<?xmlversion='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <!DOCTYPE rfc [ <!ENTITY nbsp " "> <!ENTITY zwsp "​"> <!ENTITY nbhy "‑"> <!ENTITY wj "⁠"> ]><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?> <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.6.39 (Ruby 3.0.2) --><rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902"docName="draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-22"docName="draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-23" number="9528" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="true"submissionType="IETF"tocDepth="2" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" updates="" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" version="3"> <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.18.0 --> <front> <title abbrev="EDHOC">Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)</title> <seriesInfoname="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-22"/>name="RFC" value="9528"/> <author initials="G." surname="Selander" fullname="Göran Selander"> <organization abbrev="Ericsson">Ericsson AB</organization> <address> <postal><street>SE-164 80 Stockholm</street><code>164 80</code> <city>Stockholm</city> <country>Sweden</country> </postal> <email>goran.selander@ericsson.com</email> </address> </author> <author initials="J" surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson"> <organization abbrev="Ericsson">Ericsson AB</organization> <address> <postal><street>SE-164<code>164 80Stockholm</street></code> <city>Stockholm</city> <country>Sweden</country> </postal> <email>john.mattsson@ericsson.com</email> </address> </author> <author initials="F." surname="Palombini" fullname="Francesca Palombini"> <organization abbrev="Ericsson">Ericsson AB</organization> <address> <postal><street>SE-164<code>164 80Stockholm</street></code> <city>Stockholm</city> <country>Sweden</country> </postal> <email>francesca.palombini@ericsson.com</email> </address> </author> <dateyear="2023" month="August" day="25"/> <area>SEC</area> <workgroup>LAKE Working Group</workgroup>year="2024" month="March"/> <area>sec</area> <workgroup>lake</workgroup> <keyword>AKE</keyword> <keyword>LAKE</keyword> <keyword>COSE</keyword> <keyword>OSCORE</keyword> <keyword>lightweight authenticated key exchange</keyword> <keyword>constrained node networks</keyword> <keyword>IoT security</keyword> <abstract><?line 278?><t>This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrainedscenariosscenarios, and a main use case is to establish anOSCOREObject Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) security context. By reusingCOSECBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for cryptography,CBORConcise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for encoding, andCoAPConstrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low.</t> </abstract> </front> <middle> <?line 282?> <section anchor="introduction"> <name>Introduction</name> <section anchor="motivation"> <name>Motivation</name> <t>Many Internet of Things (IoT) deployments require technologieswhichthat are highly performant in constrained environments <xref target="RFC7228"/>. IoT devices may be constrained in various ways, including memory, storage, processing capacity, and power. The connectivity for these settings may also exhibitconstraintsconstraints, such as unreliable and lossy channels, highly restricted bandwidth, and dynamic topology. The IETF has acknowledged this problem by standardizing a range of lightweight protocols and enablers designed for the IoT, includingthe Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP,CoAP <xreftarget="RFC7252"/>), Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR,target="RFC7252"/>, CBOR <xreftarget="RFC8949"/>),target="RFC8949"/>, and Static Context Header Compression(SCHC,(SCHC) <xreftarget="RFC8724"/>).</t>target="RFC8724"/>.</t> <t>The need for special protocols targeting constrained IoT deployments extends also to the security domain <xref target="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs"/>. Important characteristics in constrained environments are the number of round trips and protocol message sizes, whichif(if keptlowlow) can contribute to good performance by enabling transport over a small number of radio frames, reducing latency due tofragmentation orfragmentation, duty cycles, etc. Another important criterion is code size, which may be prohibitively large for certain deployments due to device capabilities or network load during firmwareupdate.updates. Some IoT deployments also need to support a variety of underlying transport technologies, potentially even with a single connection.</t> <t>Some security solutions for such settings exist already.CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE,COSE <xreftarget="RFC9052"/>)target="RFC9052"/> specifies basic application-layer security services efficiently encoded in CBOR. Another example isObject Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE,OSCORE <xreftarget="RFC8613"/>)target="RFC8613"/>, which is a lightweight communication security extension to CoAP using CBOR and COSE. In order to establish good quality cryptographic keys for security protocols such as COSE and OSCORE, the two endpoints may run an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, from which shared secret keying material can be derived. Such a key exchange protocol should also belightweight;lightweight to prevent bad performance in case of repeated use, e.g., due to device rebooting or frequent rekeying for securityreasons;reasons or to avoid latencies in a network formation setting with many devices authenticating at the same time.</t> <t>This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol providing good security properties including forward secrecy, identity protection, and cipher suite negotiation. Authentication can be based on raw public keys(RPK)(RPKs) or public key certificates and requires the application to provide input on how to verify that endpoints are trusted. This specification supports the referencing of credentials in order to reduce message overhead, but credentials may alternatively be embedded in the messages. EDHOC does not currently supportpre-shared keyPre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication as authentication with static Diffie-Hellman (DH) public keys by reference produces equally small message sizes but with much simpler key distribution and identity protection.</t> <t>EDHOC makes use of known protocol constructions, such asSIGMASIGn-and-MAc <xref target="SIGMA"/>, the Noise XX pattern <xref target="Noise"/>, and Extract-and-Expand <xref target="RFC5869"/>. EDHOC uses COSE for cryptography and identification of credentials (including COSE_Key, CBOR Web Token (CWT), CWT Claims Set (CCS), X.509, andCBOR encodedCBOR-encoded X.509 (C509)certificates,certificates; see <xref target="auth-cred"/>). COSE provides crypto agility and enables the use of future algorithms and credential types targeting IoT.</t> <t>EDHOC is designed for highly constrainedsettingssettings, making it especially suitable for low-power networks <xref target="RFC8376"/> such as Cellular IoT,6TiSCH,IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH), and LoRaWAN. A main objective for EDHOC is to be a lightweight authenticated key exchange for OSCORE, i.e., to provide authentication and session key establishment for IoT use cases such as those built on CoAP <xref target="RFC7252"/> involving 'things' with embedded microcontrollers, sensors, and actuators. By reusing the same lightweight primitives as OSCORE (CBOR, COSE,CoAP)and CoAP), the additional code size can be kept very low. Note that while CBOR and COSE primitives are built into the protocol messages, EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport.</t> <t>A typical setting is when one of the endpoints is constrained or in a constrainednetwork,network and the other endpoint is a node on the Internet (such as a mobile phone). Thing-to-thing interactions over constrained networks are also relevant since both endpoints would then benefit from the lightweight properties of the protocol. EDHOC could, e.g., be run when a device connects for the firsttime,time or to establish fresh keyswhichthat are not revealed by a later compromise of the long-term keys.</t> </section> <section anchor="message-size-examples"> <name>Message Size Examples</name> <t>Examples of EDHOC message sizes are shown in <xreftarget="fig-sizes"/>, usingtarget="tab-sizes"/>, which use different kinds of authentication keys and COSE header parameters foridentification:identification, including static Diffie-Hellman keys or signature keys, either inCBOR Web Token (CWT) / CWT Claims Set (CCS)CWT/CCS <xref target="RFC8392"/> identified by a key identifier using 'kid' <xreftarget="RFC9052"/>,target="RFC9052"/> or in X.509 certificates identified by a hash value using 'x5t' <xref target="RFC9360"/>. EDHOC always uses ephemeral-ephemeral key exchange. As a comparison, in the case of RPKauthentication,authentication and when transferred in CoAP, the EDHOC message sizewhen transferred in CoAPcan be less than 1/7 of the DTLS 1.3 handshake <xref target="RFC9147"/> withECDHEEphemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) and connectionID,ID; see <xrefsection="2" sectionFormat="of"target="I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison"/>.</t><figure anchor="fig-sizes"><table anchor="tab-sizes"> <name>Examples of EDHOCmessage sizesMessage Sizes inbytes.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="208" width="472" viewBox="0 0 472 208" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 168,64 L 288,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 344,64 L 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 464,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 464,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 464,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="196" y="52">Static</text> <text x="236" y="52">DH</text> <text x="268" y="52">Keys</text> <text x="384" y="52">Signature</text> <text x="444" y="52">Keys</text> <text x="184" y="84">kid</text> <text x="272" y="84">x5t</text> <text x="360" y="84">kid</text> <text x="448" y="84">x5t</text> <text x="48" y="116">message_1</text> <text x="188" y="116">37</text> <text x="276" y="116">37</text> <text x="364" y="116">37</text> <text x="452" y="116">37</text> <text x="48" y="132">message_2</text> <text x="188" y="132">45</text> <text x="276" y="132">58</text> <text x="360" y="132">102</text> <text x="448" y="132">115</text> <text x="48" y="148">message_3</text> <text x="188" y="148">19</text> <text x="276" y="148">33</text> <text x="364" y="148">77</text> <text x="452" y="148">90</text> <text x="32" y="180">Total</text> <text x="184" y="180">101</text> <text x="272" y="180">128</text> <text x="360" y="180">216</text> <text x="448" y="180">242</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ ---------------------------------------------------------- StaticBytes</name> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Static DHKeys Signature Keys ---------------- ---------------- kid x5t kid x5t ---------------------------------------------------------- message_1 37 37 37 37 message_2 45 58 102 115 message_3 19 33 77 90 ---------------------------------------------------------- Total 101 128 216 242 ---------------------------------------------------------- ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure>Keys</th> <th colspan="2">Signature Keys</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th align="right">kid</th> <th align="right">x5t</th> <th align="right">kid</th> <th align="right">x5t</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>message_1</td> <td align="right">37</td> <td align="right">37</td> <td align="right">37</td> <td align="right">37</td> </tr> <tr> <td>message_2</td> <td align="right">45</td> <td align="right">58</td> <td align="right">102</td> <td align="right">115</td> </tr> <tr> <td>message_3</td> <td align="right">19</td> <td align="right">33</td> <td align="right">77</td> <td align="right">90</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td align="right">101</td> <td align="right">128</td> <td align="right">216</td> <td align="right">242</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="document-structure"> <name>Document Structure</name> <t>The remainder of the document is organized as follows: <xref target="background"/> outlines EDHOC authenticated with signaturekeys,keys; <xref target="overview"/> describes the protocol elements of EDHOC, including formatting of the ephemeral publickeys,keys; <xref target="key-der"/> specifies the keyderivation,derivation; <xref target="asym"/> specifies message processing for EDHOC authenticated with signature keys or static Diffie-Hellmankeys,keys; <xref target="error"/> describes the errormessages,messages; <xref target="duplication"/> describes EDHOC support for transport that does not handle messageduplication,duplication; and <xref target="mti"/> lists compliance requirements. Note that normative text is also used in appendices, in particular <xref target="transfer"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="term"> <name>Terminology and Requirements Language</name><t>The<t> The key words"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY","<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and"OPTIONAL""<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.<?line -6?></t> <t>Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CBOR <xref target="RFC8949"/>, CBOR Sequences <xref target="RFC8742"/>, COSEstructuresStructures andprocessingProcessing <xref target="RFC9052"/>, COSEalgorithmsAlgorithms <xref target="RFC9053"/>, CWT andCWT Claims SetCCS <xref target="RFC8392"/>, and the Concise Data Definition Language(CDDL,(CDDL) <xreftarget="RFC8610"/>),target="RFC8610"/>, which is used to express CBOR data structures. Examples of CBOR and CDDL are provided in <xref target="CBOR"/>. When referring to CBOR, this specification always refers to Deterministically EncodedCBORCBOR, as specified in Sections4.2.1<xref target="RFC8949" section="4.2.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and4.2.2<xref target="RFC8949" section="4.2.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC8949"/>. The single output from authenticated encryption (including the authentication tag) is called "ciphertext", following <xref target="RFC5116"/>.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="background"> <name>EDHOC Outline</name> <t>EDHOCspecifiessupports different authentication methods of the ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keyexchange:exchange. This document specifies authentication methods based on signature keys and static Diffie-Hellman keys. This section outlines thesignature key basedsignature-key-based method. Further details of protocol elements and other authentication methods are provided in the remainder of this document.</t><t>SIGMA (SIGn-and-MAc)<t>SIGn-and-MAc (SIGMA) is a family of theoretical protocols with alargenumber of variants <xref target="SIGMA"/>. Like inIKEv2Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) <xref target="RFC7296"/> and (D)TLS 1.3 <xreftarget="RFC8446"/><xreftarget="RFC8446"/> <xref target="RFC9147"/>, EDHOC authenticated with signature keys is built on a variant of the SIGMA protocol, SIGMA-I, which provides identity protection against active attacks on the party initiating the protocol. Also like IKEv2, EDHOC implements the MAC-then-Sign variant of the SIGMA-I protocol. The message flow (excluding an optional fourth message) is shown in <xref target="fig-sigma"/>.</t> <figure anchor="fig-sigma"> <name>MAC-then-SignvariantVariant of the SIGMA-Iprotocol usedProtocol Used by the EDHOCmethod 0.</name>Method 0</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="192" width="560"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 560 192" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,48 L 8,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,48 L 552,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,64 L 544,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 16,112 L 552,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 544,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,160 540,154.4 540,165.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,160)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,64 540,58.4 540,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="24,112 12,106.4 12,117.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,16,112)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="36">Initiator</text> <text x="520" y="36">Responder</text> <text x="280" y="52">G_X</text> <text x="76" y="100">G_Y,</text> <text x="116" y="100">Enc(</text> <text x="180" y="100">ID_CRED_R,</text> <text x="244" y="100">Sig(</text> <text x="276" y="100">R;</text> <text x="308" y="100">MAC(</text> <text x="360" y="100">CRED_R,</text> <text x="412" y="100">G_X,</text> <text x="448" y="100">G_Y</text> <text x="472" y="100">)</text> <text x="488" y="100">)</text> <text x="504" y="100">)</text> <text x="96" y="148">AEAD(</text> <text x="164" y="148">ID_CRED_I,</text> <text x="228" y="148">Sig(</text> <text x="260" y="148">I;</text> <text x="292" y="148">MAC(</text> <text x="344" y="148">CRED_I,</text> <text x="396" y="148">G_Y,</text> <text x="432" y="148">G_X</text> <text x="456" y="148">)</text> <text x="472" y="148">)</text> <text x="488" y="148">)</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Initiator Responder | G_X | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | | | G_Y, Enc( ID_CRED_R, Sig( R; MAC( CRED_R, G_X, G_Y ) ) ) | |<------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Sig( I; MAC( CRED_I, G_Y, G_X ) ) ) | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <t>The parties exchanging messages in an EDHOC session are called the Initiator (I) and the Responder (R), where the Initiator sends message_1 (see <xref target="overview"/>). They exchange ephemeral public keys, compute a shared secret session key PRK_out, and derive symmetric application keys used to protect application data.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>G_X and G_Y are theECDHElliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) ephemeral public keys of I and R, respectively.</li> <li>CRED_I and CRED_R are the authentication credentials containing the public authentication keys of I and R, respectively.</li> <li>ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are used to identify and optionally transport the credentials ofthe InitiatorI andthe Responder,R, respectively.</li> <li>Sig(I; . ) and Sig(R; . ) denote signatures made with the private authentication key of I and R, respectively.</li> <li>Enc(), AEAD(), and MAC()denotesdenote encryption,authenticated encryptionAuthenticated Encryption withadditional data,Associated Data, andmessage authentication code -Message Authentication Code -- crypto algorithms applied with keys derived from one or more shared secrets calculated during the protocol.</li> </ul> <t>In order to create a "full-fledged"protocolprotocol, some additional protocol elements are needed.EDHOCThis specification adds:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>Transcript<li>transcript hashes (hashes of messagedata)data), TH_2, TH_3,TH_4and TH_4, used for key derivation and as additional authenticateddata.</li> <li>Computationallydata,</li> <li>computationally independent keys derived from the ECDH shared secret and used for authenticated encryption of differentmessages.</li> <li>Anmessages,</li> <li>an optional fourth message giving key confirmation to I in deployments where no protected application data is sent from R toI.</li> <li>AI,</li> <li>a keying material exporter and a key update function with forwardsecrecy.</li> <li>Securesecrecy,</li> <li>secure negotiation of the ciphersuite.</li> <li>Methodsuite,</li> <li>method types, error handling, andpadding.</li> <li>Selectionpadding,</li> <li>the selection of connectionidentifiersidentifiers, C_I andC_RC_R, which may be used in EDHOC to identify the protocolstate.</li> <li>Transportstate, and</li> <li>transport of external authorization data.</li> </ul> <t>EDHOC is designed to encrypt and integrity protect as much information as possible. Symmetric keys and random material used in EDHOC are derived using EDHOC_KDF with as much previous information aspossible,possible; see <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>. EDHOC is furthermore designed to be as compact and lightweight as possible, in terms of message sizes, processing, and the ability to reuse already existing CBOR, COSE, and CoAP libraries. Like in (D)TLS, authentication is the responsibility of the application. EDHOC identifies (and optionally transports) authenticationcredentials,credentials and provides proof-of-possession of the private authentication key.</t> <t>To simplify for implementors, the use ofCBORCBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC is summarized in <xref target="CBORandCOSE"/>. Testvectorsvectors, including CBOR diagnosticnotationnotation, are provided in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lake-traces"/>.</t>target="RFC9529"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="overview"> <name>Protocol Elements</name> <section anchor="general"> <name>General</name> <t>The EDHOC protocol consists of three mandatory messages (message_1, message_2, and message_3), an optional fourth message (message_4), and an error message, between an Initiator (I) and a Responder (R). The odd messages are sent by I, the even by R. Both I and R can send error messages. The roles have slightly different security propertieswhichthat should be considered when the roles areassigned,assigned; see <xref target="sec-prop"/>. All EDHOC messages are CBOR Sequences <xreftarget="RFC8742"/>,target="RFC8742"/> and are defined to be deterministicallyencoded.encoded CBOR as specified in <xref target="RFC8949" sectionFormat="of" section="4.2.1"/>. <xref target="fig-flow"/> illustrates an EDHOC message flow with the optional fourth message as well as the content of each message. The protocol elements in the figure are introduced in Sections <xreftarget="overview"/>target="overview" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="asym"/>.target="asym" format="counter"/>. Message formatting and processing are specified in Sections <xreftarget="asym"/>target="asym" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="error"/>.</t>target="error" format="counter"/>.</t> <t>Application data may be protected using the agreed application algorithms (AEAD, hash) in the selected cipher suite (see <xreftarget="cs"/>)target="cs"/>), and the application can make use of the established connection identifiers C_I and C_R (see <xref target="ci"/>). Media types that may be used for EDHOC are defined in <xref target="media-type"/>.</t> <t>The Initiator can derive symmetric application keys after creating EDHOCmessage_3,message_3; see <xref target="exporter"/>. Protected application data can therefore be sent in parallel or together with EDHOC message_3. EDHOC message_4 is typically not sent.</t> <figure anchor="fig-flow"> <name>EDHOCmessage flow includingMessage Flow Including theoptional fourth message.</name>Optional Fourth Message</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="288" width="560"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 560 288" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,48 L 8,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,48 L 552,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,64 L 544,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 16,128 L 552,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 544,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,192 540,186.4 540,197.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,192)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,64 540,58.4 540,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="24,128 12,122.4 12,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,16,128)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="36">Initiator</text> <text x="520" y="36">Responder</text> <text x="176" y="52">METHOD,</text> <text x="248" y="52">SUITES_I,</text> <text x="308" y="52">G_X,</text> <text x="348" y="52">C_I,</text> <text x="392" y="52">EAD_1</text> <text x="280" y="84">message_1</text> <text x="84" y="116">G_Y,</text> <text x="124" y="116">Enc(</text> <text x="164" y="116">C_R,</text> <text x="228" y="116">ID_CRED_R,</text> <text x="352" y="116">Signature_or_MAC_2,</text> <text x="456" y="116">EAD_2</text> <text x="488" y="116">)</text> <text x="280" y="148">message_2</text> <text x="128" y="180">AEAD(</text> <text x="196" y="180">ID_CRED_I,</text> <text x="320" y="180">Signature_or_MAC_3,</text> <text x="424" y="180">EAD_3</text> <text x="456" y="180">)</text> <text x="280" y="212">message_3</text> <text x="248" y="244">AEAD(</text> <text x="296" y="244">EAD_4</text> <text x="328" y="244">)</text> <text x="20" y="260"><-</text> <text x="40" y="260">-</text> <text x="56" y="260">-</text> <text x="72" y="260">-</text> <text x="88" y="260">-</text> <text x="104" y="260">-</text> <text x="120" y="260">-</text> <text x="136" y="260">-</text> <text x="152" y="260">-</text> <text x="168" y="260">-</text> <text x="184" y="260">-</text> <text x="200" y="260">-</text> <text x="216" y="260">-</text> <text x="232" y="260">-</text> <text x="248" y="260">-</text> <text x="264" y="260">-</text> <text x="280" y="260">-</text> <text x="296" y="260">-</text> <text x="312" y="260">-</text> <text x="328" y="260">-</text> <text x="344" y="260">-</text> <text x="360" y="260">-</text> <text x="376" y="260">-</text> <text x="392" y="260">-</text> <text x="408" y="260">-</text> <text x="424" y="260">-</text> <text x="440" y="260">-</text> <text x="456" y="260">-</text> <text x="472" y="260">-</text> <text x="488" y="260">-</text> <text x="504" y="260">-</text> <text x="520" y="260">-</text> <text x="536" y="260">-</text> <text x="280" y="276">message_4</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Initiator Responder | METHOD, SUITES_I, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_1 | | | | G_Y, Enc( C_R, ID_CRED_R, Signature_or_MAC_2, EAD_2 ) | |<------------------------------------------------------------------+ | message_2 | | | | AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Signature_or_MAC_3, EAD_3 ) | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_3 | | | | AEAD( EAD_4 ) | |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | message_4 | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> </section> <section anchor="method"> <name>Method</name> <t>The data item METHOD in message_1 (see <xreftarget="asym-msg1-form"/>),target="asym-msg1-form"/>) is an integer specifying the authentication method. EDHOC currently supports authentication with signature or static Diffie-Hellman keys, as defined in the four authentication methods: 0, 1, 2, and3,3; see <xreftarget="fig-method-types"/>.target="tab-method-types"/>. When using a static Diffie-Hellmankeykey, the authentication is provided by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed from an ephemeral-static ECDH shared secretwhichthat enables significant reductions in message sizes. Notethatthat, also in the staticDiffie-Hellman basedDiffie-Hellman-based authenticationmethodsmethods, there is an ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange.</t> <t>The Initiator andtheResponder need to have agreed on a single method to be used forEDHOC,EDHOC; see <xref target="applicability"/>.</t><figure anchor="fig-method-types"><table anchor="tab-method-types"> <name>AuthenticationkeysKeys formethod types.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="176" width="464" viewBox="0 0 464 176" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 120,32 L 120,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 288,32 L 288,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 456,32 L 456,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 456,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,78 L 456,78" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,82 L 456,82" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 456,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="44" y="52">Method</text> <text x="92" y="52">Type</text> <text x="168" y="52">Initiator</text> <text x="336" y="52">Responder</text> <text x="88" y="68">Value</text> <text x="188" y="68">Authentication</text> <text x="264" y="68">Key</text> <text x="356" y="68">Authentication</text> <text x="432" y="68">Key</text> <text x="104" y="100">0</text> <text x="168" y="100">Signature</text> <text x="224" y="100">Key</text> <text x="336" y="100">Signature</text> <text x="392" y="100">Key</text> <text x="104" y="116">1</text> <text x="168" y="116">Signature</text> <text x="224" y="116">Key</text> <text x="324" y="116">Static</text> <text x="364" y="116">DH</text> <text x="392" y="116">Key</text> <text x="104" y="132">2</text> <text x="156" y="132">Static</text> <text x="196" y="132">DH</text> <text x="224" y="132">Key</text> <text x="336" y="132">Signature</text> <text x="392" y="132">Key</text> <text x="104" y="148">3</text> <text x="156" y="148">Static</text> <text x="196" y="148">DH</text> <text x="224" y="148">Key</text> <text x="324" y="148">Static</text> <text x="364" y="148">DH</text> <text x="392" y="148">Key</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ +-------------+--------------------+--------------------+ |Method Types</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Method Type| Initiator | Responder | | Value |Value</th> <th>Initiator AuthenticationKey |Key</th> <th>Responder AuthenticationKey | +=============+====================+====================+ | 0 | Signature Key | Signature Key | | 1 | Signature Key | StaticKey</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="right">0</td> <td>Signature Key</td> <td>Signature Key</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">1</td> <td>Signature Key</td> <td>Static DHKey | | 2 | StaticKey</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">2</td> <td>Static DHKey | Signature Key | | 3 | StaticKey</td> <td>Signature Key</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">3</td> <td>Static DHKey | StaticKey</td> <td>Static DHKey | +-------------+--------------------+--------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure>Key</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">23</td> <td>Reserved</td> <td>Reserved</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t>EDHOC does not have a dedicated message field to indicate the protocol version. Breaking changes to EDHOC can be introduced by specifying and registering new methods.</t> </section> <section anchor="ci"> <name>Connection Identifiers</name> <t>EDHOC includes the selection of connection identifiers(C_I,(C_I and C_R) identifying a connection for which keys are agreed.</t> <t>Connection identifiers may be used to correlate EDHOC messages and facilitate the retrieval of protocol state during an EDHOC session (see <xreftarget="transport"/>),target="transport"/>) or may be used in applications of EDHOC, e.g., in OSCORE (see <xref target="ci-oscore"/>). The connection identifiers do not have any cryptographic purpose in EDHOC and only facilitate the retrieval of security data associated with the protocol state.</t> <t>Connection identifiers in EDHOC are intrinsically byte strings. Most constrained devices only have a few connections for which short identifiers may be sufficient. In somecasescases, minimum length identifiers are necessary to comply with overhead requirements. However, CBOR byte strings--- with the exception of the empty byte stringh’’h'', which encodes as one byte (0x40)--- are encoded as two or more bytes. To enable one-byte encoding of certain byte strings while maintaining CBOR encoding, EDHOC represents certain identifiers as CBOR integers on thewire,wire; see <xref target="bstr-repr"/>.</t> <section anchor="selection-of-connection-identifiers"> <name>Selection of Connection Identifiers</name> <t>C_I and C_R are chosen by I and R, respectively. The Initiator selects C_I and sends it in message_1 for the Responder to use as a reference to the connection incommunicationcommunications with the Initiator. The Responder selects C_R and sends it in message_2 for the Initiator to use as a reference to the connection in communications with the Responder.</t> <t>If connection identifiers are used by an application protocol for which EDHOC establisheskeyskeys, then the selected connection identifiersSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> adhere to the requirements for thatprotocol,protocol; see <xref target="ci-oscore"/> for an example.</t> </section> <section anchor="bstr-repr"> <name>Representation of Byte String Identifiers</name> <t>To allow identifiers with minimal overhead on the wire, certain byte strings used in connection identifiers and credential identifiers (see <xref target="id_cred"/>) are defined to have integer representations.</t> <t>The integers with one-byte CBOR encoding are -24, ...,23,23; see <xref target="fig-int-one-byte"/>.</t> <figure anchor="fig-int-one-byte"><name>One-byte CBOR encoded integers.</name><name>One-Byte CBOR-Encoded Integers</name> <artwork align="center"><![CDATA[ Integer: -24 -23 ... -11 ... -2 -1 0 1 ... 15 ... 23 Encoding: 37 36 ... 2A ... 21 20 00 01 ... 0F ... 