Diff: rfc9509.original

	rfc9509.original	rfc9509.txt


	LAMPS WG T. Reddy	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Reddy.K
	Internet-Draft J. Ekman	Request for Comments: 9509 J. Ekman
	Intended status: Standards Track Nokia	Category: Standards Track Nokia
	Expires: 25 March 2024 D. Migault	ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Migault
	Ericsson	Ericsson

	22 September 2023	March 2024

	X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for 5G Network Functions	X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for 5G Network Functions

	draft-ietf-lamps-nf-eku-05

	Abstract	Abstract

	RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers	RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers
	(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines	(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines

	encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages, JSON Web Token (JWT) and	encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages, using JSON Web Tokens
	signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens KeyPurposeIds for inclusion in	(JWTs), and signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens KeyPurposeIds for
	the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key	inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3
	certificates used by Network Functions (NFs) for the 5G System.	public key certificates used by Network Functions (NFs) for the 5G
		System.

	Status of This Memo	Status of This Memo


	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the	This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.


	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months	This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any	(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference	received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."	Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
		Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.


	This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 March 2024.	Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
		and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
		https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9509.

	Copyright Notice	Copyright Notice


	Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the	Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.	document authors. All rights reserved.

	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights	publication of this document. Please review these documents
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are	include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
	provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.	Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
		in the Revised BSD License.

	Table of Contents	Table of Contents


	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2	1. Introduction
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4	2. Terminology
	3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions . . . . . . . . . 4	3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions
	4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates . . . . . 5	4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates
	5. Implications for a Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . 6	5. Implications for a Certification Authority
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6	6. Security Considerations
	7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6	7. Privacy Considerations
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7	8. IANA Considerations
	9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7	9. References
	10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7	9.1. Normative References
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8	9.2. Informative References
	11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8	Acknowledgments
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10	Contributor
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10	Authors' Addresses

	1. Introduction	1. Introduction


	The Operators of 5G ("fifth generation") systems as defined by 3GPP	The operators of 5G ("fifth generation") systems as defined by 3GPP
	make use of an internal PKI to generate X.509 PKI certificates for	make use of an internal PKI to generate X.509 PKI certificates for

	the Network Functions (NFs) (Section 6 of [TS23.501]) in a 5G system.	the Network Functions (NFs) (Section 6 of [TS23.501]) in a 5G System.
	The certificates are used for the following purposes:	The certificates are used for the following purposes:


	* Client and Server certificates for NFs in 5GC Service Based	* Client and Server certificates for NFs in 5G Core (5GC) Service
	Architecture (see Section 6.1.3c of [TS33.310])	Based Architecture (SBA) (see Section 6.1.3c of [TS33.310] and
		Section 6.7.2 of [TS29.500])


	* Client Credentials Assertion (CCA) uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT)	* Client Credentials Assertion (CCA) uses JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
	[RFC7519] and is secured with digital signatures based on JSON Web	[RFC7519] and is secured with digital signatures based on the JSON
	Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] (see Section 13.3.8.2 of [TS33.501]).	Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] (see Section 13.3.8.2 of [TS33.501],
		and Section 6.7.5 of [TS29.500]).

	* Certificates for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between	* Certificates for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between
	Security Edge Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JSON Web Encryption	Security Edge Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JSON Web Encryption

	(JWE) [RFC7516] (Section 13.2.4.4 of [TS33.501]) and Section 6.3.2	(JWE) [RFC7516] (see Section 13.2.4.4 of [TS33.501], Section 6.3.2
	of [TS33.210]).	of [TS33.210], Section 6.7.4 of [TS29.500], and Section 5.3.2.1 of
		[TS29.573]).

	* Certificates for signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service	* Certificates for signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service
	authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided by	authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided by

	NF producers using JWS (see Section 13.4.1 of [TS33.501]).	NF producers using JWS (see Section 13.4.1 of [TS33.501] and
		Section 6.7.3 of [TS29.500]).

