schindler"> <organization>Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization><!-- <organization>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)</organization> --> <!-- <organization>Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)</organization> --></author> <dateday="18" month="09"month="September" year="2011"/> </front> </reference><reference anchor="PKCS11" target="https://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs11doc/STANDARD/pkcs11v2-10.pdf"> <front> <title>The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - Cryptographic Token Interface Standard. Version 2.10</title> <author> <organization>RSA Laboratories</organization> </author> <date month="12" year="1999"/> </front> </reference></references> </references> <section anchor="ASN.1_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>ASN.1 Modules</name> <section anchor="ASN.1_1988_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update toRFC4210RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module</name> <t>This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module in AppendixF<xref target="RFC4210" sectionFormat="bare" section="F"/> of that document. Although a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the normativemodulemodule, as per the policy of the PKIXworking group.</t>Working Group.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time, AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest -- instead of importing it fromPKCS#10 [RFC2986]PKCS #10 [RFC2986]. DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX]].[RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- Also, seealsothe behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of thisspecificationspecification. EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- the updates made in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- The import of Attribute is added to define -- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from --PKCS#10 [RFC2986]PKCS #10 [RFC2986]. ; --theThe rest of the module containslocally-definedlocally defined OIDs and --constructsconstructs: CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate } -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- attribute certificates,WAP WTLScard-verifiable -- certificates, or other kinds--of certificates) within thiscertificate management protocol,-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to -- support such generality. Those--implementations that do not -- foresee a need to ever support--other certificate types MAY, if -- they wish, comment out the--above structure and"un-comment""uncomment" the -- following one prior to--compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note thatinteroperability-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be -- unaffected by--this change.) -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), cmp2021(3) }, sender GeneralName, -- identifies the sender recipient GeneralName, -- identifies the intended recipient messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, -- time of production of this message (used when the sender -- believes that the transport will be"suitable";"suitable", i.e., -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- to identify specific keys used for protection transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- identifies thetransaction;transaction, i.e., this will be the same in -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- messages senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- the intended recipient of thismessagemessage. freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- (this field is intended for human consumption) generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL -- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String -- text encoded as a UTF-8Stringstring [RFC3629] PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --CertificateconfirmConfirm pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --PollingrequestRequest pollRep [26] PollRepContent --PollingresponseResponse } PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody } id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { salt OCTET STRING, --note: implementationsNote: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-serviceattacksattacks. owf AlgorithmIdentifier, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (OWF) iterationCount INTEGER, -- number of times the OWF is applied --note: implementationsNote: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-serviceattacksattacks. mac AlgorithmIdentifier -- the MAC AlgId (e.g.,DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481], } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function mac AlgorithmIdentifier -- the MAC AlgId (e.g.,DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481], } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { accepted (0), -- you got exactly what you asked for grantedWithMods (1), -- you got something like what you asked for; the -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences rejection (2), -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message waiting (3), -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified -- in Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210]; alternatively, polling in the -- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this -- regard) revocationWarning (4), -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is -- imminent revocationNotification (5), -- notification that a revocation has occurred keyUpdateWarning (6) -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- CertReqMsg } PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { -- since we can fail in more than one way! -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. badAlg (0), -- unrecognized or unsupportedAlgorithm Identifieralgorithm identifier badMessageCheck (1), -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) badRequest (2), -- transaction not permitted or supported badTime (3), -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- as defined by local policy badCertId (4), -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria badDataFormat (5), -- the data submitted has the wrong format wrongAuthority (6), -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the -- one creating the response token incorrectData (7), -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) missingTimeStamp (8), -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- (by policy) badPOP (9), -- the proof-of-possession failed certRevoked (10), -- the certificate has already been revoked certConfirmed (11), -- the certificate has already been confirmed wrongIntegrity (12), -- not valid integrity,passwordbased on the password instead of the -- signature or--vice versa badRecipientNonce (13), -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value timeNotAvailable (14), -- theTSA'stime source of the Time Stamping Authority (TSA) is -- not available unacceptedPolicy (15), -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by theTSA.TSA unacceptedExtension (16), -- the requested extension is not supported by theTSA.TSA addInfoNotAvailable (17), -- the additional information requested could not be -- understood or is not available badSenderNonce (18), -- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size badCertTemplate (19), -- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information signerNotTrusted (20), -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted transactionIdInUse (21), -- the transaction identifier is already in use unsupportedVersion (22), -- the version of the message is not supported notAuthorized (23), -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- request or perform the preceding action systemUnavail (24), -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability systemFailure (25), -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure duplicateCertReq (26) -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- certificate already exists } PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL } OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, hashVal BIT STRING -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. } POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge --Oneone Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear inCertReqMessages).CertReqMessages) Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- Challenge is to beused).used) witness OCTET STRING, -- the result of applying theone-way functionOne-Way Function (owf) to a --randomly-generatedrandomly generated INTEGER,A. [NoteA (Note that a different -- INTEGER MUST be used for eachChallenge.]Challenge.) challenge OCTET STRING -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- request is being made) ofRand.Rand } --AddedRand was added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] Rand ::= SEQUENCE { -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- in POPODecKeyChallContent int INTEGER, -- therandomly-generatedrandomly generated INTEGER A (above) sender GeneralName -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) } POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- corresponding Challenge. CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, --seeSee [RFC4211] forcommentcomments onencodingencoding. -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- syntax without thischangechange. publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { certificate [0] CMPCertificate, encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- syntax without thischangechange. } KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatusInfo, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL } RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { certDetails CertTemplate, -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about -- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL -- requested crlEntryExtensions } RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, -- IDs for which revocation was requested -- (same order as status) crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) } CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv } CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, certId CertId, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm } PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and -- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supportedalgorithms.algorithms -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF(RFC4211)[RFC4211] } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 --public-keypublic key certificate id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, -- new root CA certificate newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key } CRLSource ::= CHOICE { dpn [0] DistributionPointName, issuer [1] GeneralNames } CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { source CRLSource, thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following(un-comment(uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): -- -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - made in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - syntax without thischangechange. -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatus -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertificateList -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- -- -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- Management Protocol request and responsemessages,messages or general- -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- specific environments. GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- The receiver is free to ignore any containedOBJ. IDsOIDs that it -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- indicates that the CA may send -- any/all information that it wishes. GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue --ReceiverThe receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not -- recognize. ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- implementation-specific error codes errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL -- implementation-specific error details } PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } -- -- ExtendedKey Usagekey usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP -- operations, added due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused fromCMCCMC, as defined in -- [RFC6402] -- -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } -- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module ofPKCS#9PKCS #9 available to import the -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore, -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9} pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21} LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING END -- of CMP module ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="ASN.1_2002_Modules" numbered="true" toc="default"> <name>Update toRFC5912RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module</name> <t>This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for <xref target="RFC5912" format="default"/>. This module replaces the module inSection 9 of<xref target="RFC5912" section="9" sectionFormat="of" format="default"/>. The module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from <xref target="RFC4210"format="default">RFC4210 Appendix F</xref>sectionFormat="of" section="F"/> that were to update to the 2002 ASN.1 standard done in <xref target="RFC5912"format="default"/>format="default"/>, as well as changes made in this document.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ PKIXCMP-2021 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} Certificate, CertificateList, Time, id-kp FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX].[RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. --seeSee also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of thisspecificationspecification. CertificationRequest FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)} -- (specified inRFC 2986[RFC2986] with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include -- the[RFC2986]syntax of [RFC2986] in thismodulemodule. localKeyId FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)} -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. EnvelopedData, SignedData FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- the updates made in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. ; --theThe rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and --constructsconstructs: CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... } -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- attribute certificates,WAP WTLScard-verifiable -- certificates, or other kinds--of certificates) within thiscertificate management protocol,-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to -- support such generality. Those--implementations that do not -- foresee a need to ever support--other certificate types MAY, if -- they wish, comment out the--above structure and "uncomment" the -- following one prior to--compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note thatinteroperability-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be -- unaffected by--this change.) -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), cmp2012(3) }, sender GeneralName, -- identifies the sender recipient GeneralName, -- identifies the intended recipient messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, -- time of production of this message (used when the sender -- believes that the transport will be"suitable";"suitable", i.e., -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- to identify specific keys used for protection transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- identifies thetransaction;transaction, i.e., this will be the same in -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- messages senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- the intended recipient of thismessagemessage. freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- (this field is intended for human consumption) generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL -- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String -- text encoded as a UTF-8Stringstring [RFC3629] PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986] popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --CertificateconfirmConfirm pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --PollingrequestRequest pollRep [26] PollRepContent --PollingresponseResponse } PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody } id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { salt OCTET STRING, --note: implementationsNote: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-serviceattacksattacks. owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function iterationCount INTEGER, -- number of times the OWF is applied --note: implementationsNote: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-serviceattacksattacks. mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} -- the MAC AlgId (e.g.,DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481], -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} -- the MAC AlgId (e.g.,DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481], -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { accepted (0), -- you got exactly what you asked for grantedWithMods (1), -- you got something like what you asked for; the -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences rejection (2), -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message waiting (3), -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified -- in Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210]; alternatively, polling in the -- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this -- regard) revocationWarning (4), -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is -- imminent revocationNotification (5), -- notification that a revocation has occurred keyUpdateWarning (6) -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- CertReqMsg } PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { -- since we can fail in more than one way! -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. badAlg (0), -- unrecognized or unsupportedAlgorithm Identifieralgorithm identifier badMessageCheck (1), -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) badRequest (2), -- transaction not permitted or supported badTime (3), -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- as defined by local policy badCertId (4), -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria badDataFormat (5), -- the data submitted has the wrong format wrongAuthority (6), -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the -- one creating the response token incorrectData (7), -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) missingTimeStamp (8), -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- (by policy) badPOP (9), -- the proof-of-possession failed certRevoked (10), -- the certificate has already been revoked certConfirmed (11), -- the certificate has already been confirmed wrongIntegrity (12), -- not valid integrity,passwordbased on the password instead of the -- signature or--vice versa badRecipientNonce (13), -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value timeNotAvailable (14), -- the TSA's time source is not available unacceptedPolicy (15), -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA unacceptedExtension (16), -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA addInfoNotAvailable (17), -- the additional information requested could not be -- understood or is not available badSenderNonce (18), -- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size badCertTemplate (19), -- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information signerNotTrusted (20), -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted transactionIdInUse (21), -- the transaction identifier is already in use unsupportedVersion (22), -- the version of the message is not supported notAuthorized (23), -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- request or perform the preceding action systemUnavail (24), -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability systemFailure (25), -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure duplicateCertReq (26) -- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- certificate already exists } PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL } OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, hashVal BIT STRING -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. } POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear inCertReqMessages).CertReqMessages) Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- Challenge is to beused).used) witness OCTET STRING, -- the result of applying theone-way functionOne-Way Function (owf) to a --randomly-generatedrandomly generated INTEGER,A. [NoteA (Note that a different -- INTEGER MUST be used for eachChallenge.]Challenge.) challenge OCTET STRING -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- request is being made) ofRand.Rand } --AddedRand was added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] Rand ::= SEQUENCE { -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge -- in POPODecKeyChallContent int INTEGER, -- therandomly-generatedrandomly generated INTEGER A (above) sender GeneralName -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) } POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- corresponding Challenge. CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, --seeSee [RFC4211] forcommentcomments onencodingencoding. -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- syntax without thischangechange. publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { certificate [0] CMPCertificate, encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480]. -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- syntax without thischangechange. } KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatusInfo, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL } RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { certDetails CertTemplate, -- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about -- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL -- requested crlEntryExtensions } RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, -- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, -- IDs for which revocation was requested -- (same order as status) crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) } CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv } CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, certId CertId, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue, -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate, -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl, -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl -- were added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supportedalgorithms.algorithms -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF(RFC4211)[RFC4211] } AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }} ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet | regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... } regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 --public-keypublic key certificate regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, -- new root CA certificate newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key -- signed with the