17 ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>The byte stringswhichthat coincide with a one-byte CBOR encoding of an integerMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be represented by the CBOR encoding of that integer. Other byte strings are simply encoded as CBOR byte strings.</t> <t>For example:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>0x21 is represented by 0x21 (CBOR encoding of the integer -2), not by 0x4121 (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x21).</li> <li>0x0D is represented by 0x0D (CBOR encoding of the integer 13), not by 0x410D (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x0D).</li> <li>0x18 is represented by 0x4118 (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x18).</li> <li>0x38 is represented by 0x4138 (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x38).</li> <li>0xABCD is represented by 0x42ABCD (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0xABCD).</li> </ul> <t>One may view this representation of byte strings as a transportencoding:encoding, i.e., a byte stringwhichthat parses as the one-byte CBOR encoding of an integer (i.e., integer in the interval -24, ..., 23) is just copied directly into the message, and a byte stringwhichthat does not is encoded as a CBOR byte string during transport.</t><t>Implementation<aside><t>Implementation Note: When implementing the byte string identifier representation,it canin some programminglanguageslanguages, it can help to define a newtype,type or other data structure, which (in itsuser facinguser-facing API) behaves like a bytestring,string but when serializing to CBOR produces a CBOR byte string or a CBOR integer depending on itsvalue.</t>value.</t></aside> </section> <section anchor="ci-oscore"> <name>Use of Connection Identifiers with OSCORE</name> <t>For OSCORE, the choice of connection identifier results in the endpoint selecting its RecipientID, see Section 3.1 ofID (see <xreftarget="RFC8613"/>,target="RFC8613" section="3.1" sectionFormat="of"/>) for which certain uniqueness requirementsapply, see Section 3.3 ofapply (see <xreftarget="RFC8613"/>.target="RFC8613" section="3.3" sectionFormat="of"/>). Therefore, the Initiator andtheResponderMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> select connection identifiers such that it results in the same OSCORE Recipient ID. Since the connection identifier is a byte string, it is converted to an OSCORE Recipient ID equal to the byte string.</t> <t>Examples:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>A connection identifier 0xFF (represented in the EDHOC message as0x41FF,0x41FF; see <xref target="bstr-repr"/>) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID 0xFF.</li> <li>A connection identifier 0x21 (represented in the EDHOC message as0x21,0x21; see <xref target="bstr-repr"/>) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID 0x21.</li> </ul> </section> </section> <section anchor="transport"> <name>Transport</name> <t>Cryptographically, EDHOC does not put requirements on the underlying layers. Received messages are processed as the expected next message according to the protocolstate,state; see <xref target="asym"/>. If processing fails for anyreason then, typically,reason, then typically an error message is attempted to be sent and the EDHOC session is aborted.</t> <t>EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer and can even be used in environments without IP. Ultimately, the application is free to choose how to transport EDHOC messages including errors. In order to avoid unnecessary message processing or protocol termination, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use reliable transport, such as CoAP in reliable mode, which is the defaulttransport,transport; see <xref target="coap"/>. In general, the transportSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> handle:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>message loss,</li> <li>messageduplication, seeduplication (see <xref target="duplication"/> for analternative,</li>alternative),</li> <li>flow control,</li> <li>congestion control,</li> <li>fragmentation and reassembly,</li> <li>demultiplexing EDHOC messages from other types of messages,</li> <li>denial-of-servicemitigation,</li>mitigation, and</li> <li>messagecorrelation, seecorrelation (see <xreftarget="ci-edhoc"/>.</li>target="ci-edhoc"/>).</li> </ul> <t>EDHOC does not requireerror freeerror-free transport since a change in message content is detected through the transcript hashes in a subsequent integrityverification,verification; see <xref target="asym"/>. The transport does not require additional means to handle message reordering because of the lockstep processing of EDHOC.</t> <t>EDHOC is designed to enable an authenticated key exchange with small messages, where the minimum message sizes are of the order illustrated in the first column of <xreftarget="fig-sizes"/>.target="tab-sizes"/>. There is no maximum message size specified by the protocol; for example, this isfor exampledependent on the size of the authentication credentials (if they are transported, see <xreftarget="auth-key-id"/>).</t>target="auth-key-id"/>). The encryption of very large content in message_2 when using certain hash algorithms is described in <xref target="large-plaintext_2"/>.</t> <t>The use of transport is specified in the application profile, which inparticularparticular, may specify limitations in messagesizes,sizes; see <xref target="applicability"/>.</t> <section anchor="ci-edhoc"> <name>EDHOC Message Correlation</name> <t>Correlation between EDHOC messages is needed to facilitate the retrieval of the protocol state and security context during an EDHOC session. It is also helpful for the Responder to get an indication that a received EDHOC message is the beginning of a new EDHOC session, such that no existing protocol state or security context needs to be retrieved.</t> <t>Correlation may be based on existing mechanisms in the transportprotocol,protocol; for example, the CoAP Token may be used to correlate EDHOC messages in a CoAP response and in an associated CoAP request. The connection identifiers may also be used to correlate EDHOC messages.</t> <t>If correlation between consecutive messages is not provided by othermeansmeans, then the transport bindingSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> mandate prepending of an appropriate connection identifier (when available from the EDHOC protocol) to the EDHOC message. If message_1 indication is not provided by other means, then the transport bindingSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> mandate prepending of message_1 with the CBOR simple value <tt>true</tt> (0xf5).</t> <t>Transport of EDHOC in CoAP payloads is described in <xref target="coap"/>, including how to use connection identifiers and message_1 indication with CoAP. A similar construction is possible for other client-server protocols. Protocols that do not provide any correlation at all can prescribe prepending of the peer's connection identifier to all messages.</t> <t>Note that correlation between EDHOC messages may be obtained without transport support or connection identifiers, forexampleexample, if the endpoints only accept a single instance of the protocol at atime,time and execute conditionally on a correct sequence of messages.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="auth-key-id"> <name>Authentication Parameters</name> <t>EDHOC supports various settings for how the other endpoint'sauthentication (public)public key for authentication may be transported, identified, andtrusted.</t>trusted. We shall use the term "authentication key" to mean key used for authentication in general, or specifically, the public key, when there is no risk for confusion.</t> <t>EDHOC performs the followingauthentication relatedauthentication-related operations:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC transports information about credentials in ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R (described in <xref target="id_cred"/>). Based on this information, the authentication credentials CRED_I and CRED_R (described in <xref target="auth-cred"/>) can be obtained. EDHOC may also transport certainauthentication relatedauthentication-related information asExternal Authorization Dataexternal authorization data (see <xref target="AD"/>).</li> <li> <t>EDHOC uses the authentication credentials in two ways (see Sections <xreftarget="asym-msg2-proc"/>target="asym-msg2-proc" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="asym-msg3-proc"/>):target="asym-msg3-proc" format="counter"/>): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The authentication credential is input to the integrity verification using the MAC fields.</li> <li>The authentication key of the authentication credential is used with the Signature_or_MAC field to verify proof-of-possession of the private key.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <t>Otherauthentication relatedauthentication-related verifications are out of scope forEDHOC,EDHOC andisare the responsibility of the application. In particular, the authentication credential needs to be validated in the context of the connection for which EDHOC isused,used; see <xref target="auth-validation"/>. EDHOCMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> allow the application to read received information aboutcredential (ID_CRED_R, ID_CRED_I).credentials in ID_CRED_R and ID_CRED_I. EDHOCMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have access to the authentication key and the authentication credential.</t> <t>Note that the type of authentication key, the type of authentication credential, and the identification of the credential have a large impact on the message size. For example, the Signature_or_MAC field is much smaller with a static DH key than with a signature key. A CWT Claims Set (CCS) is much smaller than a self-signedcertificate/CWT,certificate / CWT, but if it is possible to reference the credential with a COSE header like 'kid', then that is in turn much smaller than a CCS.</t> <section anchor="auth-keys"> <name>Authentication Keys</name> <t>The authentication key(i.e., the public key used for authentication) MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a signature key or a static Diffie-Hellman key. The Initiator andtheResponderMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use different types of authentication keys, e.g., one uses a signature key and the other uses a static Diffie-Hellman key.</t> <t>The authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the method and the selected cipher suite (see <xref target="cs"/>). The authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the EDHOC key exchange algorithm when static Diffie-Hellman authentication isused,used and compatible with the EDHOC signature algorithm when signature authentication is used.</t> <t>Note that for most signature algorithms, the signature is determined jointly by the signature algorithm and the authentication keyalgorithm together.algorithm. When using static Diffie-Hellmankeyskeys, the Initiator's and the Responder's private authentication keys are denoted as I and R, respectively, and the public authentication keys are denoted G_I and G_R, respectively.</t> <t>For X.509certificatescertificates, the authentication key is represented by a SubjectPublicKeyInfofield.field, which also contains information about authentication key algorithm. For CWT and CCS (see <xreftarget="auth-cred"/>))target="auth-cred"/>), the authentication key is represented by a 'cnf' claim <xref target="RFC8747"/> containing a COSE_Key <xreftarget="RFC9052"/>.target="RFC9052"/>, which contains information about authentication key algorithm. In EDHOC, a raw public key (RPK) is an authentication key encoded as a COSE_Key wrapped in aCCS.</t>CCS, an example is given in <xref target="fig-ccs"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="auth-cred"> <name>Authentication Credentials</name> <t>The authentication credentials, CRED_I and CRED_R,containscontain the public authentication key of the Initiator andtheResponder, respectively. We use the notation CRED_x to refer to CRED_I or CRED_R. Requirements on CRED_x applies both to CRED_I and to CRED_R. The authentication credential typically also contains other parameters that needs to be verified by theapplication, seeapplication (see <xreftarget="auth-validation"/>,target="auth-validation"/>) and in particular information about the identity ("subject") of the endpoint to prevent misbindingattacks, seeattacks (see <xreftarget="identities"/>.</t>target="identities"/>).</t> <t>EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials (see <xref target="id_cred"/>), forexampleexample, X.509 certificates <xref target="RFC9360"/>, C509 certificates <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>, CWTs <xreftarget="RFC8392"/>target="RFC8392"/>, andCWT Claims Sets (CCS)CCSs <xref target="RFC8392"/>. When the identified credential is a chain or a bag, the authentication credential CRED_x is just the end entity X.509 or C509 certificate / CWT. In the choice between a chain orbaga bag, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use a chain, since the certificates in a bag are unordered and may contain self-signed and extraneous certificates, which can add complexity to the process of extracting the end entity certificate. The Initiator andtheResponderMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use different types of authentication credentials, e.g., one uses an RPK and the other uses a public key certificate.</t> <t>Since CRED_R is used in the integrityverification, seeverification (see <xreftarget="asym-msg2-proc"/>,target="asym-msg2-proc"/>), it needs to be specified such that it is identical when used by the Initiator or Responder. Similarly for CRED_I, see <xref target="asym-msg3-proc"/>. The Initiator and Responder are expected to agree on the specific encoding of the authenticationcredentials,credentials; see <xref target="applicability"/>. It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the COSE 'kid' parameter, when used to identify the authentication credential, refers toasuch a specific encoding of the authentication credential. The Initiator and ResponderSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use an available authentication credential(transportedwithout re-encoding, i.e. an authentication credential transported in EDHOC by value, or otherwiseprovisioned) without re-encoding.provisioned, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used as is. If for some reason re-encoding ofthean authentication credential passed by reference may occur, then a potential common encoding forCBOR basedCBOR-based credentials isbytewise lexicographic order of their deterministic encodingsdeterministically encoded CBOR, as specified inSection 4.2.1Sections <xref target="RFC8949" section="4.2.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC8949" section="4.2.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC8949"/>.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>When the authentication credential is an X.509 certificate, CRED_xSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be theDER encodedDER-encoded certificate, encoded as a bstr <xref target="RFC9360"/>.</li> <li>When the authentication credential is a C509 certificate, CRED_xSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be theC509CertificateC509 certificate <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>.</li> <li>When the authentication credential is a CWT including a COSE_Key, CRED_xSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the untagged CWT.</li> <li> <t>When the authentication credential includes a COSE_Key but is not in a CWT, CRED_xSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be an untaggedCWT Claims Set (CCS).CCS. This is how RPKs are encoded, see <xref target="fig-ccs"/> for an example. </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Naked COSE_Keys are thus dressed as CCS when used in EDHOC, in its simplest form by prefixing the COSE_Key with 0xA108A101 (a map with a 'cnf' claim). In thatcasecase, the resulting authentication credential contains no other identity than the public keyitself,itself; see <xref target="identities"/>.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <t>An example of CRED_x is shown below:</t> <figure anchor="fig-ccs"><name>CWT Claims Set (CCS) containing<name>CCS Containing an X25519staticStatic Diffie-HellmankeyKey and an EUI-64identity.</name>Identity</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ { /CCS/ 2 : "42-50-31-FF-EF-37-32-39", /sub/ 8 : { /cnf/ 1 : { /COSE_Key/ 1 : 1, /kty/ 2 : h'00', /kid/ -1 : 4, /crv/ -2 : h'b1a3e89460e88d3a8d54211dc95f0b90 /x/ 3ff205eb71912d6db8f4af980d2db83a' } } } ]]></artwork> </figure> </section> <section anchor="id_cred"> <name>Identification of Credentials</name> <t>The ID_CRED fields, ID_CRED_R and ID_CRED_I, are transported in message_2 and message_3,respectively,respectively; see Sections <xreftarget="asym-msg2-proc"/>target="asym-msg2-proc" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="asym-msg3-proc"/>.target="asym-msg3-proc" format="counter"/>. We use the notation ID_CRED_x to refer to ID_CRED_I or ID_CRED_R. Requirements on ID_CRED_x applies both to ID_CRED_I and to ID_CRED_R. The ID_CRED fields are used to identify and optionally transport credentials:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_R is intended to facilitate for the Initiator retrieving the authentication credential CRED_R and the authentication key of R.</li> <li>ID_CRED_I is intended to facilitate for the Responder retrieving the authentication credential CRED_I and the authentication key of I.</li> </ul> <t>ID_CRED_x may contain the authentication credential CRED_x, for x = I or R, but for manysettingssettings, it is not necessary to transport the authentication credential within EDHOC. For example, it may be pre-provisioned or acquired out-of-band over less constrained links. ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R do not have any cryptographic purpose in EDHOC since the authentication credentials are integrityprotected.</t>protected by the Signature_or_MAC field.</t> <t>EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials and supports all credential types for which COSE header parameters aredefineddefined, including X.509 certificates(<xref target="RFC9360"/>),<xref target="RFC9360"/>, C509 certificates(<xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>), CWT (see<xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>, CWTs (<xref target="new-header-param"/>) andCWT Claims Set (see <xrefCCSs (<xref target="new-header-param"/>).</t> <t>ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are of type COSE header_map, as defined inSection 3 of<xreftarget="RFC9052"/>,target="RFC9052" section="3" sectionFormat="of"/>, andcontainscontain one or more COSE header parameters. If a map contains several header parameters, the labels do not need to be sorted in bytewise lexicographic order. ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_RMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain different header parameters. The header parameters typically provide some information about the format of the credential.</t> <t>Example: X.509 certificates can be identified by a hash value using the 'x5t'parameter,parameter; seeSection 2 of<xreftarget="RFC9360"/>:</t>target="RFC9360" section="2" sectionFormat="of"/>:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I orR,</li>R</li> </ul> <t>Example: CWT or CCS can be identified by a key identifier using the 'kid'parameter,parameter; seeSection 3.1 of<xreftarget="RFC9052"/>:</t>target="RFC9052" section="3.1" sectionFormat="of"/>:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I orR.</li>R</li> </ul> <t>Note that COSE header parameters in ID_CRED_x are used to identify the message sender's credential.ThereTherefore, there isthereforeno reason to use the "-sender" header parameters, such as x5t-sender, defined inSection 3 of<xreftarget="RFC9360"/>.target="RFC9360" section="3" sectionFormat="of"/>. Instead, the corresponding parameter without "-sender", such as x5t,SHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</t> <t>As stated inSection 3.1 of<xreftarget="RFC9052"/>,target="RFC9052" section="3.1" sectionFormat="of"/>, applicationsMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that 'kid' values are unique and several keys associated with a 'kid' may need to be checked before the correct one is found. Applications might use additional information such as 'kid context' or lower layers to determine which key to try first. Applications should strive to make ID_CRED_x as unique as possible, since the recipient may otherwise have to try several keys.</t> <t>See <xref target="COSE"/> for more examples.</t> <section anchor="new-header-param"> <name>COSE Header Parameters for CWT and CWT Claims Set</name> <t>This document registers two new COSE headerparametersparameters, 'kcwt' and'kccs''kccs', for use with CBOR Web Token(CWT,(CWT) <xreftarget="RFC8392"/>)target="RFC8392"/> and CWT Claims Set(CCS,(CCS) <xreftarget="RFC8392"/>),target="RFC8392"/>, respectively. The CWT/CCSMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim <xref target="RFC8747"/>. There may be any number of additional claims present in the CWT/CCS.</t> <t>CWTs sent in 'kcwt' are protected using a MAC or a signature and are similar to a certificate (when used with public key cryptography) or a Kerberos ticket (when used with symmetric key cryptography). CCSs sent in 'kccs' are not protected and are therefore similar to raw public keys or self-signed certificates.</t> <t>Security considerations for 'kcwt' and 'kccs' are made in <xref target="impl-cons"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="compact-kid"> <name>Compact Encoding of ID_CRED Fields for 'kid'</name> <t>To comply with theLAKELightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) message sizerequirements, seerequirements (see <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs"/>,target="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs"/>), two optimizations are made for the case when ID_CRED_x, for x = I or R, contains a single 'kid' parameter.</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>The CBOR map { 4 : kid_x } is replaced by the byte string kid_x.</li> <li>The representation of identifiers specified in <xref target="bstr-repr"/> is applied to kid_x.</li> </ol> <t>These optimizationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be applied if and only if ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x } and ID_CRED_x in PLAINTEXT_y of message_y, y = 2 or3,3; see Sections <xreftarget="asym-msg2-proc"/>target="asym-msg2-proc" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="asym-msg3-proc"/>.target="asym-msg3-proc" format="counter"/>. Note that these optimizations are not applied to instances of ID_CRED_xwhichthat have no impact on message size, e.g., context_y, or the COSE protected header.Examples:</t>For example:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'FF' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is not the CBOR map 0xA10441FF but the CBOR byte string h'FF', i.e., 0x41FF.</li> <li>For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'21' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is neither the CBOR map0xA1044121,0xA1044121 nor the CBOR byte string h'21', i.e., 0x4121, but the CBOR integer 0x21.</li> </ul> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="cs"> <name>Cipher Suites</name> <t>An EDHOC cipher suite consists of an ordered set of algorithms from the "COSE Algorithms" and "COSE Elliptic Curves" registries as well as the EDHOC MAC length. All algorithm names and definitions followfromCOSEalgorithmsAlgorithms <xref target="RFC9053"/>. Note that COSE sometimes uses peculiar names such as ES256 forECDSAElliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SHA-256, A128 for AES-128, and Ed25519 for the curve edwards25519. Algorithms need to be specified with enough parameters to make them completely determined. The EDHOC MAC lengthMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at least 8 bytes. Any cryptographic algorithm used in the COSE header parameters in ID_CRED fields is selected independently of the selected cipher suite. EDHOC is currently only specified for use with key exchange algorithms of type ECDH curves, but any Key EncapsulationMethodMechanism (KEM), including Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) KEMs, can be used in method0,0; see <xref target="pqc"/>. Use of other types of key exchange algorithms to replace static DH authentication(method 1,2,3)(methods 1, 2, and 3) would likely require a specification updating EDHOC with new methods.</t> <t>EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE. Just like in (D)TLS 1.3 <xreftarget="RFC8446"/><xreftarget="RFC8446"/> <xref target="RFC9147"/> and IKEv2 <xref target="RFC7296"/>, a signature in COSE is determined jointly by the signature algorithm and the authentication keyalgorithm together,algorithm; see <xref target="auth-keys"/>. The exact details of the authentication key algorithm depend on the type of authentication credential. COSE supports different formats for storing the public authentication keys including COSE_Key and X.509, which use different names and ways to represent the authentication key and the authentication key algorithm.</t> <t>An EDHOC cipher suite consists of the following parameters:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC AEADalgorithm</li>algorithm,</li> <li>EDHOC hashalgorithm</li>algorithm,</li> <li>EDHOC MAC length in bytes (StaticDH)</li>DH),</li> <li>EDHOC key exchange algorithm (ECDHcurve)</li>curve),</li> <li>EDHOC signaturealgorithm</li> <li>Applicationalgorithm,</li> <li>application AEADalgorithm</li> <li>Applicationalgorithm, and</li> <li>application hashalgorithm</li>algorithm.</li> </ul> <t>Each cipher suite is identified with apre-definedpredefined integer label.</t> <t>EDHOC can be used with all algorithms and curves defined for COSE. Implementations can either use any combination of COSE algorithms and parameters to define their own private ciphersuite,suite or use one of thepre-definedpredefined cipher suites. Private cipher suites can be identified with any of the fourvaluesvalues: -24, -23, -22, and -21. Thepre-definedpredefined cipher suites are listed in the IANA registry (<xref target="suites-registry"/>) with the initial content outlined here:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Cipher suites 0-3, based on AES-CCM, are intended for constrained IoT where message overhead is a very important factor. Note that AES-CCM-16-64-128 and AES-CCM-16-128-128 are compatible with the IEEECCM* mode.AES-CCM* mode of operation defined in Annex B of <xref target="IEEE.802.15.4-2015"/>. </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Cipher suites 1 and 3 use a larger tag length(128-bit)(128 bits) in EDHOC than in theApplicationapplication AEAD algorithm(64-bit).</li>(64 bits).</li> </ul> </li> <li>Cipher suites 4 and 5, based on ChaCha20, are intended for less constrained applications and only use 128-bit tag lengths.</li> <li>Cipher suite 6, based on AES-GCM, is for general non-constrained applications. It consists ofhigh performancehigh-performance algorithms that are widely used in non-constrained applications.</li> <li>Cipher suites 24 and 25 are intended for high security applications such as government use and financial applications. These cipher suites do not share any algorithms. Cipher suite 24 consists of algorithms from theCNSACommercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) 1.0 suite <xref target="CNSA"/>.</li> </ul> <t>The different methods (<xref target="method"/>) use the same cipher suites, but some algorithms are not used in some methods. The EDHOC signature algorithm is not used in methods without signature authentication.</t> <t>The Initiator needs to have a list of cipher suites it supports in order of preference. The Responder needs to have a list of cipher suites it supports. SUITES_I contains cipher suites supported by theInitiator,Initiator and formatted and processed as detailed in <xref target="asym-msg1-form"/> to secure the cipher suite negotiation. Examples of cipher suite negotiation are given in <xref target="ex-neg"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="cose_key"> <name>Ephemeral Public Keys</name> <t>The ephemeral public keys in EDHOC (G_X and G_Y) use compact representation of elliptic curvepoints,points; see <xref target="comrep"/>. In COSE, compact representation is achieved by formatting the ECDH ephemeral public keys as COSE_Keys of type EC2 orOKPOctet Key Pair (OKP) according to Sections7.1<xref target="RFC9053" section="7.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and7.2<xref target="RFC9053" section="7.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xreftarget="RFC9053"/>,target="RFC9053"/> but only including the 'x' parameter in G_X and G_Y. For Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2, compact representationMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used also in the COSE_Key. COSE always uses compact output for Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2. If the COSE implementation requires a 'y' parameter, the value y = false or a calculated y-coordinate can beused,used; see <xref target="comrep"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="AD"> <name>External Authorization Data (EAD)</name> <t>In order to reduce round trips and the number ofmessages,messages or to simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated into EDHOC by transportingauthorization relatedauthorization-related data in the messages.</t> <t>EDHOC allows processing of external authorization data (EAD) to be defined in a separatespecification,specification and sent in dedicated fields of the four EDHOCmessages (EAD_1,messages: EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3,EAD_4).and EAD_4. EAD is opaque data to EDHOC.</t> <t>Each EAD field,EAD_xEAD_x, for x = 1, 2,33, or 4, is a CBOR sequence (see <xref target="CBOR"/>) consisting of one or more EAD items.AnEAD item ead is a CBOR sequence of an ead_label and an optionalead_value,ead_value; see <xref target="fig-ead-item"/> and <xref target="CDDL"/> for the CDDL definitions.</t> <figure anchor="fig-ead-item"> <name>EADitem.</name>Item</name> <sourcecode type="CDDL"><![CDATA[ ead = ( ead_label : int, ? ead_value : bstr, ) ]]></sourcecode> </figure> <t>A security application may register one or more EADlabels, seelabels (see <xreftarget="iana-ead"/>,target="iana-ead"/>) and specify the associated processing and security considerations. The IANA registry contains the absolute value of the ead_label, |ead_label|; the same ead_value applies independently of the sign of the ead_label.</t> <t>An EAD item can be either critical or non-critical, determined by the sign of the ead_label in the EAD item transported in the EAD field. A negative value indicates that the EAD item iscriticalcritical, and anon-negativenonnegative value indicates that the EAD item is non-critical.</t> <t>If an endpoint receives a critical EAD item it does notrecognize,recognize or a critical EAD item that contains information that it cannot process, then the endpointMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send an EDHOC error message back as defined in <xref target="error"/>, and the EDHOC sessionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be aborted. The EAD item specification defines the error processing. A non-critical EAD item can be ignored.</t> <t>The security application registering a new EAD item needs to describe under what conditions the EAD item is critical or non-critical, and thus whether the ead_label is used with a negative or positive sign. ead_label = 0 is used forpadding,padding; see <xref target="padding"/>.</t> <t>The security application may define multiple uses of certain EAD items, e.g., the same EAD item may be used in different EDHOC messages. Multiple occurrences of an EAD item in one EAD field may also be specified, but the criticality of the repeated EAD item is expected to be the same.</t> <t>The EAD fields of EDHOCMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be used with registered EADitems,items; see <xref target="iana-ead"/>. Examples of the use of EAD are provided in <xref target="ead-appendix"/>.</t> <section anchor="padding"> <name>Padding</name> <t>EDHOC message_1 and the plaintext of message_2,message_3message_3, and message_4 can be padded with the use of the corresponding EAD_x field, for x = 1, 2, 3, or 4. Padding in EAD_1 mitigates amplification attacks (see <xref target="dos"/>), and padding in EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4 hides the true length of the plaintext (see <xref target="internet-threat"/>). PaddingMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored and discarded by the receiving application.</t> <t>Padding is obtained by using an EAD item with ead_label = 0 and a(pseudo-)randomly(pseudo)randomly generated byte string of appropriate length as ead_value, noting that the ead_label and the CBOR encoding of ead_value also add bytes.Examples:</t>For example:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li><t>One byte<t>One-byte padding (optional ead_value omitted): </t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>EAD_x<t>EAD_x =0x00</li> </ul>0x00</t> </li> <li><t>Two bytes<t>Two-byte padding, using the empty byte string (0x40) as ead_value: </t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>EAD_x<t>EAD_x =0x0040</li> </ul>0x0040</t> </li> <li><t>Three bytes<t>Three-byte padding, constructed from the pseudorandomly generated ead_value 0xe9 encoded as byte string: </t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>EAD_x<t>EAD_x =0x0041e9</li> </ul>0x0041e9</t> </li> </ul> <t>Multiple occurrences of EAD items with ead_label = 0 are allowed. Certain padding lengths require the use of at least two such EAD items.