	[RFC5280] specifies several key usage extensions, defined via	[RFC5280] specifies several key usage extensions, defined via
	KeyPurposeIds, for X.509 certificates. Key usage extensions added to	KeyPurposeIds, for X.509 certificates. Key usage extensions added to
	a certificate are meant to express intent as to the purpose of the	a certificate are meant to express intent as to the purpose of the
	named usage, for humans and for complying libraries. In addition,	named usage, for humans and for complying libraries. In addition,
	the IANA registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose"	the IANA registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose"

	[RFC7299] contains additional KeyPurposeIds.The use of the	[RFC7299] contains additional KeyPurposeIds. The use of the
	anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of	anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of
	[RFC5280], is generally considered a poor practice. This is	[RFC5280], is generally considered a poor practice. This is
	especially true for publicly trusted certificates, whether they are	especially true for publicly trusted certificates, whether they are

	multi-purpose or single-purpose, within the context of 5G systems and	multi-purpose or single-purpose, within the context of 5G Systems and
	the 5G Core Service Based Architecture.	the 5GC Service Based Architecture.

	If the purpose of the issued certificates is not restricted, i.e.,	If the purpose of the issued certificates is not restricted, i.e.,
	the type of operations for which a public key contained in the	the type of operations for which a public key contained in the
	certificate can be used are not specified, those certificates could	certificate can be used are not specified, those certificates could
	be used for another purpose than intended, increasing the risk of	be used for another purpose than intended, increasing the risk of
	cross-protocol attacks. Failure to ensure proper segregation of	cross-protocol attacks. Failure to ensure proper segregation of

	duties means that a NF which generates the public/private keys and	duties means that a NF that generates the public/private keys and
	applies for a certificate to the operator CA, could obtain a	applies for a certificate to the operator certification authority
	certificate which can be misused for tasks that this NF is not	could obtain a certificate that can be misused for tasks that this NF
	entitled to perform. For example, a NF service consumer could	is not entitled to perform. For example, a NF service consumer could
	potentially impersonate NF service producers using its certificate.	potentially impersonate NF service producers using its certificate.
	Additionally, in cases where the certificate's purpose is intended	Additionally, in cases where the certificate's purpose is intended
	for use by the NF service consumer as a client certificate, it's	for use by the NF service consumer as a client certificate, it's
	essential to ensure that the NF with this client certificate and the	essential to ensure that the NF with this client certificate and the

	corresponding private key is not allowed to sign the Client	corresponding private key are not allowed to sign the Client
	Credentials Assertion (CCA). When a NF service producer receives the	Credentials Assertion (CCA). When a NF service producer receives the
	signed CCA from the NF service consumer, the NF should only accept	signed CCA from the NF service consumer, the NF should only accept
	the token if the CCA is signed with a certificate that has been	the token if the CCA is signed with a certificate that has been
	explicitly issued for this purpose.	explicitly issued for this purpose.

	The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can	The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can
	be used to identify that the certificate is for a server (e.g., NF	be used to identify that the certificate is for a server (e.g., NF
	service producer), and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth	service producer), and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth
	(Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can be used to identify that the	(Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can be used to identify that the
	certificate is for a client (e.g., NF service consumer). However,	certificate is for a client (e.g., NF service consumer). However,
	there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for the other usages of	there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for the other usages of

	certificates in 5G System. This document addresses the above problem	certificates in a 5G System. This document addresses the above
	by defining the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 public	problem by defining the EKU extension of X.509 public key
	key certificates for signing the JWT Claims set using JWS, encrypting	certificates for signing the JWT Claims Set using JWS, encrypting
	JSON objects in HTTP messages using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0	JSON objects in HTTP messages using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0
	access tokens using JWS.	access tokens using JWS.

	Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by the vendor	Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by the vendor
	or a group of vendors typically do not pose interoperability	or a group of vendors typically do not pose interoperability
	concerns, as non-critical extensions can be safely ignored if	concerns, as non-critical extensions can be safely ignored if
	unrecognized. However, using or misusing KeyPurposeIds outside of	unrecognized. However, using or misusing KeyPurposeIds outside of
	their intended vendor-controlled environment can lead to	their intended vendor-controlled environment can lead to
	interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to rely on	interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to rely on
	vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, the specification defines	vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, the specification defines

	skipping to change at page 4, line 23 ¶	skipping to change at line 156 ¶
	implementations.	implementations.

	Although the specification focuses on a 5G use case, the standard	Although the specification focuses on a 5G use case, the standard
	KeyPurposeIds defined in this document can be used in other	KeyPurposeIds defined in this document can be used in other
	deployments.	deployments.

	2. Terminology	2. Terminology

	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and

	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all	BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.	capitals, as shown here.