old private root CA key oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key -- signed with the new private root CA key } CRLSource ::= CHOICE { dpn [0] DistributionPointName, issuer [1] GeneralNames } CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { source CRLSource, thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &id({SupportedInfoSet}), infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): -- -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - made in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - the syntax without this change -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatus -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CertificateList -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- -- -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- Management Protocol request and responsemessages,messages or general- -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- specific environments. GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- The receiver is free to ignore any containedOBJECT IDsOIDs that it -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- indicates that the CA may send -- any/all information that it wishes. GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue --ReceiverThe receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not -- recognize. ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- implementation-specific error codes errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL -- implementation-specific error details } CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm } PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } -- -- ExtendedKey Usagekey usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP -- operations, added due to the changes made in -- CMP Updates[RFCXXXX][RFC9480] -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused fromCMCCMC, as defined in -- [RFC6402] -- -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } END ]]></sourcecode> </section> </section> <sectionanchor="History" numbered="true"anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="false" toc="default"><name>History of Changes</name> <t>[RFC Editor: This appendix must be deleted in the final version of the document.]</t> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 22 -> 23:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread "Francesca Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-22: (with COMMENT)")</li> <li>Addressed comment from Carl (see thread "Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 21 -> 22:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Addressed comments from IESG discussion (see thread " Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 20 -> 21:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Extended Section 1 based on feedback from the IESG telechat</li> <li>Removed a redundant paragraph from the Abstract</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 19 -> 20:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Addressed comments reported after GEN AD review</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 18 -> 19:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Deleted the Comments on IANA ToDos and changed the decimals TBD1 -> 22 and TBD2 -> 23</li> <li>Updated Section 3.4 regarding ToDos updating the well-known URI registration</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 17 -> 18:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Addressed comments from AD Evaluation (see thread "AD Review of draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17")</li> <li>Added Section 2.8 to clarify on the usage of GeneralizedTime (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: fractional seconds")</li> <li>Updated Section 3.4 introducing the path segment 'p' to indicate the following arbitrary label according to the discussion during IETF 113 (see thread "/.well-known/brski reference to brski-registry")</li> <li>Capitalized all headlines</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 16 -> 17:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust</li> <li>Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs</li> <li>Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 15 -> 16:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Updated IPR disclaimer</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 14 -> 15:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Updated Section 2.16 clarifying the usage of CRLSource (see thread "CRL update retrieval - WG Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-14 and draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-08")</li> <li>Updated Section 2.22 adding further references regarding random number generation (see thread "CMP draft WGLC: measuring entropy, CA certificates")</li> <li>Fixed some nits</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 13 -> 14:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Extended id-it-caCerts support message to allow transporting to-be-trusted root CA certificates; added respective security consideration (see thread "Generalizing the CMP "Get CA certificates" use case")</li> <li>Rolled back changes made in previous version regarding root CA update to avoid registration of new OIDs. Yet we sticked to using id-it-rootCaCert in the genm body instead its headers' generalInfo field and removed the ToDos and TBDs on re-arranging id-it OIDs (see thread "Allocation of OIDs for CRL update retrieval (draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13)")</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 12 -> 13:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion and important proposals</li> <li>Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210</li> <li>Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to Section 2.7</li> <li>Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg in certStatus")</li> <li>Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized to "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to "trustAnchorUpdate" in Sections 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing former Section 2.4</li> <li>Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1, and A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL")</li> <li>Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of CMP request messages initiated by an error message with status "waiting" as initially discussed at IETF 111</li> <li>Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling</li> <li>Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs</li> <li>Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and updated Section 5 accordingly</li> <li>Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering</li> <li>Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712</li> <li>Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module")</li> <li>Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to prevent confusion</li> <li>Minor editorial changes</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 11 -> 12:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread "id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 10 -> 11:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash")</li> <li>Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix</li> <li>Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of CertificationRequest")</li> <li>Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1</li> <li>Updated new RFC numbers for draft-lamps-crmf-update-algs</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 9 -> 10:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 08 -> 09:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas Gustavsson</li> <li>Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15</li> <li>Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8</li> <li>Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1 syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the response message</li> <li>Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details of the newly introduced controls</li> <li>Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19</li> <li>Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A</li> <li>Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 07 -> 08:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the need of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from CMP-RA</li> <li>Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 06 -> 07:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added David von Oheimb as co-author</li> <li>Changed to XML V3</li> <li>Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the PKIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").