</t> <t>Note that padding is non-critical because the intendedbehaviourbehavior when receiving is to ignore it.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="applicability"> <name>Application Profile</name> <t>EDHOC requires certain parameters to be agreed upon between the Initiator and Responder. Some parameters can be negotiated through the protocol execution (specifically, ciphersuite,suite; see <xreftarget="cs"/>)target="cs"/>), but other parameters are only communicated and may not be negotiated (e.g., which authentication method isused,used; see <xref target="method"/>).YetYet, other parameters need to be known out-of-band to ensure successful completion, e.g., whether message_4 is used or not. The application decides which endpoint is the Initiator and which is the Responder.</t> <t>The purpose of an application profile is to describe the intended use of EDHOC to allow for the relevant processing and verifications to be made, including thingslike:</t>like the following:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>How the endpoint detects that an EDHOC message is received. This includes how EDHOC messages are transported, forexampleexample, in the payload of a CoAP message with a certain Uri-Path or Content-Format; see <xref target="coap"/>. </t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>The<t>The method of transporting EDHOC messages may also describe data carried along with the messages that are needed for the transport to satisfy the requirements of <xref target="transport"/>, e.g., connection identifiers used with certainmessages,messages; see <xreftarget="coap"/>.</li> </ul>target="coap"/>.</t> </li> <li>Authentication method (METHOD; see <xref target="method"/>).</li> <li>Profile for authentication credentials(CRED_I,(CRED_I and CRED_R; see <xref target="auth-cred"/>), e.g., profile for certificate or CCS, including supported authentication key algorithms (subject public key algorithm in X.509 or C509 certificate).</li> <li>Type used to identify credentials(ID_CRED_I,(ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R; see <xref target="id_cred"/>).</li> <li>Use and type of external authorization data (EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4; see <xref target="AD"/>).</li> <li>Identifier used as the identity of the endpoint; see <xref target="identities"/>.</li> <li>If message_4 shall be sent/expected, and if not, how to ensure a protected application message is sent from the Responder to the Initiator; see <xref target="m4"/>.</li> </ol> <t>The application profile may also contain information about supported cipher suites. The procedure for selecting and verifying a cipher suite is still performed as described in Sections <xreftarget="asym-msg1-form"/>target="asym-msg1-form" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="wrong-selected"/>,target="wrong-selected" format="counter"/>, but it may become simplified by this knowledge. EDHOC messages can be processed without the application profile, i.e., the EDHOC messagesincludesinclude information about the type and length of all fields.</t> <t>An example of an application profile is shown in <xref target="appl-temp"/>.</t> <t>For some parameters, like METHOD, the type of the ID_CREDfieldfield, or EAD, the receiver of an EDHOC message is able to verify compliance with the applicationprofile, andprofile and, if it needs to fail because of the lack of compliance, to infer the reason why the EDHOC session failed.</t> <t>For other encodings, like the profiling of CRED_x in the case that it is not transported, it may not be possible to verify that the lack of compliance with the application profile was the reason forfailure: Integrityfailure. For example, integrity verification in message_2 or message_3 may fail not only because of a wrong credential. For example, in case the Initiator uses a public key certificate by reference (i.e., not transported within theprotocol)protocol), then both endpoints need to use an identical data structure as CRED_I or else the integrity verification will fail.</t> <t>Note that it is not necessary for the endpoints to specify a single transport for the EDHOC messages. For example, a mix of CoAP and HTTP may be used along the path, and this may still allow correlation between messages.</t> <t>The application profile may be dependent on the identity of the otherendpoint,endpoint or other information carried in an EDHOC message, but it then applies only to the later phases of the protocol when such information is known. (The Initiator does not know the identity of the Responder before having verified message_2, and the Responder does not know the identity of the Initiator before having verified message_3.)</t> <t>Other conditions may be part of the application profile, such as what is the target application or use (if there is more than one application/use) to the extent that EDHOC can distinguish between them. In case multiple application profiles are used, the receiver needs to be able to determine which is applicable for a given EDHOC session, forexampleexample, based on the URI to which the EDHOC message is sent, or external authorization data type.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="key-der"> <name>Key Derivation</name> <section anchor="keys-for-edhoc-message-processing"> <name>Keys for EDHOC Message Processing</name> <t>EDHOC uses Extract-and-Expand <xref target="RFC5869"/> with the EDHOC hash algorithm in the selected cipher suite to derive keys used in message processing. This section defines EDHOC_Extract (<xref target="extract"/>) and EDHOC_Expand (<xreftarget="expand"/>),target="expand"/>) and how to use them to derive PRK_out (<xreftarget="prkout"/>)target="prkout"/>), which is the shared secret session key resulting from a completed EDHOC session.</t> <t>EDHOC_Extract is used to derive fixed-length uniformly pseudorandom keys(PRK)(PRKs) from ECDH shared secrets. EDHOC_Expand is used to define EDHOC_KDF for generating MACs and for deriving output keying material (OKM) from PRKs.</t> <t>InEDHOCEDHOC, a specific message is protected with a certainpseudorandom key,PRK, but how the key is derived depends on the authentication method (<xreftarget="method"/>)target="method"/>), as detailed in <xref target="asym"/>.</t><!-- A diagram of the EDHOC key schedule can be found in Figure 2 of {{Vucinic22}}. TBD: Rewrite the diagram --><section anchor="extract"> <name>EDHOC_Extract</name> <t>The pseudorandom keys (PRKs) used for EDHOC message processing are derived using EDHOC_Extract:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ PRK = EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM ) ]]></artwork> <t>where the input keying material (IKM) and salt are defined for each PRK below.</t> <t>The definition of EDHOC_Extract depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>if<li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM ) = HKDF-Extract( salt, IKM ) <xreftarget="RFC5869"/></li> <li>iftarget="RFC5869"/>.</li> <li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM ) = KMAC128( salt, IKM, 256, "")</li> <li>if).</li> <li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM ) = KMAC256( salt, IKM, 512, "")</li>).</li> </ul> <t>where the Keccakmessage authentication codeMessage Authentication Code (KMAC) is specified in <xref target="SP800-185"/>.</t> <t>The rest of the section defines the pseudorandom keys PRK_2e,PRK_3e2mPRK_3e2m, and PRK_4e3m; their use is shown in <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>. The index of a PRK indicates its use or in what message protection operation it is involved. For example, PRK_3e2m is involved in the encryption of message 3 and in calculating the MAC of message 2.</t> <section anchor="prk2e"> <name>PRK_2e</name> <t>The pseudorandom key PRK_2e is derived with the following input:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The saltSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be TH_2.</li> <li>The IKMSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH shared secret G_XY (calculated from G_X and Y or G_Y and X) as defined in <xref section="6.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9053"/>. The use of G_XY gives forwardsecrecy,secrecy in the sense that compromise of the private authentication keys does not compromise past session keys.</li> </ul> <t>Example: Assuming the use of curve25519, the ECDH shared secret G_XY is the output of the X25519 function <xref target="RFC7748"/>:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ G_XY = X25519( Y, G_X ) = X25519( X, G_Y ) ]]></artwork> <t>Example: Assuming the use ofSHA-256SHA-256, the extract phase ofHKDFthe key derivation function is HKDF-Extract, which produces PRK_2e as follows:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ PRK_2e = HMAC-SHA-256( TH_2, G_XY ) ]]></artwork> </section> <section anchor="prk3e2m"> <name>PRK_3e2m</name> <t>The pseudorandom key PRK_3e2m is derived as follows:</t> <t>If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then PRK_3e2m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_3e2m, G_RX ), where</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>SALT_3e2m is derived fromPRK_2e, seePRK_2e (see <xreftarget="expand"/>,target="expand"/>) and</li> <li>G_RX is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_R and X, or G_X and R (the Responder's private authenticationkey,key; see <xref target="auth-keys"/>),</li> </ul> <t>else PRK_3e2m = PRK_2e.</t> </section> <section anchor="prk4e3m"> <name>PRK_4e3m</name> <t>The pseudorandom key PRK_4e3m is derived as follows:</t> <t>If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then PRK_4e3m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_4e3m, G_IY ), where</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>SALT_4e3m is derived fromPRK_3e2m, seePRK_3e2m (see <xreftarget="expand"/>,target="expand"/>) and</li> <li>G_IY is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_I and Y, or G_Y and I (the Initiator's private authenticationkey,key; see <xref target="auth-keys"/>),</li> </ul> <t>else PRK_4e3m = PRK_3e2m.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="expand"> <name>EDHOC_Expand and EDHOC_KDF</name> <t>The output keying material (OKM)--- including keys,IVs,initialization vectors (IVs), and salts--- are derived from the PRKs using the EDHOC_KDF, which is defined through EDHOC_Expand:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ OKM = EDHOC_KDF( PRK, info_label, context, length ) = EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length ) ]]></artwork> <t>where info is encoded as the CBORsequence</t>sequence:</t> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ info = ( info_label : int, context : bstr, length : uint, ) ]]></sourcecode><t>where</t><t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>info_label is anint</li>int,</li> <li>context is abstr</li>bstr, and</li> <li>length is the length of OKM inbytes</li>bytes.</li> </ul> <t>When EDHOC_KDF is used to derive OKM for EDHOC message processing, then the context includes one of the transcripthasheshashes, TH_2, TH_3, orTH_4TH_4, defined in Sections <xref target="asym-msg2-proc" format="counter"/> and <xref target="asym-msg3-proc" format="counter"/>.</t> <t>The definition of EDHOC_Expand depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>if<li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length ) = HKDF-Expand( PRK, info, length ) <xreftarget="RFC5869"/></li> <li>iftarget="RFC5869"/>.</li> <li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length ) = KMAC128( PRK, info, L, "")</li> <li>if).</li> <li>If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length ) = KMAC256( PRK, info, L, "")</li>).</li> </ul> <t>where L = 8<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ length, the output length in bits.</t> <t><xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/> lists derivations made with EDHOC_KDF,where</t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>hash_length-is the length of output size of the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected ciphersuite</li>suite,</li> <li>key_length-is the length of the encryption key of the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected ciphersuite</li>suite, and</li> <li>iv_length-is the length of the initialization vector of the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite</li> </ul> <t>Further details of the key derivation and how the output keying material is used are specified in <xref target="asym"/>.</t> <figure anchor="fig-edhoc-kdf"> <name>Keyderivations using EDHOC_KDF. h'' is CBOR diagnostic notation for the empty byte string, 0x40.</name>Derivations Using EDHOC_KDF</name> <artwork align="center"><![CDATA[ KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 0, TH_2, plaintext_length ) SALT_3e2m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 1, TH_2, hash_length ) MAC_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 2, context_2, mac_length_2 ) K_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 3, TH_3, key_length ) IV_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 4, TH_3, iv_length ) SALT_4e3m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 5, TH_3, hash_length ) MAC_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 6, context_3, mac_length_3 ) PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 7, TH_4, hash_length ) K_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 8, TH_4, key_length ) IV_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 9, TH_4, iv_length ) PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length ) ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>h'' is CBOR diagnostic notation for the empty byte string, 0x40.</t> </section> <section anchor="prkout"> <name>PRK_out</name> <t>The pseudorandom key PRK_out, derived as shown in <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>, is the output session key of a completed EDHOC session.</t> <t>Keys for applications are derived using EDHOC_Exporter (see <xref target="exporter"/>) from PRK_exporter, which in turn is derived from PRK_out as shown in <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>. For the purpose of generating application keys, it is sufficient to store PRK_out or PRK_exporter. (Note that the word "store" used here does not imply that the application has access to the plaintext PRK_out since that may be reserved for code within a Trusted ExecutionEnvironment,Environment (TEE); see <xreftarget="impl-cons"/>).</t>target="impl-cons"/>.)</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="keys-for-edhoc-applications"> <name>Keys for EDHOC Applications</name> <t>This section defines EDHOC_Exporter in terms of EDHOC_KDF and PRK_exporter. A key update function is defined in <xref target="keyupdate"/>.</t> <section anchor="exporter"> <name>EDHOC_Exporter</name> <t>Keying material for the application can be derived using the EDHOC_Exporter interface defined as:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ EDHOC_Exporter(exporter_label, context, length) = EDHOC_KDF(PRK_exporter, exporter_label, context, length) ]]></artwork><t>where</t><t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>exporter_label is a registered uint from theEDHOC_Exporter Label"EDHOC Exporter Labels" registry (<xreftarget="exporter-label"/>)</li>target="exporter-label"/>),</li> <li>context is a bstr defined by theapplication</li>application, and</li> <li>length is a uint defined by theapplication</li>application.</li> </ul> <t>The (exporter_label, context) pair used in EDHOC_Exporter must be unique, i.e., an (exporter_label, context)MUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used for two different purposes. However, an application can re-derive the same key several times as long as it is done securely. For example, in most encryptionalgorithmsalgorithms, the same key can be reused with different nonces. The contextcancan, forexampleexample, be the empty CBOR byte string.</t> <t>Examples of use of the EDHOC_Exporter are given in <xref target="transfer"/>.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="asym"> <name>Message Formatting and Processing</name> <t>This section specifies formatting of the messages and processing steps. Error messages are specified in <xref target="error"/>. Annotated traces of EDHOC sessions are provided in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-lake-traces"/>.</t>target="RFC9529"/>.</t> <t>An EDHOC message is encoded as a sequence of CBOR data items (CBORSequence,Sequence <xref target="RFC8742"/>). Additional optimizations are made to reduce message overhead.</t> <t>While EDHOC uses the COSE_Key, COSE_Sign1, and COSE_Encrypt0 structures, only a subset of the parameters is included in the EDHOCmessages,messages; see <xref target="COSE"/>. In order to recreate the COSE object, the recipient endpoint may need to add parameters to the COSE headers not included in the EDHOC message, forexampleexample, the parameter 'alg' to COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Encrypt0.</t> <section anchor="proc-outline"> <name>EDHOC Message Processing Outline</name> <t>For each new/ongoing EDHOC session, the endpoints are assumed to keep an associated protocol state containing identifiers, keying material, etc. used for subsequent processing ofprotocol relatedprotocol-related data. The protocol state is assumed to be associated with an application profile (<xref target="applicability"/>)whichthat provides the context for how messages are transported, identified, and processed.</t> <t>EDHOC messagesSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be processed according to the current protocol state. The following steps are expected to be performed at reception of an EDHOC message:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Detect that an EDHOC message has been received, forexampleexample, by means of a port number, URI, or media type (<xref target="applicability"/>).</li> <li>Retrieve the protocol state according to the messagecorrelation,correlation; see <xref target="ci-edhoc"/>. If there is no protocol state, in the case of message_1, a new protocol state is created. The Responder endpoint needs to make use of available denial-of-service mitigation (<xref target="dos"/>).</li> <li>If the message received is an error message, then process it according to <xref target="error"/>, else process it as the expected next message according to the protocol state.</li> </ol> <t>The message processing stepsSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be processed in order, unless otherwise stated. If the processing fails for somereason then, typically,reason, then typically an error message is sent, the EDHOC session is aborted, and the protocol state is erased. When the composition and sending of one message is completed and before the next message is received, error messagesSHALL NOT<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14> be sent.</t> <t>After having successfully processed the last message (message_3 or message_4 depending on applicationprofile)profile), the EDHOC session iscompleted,completed; afterwhichwhich, no error messages are sent and EDHOC session outputMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be maintained even if error messages are received. Further details are provided in the following subsections and in <xref target="error"/>.</t> <t>Different instances of the same messageMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be processed in one EDHOC session. Note that processing will fail if the same message appears a second time for EDHOC processing in the same EDHOC session because the state of the protocol has moved on and now expects something else. Message deduplicationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be done by the transport protocol (see <xref target="transport"/>) or, if not supported by the transport, as described in <xref target="duplication"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="m1"> <name>EDHOC Message 1</name> <section anchor="asym-msg1-form"> <name>Formatting of Message 1</name> <t>message_1SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a CBOR Sequence (see <xreftarget="CBOR"/>)target="CBOR"/>), as definedbelow</t>below.</t> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ message_1 = ( METHOD : int, SUITES_I : suites, G_X : bstr, C_I : bstr / -24..23, ? EAD_1, ) suites = [ 2* int ] / int EAD_1 = 1* ead ]]></sourcecode> <t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>METHOD-is an authenticationmethod,method; see <xreftarget="method"/>.</li>target="method"/>,</li> <li>SUITES_I-is an array of cipher suiteswhichthat the Initiator supports constructed as specified in <xreftarget="init-proc-msg1"/>.</li>target="init-proc-msg1"/>,</li> <li>G_X-is the ephemeral public key of theInitiator</li>Initiator, and</li> <li>C_I- variable lengthis a variable-length connectionidentifier. Noteidentifier (note that connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values are represented as integers in themessage,message; see <xreftarget="bstr-repr"/>.</li>target="bstr-repr"/>), and</li> <li>EAD_1-is external authorizationdata,data; see <xref target="AD"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="init-proc-msg1"> <name>Initiator Composition of Message 1</name> <t>The processing steps are detailed below and in <xref target="wrong-selected"/>.</t> <t>The InitiatorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> compose message_1 as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Construct SUITES_I as an array of cipher suites supported by I in order of preference by I with the first cipher suite in the array being the most preferred byI,I and the last being the one selected by I for this EDHOC session. If the cipher suite most preferred by I isselectedselected, then SUITES_I contains only that cipher suite and is encoded as an int. All cipher suites, if any, preferred by I over the selected oneMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included. (See also <xref target="wrong-selected"/>.) </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The selected suite is based on what the Initiator can assume to be supported by the Responder; if the Initiator previously received from the Responder an error message with error code 2 containing SUITES_R (see <xref target="wrong-selected"/>) indicating cipher suites supported by the Responder, then the InitiatorSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> select its most preferred supported cipher suite among those (bearing in mind that error messages may be forged).</li> <li>The InitiatorMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> change its order of preference for ciphersuites,suites andMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> omit a cipher suite preferred to the selected one because of previous error messages received from the Responder.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_X be the 'x' parameter of the COSE_Key.</li> <li>Choose a connection identifier C_I and store it during the EDHOC session.</li> <li>Encode message_1 as a sequence ofCBOR encodedCBOR-encoded data items as specified in <xref target="asym-msg1-form"/></li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="resp-proc-msg1"> <name>Responder Processing of Message 1</name> <t>The ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> process message_1 in the following order:</t><ul<ol spacing="normal"> <li>Decode message_1 (see <xref target="CBOR"/>).</li> <li>Processmessage_1, in particularmessage_1. In particular, verify that the selected cipher suite is supported and that no prior cipher suite as ordered in SUITES_I is supported.</li> <li>If all processing completed successfully, and if EAD_1 is present, then make it available to the application for EAD processing.</li></ul></ol> <t>If any processing step fails, then the ResponderMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send an EDHOC error message back as defined in <xref target="error"/>, and the EDHOC sessionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be aborted.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="m2"> <name>EDHOC Message 2</name> <section anchor="asym-msg2-form"> <name>Formatting of Message 2</name> <t>message_2SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a CBOR Sequence (see <xreftarget="CBOR"/>)target="CBOR"/>), as definedbelow</t>below.</t> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ message_2 = ( G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 : bstr, ) ]]></sourcecode> <t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2-is the concatenation of G_Y (i.e., the ephemeral public key of the Responder) and CIPHERTEXT_2.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="asym-msg2-proc"> <name>Responder Composition of Message 2</name> <t>The ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> compose message_2 as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_Y be the 'x' parameter of the COSE_Key.</li> <li>Choose a connection identifier C_R and store it for the length of the EDHOC session.</li> <li>Compute the transcript hash TH_2 = H( G_Y, H(message_1))), where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that H(message_1) can be computed and cached already in the processing of message_1.</li> <li> <t>Compute MAC_2 as in <xref target="expand"/> with context_2 = << C_R, ID_CRED_R, TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> (see <xref target="CBOR"/> fornotation)notation). </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key (method equals 1 or 3), then mac_length_2 is the EDHOC MAC length of the selected cipher suite. If the Responder authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 2), then mac_length_2 is equal to hash_length.</li> <li>C_R is a variable-length connection identifier. Note that connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values are represented as integers in the message; see <xref target="bstr-repr"/>.</li> <li>ID_CRED_R-is an identifier to facilitate the retrieval ofCRED_R,CRED_R; see <xreftarget="id_cred"/></li>target="id_cred"/>.</li> <li>CRED_R-is a CBOR item containing the authentication credential of theResponder,Responder; see <xreftarget="auth-cred"/></li>target="auth-cred"/>.</li> <li>EAD_2-is external authorizationdata,data; see <xreftarget="AD"/></li>target="AD"/>.</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key (method equals 1 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is MAC_2. If the Responder authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 2), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is the 'signature' field of a COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified inSection 4.4 of<xreftarget="RFC9053"/>target="RFC9052" section="4.4" sectionFormat="of"/> using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher suite, the private authentication key of the Responder, and the following parameters as input (see <xref target="COSE"/> for an overview of COSE and <xref target="CBOR"/> for notation): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>protected = << ID_CRED_R >></li> <li>external_aad = << TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >></li> <li>payload = MAC_2</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>CIPHERTEXT_2 is calculated with a binary additive stream cipher, using a keystream generated withEDHOC_Expand,EDHOC_Expand and the following plaintext: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>PLAINTEXT_2 = ( C_R, ID_CRED_R / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_2, ? EAD_2 ) </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>If ID_CRED_R contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e., ID_CRED_R = { 4 : kid_R }, then the compact encoding isapplied,applied; see <xref target="compact-kid"/>.</li> <li>C_R- variable lengthis the variable-length connection identifier. Note that connection identifiers are bytestringsstrings, but certain values are represented as integers in themessage,message; see <xref target="bstr-repr"/>.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Compute KEYSTREAM_2 as in <xref target="expand"/>, where plaintext_length is the length of PLAINTEXT_2. For the case of plaintext_length exceeding the EDHOC_KDF output size, see <xref target="large-plaintext_2"/>.</li> <li>CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2</li> </ul> </li> <li>Encode message_2 as a sequence ofCBOR encodedCBOR-encoded data items as specified in <xref target="asym-msg2-form"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="initiator-processing-of-message-2"> <name>Initiator Processing of Message 2</name> <t>The InitiatorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> process message_2 in the following order:</t><ul<ol spacing="normal"> <li>Decode message_2 (see <xref target="CBOR"/>).</li> <li>Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prependedC_I,C_I; see <xref target="ci-edhoc"/>).</li> <li>DecryptCIPHERTEXT_2,CIPHERTEXT_2; see <xref target="asym-msg2-proc"/>.</li> <li>If all processing is completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_R and (if present) EAD_2 available to the application forauthentication-authentication and EAD processing. When and how to perform authentication is up to the application.</li> <li>Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_R) and the authentication key of R from the application (or by other means).</li> <li>Verify Signature_or_MAC_2 using the algorithm in the selected cipher suite. The verification process depends on themethod,method; see <xref target="asym-msg2-proc"/>. Make the result of the verification available to the application.</li></ul></ol> <t>If any processing step fails, then the InitiatorMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send an EDHOC error message back as defined in <xref target="error"/>, and the EDHOC sessionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be aborted.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="m3"> <name>EDHOC Message 3</name> <section anchor="asym-msg3-form"> <name>Formatting of Message 3</name> <t>message_3SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a CBOR Sequence (see <xreftarget="CBOR"/>)target="CBOR"/>), as definedbelow</t>below.</t> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ message_3 = ( CIPHERTEXT_3 : bstr, ) ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="asym-msg3-proc"> <name>Initiator Composition of Message 3</name> <t>The InitiatorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> compose message_3 as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2,CRED_R)CRED_R), where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that TH_3 can be computed and cached already in the processing of message_2.</li> <li> <t>Compute MAC_3 as in <xref target="expand"/>, with context_3 = << ID_CRED_I, TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >> </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key (method equals 2 or 3), then mac_length_3 is the EDHOC MAC length of the selected cipher suite. If the Initiator authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 1), then mac_length_3 is equal to hash_length.</li> <li>ID_CRED_I-is an identifier to facilitate the retrieval ofCRED_I,CRED_I; see <xreftarget="id_cred"/></li>target="id_cred"/>.</li> <li>CRED_I-is a CBOR item containing the authentication credential of theInitiator,Initiator; see <xreftarget="auth-cred"/></li>target="auth-cred"/>.</li> <li>EAD_3-is external authorizationdata,data; see <xreftarget="AD"/></li>target="AD"/>.</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key (method equals 2 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is MAC_3. If the Initiator authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 1), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is the 'signature' field of a COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified inSection 4.4 of<xreftarget="RFC9052"/>target="RFC9052" section="4.4" sectionFormat="of"/> using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher suite, the private authentication key of the Initiator, and the following parameters as input (see <xref target="COSE"/>): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>protected = << ID_CRED_I >></li> <li>external_aad = << TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >></li> <li>payload = MAC_3</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 object as defined in Sections5.2<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and5.3<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite, using the encryption key K_3, the initialization vector IV_3 (if used by the AEAD algorithm), the plaintext PLAINTEXT_3, and the following parameters as input (see <xref target="COSE"/>): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>protected = h''</li> <li>external_aad = TH_3</li> <li>K_3 and IV_3 are defined in <xref target="expand"/></li> <li> <t>PLAINTEXT_3 = ( ID_CRED_I / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3, ? EAD_3 ) </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>If ID_CRED_I contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e., ID_CRED_I = { 4 : kid_I }, then the compact encoding isapplied,applied; see <xref target="compact-kid"/>.