	3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions	3. Extended Key Purpose for Network Functions

	This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp-	This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp-

	httpContentEncrypt, id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning and uses these for	httpContentEncrypt, and id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning and uses these,
	respectively signing the JWT Claims set of CCA using JWS, encrypting	respectively, for: signing the JWT Claims Set of CCA using JWS,
	JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge Protection	encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge
	Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE and signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens for	Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, and signing the OAuth 2.0
	service authorization to grant temporary access to resources provided	access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary access to
	by NF producers using JWS. As described in [RFC5280], "[i]f the	resources provided by NF producers using JWS. As described in
	[Extended Key Usage] extension is present, then the certificate MUST	[RFC5280], "[i]f the [Extended Key Usage] extension is present, then
	only be used for one of the purposes indicated." [RFC5280] also	the certificate MUST only be used for one of the purposes indicated."
	notes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated the	[RFC5280] also notes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated
	application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as the	the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as
	intended purpose is present."	the intended purpose is present."
	Network functions that verify the signature of a CCA represented as a
		Network Functions that verify the signature of a CCA represented as a
	JWT, decrypt JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge	JWT, decrypt JSON objects in HTTP messages between Security Edge
	Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, or verify the signature of an	Protection Proxies (SEPPs) using JWE, or verify the signature of an
	OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary	OAuth 2.0 access tokens for service authorization to grant temporary
	access to resources provided by NF producers using JWS SHOULD require	access to resources provided by NF producers using JWS SHOULD require

	the specification of corresponding KeyPurposeIds by the Extended Key	that corresponding KeyPurposeIds be specified by the EKU extension.
	Usage (EKU) extension. If the certificate requester knows the	If the certificate requester knows the certificate users are mandated
	certificate users are mandated to use these KeyPurposeIds, it MUST	to use these KeyPurposeIds, it MUST enforce their inclusion.
	enforce their inclusion. Additionally, such certificate requester	Additionally, such a certificate requester MUST ensure that the
	MUST ensure that the KeyUsage extension be set to digitalSignature or	KeyUsage extension be set to digitalSignature or nonRepudiation (also
	nonRepudiation (also designated as contentCommitment) for signature	designated as contentCommitment) for signature calculation and/or to
	calculation and/or to keyEncipherment for secret key encryption.	keyEncipherment for secret key encryption.

	4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates	4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates


	[RFC5280] specifies the Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate	[RFC5280] specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on
	extension for use on end entity certificates. The extension	end entity certificates. The extension indicates one or more
	indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key is	purposes for which the certified public key is valid. The EKU
	valid. The EKU extension can be used in conjunction with the key	extension can be used in conjunction with the key usage extension,
	usage extension, which indicates the set of basic cryptographic	which indicates the set of basic cryptographic operations for which
	operations for which the certified key may be used. The EKU	the certified key may be used. The EKU extension syntax is repeated
	extension syntax is repeated here for convenience:	here for convenience:

	ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId	ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId

	KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER	KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

	As described in [RFC5280], the EKU extension may, at the option of	As described in [RFC5280], the EKU extension may, at the option of
	the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The	the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The

	inclusion of KeyPurposeId id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and	inclusion of KeyPurposeIds id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and
	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning in a certificate indicates that the	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning in a certificate indicates that the
	public key encoded in the certificate has been certified for use in	public key encoded in the certificate has been certified for use in
	the following:	the following:

	1. Validating the JWS Signature in JWT. The distinction between JWS	1. Validating the JWS Signature in JWT. The distinction between JWS

	and JWE is determined by the KU that is set to digitalSignature	and JWE is determined by the Key Usage (KU) that is set to
	or nonRepudiation for JWS and keyEncipherment for JWE.	digitalSignature or nonRepudiation for JWS and keyEncipherment
		for JWE.

	2. Encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages (for example, encrypting	2. Encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages (for example, encrypting

	the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES-OAEP	the content-encryption key (CEK) with the recipient's public key
	algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key). KU is set to	using the RSAES-OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key).
	keyEncipherment.	KU is set to keyEncipherment.

	3. Signing OAuth 2.0 access tokens. In this case, KU is set to	3. Signing OAuth 2.0 access tokens. In this case, KU is set to
	digitalSignature or nonRepudiation.	digitalSignature or nonRepudiation.

	id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {	id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }


	id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }	id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 37 }
	id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD2 }	id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 38 }
	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD3 }	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 39 }

	5. Implications for a Certification Authority	5. Implications for a Certification Authority

	The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority	The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority
	MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as	MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as
	the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued.	the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued.