</li> <li>Added Section 2.4 to refer to draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs for the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection using passwords or shared secrets.</li> <li>Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to properly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue in case a transaction requires use of EnvelopedData (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").</li> <li>Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective section in CMP more explicit.</li> <li>Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol version in Section 7 Version Negotiation.</li> <li>Updated Section 2.17<name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>Special thanks goes toadd new OIDs<contact fullname="Jim Schaad"/> forid-regCtrl-algIdhis guidance andid-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.</li> <li>Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation in Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.</li> <li>Added Section 2.21 to updatetheAlgorithm Use Profile in Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document as decided at IETF 108.</li> <li>Updates Section 3.1inspiration todelete the description of a discovery mechanism as decided at IETF 108.</li> <li>Various changesstructure andcorrections in wording.</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 05 -> 06:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithmswrite this documentas decided in IETF 108</li> <li>Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.</li> <li>Minor changes and corrections</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 04 -> 05:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added <xref target="CMP-5.3.19.2" format="default"/> and <xref target="CMP-5.3.19.3" format="default"/> to clarify the usage of these general messages types with EC curves (see thread "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue in CMP headers")</li> <li>Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three separate sections for easier readability</li> <li>Changed in <xref target="CMP-5.3.19.15" format="default"/> the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF Section 6</xref> (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")</li> <li>Updated the IANA considerations inlike <xreftarget="IANA" format="default"/> to introduce new OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")</li> <li>Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce new OID for thetarget="RFC6402" format="default"/>, which updatesASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")</li> <li>Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of types imported from <xref target="RFC4211" format="default">CRMF</xref> in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")</li> <li>Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")</li> <li>Minor changes and corrections</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 03 -> 04:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added Section 2.7CMC. Special thanks also goes tointroduce three new id-it IDs<contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Lijun Liao"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Peylo"/>, and <contact fullname="Tomas Gustavsson"/> foruses in general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")</li> <li>Added the new id-it IDsreviewing andthe /.well-known/cmp to the IANA Considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> in Section 2.9</li> <li>Updated the IANA Considerations of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li> <li>Some changes in wording on <xref target="Trans-Updates" format="default"/> due to review comments from Martin Peylo</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 02 -> 03:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will be set up as decided in IETF 108</li> <li>Updated sectionproviding valuable suggestions onEncrypted Values in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> to add the AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated private key as decided in IETF 108</li> <li>Updated the IANA Considerationsimproving this document.</t> <t>We also thank all reviewers of<xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li> <li>Added the pre-registered OID in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/> and the ASN.1 module</li> <li>Added <xref target="Trans-Updates" format="default"/> tothis documentthe changes to <xref target="RFC6712" format="default">RFC 6712</xref> regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-known/' as discussed in IETF 108</li> <li>Updated the IANA Considerations section</li> <li>Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update Appendix F of <xref target="RFC4210" format="default"/> and a complete updated ASN.1 module in 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of <xref target="RFC5912" format="default"/></li> <li>Minor changes in wording</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 01 -> 02:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Updated section on EKU OIDs in <xref target="CMP-4.5" format="default"/> as decided in IETF 107</li> <li>Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key management technique in <xref target="CMP-5.2.2" format="default"/> as discussed with Russ and Jim on the mailing list</li> <li>Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the revocation passphrase in <xref target="CMP-B" format="default"/></li> <li>Moved the change history to the Appendix</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 00 -> 01:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Minor changes in wording</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-00:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Changes required to reflect WG adoption</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 02 -> 03:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added some clarification in <xref target="CMP-1.1" format="default"/></li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 01 -> 02:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added clarification to section on multiple protection</li> <li>Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas Gustavsson</li> <li>Reused OIDs from <xref target="RFC6402" format="default">RFC 6402</xref> as suggested by Sean Turner at IETF 106</li> <li>Added clarification on the field containing the key identifierfora revocation passphrase</li> <li>Minor changes in wording</li> </ul> <t keepWithNext="true">From version 00 -> 01:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>Added a section describing the new extended key usages</li> <li>Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted values</li> <li>Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4</li> <li>Minor generalization in <xref target="RFC4210" format="default">RFC 4210</xref> Sections 5.1.3.4 and 5.3.22</li> <li>Minor changes in wording</li> </ul>their valuable feedback.</t> </section> </back> </rfc>