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <t> CIPHERTEXT_3 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0.</t> </li> <li>Compute the transcript hash TH_4 = H(TH_3, PLAINTEXT_3,CRED_I)CRED_I), where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence.</li> <li>Calculate PRK_out as defined in <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>. The Initiator can now derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporterinterface,interface; see <xref target="exporter"/>.</li> <li>Encode message_3 as a CBOR data item as specified in <xref target="asym-msg3-form"/>.</li> <li>Make the connection identifiers(C_I,(C_I and C_R) and the application algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the application.</li> </ul> <t>After creating message_3, the Initiator can computePRK_out, seePRK_out (see <xreftarget="prkout"/>,target="prkout"/>) and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporterinterface, seeinterface (see <xreftarget="exporter"/>.target="exporter"/>). The InitiatorSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> persistently store PRK_out or application keys until the Initiator has verified message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such as an OSCORE message, from the Responder and the application has authenticated the Responder. This is similar to waiting for an acknowledgment (ACK) in a transport protocol. The InitiatorSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> send protected application data until the application has authenticated the Responder.</t> </section> <section anchor="responder-processing-of-message-3"> <name>Responder Processing of Message 3</name> <t>The ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> process message_3 in the following order:</t><ul<ol spacing="normal"> <li>Decode message_3 (see <xref target="CBOR"/>).</li> <li>Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prependedC_R,C_R; see <xref target="ci-edhoc"/>).</li> <li>Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections5.2<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and5.3<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the selected ciphersuite,suite and the parameters defined in <xref target="asym-msg3-proc"/>.</li> <li>If all processing completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_I and (if present) EAD_3 available to the application forauthentication-authentication and EAD processing. When and how to perform authentication is up to the application.</li> <li>Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_I) and the authentication key of I from the application (or by other means).</li> <li>Verify Signature_or_MAC_3 using the algorithm in the selected cipher suite. The verification process depends on themethod,method; see <xref target="asym-msg3-proc"/>. Make the result of the verification available to the application.</li> <li>Make the connection identifiers(C_I,(C_I and C_R) and the application algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the application.</li></ul></ol> <t>After processing message_3, the Responder can computePRK_out, seePRK_out (see <xreftarget="prkout"/>,target="prkout"/>) and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporterinterface, seeinterface (see <xreftarget="exporter"/>.target="exporter"/>). The ResponderSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> persistently store PRK_out or application keys until the application has authenticated the Initiator. The ResponderSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> send protected application data until the application has authenticated the Initiator.</t> <t>If any processing step fails, then the ResponderMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send an EDHOC error message back as defined in <xref target="error"/>, and the EDHOC sessionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be aborted.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="m4"> <name>EDHOC Message 4</name> <t>This section specifiesmessage_4message_4, which isOPTIONAL<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> to support. Key confirmation is normally provided by sending an application message from the Responder to the Initiator protected with a key derived with the EDHOC_Exporter, e.g., using OSCORE (see <xref target="transfer"/>). In deployments where no protected application message is sent from the Responder to the Initiator, message_4MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported andMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used. Two examples of such deployments are:</t> <ol spacing="normal"type="1"><li>Whentype="1"><li>when EDHOC is only used for authentication and no application data issent.</li> <li>Whensent and</li> <li>when application data is only sent from the Initiator to the Responder.</li> </ol> <t>Further considerations about when to use message_4 are provided in Sections <xreftarget="applicability"/>target="applicability" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="sec-prop"/>.</t>target="sec-prop" format="counter"/>.</t> <section anchor="asym-msg4-form"> <name>Formatting of Message 4</name> <t>message_4SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a CBOR Sequence (see <xreftarget="CBOR"/>)target="CBOR"/>), as definedbelow</t>below.</t> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ message_4 = ( CIPHERTEXT_4 : bstr, ) ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="asym-msg4-proc"> <name>Responder Composition of Message 4</name> <t>The ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> compose message_4 as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections5.2<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and5.3<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite, using the encryption key K_4, the initialization vector IV_4 (if used by the AEAD algorithm), the plaintext PLAINTEXT_4, and the following parameters as input (see <xref target="COSE"/>): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>protected = h''</li> <li>external_aad = TH_4</li> <li>K_4 and IV_4 are defined in <xref target="expand"/></li> <li> <t>PLAINTEXT_4 = ( ? EAD_4 ) </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EAD_4-is external authorizationdata,data; see <xref target="AD"/>.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <t> CIPHERTEXT_4 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0.</t> </li> <li>Encode message_4 as a CBOR data item as specified in <xref target="asym-msg4-form"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="initiator-processing-of-message-4"> <name>Initiator Processing of Message 4</name> <t>The InitiatorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> process message_4 as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Decode message_4 (see <xref target="CBOR"/>).</li> <li>Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prependedC_I,C_I; see <xref target="ci-edhoc"/>).</li> <li>Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections5.2<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and5.3<xref target="RFC9052" section="5.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the selected ciphersuite,suite and the parameters defined in <xref target="asym-msg4-proc"/>.</li> <li>Make (if present) EAD_4 available to the application for EAD processing.</li> </ul> <t>If any processing step fails, then the InitiatorMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send an EDHOC error message back as defined in <xref target="error"/>, and the EDHOC sessionMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be aborted.</t> <t>After verifying message_4, the Initiator is assured that the Responder has calculated the key PRK_out (key confirmation) and that no other party can derive the key.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="error"> <name>Error Handling</name> <t>This section defines the format for errormessages,messages and the processing associated with the currently defined error codes. Additional error codes may beregistered,registered; see <xref target="error-code-reg"/>.</t> <t>Many kinds of errorsthatcan occur during EDHOC processing. As in CoAP, an error can be triggered by errors in the received message or internal errors in the receiving endpoint. Except for processing and formatting errors, it is up to the application when to send an error message. Sending error messages is essential for debugging butMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be skipped if, for example, an EDHOC session cannot be found or due to denial-of-servicereasons,reasons; see <xref target="dos"/>. Error messages in EDHOC are always fatal. After sending an error message, the senderMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session. The receiverSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat an error message as an indication that the other party likely has aborted the EDHOC session. But since error messages might be forged, the receiverMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to continue the EDHOC session.</t> <t>An EDHOC error message can be sent by either endpoint as a reply to any non-error EDHOC message. How errors at the EDHOC layer are transported depends on lower layers, which need to enable error messages to be sent and processed as intended.</t> <t>errorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a CBOR Sequence (see <xreftarget="CBOR"/>)target="CBOR"/>), as definedbelow</t>below.</t> <figure anchor="fig-error-message"> <name>EDHOCerror message.</name>Error Message</name> <sourcecodetype="CDDL"><![CDATA[type="cbor"><![CDATA[ error = ( ERR_CODE : int, ERR_INFO : any, ) ]]></sourcecode> </figure> <t>where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ERR_CODE-is an error code encoded as an integer. The value 0 is reserved for success and can only be usedinternally,internally; all other values (negative or positive) indicate errors.</li> <li>ERR_INFO-is error information. Content and encoding depend on the error code.</li> </ul> <t>The remainder of this section specifies the currently defined errorcodes,codes; see <xreftarget="fig-error-codes"/>.target="tab-error-codes"/>. Additional error codes and corresponding error information may be specified.</t><figure anchor="fig-error-codes"><table anchor="tab-error-codes"> <name>EDHOCerror codesError Codes anderror information.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="208" width="560" viewBox="0 0 560 208" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 96,32 L 96,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 224,32 L 224,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,32 L 552,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 552,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 552,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 552,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 552,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 552,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 552,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 552,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="52" y="52">ERR_CODE</text> <text x="140" y="52">ERR_INFO</text> <text x="196" y="52">Type</text> <text x="280" y="52">Description</text> <text x="80" y="84">0</text> <text x="252" y="84">This</text> <text x="296" y="84">value</text> <text x="332" y="84">is</text> <text x="380" y="84">reserved</text> <text x="80" y="116">1</text> <text x="124" y="116">tstr</text> <text x="280" y="116">Unspecified</text> <text x="352" y="116">error</text> <text x="80" y="148">2</text> <text x="132" y="148">suites</text> <text x="256" y="148">Wrong</text> <text x="316" y="148">selected</text> <text x="380" y="148">cipher</text> <text x="432" y="148">suite</text> <text x="80" y="180">3</text> <text x="124" y="180">true</text> <text x="264" y="180">Unknown</text> <text x="340" y="180">credential</text> <text x="428" y="180">referenced</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ | ERR_CODE | ERR_INFO Type | Description | +==========+===============+========================================+ | 0 | | This value is reserved | +----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ | 1 | tstr | Unspecified error | +----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ | 2 | suites | WrongError Information</name> <thead> <tr> <th>ERR_CODE</th> <th>ERR_INFO Type</th> <th>Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td align="right">0</td> <td></td> <td>Reserved for success</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">1</td> <td>tstr</td> <td>Unspecified error</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">2</td> <td>suites</td> <td>Wrong selected ciphersuite | +----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ | 3 | true | Unknownsuite</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">3</td> <td>true</td> <td>Unknown credentialreferenced | +----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure>referenced</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right">23</td> <td></td> <td>Reserved</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <section anchor="success"> <name>Success</name> <t>Error code 0MAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used internally in an application to indicate success, i.e., as a standard value in case of no error, e.g., in status reporting or log files. Error code 0MUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used as part of the EDHOC message exchange. If an endpoint receives an error message with error code 0, then itMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session andMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send an error message.</t> </section> <section anchor="unspecified-error"> <name>Unspecified Error</name> <t>Error code 1 is used for errors that do not have a specific error code defined. ERR_INFOMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a text string containing a human-readable diagnostic messagewhich SHOULDthat <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be written in English, forexampleexample, "Method not supported". The diagnostic text message is mainly intended for software engineersthatwho during debugging need to interpret it in the context of the EDHOC specification. The diagnostic messageSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be provided to the calling application where itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be logged.</t> </section> <section anchor="wrong-selected"> <name>Wrong Selected Cipher Suite</name> <t>Error code 2MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be used when replying to message_1 in case the cipher suite selected by the Initiator is not supported by theResponder,Responder or if the Responder supports a cipher suite more preferred by the Initiator than the selected ciphersuite,suite; see <xref target="resp-proc-msg1"/>. In this case, ERR_INFO = SUITES_R and is of typesuites,suites; see <xref target="asym-msg1-form"/>. If the Responder does not support the selected cipher suite, then SUITES_RMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include one or more supported cipher suites. If the Responder supports a cipher suite in SUITES_I other than the selected cipher suite (independently of if the selected cipher suite is supported ornot)not), then SUITES_RMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the supported cipher suite inSUITES_ISUITES_I, which is most preferred by the Initiator. SUITES_RMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include a single ciphersuite,suite; in whichcasecase, it is encoded as an int. If the Responder does not support any cipher suite in SUITES_I, then itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include all its supported cipher suites in SUITES_R.</t> <t>In contrast to SUITES_I, the order of the cipher suites in SUITES_R has no significance.</t> <section anchor="cipher-suite-negotiation"> <name>Cipher Suite Negotiation</name> <t>After receiving SUITES_R, the Initiator can determine which cipher suite to select (if any) for the next EDHOC run with theResponder.</t> <t>If the Initiator intends to contact the Responder in the future, theResponder. The InitiatorSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> remember which selected cipher suite to use until the next message_1 has beensent, otherwisesent; otherwise, the Initiator and Responder willlikelyrun into an infinite loop where the Initiator selects its most preferred cipher suite and the Responder sends an error with supported ciphersuites. Aftersuites.</t> <t>After a completed EDHOC session, the InitiatorMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> remember the selected cipher suite to use in future EDHOCsessions.sessions with this Responder. Note that if the Initiator or Responder is updated with new cipher suite policies, any cached information may be outdated.</t> <t>Note that the Initiator's list of supported cipher suites and order of preference is fixed (see Sections <xreftarget="asym-msg1-form"/>target="asym-msg1-form" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="init-proc-msg1"/>).target="init-proc-msg1" format="counter"/>). Furthermore, the ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> only accept message_1 if the selected cipher suite is the first cipher suite in SUITES_I that the Responder also supports (see <xref target="resp-proc-msg1"/>). Following this procedure ensures that the selected cipher suite is the most preferred (by the Initiator) cipher suite supported by both parties. For examples, see <xref target="ex-neg"/>.</t> <t>If the selected cipher suite is not the first cipher suitewhichthat the Responder supports in SUITES_I received in message_1, then the ResponderMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the EDHOCsession,session; see <xref target="resp-proc-msg1"/>. If SUITES_I in message_1 is manipulated, then the integrity verification of message_2 containing the transcript hash TH_2 will fail and the Initiator will abort the EDHOC session.</t> </section> <section anchor="ex-neg"> <name>Examples</name> <t>Assume that the Initiator supports the five ciphersuitessuites, 5, 6, 7, 8, and99, in decreasing order of preference. Figures <xref target="fig-error1" format="counter"/> and <xref target="fig-error2" format="counter"/> show two examples of how the Initiator can format SUITES_I and how SUITES_R is used by Responders to give the Initiator information about the cipher suites that the Responder supports.</t> <t>In Example 1 (<xref target="fig-error1"/>), the Responder supports cipher suite 6 but not the initially selected cipher suite 5. The Responder rejects the first message_1 with an error indicating support for suite 6 in SUITES_R. The Initiator also supports suite6,6 and therefore selects suite 6 in the second message_1. The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I the selected suite 6 with the more preferred suites, in this case suite 5, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite negotiation.</t> <figure anchor="fig-error1"> <name>Ciphersuite negotiation example 1.</name>Suite Negotiation Example 1</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="224" width="560"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 560 224" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,48 L 8,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,48 L 552,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,64 L 544,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 16,128 L 552,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 544,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,192 540,186.4 540,197.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,192)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,64 540,58.4 540,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="24,128 12,122.4 12,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,16,128)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="36">Initiator</text> <text x="520" y="36">Responder</text> <text x="152" y="52">METHOD,</text> <text x="220" y="52">SUITES_I</text> <text x="264" y="52">=</text> <text x="284" y="52">5,</text> <text x="316" y="52">G_X,</text> <text x="356" y="52">C_I,</text> <text x="400" y="52">EAD_1</text> <text x="280" y="84">message_1</text> <text x="196" y="116">ERR_CODE</text> <text x="240" y="116">=</text> <text x="260" y="116">2,</text> <text x="308" y="116">SUITES_R</text> <text x="352" y="116">=</text> <text x="368" y="116">6</text> <text x="280" y="148">error</text> <text x="144" y="180">METHOD,</text> <text x="212" y="180">SUITES_I</text> <text x="256" y="180">=</text> <text x="280" y="180">[5,</text> <text x="312" y="180">6],</text> <text x="348" y="180">G_X,</text> <text x="388" y="180">C_I,</text> <text x="432" y="180">EAD_1</text> <text x="280" y="212">message_1</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Initiator Responder | METHOD, SUITES_I = 5, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_1 | | | | ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = 6 | |<------------------------------------------------------------------+ | error | | | | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_1 | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <t>In Example 2 (<xref target="fig-error2"/>), the Responder supports cipher suites 8 and 9 but not the more preferred (by the Initiator) cipher suites 5, 6 or 7. To illustrate the negotiationmechanicsmechanics, we let the Initiator first make a guess that the Responder supports suite 6 but not suite 5. Since the Responder supports neither 5 nor 6, it rejects the first message_1 with an error indicating support for suites 8 and 9 in SUITES_R (in any order). The Initiator also supports suites 8 and 9, and prefers suite 8, so it selects suite 8 in the second message_1. The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I the selected suite 8 with the more preferred suites in order of preference, in thiscasecase, suites 5, 6 and 7, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite negotiation.</t><t>Note 1. If<ol type="Note %d."> <li>If the Responder had supported suite 5, then the first message_1 would not have been accepted either, since the Responder observes that suite 5 is more preferred by the Initiator than the selected suite 6. In thatcasecase, the Responder would have included suite 5 in SUITES_R of the response, and it would then have become the selected and only suite in the secondmessage_1.</t> <t>Note 2. Formessage_1.</li> <li>For eachmessage_1message_1, the InitiatorMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a new ephemeral ECDH key pair matching the selected ciphersuite.</t>suite.</li> </ol> <figure anchor="fig-error2"> <name>Ciphersuite negotiation example 2.</name>Suite Negotiation Example 2</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="224" width="560"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 560 224" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,48 L 8,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,48 L 552,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,64 L 544,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 16,128 L 552,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 544,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,192 540,186.4 540,197.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,192)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="552,64 540,58.4 540,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,544,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="24,128 12,122.4 12,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,16,128)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="36">Initiator</text> <text x="520" y="36">Responder</text> <text x="136" y="52">METHOD,</text> <text x="204" y="52">SUITES_I</text> <text x="248" y="52">=</text> <text x="272" y="52">[5,</text> <text x="304" y="52">6],</text> <text x="340" y="52">G_X,</text> <text x="380" y="52">C_I,</text> <text x="424" y="52">EAD_1</text> <text x="280" y="84">message_1</text> <text x="188" y="116">ERR_CODE</text> <text x="232" y="116">=</text> <text x="252" y="116">2,</text> <text x="300" y="116">SUITES_R</text> <text x="344" y="116">=</text> <text x="368" y="116">[9,</text> <text x="396" y="116">8]</text> <text x="280" y="148">error</text> <text x="128" y="180">METHOD,</text> <text x="196" y="180">SUITES_I</text> <text x="240" y="180">=</text> <text x="264" y="180">[5,</text> <text x="292" y="180">6,</text> <text x="316" y="180">7,</text> <text x="344" y="180">8],</text> <text x="380" y="180">G_X,</text> <text x="420" y="180">C_I,</text> <text x="464" y="180">EAD_1</text> <text x="280" y="212">message_1</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Initiator Responder | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_1 | | | | ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = [9, 8] | |<------------------------------------------------------------------+ | error | | | | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6, 7, 8], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | +------------------------------------------------------------------>| | message_1 | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> </section> </section> <section anchor="unknown-credential-referenced"> <name>Unknown Credential Referenced</name> <t>Error code 3 is used for errors due to a received credential identifier (ID_CRED_R in message_2 or ID_CRED_I message_3) containing a reference to a credentialwhichthat the receiving endpoint does not have access to. The intent with this error code is that the endpoint who sent the credential identifiershouldshould, for the next EDHOCsessionsession, try another credential identifier supported according to the application profile.</t> <t>For example, an application profile could list x5t and x5chain as supported credentialidentifiers,identifiers and state that x5t should be used if it can be assumed that the X.509 certificate is available at the receiving side. This error code thus enables the certificate chain to be sent only when needed, bearing in mind that error messages are not protected so an adversary can try to causeunnecessaryunnecessary, large credential identifiers.</t> <t>For the error code 3, the error informationSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the CBOR simple value <tt>true</tt> (0xf5). Error code 3MUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used when the received credential identifier type is not supported.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="duplication"> <name>EDHOC Message Deduplication</name><t>EDHOC by default<t>By default, EDHOC assumes that message duplication is handled by thetransport,transport (which is exemplified by CoAP in thissection exemplified with CoAP,section); see <xref target="coap"/>.</t> <t>Deduplication of CoAP messages is described inSection 4.5 of<xreftarget="RFC7252"/>.target="RFC7252" section="4.5" sectionFormat="of"/>. This handles the case when the same Confirmable (CON) message is received multiple times due to missing acknowledgment on the CoAP messaging layer. The recommended processing in <xref target="RFC7252"/> is that the duplicate message isacknowledged (ACK),acknowledged, but the received message is only processed once by the CoAP stack.</t> <t>Message deduplication is resource demanding and therefore not supported in all CoAP implementations. Since EDHOC is targeting constrained environments, it is desirable that EDHOC can optionally support transport layerswhichthat do not handle message duplication. Special care is needed to avoid issues with duplicatemessages,messages; see <xref target="proc-outline"/>.</t> <t>The guiding principle here is similar to the deduplication processing on the CoAP messaginglayer:layer, i.e., a received duplicate EDHOC messageSHALL NOT<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14> result in another instance of the next EDHOC message. The resultMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be that a duplicate next EDHOC message is sent, provided it is still relevant with respect to the current protocol state. In any case, the received messageMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be processed more than once in the same EDHOC session. This is called "EDHOC message deduplication".</t> <t>An EDHOC implementationMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> store the previously sent EDHOC message to be able to resend it.</t> <t>In principle, if the EDHOC implementation would deterministically regenerate the identical EDHOC message previously sent, it would be possible to instead store the protocol state to be able to recreate and resend the previously sent EDHOC message. However, even if the protocol state is fixed, the message generation may introduce differenceswhichthat compromise security. For example, in the generation of message_3, if I is performing a (non-deterministic) ECDSA signature (say, method 0 or1,1 and cipher suite 2 or3)3), then PLAINTEXT_3 is randomized, but K_3 and IV_3 are the same, leading to a key and nonce reuse.</t> <t>The EDHOC implementationMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> store the previous protocol state and regenerate an EDHOC message if there is a risk that the same key and IV are used for two (or more) distinct messages.</t> <t>The previous message or protocol stateMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be kept longer than what is required for retransmission, for example, in the case of CoAP transport, no longer than the EXCHANGE_LIFETIME (seeSection 4.8.2 of<xreftarget="RFC7252"/>).</t>target="RFC7252" section="4.8.2" sectionFormat="of"/>).</t> </section> <section anchor="mti"> <name>Compliance Requirements</name> <t>In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise:</t><t>An<ul spacing="normal"> <li>An implementationMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support only an Initiator or onlyResponder.</t> <t>Ana Responder.</li> <li>An implementationMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support only a single method. None of the methods aremandatory-to-implement.</t> <t>Implementations MUSTmandatory to implement.</li> <li>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support 'kid' parameters. None of the other COSE header parameters aremandatory-to-implement.</t> <t>Anmandatory to implement.</li> <li>An implementationMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support only a single credential type (CCS, CWT, X.509, or C509). None of the credential types aremandatory-to-implement.</t> <t>Implementations MUSTmandatory to implement.</li> <li>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support theEDHOC_Exporter.</t> <t>Implementations MAYEDHOC_Exporter.</li> <li>Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support message_4. Error codes (ERR_CODE) 1 and 2MUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> besupported.</t> <t>Implementations MUSTsupported.</li> <li>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> supportEAD.</t> <t>Implementations MUSTEAD.</li> <li>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support ciphersuitesuites 2 and 3. Cipher suites 2 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) and 3 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) only differ in the size of the MAC length, so supporting one or both of these is not significantly different. Implementations only need to implement the algorithms needed for their supportedmethods.</t>methods.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="security"> <name>Security Considerations</name> <section anchor="sec-prop"> <name>Security Properties</name> <t>EDHOC has similar security properties as can be expected from the theoretical SIGMA-I protocol <xref target="SIGMA"/> and the Noise XX pattern <xref target="Noise"/>, which are similar to methods 0 and 3, respectively. Proven security properties are detailed in the security analysis publications referenced at the end of this section.</t> <t>Using the terminology from <xref target="SIGMA"/>, EDHOC provides forward secrecy, mutual authentication with aliveness, consistency, and peer awareness. As described in <xref target="SIGMA"/>, message_3 provides peer awareness to theResponderResponder, while message_4 provides peer awareness to the Initiator. By including the authentication credentials in the transcript hash, EDHOC protects against an identity misbinding attack like the Duplicate Signature Key Selection(DSKS)-like identity mis-binding attack(DSKS) that the MAC-then-Sign variant of SIGMA-I is otherwise vulnerable to.</t> <t>As described in <xref target="SIGMA"/>, different levels of identity protection are provided to the Initiator andtheResponder. EDHOC provides identity protection of the Initiator against active attacks and identity protection of the Responder against passive attacks. An active attacker can get the credential identifier of the Responder by eavesdropping on the destination address used for transporting message_1 and then sending its own message_1 to the same address. The roles should be assigned to protect the most sensitive identity/identifier, typically that which is not possible to infer from routing information in the lower layers.