	The inclusion of the id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt and id-kp-	The inclusion of the id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, and id-kp-
	oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion	oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion
	of other KeyPurposeIds.	of other KeyPurposeIds.

	6. Security Considerations	6. Security Considerations

	The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this	The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this
	document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security	document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security

	risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means	risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing the
	to identify if the certificate is generated to sign the JWT Claims	means to identify if the certificate is generated to sign the JWT
	Set, signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens using JWS or to encrypt the	Claims Set, signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens using JWS, or
	CEK in JWE for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages.	encrypting the CEK in JWE for encrypting JSON objects in HTTP
		messages.

	To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying	To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying
	party or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of	party or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of
	specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing	specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing
	or disallowing combinations of KeyPurposeIds using Excluded	or disallowing combinations of KeyPurposeIds using Excluded
	KeyPurposeId and Permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying	KeyPurposeId and Permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying
	party, is defined in Section 4 of [RFC9336]. Examples of Excluded	party, is defined in Section 4 of [RFC9336]. Examples of Excluded

	KeyPurposeId include the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage	KeyPurposeIds include the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage
	KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of the EKU extension in a	KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of the EKU extension in a

	certificate. Examples of Permitted KeyPurposeId include the presence	certificate. Examples of Permitted KeyPurposeIds include the
	of id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt or id-kp-	presence of id-kp-jwt, id-kp-httpContentEncrypt, or id-kp-
	oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeId.	oauthAccessTokenSigning KeyPurposeIds.

	7. Privacy Considerations	7. Privacy Considerations

	In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates	In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates
	are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS	are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS
	1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the	1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the
	EKU extension can help an observer determine the purpose of the	EKU extension can help an observer determine the purpose of the

	certificate. In addition, If the certificate is issued by a public	certificate. In addition, if the certificate is issued by a public
	certification authority, the inclusion of EKU extension can help an	certification authority, the inclusion of an EKU extension can help
	attacker to monitor the Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] to	an attacker to monitor the Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] to
	identify the purpose of the certificate.	identify the purpose of the certificate.

	8. IANA Considerations	8. IANA Considerations


	IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security	IANA has registered the following OIDs in the "SMI Security for PKIX
	for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These	Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These OIDs are
	OIDs are defined in Section 4.	defined in Section 4.

	+=========+===============================+============+	+=========+===============================+============+
	\| Decimal \| Description \| References \|	\| Decimal \| Description \| References \|
	+=========+===============================+============+	+=========+===============================+============+

	\| TBD1 \| id-kp-jwt \| This-RFC \|	\| 37 \| id-kp-jwt \| RFC 9509 \|
	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+

	\| TBD2 \| id-kp-httpContentEncrypt \| This-RFC \|	\| 38 \| id-kp-httpContentEncrypt \| RFC 9509 \|
	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+

	\| TBD3 \| id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning \| This-RFC \|	\| 39 \| id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning \| RFC 9509 \|
	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+	+---------+-------------------------------+------------+


	Figure 1: Table 1	Table 1

	IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1[X.680] module
	OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
	(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in Appendix A.

	+=========+==========================+============+
	\| Decimal \| Description \| References \|
	+=========+==========================+============+
	\| TBD4 \| id-mod-nf-eku \| This-RFC \|
	+---------+--------------------------+------------+

	Figure 2: Table 2

	9. Contributors

	The following individuals have contributed to this document:

	German Peinado
	Nokia

	Email: german.peinado@nokia.com


	10. Acknowledgments	IANA has registered the following ASN.1[X.680] module OID in the "SMI
		Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).
		This OID is defined in Appendix A.


	We would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Ilari Liusvaara, Carl Wallace	+=========+===============+============+
	and Russ Housley for their useful feedback. Thanks to Yoav Nir for	\| Decimal \| Description \| References \|
	the secdir review, Elwyn Davies for the genart review and Benson	+=========+===============+============+
	Muite for the intdir review.	\| 108 \| id-mod-nf-eku \| RFC 9509 \|
		+---------+---------------+------------+


	Thanks to Paul Wouters, Lars Eggert, and Éric Vyncke for the IESG	Table 2
	review.


	11. References	9. References


	11.1. Normative References	9.1. Normative References

	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

	skipping to change at page 8, line 39 ¶	skipping to change at line 333 ¶
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.