</t> <t>EDHOC messages might change in transit due to a noisy channel or through modification by an attacker. Changes in message_1 and message_2 (except Signature_or_MAC_2 when the signature scheme is not strongly unforgeable) are detected when verifying Signature_or_MAC_2. Changes to not strongly unforgeableSignature_or_MAC_2,Signature_or_MAC_2 and message_3 are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_3. Changes to message_4 are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_4.</t> <t>Compared to <xref target="SIGMA"/>, EDHOC adds an explicit method type and expands the message authentication coverage to additional elements such as algorithms, external authorization data, and previous plaintext messages. This protects against an attacker replaying messages or injecting messages from another EDHOC session.</t> <t>EDHOC also adds the selection of connection identifiers anddowngrade protecteddowngrade-protected negotiation of cryptographic parameters, i.e., an attacker cannot affect the negotiated parameters. A single session of EDHOC does not include negotiation of cipher suites, but it enables the Responder to verify that the selected cipher suite is the most preferred cipher suite by the Initiatorwhichthat is supported by both the Initiator andthe Responder,Responder and to abort the EDHOC session if not.</t> <t>As required by <xref target="RFC7258"/>, IETF protocols need to mitigate pervasive monitoring when possible. Therefore, EDHOCthereforeonly supports methods with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and provides a key update function (see <xref target="keyupdate"/>) for lightweight application protocol rekeying. Either of these provides forward secrecy, in the sense that compromise of the private authentication keys does not compromise past session keys(PRK_out),(PRK_out) and compromise of a session key does not compromise past session keys. Frequently re-running EDHOC with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman forces attackers to perform dynamic key exfiltration where the attacker must have continuous interactions with the collaborator, which is a significant sustained attack.</t> <t>To limit the effect of breaches, it is important to limit the use of symmetric group keys for bootstrapping. Therefore, EDHOCthereforestrives to make the additional cost of using raw public keys and self-signed certificates as small as possible. Raw public keys and self-signed certificates are not a replacement for a public key infrastructure butSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used instead of symmetric group keys for bootstrapping.</t> <t>Compromise of the long-term keys (private signature or static DH keys) does not compromise the security of completed EDHOC sessions. Compromising the private authentication keys of one party lets an active attacker impersonate that compromised party in EDHOC sessions with other parties but does not let the attacker impersonate other parties in EDHOC sessions with the compromised party. Compromise of the long-term keys does not enable a passive attacker to compromise future session keys (PRK_out). Compromise of theHDKFHKDF input parameters (ECDH shared secret) leads to compromise of all session keys derived from that compromised shared secret. Compromise of one session key does not compromise other session keys. Compromise of PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material derived with the EDHOC_Exporter.</t> <t>Based on the cryptographicalgorithmsalgorithm requirements<xref target="sec_algs"/>,(<xref target="sec_algs"/>), EDHOC provides a minimum of 64-bit security against online brute force attacks and a minimum of 128-bit security against offline brute force attacks. To break 64-bit security against online bruteforceforce, an attacker would on average have to send 4.3 billion messages per second for 68 years, which is infeasible in constrained IoT radio technologies. A forgery against a 64-bit MAC in EDHOC breaks the security of all future application data, while a forgery against a 64-bit MAC in the subsequent application protocol (e.g., OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613"/>) typically only breaks the security of the data in the forged packet.</t> <t>As the EDHOC session is aborted when verification fails, the security against online attacks is given by the sum of the strength of the verified signatures and MACs (including MAC in AEAD). As an example, if EDHOC is used with method 3, cipher suite 2, and message_4, the Responder is authenticated with 128-bit security against online attacks (the sum of the 64-bit MACs in message_2 and message_4). The same principle applies for MACs in an application protocol keyed by EDHOC as long as EDHOC isrerunre-run when verification of the first MACs in the application protocol fails. As an example, if EDHOC with method 3 and cipher suite 2 is used as in Figure 2 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc"/>, 128-bit mutual authentication against online attacks can be achieved after completion of the first OSCORE request and response.</t> <t>After sending message_3, the Initiator is assured that no other party than the Responder can compute the key PRK_out. While the Initiator can securely send protected application data, the InitiatorSHOULD NOT<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> persistently store the keying material PRK_out until the Initiator has verified message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such as an OSCORE message, from the Responder. After verifying message_3, the Responder is assured that an honest Initiator has computed the key PRK_out. The Responder can securely derive and store the keying materialPRK_out,PRK_out and send protected application data.</t> <t>External authorization data sent in message_1 (EAD_1) or message_2 (EAD_2) should be considered unprotected byEDHOC,EDHOC; see <xref target="unprot-data"/>. EAD_2 isencryptedencrypted, but the Responder has not yet authenticated the Initiator and the encryption does not provide confidentiality against active attacks.</t> <t>External authorization data sent in message_3 (EAD_3) or message_4 (EAD_4) is protected between the Initiator and Responder by the protocol, but note that EAD fields may be used by the application before the message verification iscompleted,completed; see <xref target="AD"/>. Designing a secure mechanism that uses EAD is not necessarily straightforward. This document only provides the EAD transport mechanism, but the problem of agreeing on the surrounding context and the meaning of the information passed to and from the application remains. Any new uses of EAD should be subject to careful review.</t><t>Key compromise impersonation (KCI): In<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI):</dt> <dd>In EDHOC authenticated with signature keys, EDHOC provides KCI protection against an attacker having access to the long-term key or the ephemeral secret key. With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, KCI protection would be provided against an attacker having access to the long-term Diffie-Hellmankey,key but not to an attacker having access to the ephemeral secret key. Note that the term KCI has typically been used for compromise of long-termkeys,keys and that an attacker with access to the ephemeral secret key can only attack that specific EDHOCsession.</t> <t>Repudiation: Ifsession.</dd> <dt>Repudiation:</dt> <dd>If an endpoint authenticates with a signature, the other endpoint can prove that the endpoint performed a run of the protocol by presenting the data being signed as well as the signature itself. With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, the authenticating endpoint can deny having participated in theprotocol.</t>protocol.</dd> </dl> <t>Earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed <xref target="Bruni18"/> <xref target="Norrman20"/> <xref target="CottierPointcheval22"/> <xref target="Jacomme23"/> <xreftarget="GuentherIlunga22"/>target="GuentherIlunga22"/>, and the specification has been updated based on the analysis.</t> </section> <section anchor="crypto"> <name>Cryptographic Considerations</name> <t>The SIGMA protocol requires that the encryption of message_3 provides confidentiality against active attackers and EDHOC message_4 relies on the use of authenticated encryption. Hence, the message authenticating functionality of the authenticated encryption in EDHOC iscritical:critical, i.e., authenticated encryptionMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be replaced by plain encryption only, even if authentication is provided at another level or through a different mechanism.</t> <t>To reduce messageoverheadoverhead, EDHOC does not use explicit nonces and instead relies on the ephemeral public keys to provide randomness to each EDHOC session. A good amount of randomness is important for the keygeneration,generation to provideliveness,liveness and to protect against interleaving attacks. For this reason, the ephemeral keysMUST NOT<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used in more than one EDHOC message, and both partiesSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> generatefreshfresh, random ephemeral key pairs. Note that an ephemeral key may be used to calculate several ECDH shared secrets. When static Diffie-Hellman authentication isusedused, the same ephemeral key is used in both ephemeral-ephemeral and ephemeral-static ECDH.</t> <t>As discussed in <xref target="SIGMA"/>, the encryption of message_2doesonlyneedneeds to protect against a passive attackerassince active attackers can always get the Responder's identity by sending their own message_1. EDHOC uses the EDHOC_Expand function (typically HKDF-Expand) as a binary additive stream cipherwhichthat is proven secure as long as the expand function is aPRF.Pseudorandom Function (PRF). HKDF-Expand is not often used as a stream cipher as it is slow on long messages, and most applications require both confidentiality with indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext(IND-CCA)attack (IND-CCA2) as well as integrity protection. For the encryption of message_2, any speed difference is negligible,IND-CCAIND-CCA2 does not increase security, and integrity is provided by the inner MAC (and signature depending on method).</t> <t>Requirements for how to securely generate, validate, and process theephemeralpublic keys depend on the elliptic curve. For X25519 and X448, the requirements are defined in <xref target="RFC7748"/>. For X25519 and X448, the check for all-zero output as specified in <xref target="RFC7748" sectionFormat="of" section="6"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be done. For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the requirements are defined in Section 5 of <xref target="SP-800-56A"/>. For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, at least partialpublic-keypublic key validationMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be done.</t> <t>The same authentication credentialMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used for both the Initiator and Responder roles. As noted inSection 12 of<xreftarget="RFC9052"/>target="RFC9052" section="12" sectionFormat="of"/>, the use of a single key for multiple algorithms is strongly discouraged unless proven secure by a dedicated cryptographic analysis. Inparticularparticular, this recommendation applies to using the same private key for static Diffie-Hellman authentication and digital signature authentication. A preliminary conjecture is that a minor change to EDHOC may be sufficient to fit the analysis of a secure shared signature and ECDH key usage in <xref target="Degabriele11"/> and <xreftarget="Thormarker21"/>.</t>target="Thormarker21"/>. Note that Section 5.6.3.2 of <xref target="SP-800-56A"/> allows a key agreement key pair to be used with a signature algorithm in certificate requests.</t> <t>The property that a completed EDHOC session implies that another identity has been active is upheld as long as the Initiator does not have its own identity in the set of Responder identities it is allowed to communicate with. InTrust on first usetrust-on-first-use (TOFU) usecases, seecases (see <xreftarget="tofu"/>,target="tofu"/>), the Initiator should verify that the Responder's identity is not equal to its own. Any future EDHOC methodsusingusing, e.g.,pre-shared keysPSKs might need to mitigate this in other ways. However, an active attacker can gain information about the set of identities an Initiator is willing to communicate with. If the Initiator is willing to communicate with all identities except itsownown, an attacker can determine that a guessed Initiator identity is correct. To not leak any long-term identifiers, using a freshly generated authentication key as an identity in each initial TOFU session isRECOMMENDED.</t><bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.</t> <t>NIST SP 800-56A <xref target="SP-800-56A"/> forbids deriving secret and non-secret randomness from the sameKDFKey Derivation Function (KDF) instance, but this decision has been criticized by Krawczyk in <xref target="HKDFpaper"/> and doing so is common practice. In addition to IVs, other examples are the challenge inEAP-TTLS,Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS), the RAND in 3GPPAKAs,Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), and the Session-Id in EAP-TLS 1.3. Note that part of KEYSTREAM_2 is also non-secretrandomnessrandomness, as it is known or predictable to an attacker. The more recent NIST SP 800-108 <xref target="SP-800-108"/> aligns with <xref target="HKDFpaper"/> and statesthatthat, for a secure KDF, the revelation of one portion of the derived keying material must not degrade the security of any other portion of that keying material.</t> </section> <section anchor="sec_algs"> <name>Cipher Suites and Cryptographic Algorithms</name> <t>When using a private cipher suite or registering new cipher suites, the choice of the key length used in the different algorithms needs to beharmonized,harmonized so that a sufficient security level is maintained for authentication credentials, the EDHOC session, and the protection of application data. The Initiator andtheResponder should enforce a minimum security level.</t> <t>The output size of the EDHOC hash algorithmMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at least256-bits, i.e.,256 bits. In particular, the hash algorithms SHA-1 and SHA-256/64 (SHA-256 truncated to64-bits) SHALL NOT64 bits) <bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14> be supported for use in EDHOC except for certificate identification with x5t and c5t. For security considerations of SHA-1, see <xref target="RFC6194"/>. As EDHOC integrity protects all thewholeauthentication credentials, the choice of hash algorithm in x5t and c5t does not affectsecurity,security and using the same hash algorithm as in the cipher suite, but with as much truncation as possible, isRECOMMENDED.<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>. That is, when the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-256, using SHA-256/64 in x5t and c5t isRECOMMENDED.<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>. The EDHOC MAC lengthMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at least 8 bytes and the tag length of the EDHOC AEAD algorithmMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at least64-bits.64 bits. Note that secp256k1 is only defined for use with ECDSA and not for ECDH. Note that some COSE algorithms are marked as not recommended in the COSE IANA registry.</t> </section> <section anchor="pqc"> <name>Post-Quantum Considerations</name> <t>As of the publication of this specification, it is unclear when or even if a quantum computer of sufficient size and power to exploit public key cryptography will exist. Deployments that need to consider risks decades into the future should transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the not-too-distant future. Many other systems should take a slower wait-and-see approach where PQC is phased in when the quantum threat is more imminent. Current PQC algorithms have limitations compared to Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC)(ECC), and the data sizes would be problematic in many constrained IoT systems.</t> <t>Symmetric algorithms used inEDHOCEDHOC, such as SHA-256 andAES-CCM-16-64-128AES-CCM-16-64-128, are practically secure against even large quantum computers. Two of NIST's security levels for quantum-resistantpublic-keypublic key cryptography are based on AES-128 and SHA-256.QuantumA quantum computer will likely beexpensive,expensive and slow due to heavy errorcorrection, and Grover’scorrection. Grover's algorithm, which is proven to be optimal, cannot effectively be parallelized.Grover’s algorithmIt will provide little or no advantage in attacking AES, and AES-128 will remain secure for decades to come <xref target="NISTPQC"/>.</t> <t>EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE, including PQC signature algorithms such as HSS-LMS. EDHOC is currently only specified for use with key exchange algorithms of type ECDH curves, but any Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), including PQC KEMs, can be used in method 0. While the key exchange in method 0 is specified with the terms of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the key exchange adheres to a KEM interface: G_X is then the public key of the Initiator, G_Y is the encapsulation, and G_XY is the shared secret. Use of PQC KEMs to replace static DH authentication would likely require a specification updating EDHOC with new methods.</t> </section> <section anchor="unprot-data"> <name>Unprotected Data and Privacy</name> <t>The Initiator andtheResponder must make sure that unprotected data and metadata do not reveal any sensitive information. This also applies for encrypted data sent to an unauthenticated party. In particular, it applies to EAD_1, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, and error messages. Using the same EAD_1 in several EDHOC sessions allows passive eavesdroppers to correlate the different sessions. Note that even if ead_value is encrypted outside of EDHOC, the ead_labels in EAD_1isare revealed to passive attackers and the ead_labels in EAD_2isare revealed to active attackers. Another consideration is that the list of supported cipher suites may potentially be used to identify the application. The Initiator andtheResponder must also make sure that unauthenticated data does not trigger any harmful actions. In particular, this applies to EAD_1 and error messages.</t> <t>An attacker observing network traffic may use connection identifiers sent in clear in EDHOC or the subsequent application protocol to correlate packets sent on different paths or at different times. The attacker may use this information for traffic flow analysis or to track an endpoint. Application protocols using connection identifiers from EDHOCSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide mechanisms to update the connection identifiers andMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> provide mechanisms to issue several simultaneously active connection identifiers. See <xref target="RFC9000"/> for a non-constrained example of such mechanisms. Connection identifierscancan, e.g., be chosen randomly among the set of unused 1-byte connection identifiers. Connection identity privacy mechanisms are only useful when there are not fixedidentifiersidentifiers, such as IP address or MAC address in the lower layers.</t> </section> <section anchor="internet-threat"> <name>Updated Internet Threat Model Considerations</name> <t>Since the publication of <xreftarget="RFC3552"/>target="RFC3552"/>, there has been an increased awareness of the need to protect against endpoints that arecompromised, malicious,compromised or malicious or whose interests simply do not align with the interests of users <xref target="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance"/>. <xref target="RFC7624"/> describes an updated threat model for Internetconfidentiality,confidentiality; see <xref target="sec-prop"/>. <xref target="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance"/> further expands the threat model. Implementations and users should take these threat models into account and consider actions to reduce the risk of tracking by other endpoints. In particular, even data sent protected to the otherendpointendpoint, such as ID_CRED fields and EADfieldsfields, can be used fortracking,tracking; seeSection 2.7 of<xreftarget="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance"/>.</t>target="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance" section="2.7" sectionFormat="of"/>.</t> <t>The fields ID_CRED_I, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4 have variable length, and information regarding the length may leak to an attacker. A passive attacker may, e.g., be able to differentiate endpoints using identifiers of different length. To mitigate this informationleakageleakage, an implementation may ensure that the fields have a fixed length or use padding. An implementation may, e.g., only use fixed length identifiers like 'kid' of length 1. Alternatively, padding may be used (see <xref target="padding"/>) to hide the true length of, e.g., certificates by value in 'x5chain' or 'c5c'.</t> </section> <section anchor="dos"><name>Denial-of-Service</name><name>Denial of Service</name> <t>EDHOC itself does not provide countermeasures against denial-of-service attacks. In particular, by sending a number of new or replayedmessage_1message_1, an attacker may cause the Responder to allocate the state, perform cryptographic operations, and amplify messages. To mitigate such attacks, an implementationSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> make use of available lower layer mechanisms. For instance, when EDHOC istransferred astransferred as an exchange of CoAP messages, the CoAP server can use the Echo option defined in <xreftarget="RFC9175"/>target="RFC9175"/>, which forces the CoAP client to demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. To avoid an additionalroundtripround trip, the Initiator can reduce the amplification factor by padding message_1, i.e., usingEAD_1,EAD_1; see <xref target="padding"/>. Note that while the Echo option mitigates some resource exhaustion aspects of spoofing, it does not protect against a distributed denial-of-service attack made by real, potentially compromised, clients. Similarly, limiting amplification only reduces the impact, which still may be significant because of a large number of clients engaged in the attack.</t> <t>An attacker can also send a faked message_2, message_3, message_4, or error in an attempt to trick the receiving party to send an error message and abort the EDHOC session. EDHOC implementationsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> evaluate if a received message is likely to have been forged by an attacker and ignore it without sending an error message or aborting the EDHOC session.</t> </section> <section anchor="impl-cons"> <name>Implementation Considerations</name> <t>The availability of a secure random number generator is essential for the security of EDHOC. If no true random number generator is available, a random seedMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be provided from an external source and used with a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator. As each pseudorandom number must only be used once, an implementation needs to get a unique input to the pseudorandom number generator afterreboot,reboot or continuously store state in nonvolatile memory.Appendix B.1.1 in<xreftarget="RFC8613"/>target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="B.1.1"/> describes issues and solution approaches for writing to nonvolatile memory. Intentionally or unintentionally weak or predictable pseudorandom number generators can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. <xref target="RFC8937"/> describes a way for security protocol implementations to augment their (pseudo)random number generators using a long-term private key and a deterministic signature function. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted random number generators. The same idea can be used with other secrets andfunctionsfunctions, such as a Diffie-Hellman function or a symmetricsecretsecret, and a PRF like HMAC or KMAC. It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to not trust a single source of randomness and to not put unaugmented random numbers on the wire.</t> <t>For many constrained IoTdevicesdevices, it is problematic to support several crypto primitives. Existing devices can be expected to support either ECDSA orEdDSA.Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). If ECDSA is supported, "deterministicECDSA"ECDSA", as specified in <xreftarget="RFC6979"/> MAYtarget="RFC6979"/>, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used. Pure deterministic elliptic-curvesignaturessignatures, such as deterministic ECDSA andEdDSAEdDSA, have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their securitydodoes not depend on a source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however found that implementations of these signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism.See e.g., Section 1 ofFor example, see <xreftarget="I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise"/>target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise" section="1" sectionFormat="of"/> for a list of attack papers. As suggested inSection 2.1.1 of<xreftarget="RFC9053"/>target="RFC9053" section="2.1.1" sectionFormat="of"/>, this can be addressed by combining randomness and determinism.</t><t>Appendix D of <xref target="I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations"/><t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations" sectionFormat="of" section="D"/> describes how Montgomerycurvescurves, such as X25519 andX448X448, and (twisted) Edwardscurves as curvescurves, such as Ed25519 andEd448Ed448, can be mapped to and from short-Weierstrass form forimplementationimplementations on platforms that accelerate elliptic curve group operations in short-Weierstrass form.</t> <t>All private keys, symmetric keys, and IVsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be secret. Only the ResponderSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> have access to the Responder's private authenticationkeykey, and only the InitiatorSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> have access to the Initiator's private authentication key. Implementations should provide countermeasures to side-channelattacksattacks, such as timing attacks. Intermediate computedvaluesvalues, such as ephemeral ECDH keys and ECDH sharedsecrets MUSTsecrets, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be deleted after key derivation is completed.</t> <t>The Initiator andtheResponder are responsible for verifying the integrity and validity of certificates. Verification of validity may require the use of a Real-Time Clock (RTC). The selection of trustedCAscertification authorities (CAs) should be done very carefully and certificate revocation should be supported. The choice of revocation mechanism is left to the application. For example, in case of X.509 certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists <xref target="RFC5280"/> orOCSPthe Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) <xref target="RFC6960"/> may be used.</t> <t>Similar considerations as for certificates are needed for CWT/CCS. The endpoints are responsible for verifying the integrity and validity ofCWT/CCS,CWT/CCS and to handle revocation. The application needs to determine what trust anchors arerelevant,relevant and have a well-defined trust-establishment process. A self-signedcertificate/CWTcertificate / CWT or CCS appearing in the protocol cannot be a trigger to modify the set of trust anchors. One common way for a new trust anchor to be added to (or removed from) a device is by means firmware upgrade. See <xref target="RFC9360"/> for a longer discussion on trust and validation in constrained devices.</t> <t>Just like for certificates, the contents of the COSE header parameters 'kcwt' and 'kccs' defined in <xref target="cwt-header-param"/> must be processed as untrustedinput.inputs. Endpoints that intend to rely on the assertions made by a CWT/CCS obtained from any of these methods need to validate the contents. For 'kccs', which enables transport of raw public keys, the data structure used does not include any protection or verification data. 'kccs' may be used for unauthenticated operations,e.g.e.g., trust on first use, with the limitations and caveatsentailed,entailed; see <xref target="tofu"/>.</t> <t>The Initiator andtheResponder are allowed to selecttheconnectionidentifieridentifiers C_I and C_R, respectively, for the other party to use in the ongoing EDHOC session as well as in a subsequent application protocol (e.g., OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613"/>). The choice of the connection identifier is not security critical in EDHOC but intended to simplify the retrieval of the right security context in combination with using short identifiers. If the wrong connection identifier of the other party is used in a protocolmessagemessage, it will result in the receiving party not being able to retrieve a security context (which will abort the EDHOC session) or retrieve the wrong security context (which also aborts the EDHOC session as the message cannot be verified).</t> <t>If two nodes unintentionally initiate two simultaneous EDHOC sessions with eachotherother, even if they only want to complete a single EDHOC session, theyMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session with the lexicographically smallest G_X. Note that in cases where several EDHOC sessions with different parameter sets (method, COSE headers, etc.) are used, an attacker can affect which parameter set will be used by blocking some of the parameter sets.</t> <t>If supported by the device, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that at least the long-term private keys are stored in a Trusted Execution Environment(TEE,(TEE) (for example, seefor example<xref target="RFC9397"/>) and that sensitive operations using these keys are performed inside the TEE. To achieve even highersecuritysecurity, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that additional operations such as ephemeral key generation, all computations of shared secrets, and storage of the PRK keys can be done inside the TEE. The use of a TEE aims at preventing code within that environment to be tamperedwith,with and preventing data used by such code to be read or tampered with by code outside that environment.</t> <t>Note that HKDF-Expand has a relatively small maximum output length of 255<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. This means that when SHA-256 is used as a hash algorithm, PLAINTEXT_2 cannot be longer than 8160 bytes. This is probably not a limitation for most intended applications, but to be able tosupportsupport, forexampleexample, long certificate chains or large external authorization data, there is a backwards compatible method specified in <xref target="large-plaintext_2"/>.</t> <t>The sequence of transcript hashes in EDHOC (TH_2, TH_3, and TH_4) does not make use of a so-called running hash. This is a designchoicechoice, as running hashes are often not supported on constrained platforms.</t> <t>When parsing a received EDHOC message, implementationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session if the message does not comply with the CDDL for that message. Implementations are not required to support non-deterministic encodings and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session if the received EDHOC message is not encoded using deterministic CBOR. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the EDHOC session if validation of a received public key fails or if any cryptographic field has the wrong length. It isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to abort the EDHOC session if the received EDHOC message is not encoded using deterministic CBOR.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="iana"> <name>IANA Considerations</name> <t>ThisSectionsection gives IANAConsiderationsconsiderations and, unless otherwise noted, conforms with <xref target="RFC8126"/>.</t> <section anchor="exporter-label"> <name>EDHOC Exporter Label Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new registry under the new registry group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:</t><t>Registry Name: EDHOC<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Registry Name:</dt> <dd>EDHOC ExporterLabel</t> <t>Reference: [[this document]]</t> <figure anchor="fig-exporter-label">Labels</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> <table anchor="tab-exporter-label"> <name>EDHOCexporter label.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="288" width="536" viewBox="0 0 536 288" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 120,32 L 120,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 368,32 L 368,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 528,32 L 528,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 528,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 528,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 528,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 528,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 528,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 528,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,192 L 528,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,224 L 528,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,256 L 528,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Label</text> <text x="176" y="52">Description</text> <text x="416" y="52">Reference</text> <text x="24" y="84">0</text> <text x="160" y="84">Derived</text> <text x="220" y="84">OSCORE</text> <text x="276" y="84">Master</text> <text x="332" y="84">Secret</text> <text x="404" y="84">[[this</text> <text x="476" y="84">document]]</text> <text x="24" y="116">1</text> <text x="160" y="116">Derived</text> <text x="220" y="116">OSCORE</text> <text x="276" y="116">Master</text> <text x="324" y="116">Salt</text> <text x="404" y="116">[[this</text> <text x="476" y="116">document]]</text> <text x="36" y="148">2-22</text> <text x="172" y="148">Unassigned</text> <text x="28" y="180">23</text> <text x="164" y="180">Reserved</text> <text x="404" y="180">[[this</text> <text x="476" y="180">document]]</text> <text x="52" y="212">24-32767</text> <text x="172" y="212">Unassigned</text> <text x="64" y="244">32768-65535</text> <text x="160" y="244">Private</text> <text x="208" y="244">Use</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | Label | Description | Reference | +=============+==============================+===================+ | 0 | DerivedExporter Labels</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Label</th> <th>Description</th> <th>Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>Derived OSCORE MasterSecret | [[this document]] | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | 1 | DerivedSecret</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Derived OSCORE MasterSalt | [[this document]] | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | 2-22 | Unassigned | | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | 23 | Reserved | [[this document]] | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | 24-32767 | Unassigned | | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ | 32768-65535 |Salt</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr><tr> <td>2-22</td> <td>Unassigned</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td>Reserved</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24-32767</td> <td>Unassigned</td> <td></td> </tr><tr> <td>32768-65535</td> <td>Reserved for PrivateUse | | +-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="160" width="432" viewBox="0 0 432 160" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 120,32 L 120,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 424,32 L 424,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 424,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 424,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 424,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 424,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 424,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Range</text> <text x="180" y="52">Registration</text> <text x="276" y="52">Procedures</text> <text x="24" y="84">0</text> <text x="44" y="84">to</text> <text x="68" y="84">23</text> <text x="168" y="84">Standards</text> <text x="236" y="84">Action</text> <text x="28" y="116">24</text> <text x="52" y="116">to</text> <text x="88" y="116">32767</text> <text x="156" y="116">Expert</text> <text x="212" y="116">Review</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +-------------+-------------------------------------+ | Range | RegistrationUse</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t>This registry also has a "Change Controller" field. For registrations made by IETF documents, the IETF is listed.</t> <table> <name>Registration Procedures| +=============+=====================================+ | 0 to 23 | Standards Action | +-------------+-------------------------------------+ | 24 to 32767 | Expert Review | +-------------+-------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset>for EDHOC Exporter Labels</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Range</th> <th>Registration Procedures</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>0-23</td> <td>Standards Action</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24-32767</td> <td>Expert Review</td> </tr> <tr> <td>32768-65535</td> <td>Private Use</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="suites-registry"> <name>EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new registry under the new registry group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:</t><t>Registry Name: EDHOC<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Registry Name:</dt> <dd>EDHOC CipherSuites</t> <t>Reference: [[this document]]</t>Suites</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> <t>The columns of the registry are Value,Array andArray, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer and the other columns are text strings. The initial contents of the registry are:</t><artwork><![CDATA[ Value: -24 Array: N/A Description: Private Use Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: -23 Array: N/A Description: Private Use Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: -22 Array: N/A Description: Private Use Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: -21 Array: N/A Description: Private Use Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 0 Array: 10,<table> <name>EDHOC Cipher Suites</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Value</th> <th>Array</th> <th>Description</th> <th>Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>-24</td> <td>N/A</td> <td>Private Use</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-23</td> <td>N/A</td> <td>Private Use</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-22</td> <td>N/A</td> <td>Private Use</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-21</td> <td>N/A</td> <td>Private Use</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>10, -16, 8, 4, -8, 10,-16 Description: AES-CCM-16-64-128,-16</td> <td>AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, X25519, EdDSA,AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 1 Array: 30,AES&nbhy;CCM&nbhy;16&nbhy;64&nbhy;128, SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>30, -16, 16, 4, -8, 10,-16 Description: AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256,-16</td> <td>AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA&nbhy;256, 16, X25519, EdDSA,AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 2 Array: 10,AES&nbhy;CCM&nbhy;16&nbhy;64&nbhy;128, SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>10, -16, 8, 1, -7, 10,-16 Description: AES-CCM-16-64-128,-16</td> <td>AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256,AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 3 Array: 30,AES&nbhy;CCM&nbhy;16&nbhy;64&nbhy;128, SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>30, -16, 16, 1, -7, 10,-16 Description: AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256,-16</td> <td>AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA&nbhy;256, 16, P-256, ES256,AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 4 Array: 24,AES&nbhy;CCM&nbhy;16&nbhy;64&nbhy;128, SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>24, -16, 16, 4, -8, 24,-16 Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305,-16</td> <td>ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA, ChaCha20/Poly1305,SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 5 Array: 24,SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>24, -16, 16, 1, -7, 24,-16 Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305,-16</td> <td>ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256,ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 6 Array: 1,ChaCha20/&wj;Poly1305, SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>1, -16, 16, 4, -7, 1,-16 Description: A128GCM,-16</td> <td>A128GCM, SHA-256, 16, X25519, ES256, A128GCM,SHA-256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 23 Reserved Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 24 Array: 3,SHA-256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td></td> <td>Reserved</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> <td>3, -43, 16, 2, -35, 3,-43 Description: A256GCM,-43</td> <td>A256GCM, SHA-384, 16, P-384, ES384, A256GCM,SHA-384 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artwork><![CDATA[ Value: 25 Array: 24,SHA-384</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> <td>24, -45, 16, 5, -8, 24,-45 Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305,-45</td> <td>ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256, 16, X448, EdDSA, ChaCha20/Poly1305,SHAKE256 Reference: [[this document]] ]]></artwork> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="176" width="456" viewBox="0 0 456 176" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 144,32 L 144,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 448,32 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 448,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 448,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 448,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 448,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Range</text> <text x="204" y="52">Registration</text> <text x="300" y="52">Procedures</text> <text x="44" y="84">-65536</text> <text x="84" y="84">to</text> <text x="112" y="84">-25</text> <text x="208" y="84">Specification</text> <text x="300" y="84">Required</text> <text x="32" y="116">-20</text> <text x="60" y="116">to</text> <text x="84" y="116">23</text> <text x="192" y="116">Standards</text> <text x="260" y="116">Action</text> <text x="308" y="116">with</text> <text x="356" y="116">Expert</text> <text x="412" y="116">Review</text> <text x="28" y="148">24</text> <text x="52" y="148">to</text> <text x="88" y="148">65535</text> <text x="208" y="148">Specification</text> <text x="300" y="148">Required</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | Range | RegistrationSHAKE256</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table> <name>Registration Procedures| +================+=====================================+ | -65536 to -25 | Specification Required | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | -20for EDHOC Cipher Suites</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Range</th> <th>Registration Procedures</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>-65536 to -25</td> <td>Specification Required</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-24 to -21</td> <td>Private Use</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-20 to23 | Standards23</td> <td>Standards Action with ExpertReview | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | 24 to 65535 | Specification Required | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset>Review</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24 to 65535</td> <td>Specification Required</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="method-types"> <name>EDHOC Method Type Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new registry under the new registry group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:</t><t>Registry Name: EDHOC<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Registry Name:</dt> <dd>EDHOC MethodType</t> <t>Reference: [[this document]]</t>Types</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> <t>The columns of the registry are Value, Initiator Authentication Key,andResponder Authentication Key, and Reference, where Value is an integer and the key columns are text strings describing the authentication keys.</t> <t>The initial contents of the registry are shown in <xreftarget="fig-method-types"/>.target="tab-method-types"/>. Method 23 is Reserved.</t><artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="176" width="456" viewBox="0 0 456 176" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 144,32 L 144,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 448,32 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 448,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 448,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 448,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 448,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Range</text> <text x="204" y="52">Registration</text> <text x="300" y="52">Procedures</text> <text x="44" y="84">-65536</text> <text x="84" y="84">to</text> <text x="112" y="84">-25</text> <text x="208" y="84">Specification</text> <text x="300" y="84">Required</text> <text x="32" y="116">-24</text> <text x="60" y="116">to</text> <text x="84" y="116">23</text> <text x="192" y="116">Standards</text> <text x="260" y="116">Action</text> <text x="308" y="116">with</text> <text x="356" y="116">Expert</text> <text x="412" y="116">Review</text> <text x="28" y="148">24</text> <text x="52" y="148">to</text> <text x="88" y="148">65535</text> <text x="208" y="148">Specification</text> <text x="300" y="148">Required</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | Range | Registration<table> <name>Registration Procedures| +================+=====================================+ | -65536 to -25 | Specification Required | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | -24for EDHOC Method Types</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Range</th> <th>Registration Procedures</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>-65536 to -25</td> <td>Specification Required</td> </tr> <tr> <td>-24 to23 | Standards23</td> <td>Standards Action with ExpertReview | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | 24 to 65535 | Specification Required | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset>Review</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24 to 65535</td> <td>Specification Required</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="error-code-reg"> <name>EDHOC Error Codes Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new registry under the new registry group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:</t><t>Registry Name: EDHOC<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Registry Name:</dt> <dd>EDHOC ErrorCodes</t> <t>Reference: [[this document]]</t>Codes</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> <t>The columns of the registry are ERR_CODE, ERR_INFO Type, Description, Change Controller, and Reference, where ERR_CODE is an integer, ERR_INFO is a CDDL defined type, and Description is a text string. The initial contents of the registry are shown in <xreftarget="fig-error-codes"/>.target="tab-error-codes"/>. Error code 23 isReserved.</t> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="176" width="456" viewBox="0 0 456 176" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 144,32 L 144,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 448,32 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 448,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 448,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 448,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 448,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 448,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Range</text> <text x="204" y="52">Registration</text> <text x="300" y="52">Procedures</text> <text x="44" y="84">-65536</text> <text x="84" y="84">to</text> <text x="112" y="84">-25</text> <text x="180" y="84">Expert</text> <text x="236" y="84">Review</text> <text x="32" y="116">-24</text> <text x="60" y="116">to</text> <text x="84" y="116">23</text> <text x="192" y="116">Standards</text> <text x="260" y="116">Action</text> <text x="28" y="148">24</text> <text x="52" y="148">to</text> <text x="88" y="148">65535</text> <text x="180" y="148">Expert</text> <text x="236" y="148">Review</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | Range | RegistrationReserved. This registry also has a "Change Controller" field. For registrations made by IETF documents, the IETF is listed.</t> <table> <name>Registration Procedures| +================+=====================================+ | -65536 to -25 | Expert Review | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | -24 to 23 | Standards Action | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ | 24 to 65535 | Expert Review | +----------------+-------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset>for EDHOC Error Codes</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Range</th> <th>Registration Procedures</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>-65536 to -25</td> <td>Expert Review</td> </tr><tr> <td>-24 to 23</td> <td>Standards Action</td> </tr><tr> <td>24 to 65535</td> <td>Expert Review</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="iana-ead"> <name>EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new registry under the new registry group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:</t><t>Registry Name: EDHOC<dl newline="false" spacing="normal"> <dt>Registry Name:</dt> <dd>EDHOC External AuthorizationData</t> <t>Reference: [[this document]]</t>Data</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> <t>The columns of the registry are Name, Label, Description, and Reference, where Label is anon-negativenonnegative integer and the other columns are text strings. The initial contents of the registryisare shown in <xreftarget="fig-ead-labels"/>.target="tab-ead-labels"/>. EAD label 23 is Reserved.</t><figure anchor="fig-ead-labels"> <name>EAD labels.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="128" width="536" viewBox="0 0 536 128" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 104,32 L 104,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 168,32 L 168,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 368,32 L 368,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 528,32 L 528,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 528,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 528,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 528,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,112 L 528,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="36" y="52">Name</text> <text x="136" y="52">Label</text> <text x="224" y="52">Description</text> <text x="416" y="52">Reference</text> <text x="48" y="84">Padding</text> <text x="136" y="84">0</text> <text x="212" y="84">Randomly</text> <text x="288" y="84">generated</text> <text x="404" y="84">[[this</text> <text x="476" y="84">document]]</text> <text x="196" y="100">CBOR</text> <text x="236" y="100">byte</text> <text x="284" y="100">string</text> <text x="408" y="100">Section</text> <text x="464" y="100">3.8.1</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +-----------+-------+------------------------+-------------------+ | Name | Label | Description | Reference | +===========+=======+========================+===================+ | Padding | 0 | Randomly<table anchor="tab-ead-labels"> <name>EDHOC EAD Labels</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Name</th> <th>Label</th> <th>Description</th> <th>Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Padding</td> <td>0</td> <td>Randomly generated| [[this document]] | | | |CBOR bytestring | Section 3.8.1 | +-----------+-------+------------------------+-------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="160" width="432" viewBox="0 0 432 160" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 120,32 L 120,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 424,32 L 424,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 424,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 424,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 424,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 424,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 424,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="40" y="52">Range</text> <text x="180" y="52">Registration</text> <text x="276" y="52">Procedures</text> <text x="24" y="84">0</text> <text x="44" y="84">to</text> <text x="68" y="84">23</text> <text x="168" y="84">Standards</text> <text x="236" y="84">Action</text> <text x="284" y="84">with</text> <text x="332" y="84">Expert</text> <text x="388" y="84">Review</text> <text x="28" y="116">24</text> <text x="52" y="116">to</text> <text x="88" y="116">65535</text> <text x="184" y="116">Specification</text> <text x="276" y="116">Required</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +-------------+-------------------------------------+ | Range | Registrationstring</td> <td>RFC 9528, <xref target="padding"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>23</td> <td>Reserved</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table> <name>Registration Procedures| +=============+=====================================+ | 0for EDHOC EAD Labels</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Range</th> <th>Registration Procedures</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>0 to23 | Standards23</td> <td>Standards Action with ExpertReview | +-------------+-------------------------------------+ | 24 to 65535 | Specification Required | +-------------+-------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset>Review</td> </tr><tr> <td>24 to 65535</td> <td>Specification Required</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="cwt-header-param"> <name>COSE Header Parameters Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to registerhas registered the following entries in the "COSE Header Parameters" registry under the registry group "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)" (see <xreftarget="fig-header-params"/>):target="tab-header-params"/>). The value of the 'kcwt' header parameter is a COSE Web Token (CWT) <xref target="RFC8392"/>, and the value of the 'kccs' header parameter is a CWT Claims Set(CCS),(CCS); see <xref target="term"/>. The CWT/CCS must contain a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim <xref target="RFC8747"/>. The Value Registry column for this item is empty and omitted from the table below.</t><figure anchor="fig-header-params"><table anchor="tab-header-params"> <name>COSEheader parameter labels.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="256" width="560" viewBox="0 0 560 256" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 64,32 L 64,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 128,32 L 128,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 256,32 L 256,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 552,32 L 552,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 552,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 552,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 552,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,160 L 552,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,240 L 552,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="36" y="52">Name</text> <text x="96" y="52">Label</text> <text x="160" y="52">Value</text> <text x="204" y="52">Type</text> <text x="312" y="52">Description</text> <text x="36" y="84">kcwt</text> <text x="92" y="84">TBD1</text> <text x="192" y="84">COSE_Messages</text> <text x="272" y="84">A</text> <text x="300" y="84">CBOR</text> <text x="336" y="84">Web</text> <text x="376" y="84">Token</text> <text x="424" y="84">(CWT)</text> <text x="492" y="84">containing</text> <text x="272" y="100">a</text> <text x="316" y="100">COSE_Key</text> <text x="364" y="100">in</text> <text x="384" y="100">a</text> <text x="416" y="100">'cnf'</text> <text x="464" y="100">claim</text> <text x="504" y="100">and</text> <text x="300" y="116">possibly</text> <text x="360" y="116">other</text> <text x="416" y="116">claims.</text> <text x="464" y="116">CWT</text> <text x="492" y="116">is</text> <text x="296" y="132">defined</text> <text x="340" y="132">in</text> <text x="368" y="132">RFC</text> <text x="408" y="132">8392.</text> <text x="488" y="132">COSE_Messages</text> <text x="276" y="148">is</text> <text x="320" y="148">defined</text> <text x="364" y="148">in</text> <text x="392" y="148">RFC</text> <text x="432" y="148">9052.</text> <text x="36" y="180">kccs</text> <text x="92" y="180">TBD2</text> <text x="152" y="180">map</text> <text x="272" y="180">A</text> <text x="296" y="180">CWT</text> <text x="340" y="180">Claims</text> <text x="384" y="180">Set</text> <text x="424" y="180">(CCS)</text> <text x="492" y="180">containing</text> <text x="272" y="196">a</text> <text x="316" y="196">COSE_Key</text> <text x="364" y="196">in</text> <text x="384" y="196">a</text> <text x="416" y="196">'cnf'</text> <text x="464" y="196">claim</text> <text x="504" y="196">and</text> <text x="300" y="212">possibly</text> <text x="360" y="212">other</text> <text x="416" y="212">claims.</text> <text x="464" y="212">CCS</text> <text x="492" y="212">is</text> <text x="296" y="228">defined</text> <text x="340" y="228">in</text> <text x="368" y="228">RFC</text> <text x="408" y="228">8392.</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[ +------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ | Name | Label | Value Type | Description | +======+=======+===============+====================================+ | kcwt | TBD1 | COSE_Messages | AHeader Parameter Labels</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Name</th> <th>Label</th> <th>Value Type</th> <th>Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>kcwt</td> <td>13</td> <td>COSE_Messages</td> <td>A CBOR Web Token (CWT) containing| | | | |a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim and| | | | |possibly other claims. CWT is| | | | |defined in RFC 8392. COSE_Messages| | | | |is defined in RFC9052. | +------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ | kccs | TBD2 | map | A9052.</td> </tr><tr> <td>kccs</td> <td>14</td> <td>map</td> <td>A CWT Claims Set (CCS) containing| | | | |a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim and| | | | |possibly other claims. CCS is| | | | |defined in RFC8392. | +------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure>8392.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="well-known"><name>The Well-Known<name>Well-Known URI Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to addhas added the well-known URI "edhoc" to the "Well-Known URIs" registry.</t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>URI suffix: edhoc</li> <li>Change controller: IETF</li> <li>Specification document(s): [[this document]]</li> <li>Related information: None</li> </ul><dl> <dt>URI Suffix:</dt><dd>edhoc</dd> <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9528</dd> <dt>Related Information:</dt><dd> None</dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="media-type"> <name>Media Types Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to addhas added the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" and "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "Media Types" registry.</t> <section anchor="applicationedhoccbor-seq-media-type-registration"> <name>application/edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration</name><ul spacing="normal"> <li>Type name: application</li> <li>Subtype name: edhoc+cbor-seq</li> <li>Required parameters: N/A</li> <li>Optional parameters: N/A</li> <li>Encoding considerations: binary</li> <li>Security considerations: See Section 7<dl> <dt>Type name:</dt><dd> application</dd> <dt>Subtype name:</dt><dd> edhoc+cbor-seq</dd> <dt>Required parameters:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Optional parameters:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Encoding considerations:</dt><dd> binary</dd> <dt>Security considerations:</dt><dd>See <xref target="duplication"/> ofthis document.</li> <li>Interoperability considerations: N/A</li> <li>Published specification: [[this document]] (this document)</li> <li>ApplicationsRFC 9528.</dd> <dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Published specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9528</dd> <dt>Applications that use this mediatype:type:</dt><dd> To beidentified</li> <li>Fragmentidentified</dd> <dt>Fragment identifierconsiderations: N/A</li> <li> <t>Additionalconsiderations:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Additional information:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Magic number(s): N/A</li> <li>File extension(s): N/A</li> <li>Macintosh</dt> <dd> <t><br/></t> <dl> <dt>Magic number(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>File extension(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Macintosh file typecode(s): N/A</li> </ul> </li> <li>Personcode(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> </dl> </dd> <dt>Person & email address to contact for furtherinformation:information:</dt><dd> See "Authors' Addresses"section.</li> <li>Intended usage: COMMON</li> <li>Restrictions on usage: N/A</li> <li>Author:section in RFC 9528.</dd> <dt>Intended usage:</dt><dd> COMMON</dd> <dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Author:</dt><dd> See "Authors' Addresses"section.</li> <li>Change Controller: IESG</li> </ul>section.</dd> <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd> IETF</dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="applicationcid-edhoccbor-seq-media-type-registration"> <name>application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration</name><ul spacing="normal"> <li>Type name: application</li> <li>Subtype name: cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</li> <li>Required parameters: N/A</li> <li>Optional parameters: N/A</li> <li>Encoding considerations: binary</li> <li>Security considerations:<dl> <dt>Type name:</dt><dd> application</dd> <dt>Subtype name:</dt><dd> cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</dd> <dt>Required parameters:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Optional parameters:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Encoding considerations:</dt><dd> binary</dd> <dt>Security considerations:</dt><dd> SeeSection 7<xref target="duplication"/> ofthis document.</li> <li>Interoperability considerations: N/A</li> <li>Published specification: [[this document]] (this document)</li> <li>ApplicationsRFC 9528.</dd> <dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Published specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9528</dd> <dt>Applications that use this mediatype:type:</dt><dd> To beidentified</li> <li>Fragmentidentified</dd> <dt>Fragment identifierconsiderations: N/A</li> <li> <t>Additional information: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Magic number(s): N/A</li> <li>File extension(s): N/A</li> <li>Macintoshconsiderations:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Additional information:</dt> <dd> <t><br/></t> <dl> <dt>Magic number(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>File extension(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Macintosh file typecode(s): N/A</li> </ul> </li> <li>Personcode(s):</dt><dd> N/A</dd> </dl> </dd> <dt>Person & email address to contact for furtherinformation:information:</dt><dd> See "Authors' Addresses"section.</li> <li>Intended usage: COMMON</li> <li>Restrictions on usage: N/A</li> <li>Author:section in RFC 9528.</dd> <dt>Intended usage:</dt><dd> COMMON</dd> <dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt><dd> N/A</dd> <dt>Author:</dt><dd> See "Authors' Addresses"section.</li> <li>Change Controller: IESG</li> </ul>section.</dd> <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd> IETF</dd> </dl> </section> </section> <section anchor="content-format"> <name>CoAP Content-Formats Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to addhas added the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" and "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters".</t><figure anchor="fig-format-ids"><table anchor="tab-format-ids"> <name>CoAP Content-Format IDs</name><artset> <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="128" width="584" viewBox="0 0 584 128" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 272,32 L 272,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 360,32 L 360,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 416,32 L 416,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 576,32 L 576,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 576,32" fill="none" 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+================================+==========+======+===================+ | application/edhoc+cbor-seq | - | TBD5 | [[this document]] | | application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | - | TBD6 | [[this document]] | +--------------------------------+----------+------+-------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure><thead> <tr> <th>Content Type</th> <th>Content Coding</th> <th>ID</th> <th>Reference</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>application/edhoc+cbor-seq</td> <td>-</td> <td>64</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr><tr> <td>application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</td> <td>-</td> <td>65</td> <td>RFC 9528</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="rt"> <name>Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to addhas added the resource type "core.edhoc" to the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters".</t><ul spacing="normal"> <li>Value: "core.edhoc"</li> <li>Description: EDHOC resource.</li> <li>Reference: [[this document]]</li> </ul><dl> <dt>Value:</dt><dd>core.edhoc</dd> <dt>Description:</dt><dd>EDHOC resource</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9528</dd> </dl> </section> <section anchor="expert-review-instructions"> <name>Expert Review Instructions</name> <t>The IANARegistriesregistries established in this document are defined as "Expert Review", "SpecificationRequired"Required", or "Standards Action with Expert Review". This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.