	[X.680] "ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation	[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
	One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T	One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T

	Recommendation X.680, February 2021.",	Recommendation X.680, February 2021,
	<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.	<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.


	[X.690] "ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:	[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
	Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical	Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
	Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules	Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules

	(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021,",	(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021,
	<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.	<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.


	11.2. Informative References	9.2. Informative References

	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,	DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

	[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX	[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
	Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,	Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.


	skipping to change at page 9, line 27 ¶	skipping to change at line 368 ¶

	[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate	[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
	Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,	Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
	December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.	December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.

	[RFC9336] Ito, T., Okubo, T., and S. Turner, "X.509 Certificate	[RFC9336] Ito, T., Okubo, T., and S. Turner, "X.509 Certificate
	General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document	General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document
	Signing", RFC 9336, DOI 10.17487/RFC9336, December 2022,	Signing", RFC 9336, DOI 10.17487/RFC9336, December 2022,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9336>.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9336>.


	[TS23.501] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical	[TS23.501] 3GPP, "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)",
	Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System	Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 23.501, December 2023,
	architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2 (Release
	18), 3GPP TS 23.501 V18.0.0 Dec 2022,",
	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/

	archive/23_series/23.501/23501-i00.zip>.	archive/23_series/23.501/23501-i40.zip>.


	[TS33.210] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical	[TS29.500] 3GPP, "5G System; Technical Realization of Service Based
	Specification Group Services and System Aspects;Network	Architecture; Stage 3", Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 29.500,
	Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (Release	December 2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
	17), 3GPP TS 33.210 V17.1.0 Sept 2022,",	archive/29_series/29.500/29500-i40.zip>.

		[TS29.573] 3GPP, "5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)
		Interconnection; Stage 3", Release 18.5.0, 3GPP TS 29.573,
		December 2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
		archive/29_series/29.573/29573-i50.zip>.

		[TS33.210] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer
		security", Release 17.1.0, 3GPP TS 33.210, September 2022,
	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
	archive/33_series/33.210/33210-h10.zip>.	archive/33_series/33.210/33210-h10.zip>.


	[TS33.310] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical	[TS33.310] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication
	Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Network	Framework (AF)", Release 18.2.0, 3GPP TS 33.310, December
	Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)	2023, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
	(Release 17), 3GPP 33.310 V17.4.0, Sept 2022,",	archive/33_series/33.310/33310-i20.zip>.
	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
	archive/33_series/33.310/33310-h40.zip>.


	[TS33.501] "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical	[TS33.501] 3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G
	Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security	system", Release 18.4.0, 3GPP TS 33.501, December 2023,
	architecture and procedures for 5G system (Release 17), ,
	3GPP TS:33.501 V17.7.0, Sept 2022,",
	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/	<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/

	archive/33_series/33.501/33501-h70.zip>.	archive/33_series/33.501/33501-i40.zip>.

	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

	The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [X.680] and	The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [X.680] and
	[X.690].	[X.690].

	<CODE BEGINS>	<CODE BEGINS>
	NF-EKU	NF-EKU
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)

	id-mod-nf-eku (TBD4) }	id-mod-nf-eku (108) }

	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN	BEGIN

	-- OID Arc	-- OID Arc

	id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=	id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

	-- Extended Key Usage Values	-- Extended Key Usage Values


	id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }	id-kp-jwt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 37 }
	id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD2 }	id-kp-httpContentEncrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 38 }
	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD3 }	id-kp-oauthAccessTokenSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 39 }

	END	END
	<CODE ENDS>	<CODE ENDS>


		Acknowledgments

		We would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Ilari Liusvaara, Carl Wallace,
		and Russ Housley for their useful feedback. Thanks to Yoav Nir for
		the secdir review, Elwyn Davies for the genart review, and Benson
		Muite for the intdir review.

		Thanks to Paul Wouters, Lars Eggert, and Éric Vyncke for the IESG
		review.

		Contributor

		The following individual has contributed to this document:

		German Peinado
		Nokia
		Email: german.peinado@nokia.com

	Authors' Addresses	Authors' Addresses


	Tirumaleswar Reddy	Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
	Nokia	Nokia
	India	India
	Email: kondtir@gmail.com	Email: kondtir@gmail.com

	Jani Ekman	Jani Ekman
	Nokia	Nokia
	Finland	Finland
	Email: jani.ekman@nokia.com	Email: jani.ekman@nokia.com


	Daniel Migault	Daniel Migault
	Ericsson	Ericsson
	Canada	Canada
	Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com	Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com

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