</t> <t>Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>Clarity<li>The clarity and correctness of registrations. Experts are expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested entries. Expert needs to make sure the values of algorithms are taken from the rightregistry,registry when that is required. Experts should consider requesting an opinion on the correctness of registered parameters from relevant IETF working groups. Encodings that do not meet theseobjectiveobjectives of clarity and completeness should not be registered.</li><li>Experts should take into account the<li>The expected usage of fields when approving code point assignment. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.</li><li>Even for<li>It is recommended to have a specification even if the registration procedure is "ExpertReview" specifications are recommended.Review". When specifications are not provided for a request where Expert Review is the assignment policy, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to verify the code points as above.</li> </ul> </section> </section> </middle> <back> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat" to="EAT"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs" to="LAKE-REQS"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc" to="EDHOC-CoAP-OSCORE"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert" to="C509-CERTS"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update" to="KUDOS"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations" to="CURVE-REPR"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison" to="CoAP-SEC-PROT"/> <displayreference target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise" to="HEDGED-ECC-SIGS"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lake-authz" to="LAKE-AUTHZ"/> <displayreference target="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance" to="THREAT-MODEL-GUIDANCE"/> <references> <name>References</name> <references> <name>Normative References</name> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3279.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3552.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5116.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5869.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6090.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6960.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6979.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7252.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7748.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7959.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8410.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8610.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8613.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8724.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8742.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8747.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8949.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9053.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9175.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9360.xml"/> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2986.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6194.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7228.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7258.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7296.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7624.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8366.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8376.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8937.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9000.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9176.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9397.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-rats-eat.xml"/> <referenceanchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">anchor="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-reqs-04"> <front><title>Key words<title>Requirements foruse in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE</title> <authorfullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>initials="M." surname="Vučinić" fullname="Mališa Vučinić"> <organization>Inria</organization> </author> <author initials="G." surname="Selander" fullname="Göran Selander"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Garcia-Carillo" fullname="Dan Garcia-Carillo"> <organization>Odin Solutions S.L.</organization> </author> <datemonth="March" year="1997"/> <abstract> <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract>month="June" day="8" year="2020"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="BCP" value="14"/>name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lake-reqs-04"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9529" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9529"> <front> <title>Traces of Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)</title> <author initials="G." surname="Selander" fullname="Göran Selander"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Serafin" fullname="Marek Serafin"> <organization>ASSA ABLOY</organization> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Tiloca" fullname="Marco Tiloca"> <organization>RISE</organization> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Vučinić" fullname="Mališa Vučinić"> <organization>Inria</organization> </author> <date month="March" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="2119"/>value="9529"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>value="10.17487/RFC9529"/> </reference> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc.xml"/> <referenceanchor="RFC3279" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3279.xml">anchor="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-09"> <front><title>Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet<title> CBOR Encoded X.509Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>Certificates (C509 Certificates) </title> <authorfullname="L. Bassham" initials="L." surname="Bassham"/>initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <authorfullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>initials="G." surname="Selander" fullname="Göran Selander"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <authorfullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>initials="S." surname="Raza" fullname="Shahid Raza"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author initials="J." surname="Höglund" fullname="Joel Höglund"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Furuhed" fullname="Martin Furuhed"> <organization>Nexus Group</organization> </author> <datemonth="April" year="2002"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for digital signatures and subject public keys used in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Digital signatures are used to sign certificates and certificate revocation list (CRLs). Certificates include the public key of the named subject. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract>month="March" day="4" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="RFC" value="3279"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3279"/>name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-09"/> </reference> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison.xml"/> <referenceanchor="RFC3552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3552.xml">anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02"> <front><title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title><title> Hedged ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures </title> <author initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <authorfullname="E. Rescorla"initials="E."surname="Rescorla"/>surname="Thormarker" fullname="Erik Thormarker"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <authorfullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/>initials="S." surname="Ruohomaa" fullname="Sini Ruohomaa"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <datemonth="July" year="2003"/> <abstract> <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract>month="March" day="1" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="BCP" value="72"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02"/> </reference> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lake-authz.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance.xml"/> <referenceanchor="RFC5116" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5116.xml">anchor="SP-800-56A"> <front><title>An Interface and Algorithms<title>Recommendation forAuthenticated Encryption</title>Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</title> <authorfullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>initials="E." surname="Barker"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Chen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Roginsky"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Vassilev"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Davis"> <organization/> </author> <datemonth="January" year="2008"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), and defines a uniform interface and a registry for such algorithms. The interface and registry can be used as an application-independent set of cryptoalgorithm suites. This approach provides advantages in efficiency and security, and promotes the reuse of crypto implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract>year="2018" month="April"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="RFC" value="5116"/>name="NIST" value="Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC5116"/>value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC5869" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5869.xml">anchor="SP-800-108" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1"> <front><title>HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand<title>Recommendation for Key DerivationFunction (HKDF)</title> <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>Using Pseudorandom Functions</title> <authorfullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/>initials="L." surname="Chen"> <organization/> </author> <datemonth="May" year="2010"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract>year="2022" month="August"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="RFC" value="5869"/>name="NIST" value="Special Publication 800-108 Revision 1"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC5869"/>value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1"/> </reference> <referenceanchor="RFC6090" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6090.xml">anchor="SP800-185" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185"> <front><title>Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms</title><title>SHA-3 Derived Functions cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash</title> <authorfullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>initials="J" surname="Kelsey"> <organization/> </author> <authorfullname="K. Igoe" initials="K." surname="Igoe"/>initials="S" surname="Chang"> <organization/> </author> <authorfullname="M. Salter" initials="M." surname="Salter"/> <date month="February" year="2011"/> <abstract> <t>This note describes the fundamental algorithms of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as they were defined in some seminal references from 1994 and earlier. These descriptions may be useful for implementing the fundamental algorithms without using any of the specialized methods that were developed in following years. Only elliptic curves defined over fields of characteristic greater than three are in scope; these curves are those used in Suite B. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6090"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6090"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6960" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6960.xml"> <front> <title>X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP</title> <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/> <author fullname="M. Myers" initials="M." surname="Myers"/> <author fullname="R. Ankney" initials="R." surname="Ankney"/> <author fullname="A. Malpani" initials="A." surname="Malpani"/> <author fullname="S. Galperin" initials="S." surname="Galperin"/> <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/> <date month="June" year="2013"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current status of a digital certificate without requiring Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Additional mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in separate documents. This document obsoletes RFCs 2560 and 6277. It also updates RFC 5912.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6960"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6960"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6979" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6979.xml"> <front> <title>Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</title> <author fullname="T. Pornin" initials="T." surname="Pornin"/> <date month="August" year="2013"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines a deterministic digital signature generation procedure. Such signatures are compatible with standard Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) digital signatures and can be processed with unmodified verifiers, which need not be aware of the procedure described therein. Deterministic signatures retain the cryptographic security features associated with digital signatures but can be more easily implemented in various environments, since they do not need access to a source of high-quality randomness.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6979"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6979"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7252" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7252.xml"> <front> <title>The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)</title> <author fullname="Z. Shelby" initials="Z." surname="Shelby"/> <author fullname="K. Hartke" initials="K." surname="Hartke"/> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <date month="June" year="2014"/> <abstract> <t>The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation.</t> <t>CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7252"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7252"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7748" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7748.xml"> <front> <title>Elliptic Curves for Security</title> <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/> <author fullname="M. Hamburg" initials="M." surname="Hamburg"/> <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/> <date month="January" year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>This memo specifies two elliptic curves over prime fields that offer a high level of practical security in cryptographic applications, including Transport Layer Security (TLS). These curves are intended to operate at the ~128-bit and ~224-bit security level, respectively, and are generated deterministically based on a list of required properties.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7748"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7748"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7959" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7959.xml"> <front> <title>Block-Wise Transfers in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)</title> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <author fullname="Z. Shelby" initials="Z." role="editor" surname="Shelby"/> <date month="August" year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a RESTful transfer protocol for constrained nodes and networks. Basic CoAP messages work well for small payloads from sensors and actuators; however, applications will need to transfer larger payloads occasionally -- for instance, for firmware updates. In contrast to HTTP, where TCP does the grunt work of segmenting and resequencing, CoAP is based on datagram transports such as UDP or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). These transports only offer fragmentation, which is even more problematic in constrained nodes and networks, limiting the maximum size of resource representations that can practically be transferred.</t> <t>Instead of relying on IP fragmentation, this specification extends basic CoAP with a pair of "Block" options for transferring multiple blocks of information from a resource representation in multiple request-response pairs. In many important cases, the Block options enable a server to be truly stateless: the server can handle each block transfer separately, with no need for a connection setup or other server-side memory of previous block transfers. Essentially, the Block options provide a minimal way to transfer larger representations in a block-wise fashion.</t> <t>A CoAP implementation that does not support these options generally is limited in the size of the representations that can be exchanged, so there is an expectation that the Block options will be widely used in CoAP implementations. Therefore, this specification updates RFC 7252.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7959"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7959"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"> <front> <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title> <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/> <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/> <date month="June" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t> <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t> <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"> <front> <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title> <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> <date month="May" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8392" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml"> <front> <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title> <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/> <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/> <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <date month="May" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8410" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8410" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8410.xml"> <front> <title>Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</title> <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/> <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/> <date month="August" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for elliptic curve constructs using the curve25519 and curve448 curves. The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519 and Ed448. The key agreement algorithms covered are X25519 and X448. The encoding for public key, private key, and Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) structures is provided.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8410"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8410"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8610" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8610.xml"> <front> <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title> <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/> <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <date month="June" year="2019"/> <abstract> <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8613" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8613.xml"> <front> <title>Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)</title> <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/> <author fullname="J. Mattsson" initials="J." surname="Mattsson"/> <author fullname="F. Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"/> <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/> <date month="July" year="2019"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols.</t> <t>Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8613"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8613"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8724" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8724" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8724.xml"> <front> <title>SCHC: Generic Framework for Static Context Header Compression and Fragmentation</title> <author fullname="A. Minaburo" initials="A." surname="Minaburo"/> <author fullname="L. Toutain" initials="L." surname="Toutain"/> <author fullname="C. Gomez" initials="C." surname="Gomez"/> <author fullname="D. Barthel" initials="D." surname="Barthel"/> <author fullname="JC. Zuniga" initials="JC." surname="Zuniga"/> <date month="April" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines the Static Context Header Compression and fragmentation (SCHC) framework, which provides both a header compression mechanism and an optional fragmentation mechanism. SCHC has been designed with Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs) in mind.</t> <t>SCHC compression is based on a common static context stored both in the LPWAN device and in the network infrastructure side. This document defines a generic header compression mechanism and its application to compress IPv6/UDP headers.</t> <t>This document also specifies an optional fragmentation and reassembly mechanism. It can be used to support the IPv6 MTU requirement over the LPWAN technologies. Fragmentation is needed for IPv6 datagrams that, after SCHC compression or when such compression was not possible, still exceed the Layer 2 maximum payload size.</t> <t>The SCHC header compression and fragmentation mechanisms are independent of the specific LPWAN technology over which they are used. This document defines generic functionalities and offers flexibility with regard to parameter settings and mechanism choices. This document standardizes the exchange over the LPWAN between two SCHC entities. Settings and choices specific to a technology or a product are expected to be grouped into profiles, which are specified in other documents. Data models for the context and profiles are out of scope.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8724"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8724"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8742" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8742" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8742.xml"> <front> <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Sequences</title> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <date month="February" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Sequence format and associated media type "application/cbor-seq". A CBOR Sequence consists of any number of encoded CBOR data items, simply concatenated in sequence.</t> <t>Structured syntax suffixes for media types allow other media types to build on them and make it explicit that they are built on an existing media type as their foundation. This specification defines and registers "+cbor-seq" as a structured syntax suffix for CBOR Sequences.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8742"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8742"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8747" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8747.xml"> <front> <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)</title> <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/> <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/> <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/> <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <date month="March" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) (which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8747"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8747"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8949" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8949.xml"> <front> <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <date month="December" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml"> <front> <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title> <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/> <date month="August" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t> <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9053" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9053.xml"> <front> <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms</title> <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/> <date month="August" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052).</t> <t>This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9053"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9053"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9175" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9175" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9175.xml"> <front> <title>Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Echo, Request-Tag, and Token Processing</title> <author fullname="C. Amsüss" initials="C." surname="Amsüss"/> <author fullname="J. Preuß Mattsson" initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson"/> <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/> <date month="February" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies enhancements to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) that mitigate security issues in particular use cases. The Echo option enables a CoAP server to verify the freshness of a request or to force a client to demonstrate reachability at its claimed network address. The Request-Tag option allows the CoAP server to match block-wise message fragments belonging to the same request. This document updates RFC 7252 with respect to the following: processing requirements for client Tokens, forbidding non-secure reuse of Tokens to ensure response-to-request binding when CoAP is used with a security protocol, and amplification mitigation (where the use of the Echo option is now recommended).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9175"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9175"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9360" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9360" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9360.xml"> <front> <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509 Certificates</title> <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/> <date month="February" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) message structure uses references to keys in general. For some algorithms, additional properties are defined that carry parameters relating to keys as needed. The COSE Key structure is used for transporting keys outside of COSE messages. This document extends the way that keys can be identified and transported by providing attributes that refer to or contain X.509 certificates.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9360"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9360"/> </reference> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name> <reference anchor="RFC2986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2986.xml"> <front> <title>PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7</title> <author fullname="M. Nystrom" initials="M." surname="Nystrom"/> <author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/> <date month="November" year="2000"/> <abstract> <t>This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2986"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2986"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"> <front> <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title> <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/> <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/> <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/> <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/> <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/> <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/> <date month="May" year="2008"/> <abstract> <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6194" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6194.xml"> <front> <title>Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms</title> <author fullname="T. Polk" initials="T." surname="Polk"/> <author fullname="L. Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen"/> <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <date month="March" year="2011"/> <abstract> <t>This document includes security considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 message digest algorithm. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6194"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6194"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7228" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7228.xml"> <front> <title>Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks</title> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <author fullname="M. Ersue" initials="M." surname="Ersue"/> <author fullname="A. Keranen" initials="A." surname="Keranen"/> <date month="May" year="2014"/> <abstract> <t>The Internet Protocol Suite is increasingly used on small devices with severe constraints on power, memory, and processing resources, creating constrained-node networks. This document provides a number of basic terms that have been useful in the standardization work for constrained-node networks.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7228"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7228"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7258" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7258.xml"> <front> <title>Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack</title> <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <date month="May" year="2014"/> <abstract> <t>Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="188"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7258"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7258"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7296" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7296.xml"> <front> <title>Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title> <author fullname="C. Kaufman" initials="C." surname="Kaufman"/> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <author fullname="Y. Nir" initials="Y." surname="Nir"/> <author fullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/> <author fullname="T. Kivinen" initials="T." surname="Kivinen"/> <date month="October" year="2014"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). This document obsoletes RFC 5996, and includes all of the errata for it. It advances IKEv2 to be an Internet Standard.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="79"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7296"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7296"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7624" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7624.xml"> <front> <title>Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statement</title> <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/> <author fullname="B. Schneier" initials="B." surname="Schneier"/> <author fullname="C. Jennings" initials="C." surname="Jennings"/> <author fullname="T. Hardie" initials="T." surname="Hardie"/> <author fullname="B. Trammell" initials="B." surname="Trammell"/> <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/> <author fullname="D. Borkmann" initials="D." surname="Borkmann"/> <date month="August" year="2015"/> <abstract> <t>Since the initial revelations of pervasive surveillance in 2013, several classes of attacks on Internet communications have been discovered. In this document, we develop a threat model that describes these attacks on Internet confidentiality. We assume an attacker that is interested in undetected, indiscriminate eavesdropping. The threat model is based on published, verified attacks.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7624"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7624"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8366" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8366.xml"> <front> <title>A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols</title> <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/> <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/> <author fullname="M. Pritikin" initials="M." surname="Pritikin"/> <author fullname="T. Eckert" initials="T." surname="Eckert"/> <date month="May" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".</t> <t>This document defines an artifact format as a YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) structure. Other YANG-derived formats are possible. The voucher artifact is normally generated by the pledge's manufacturer (i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)).</t> <t>This document only defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8366"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8366"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8376" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8376" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8376.xml"> <front> <title>Low-Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) Overview</title> <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Farrell"/> <date month="May" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs) are wireless technologies with characteristics such as large coverage areas, low bandwidth, possibly very small packet and application-layer data sizes, and long battery life operation. This memo is an informational overview of the set of LPWAN technologies being considered in the IETF and of the gaps that exist between the needs of those technologies and the goal of running IP in LPWANs.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8376"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8376"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"> <front> <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/> <date month="August" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t> <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8937" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8937" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8937.xml"> <front> <title>Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols</title> <author fullname="C. Cremers" initials="C." surname="Cremers"/> <author fullname="L. Garratt" initials="L." surname="Garratt"/> <author fullname="S. Smyshlyaev" initials="S." surname="Smyshlyaev"/> <author fullname="N. Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan"/> <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/> <date month="October" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>Randomness is a crucial ingredient for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically secure" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems. This document describes a way for security protocol implementations to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.</t> <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8937"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8937"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9000" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9000.xml"> <front> <title>QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport</title> <author fullname="J. Iyengar" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Iyengar"/> <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/> <date month="May" year="2021"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9000"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9000"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9147" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"> <front> <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/> <date month="April" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t> <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9176" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9176" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9176.xml"> <front> <title>Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Resource Directory</title> <author fullname="C. Amsüss" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Amsüss"/> <author fullname="Z. Shelby" initials="Z." surname="Shelby"/> <author fullname="M. Koster" initials="M." surname="Koster"/> <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/> <author fullname="P. van der Stok" initials="P." surname="van der Stok"/> <date month="April" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>In many Internet of Things (IoT) applications, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which contains information about resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources. The input to an RD is composed of links, and the output is composed of links constructed from the information stored in the RD. This document specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, look up, and remove information on resources. Furthermore, new target attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9176"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9176"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9397" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9397" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9397.xml"> <front> <title>Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Architecture</title> <author fullname="M. Pei" initials="M." surname="Pei"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/> <author fullname="D. Wheeler" initials="D." surname="Wheeler"/> <date month="July" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is an environment that enforces the following: any code within the environment cannot be tampered with, and any data used by such code cannot be read or tampered with by any code outside the environment. This architecture document discusses the motivation for designing and standardizing a protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Applications running inside such a TEE.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9397"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9397"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-eat" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-21" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-rats-eat.xml"> <front> <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title> <author fullname="Laurence Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade"> <organization>Security Theory LLC</organization> </author> <author fullname="Giridhar Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam"> <organization>Qualcomm Technologies Inc.</organization> </author> <author fullname="Jeremy O'Donoghue" initials="J." surname="O'Donoghue"> <organization>Qualcomm Technologies Inc.</organization> </author> <author fullname="Carl Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"> <organization>Red Hound Software, Inc.</organization> </author> <date day="30" month="June" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server or service to determine how much it wishes to trust the entity. An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-eat-21"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lake-reqs" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-reqs-04" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lake-reqs.xml"> <front> <title>Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE</title> <author fullname="Mališa Vučinić" initials="M." surname="Vučinić"> <organization>Inria</organization> </author> <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Dan Garcia-Carillo" initials="D." surname="Garcia-Carillo"> <organization>Odin Solutions S.L.</organization> </author> <date day="8" month="June" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document compiles the requirements for a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol for OSCORE. This draft has completed a working group last call (WGLC) in the LAKE working group. Post-WGLC, the requirements are considered sufficiently stable for the working group to proceed with its work. It is not currently planned to publish this draft as an RFC.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lake-reqs-04"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lake-traces" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-traces-05" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lake-traces.xml"> <front> <title>Traces of EDHOC</title> <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="Marek Serafin" initials="M." surname="Serafin"> <organization>ASSA ABLOY</organization> </author> <author fullname="Marco Tiloca" initials="M." surname="Tiloca"> <organization>RISE</organization> </author> <date day="28" month="April" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document contains some example traces of Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC).</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lake-traces-05"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-08" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc.xml"> <front> <title>Using EDHOC with CoAP and OSCORE</title> <author fullname="Francesca Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="Marco Tiloca" initials="M." surname="Tiloca"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Rikard Höglund" initials="R." surname="Höglund"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Stefan Hristozov" initials="S." surname="Hristozov"> <organization>Fraunhofer AISEC</organization> </author> <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <date day="8" month="August" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>The lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC can be run over CoAP and used by two peers to establish an OSCORE Security Context. This document details this use of the EDHOC protocol, by specifying a number of additional and optional mechanisms. These especially include an optimization approach for combining the execution of EDHOC with the first OSCORE transaction. This combination reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-08"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-06" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert.xml"> <front> <title>CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)</title> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Shahid Raza" initials="S." surname="Raza"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Joel Höglund" initials="J." surname="Höglund"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Martin Furuhed" initials="M." surname="Furuhed"> <organization>Nexus Group</organization> </author> <date day="7" month="July" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates. The resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CNSA, RPKI, GSMA eUICC, and CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements profiles. When used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates with over 50%. The CBOR encoded structure can alternatively be signed directly ("natively signed"), which does not require re- encoding for the signature to be verified. The document also specifies C509 COSE headers, a C509 TLS certificate type, and a C509 file format.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-06"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-05" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update.xml"> <front> <title>Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)</title> <author fullname="Rikard Höglund" initials="R." surname="Höglund"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Marco Tiloca" initials="M." surname="Tiloca"> <organization>RISE AB</organization> </author> <date day="10" month="July" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS), a lightweight procedure that two CoAP endpoints can use to update their keying material by establishing a new OSCORE Security Context. Accordingly, it updates the use of the OSCORE flag bits in the CoAP OSCORE Option as well as the protection of CoAP response messages with OSCORE, and it deprecates the key update procedure specified in Appendix B.2 of RFC 8613. Thus, this document updates RFC 8613. Also, this document defines a procedure that two endpoints can use to update their OSCORE identifiers, run either stand-alone or during a KUDOS execution.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-05"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-representations-23" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations.xml"> <front> <title>Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations</title> <author fullname="Rene Struik" initials="R." surname="Struik"> <organization>Struik Security Consultancy</organization> </author> <date day="21" month="January" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies how to represent Montgomery curves and (twisted) Edwards curves as curves in short-Weierstrass form and illustrates how this can be used to carry out elliptic curve computations leveraging existing implementations and specifications of, e.g., ECDSA and ECDH using NIST prime curves. We also provide extensive background material that may be useful for implementers of elliptic curve cryptography.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lwig-curve-representations-23"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison-02" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison.xml"> <front> <title>Comparison of CoAP Security Protocols</title> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Francesca Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Mališa Vučinić" initials="M." surname="Vučinić"> <organization>INRIA</organization> </author> <date day="11" month="April" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document analyzes and compares the sizes of key exchange flights and the per-packet message size overheads when using different security protocols to secure CoAP. The described overheads are independent of the underlying transport. Small message sizes are very important for reducing energy consumption, latency, and time to completion in constrained radio network such as Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs). The analyzed security protocols are DTLS 1.2, DTLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, cTLS, EDHOC, OSCORE, and Group OSCORE. The DTLS and TLS record layers are analyzed with and without 6LoWPAN- GHC compression. DTLS is analyzed with and without Connection ID.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison-02"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-00" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise.xml"> <front> <title>Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness</title> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="Erik Thormarker" initials="E." surname="Thormarker"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="Sini Ruohomaa" initials="S." surname="Ruohomaa"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <date day="8" month="August" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however found that implementations of these signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism. One countermeasure to such attacks is to re-add randomness to the otherwise deterministic calculation of the per-message secret number. This document updates RFC 6979 and RFC 8032 to recommend constructions with additional randomness for deployments where side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks are a concern. The updates are invisible to the validator of the signature and compatible with existing ECDSA and EdDSA validators.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-00"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.selander-lake-authz" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-selander-lake-authz-03" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.selander-lake-authz.xml"> <front> <title>Lightweight Authorization using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE</title> <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson"> <organization>Ericsson AB</organization> </author> <author fullname="Mališa Vučinić" initials="M." surname="Vučinić"> <organization>INRIA</organization> </author> <author fullname="Michael Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"> <organization>Sandelman Software Works</organization> </author> <author fullname="Aurelio Schellenbaum" initials="A." surname="Schellenbaum"> <organization>Institute of Embedded Systems, ZHAW</organization> </author> <date day="7" month="July" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a procedure for authorizing enrollment of new devices using the lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC). The procedure is applicable to zero-touch onboarding of new devices to a constrained network leveraging trust anchors installed at manufacture time.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-selander-lake-authz-03"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance.xml"> <front> <title>Internet Threat Model Guidance</title> <author fullname="Jari Arkko" initials="J." surname="Arkko"> <organization>Ericsson</organization> </author> <author fullname="Stephen Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"> <organization>Trinity College Dublin</organization> </author> <date day="12" month="July" year="2021"/> <abstract> <t>Communications security has been at the center of many security improvements in the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that communications are protected against outside observers and attackers. This memo suggests that the existing RFC 3552 threat model, while important and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for the pressing security and privacy issues seen on the Internet today. For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against endpoints that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not align with the interests of users. While such protection is difficult, there are some measures that can be taken and we argue that investigation of these issues is warranted. It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop Internet technology, non-communications security related threats, and privacy issues, are properly understood.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00"/> </reference> <reference anchor="SP-800-56A" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3"> <front> <title>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</title> <author initials="E." surname="Barker"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="L." surname="Chen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Roginsky"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Vassilev"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="R." surname="Davis"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2018" month="April"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="NIST" value="Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3"/> </reference> <reference anchor="SP-800-108" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1"> <front> <title>Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions</title> <author initials="L." surname="Chen"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2022" month="August"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="NIST" value="Special Publication 800-108 Revision 1"/> </reference> <reference anchor="SP800-185" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185"> <front> <title>SHA-3 Derived Functions cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash</title> <author initials="" surname="John Kelsey"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="" surname="Shu-jen Chang"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="" surname="Ray Perlner"> <organization/> </author>initials="R" surname="Perlner"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2016" month="December"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="NIST" value="Special Publication 800-185"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185"/> </reference> <reference anchor="Degabriele11" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615"> <front> <title>On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV</title> <authorinitials="J. P."initials="J." surname="Degabriele"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Lehmann"> <organization/> </author> <authorinitials="K. G."initials="K." surname="Paterson"> <organization/> </author> <authorinitials="N. P."initials="N." surname="Smart"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Strefler"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2011" month="December"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="NISTPQC" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/faqs"> <front> <title>Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQs</title> <author><organization/><organization>National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization> </author><date year="2023" month="August"/></front> </reference> <reference anchor="SECG" target="https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf"> <front><title>Standards for Efficient Cryptography 1 (SEC 1)</title><title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title> <author><organization/><organization>Certicom Research</organization> </author> <date year="2009" month="May"/> </front> <refcontent>Standards for Efficient Cryptography</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="SIGMA" target="https://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2003/CRYPTO/1495/1495.pdf"> <front><title>SIGMA - The<title>SIGMA: the 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-Protocols</title> <author initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2003" month="June"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="HKDFpaper" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf"> <front> <title>Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme</title> <author initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2010" month="May"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="Thormarker21" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509.pdf"> <front> <title>On using the same key pair for Ed25519 and an X25519 based KEM</title> <author initials="E." surname="Thormarker"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2021" month="April"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="CNSA"target="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_National_Security_Algorithm_Suite">target="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Commercial_National_Security_Algorithm_Suite&oldid=1181333611"> <front> <title>Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite</title><author initials="" surname="NSA"> <organization/><author> <organization>Wikipedia</organization> </author> <dateyear="2015" month="August"/>year="2023" month="October"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="GuentherIlunga22" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1705"> <front> <title>Careful with MAc-then-SIGn: A Computational Analysis of the EDHOC Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol</title> <author initials="F." surname="Günther"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M."surname="Ilunga">surname="Mukendi"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2022" month="December"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="Jacomme23" target="https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03810102/"> <front> <title>A comprehensive, formal and automated analysis of the EDHOC protocol</title> <author initials="C." surname="Jacomme"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="E." surname="Klein"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="S." surname="Kremer"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="M." surname="Racouchot"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2022" month="October"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="CottierPointcheval22" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03599"> <front> <title>Security Analysis of the EDHOC protocol</title> <author initials="B." surname="Cottier"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="D." surname="Pointcheval"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2022" month="September"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="Norrman20" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427"> <front> <title>Formal Analysis of EDHOC Key Establishment for Constrained IoT Devices</title> <author initials="K." surname="Norrman"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="V." surname="Sundararajan"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="A." surname="Bruni"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2020" month="September"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="Bruni18" target="https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/formal-verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose-edhoc/16284348"> <front> <title>Formal Verification of Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)</title> <author initials="A." surname="Bruni"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Sahl Jørgensen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="T." surname="Grønbech Petersen"> <organization/> </author> <author initials="C." surname="Schürmann"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2018" month="November"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="CborMe" target="https://cbor.me/"> <front> <title>CBOR Playground</title> <author initials="C." surname="Bormann"> <organization/> </author><date year="2018" month="May"/></front> </reference> <reference anchor="Noise" target="https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html"> <front> <title>The Noise ProtocolFramework, Revision 34</title>Framework</title> <author initials="T." surname="Perrin"> <organization/> </author> <date year="2018" month="July"/> </front> <refcontent>Revision 34</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="IEEE.802.15.4-2015" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7460875"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks</title> <author> <organization>IEEE</organization> </author> <date year="2016" month="April"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7460875"/> </reference> </references> </references> <?line 1918?> <section anchor="transfer"> <name>Use with OSCORE and Transfer over CoAP</name> <t>This appendix describes how to derive an OSCORE security context when EDHOC is used to keyOSCORE,OSCORE and how to transfer EDHOC messages over CoAP. The use of CoAP or OSCORE with EDHOC is optional, but if you are using CoAP or OSCORE, then certain normative requirements apply as detailed in the subsections.</t> <section anchor="oscore-ctx-derivation"> <name>Deriving the OSCORE Security Context</name> <t>This section specifies how to use EDHOC output to derive the OSCORE security context.</t> <t>After successful processing of EDHOC message_3, the Client and Server derive Security Context parameters for OSCORE as follows (seeSection 3.2 of<xreftarget="RFC8613"/>):</t>target="RFC8613" section="3.2" sectionFormat="of"/>):</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>The Master Secret and Master SaltSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be derived by using the EDHOC_Exporterinterface, seeinterface (see <xreftarget="exporter"/>:target="exporter"/>): </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The EDHOC Exporter Labels for deriving the OSCORE Master Secret andtheOSCORE MasterSalt,Salt are the uints 0 and 1, respectively.</li> <li>The context parameter is h'' (0x40), the empty CBOR byte string.</li> <li>By default, oscore_key_length is the key length (in bytes) of the application AEAD Algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. Also by default, oscore_salt_length has value 8. The Initiator and ResponderMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> agree out-of-band on a longer oscore_key_length than thedefault,default and on shorter or longer than the default oscore_salt_length.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <artwork><![CDATA[ Master Secret = EDHOC_Exporter( 0, h'', oscore_key_length ) Master Salt = EDHOC_Exporter( 1, h'', oscore_salt_length ) ]]></artwork> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The AEAD AlgorithmSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the application AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session.</li> <li>The HKDF AlgorithmSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the one based on the application hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. For example, if SHA-256 is the application hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite, HKDF SHA-256 is used as the HKDF Algorithm in the OSCORE Security Context.</li> <li>The relationship between identifiers in OSCORE and EDHOC is specified in <xref target="ci-oscore"/>. The OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient IDSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be determined bytheEDHOC connection identifiers C_R and C_I for the EDHOC session as shown in <xreftarget="fig-edhoc-oscore-id-mapping"/>.</li>target="tab-edhoc-oscore-id-mapping"/>.</li> </ul><figure anchor="fig-edhoc-oscore-id-mapping"><table anchor="tab-edhoc-oscore-id-mapping"> <name>Usage ofconnection identifiersConnection Identifiers inOSCORE.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="144" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 144" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,32 L 8,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 152,32 L 152,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 304,32 L 304,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 480,32 L 480,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,32 L 480,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,62 L 480,62" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,66 L 480,66" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,96 L 480,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,128 L 480,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="188" y="52">OSCORE</text> <text x="244" y="52">Sender</text> <text x="284" y="52">ID</text> <text x="340" y="52">OSCORE</text> <text x="408" y="52">Recipient</text> <text x="460" y="52">ID</text> <text x="40" y="84">EDHOC</text> <text x="104" y="84">Initiator</text> <text x="232" y="84">C_R</text> <text x="392" y="84">C_I</text> <text x="40" y="116">EDHOC</text> <text x="104" y="116">Responder</text> <text x="232" y="116">C_I</text> <text x="392" y="116">C_R</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ +-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ | | OSCOREOSCORE</name> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>OSCORE SenderID | OSCOREID</th> <th>OSCORE RecipientID | +=================+==================+=====================+ | EDHOC Initiator | C_R | C_I | +-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ | EDHOC Responder | C_I | C_R | +-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <t>ClientID</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>EDHOC Initiator</td> <td align="center">C_R</td> <td align="center">C_I</td> </tr><tr> <td>EDHOC Responder</td> <td align="center">C_I</td> <td align="center">C_R</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <t>The Client and ServerSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> use the parameters above to establish an OSCORE Security Context, as perSection 3.2.1 of<xreftarget="RFC8613"/>.</t>target="RFC8613" section="3.2.1" sectionFormat="of"/>.</t> <t>From then on, the Client and Server retrieve the OSCORE protocol state using the RecipientID,ID and optionally other transport information such as the 5-tuple.</t> </section> <section anchor="coap"> <name>Transferring EDHOC over CoAP</name> <t>This section specifies how EDHOC can be transferred as an exchange of CoAP <xref target="RFC7252"/> messages. CoAP provides a reliable transport that can preserve packet ordering, provides flow and congestion control, and handles message duplication. CoAP can also perform fragmentation and mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks. The underlying CoAP transport should be used in reliable mode, inparticularparticular, when fragmentation is used, to avoid, e.g., situations with hanging endpoints waiting for each other.</t> <t>EDHOC may run with the Initiator either being a CoAP client or CoAP server. We denote the former by the "forward message flow" (see <xref target="forward"/>) and the latter by the "reverse message flow" (see <xref target="reverse"/>). By default, we assume the forward message flow, but the rolesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be chosen to protect the most sensitiveidentity,identity; see <xref target="security"/>.</t> <t>According to this specification, EDHOC is transferred in POST requests to the Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" (see <xreftarget="well-known"/>),target="well-known"/>) and 2.04 (Changed) responses. An application may define its own path that can be discovered, e.g., using a resource directory <xref target="RFC9176"/>. Client applications can use the resource type "core.edhoc" to discover a server's EDHOC resource, i.e., where to send a request for executing the EDHOCprotocol,protocol; see <xref target="rt"/>. An alternative transfer of the forward message flow is specified in <xref target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc"/>.</t> <t>In order for the server to correlate a message received from a client to a message previously sent in the same EDHOC session over CoAP, messages sent by the clientSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be prepended with the CBOR serialization of the connection identifierwhichthat the server hasselected,selected; see <xref target="ci-edhoc"/>. This applies both to the forward and the reverse message flows. To indicate a new EDHOC session in the forward message flow, message_1SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be prepended with the CBOR simple value <tt>true</tt> (0xf5). Even if CoAP is carried over a reliable transportprotocolprotocol, such as TCP, the prepending of identifiers specified hereSHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be practiced to enable interoperability independent of how CoAP is transported.</t> <t>The prepended identifiers are encoded in CBOR and thus self-delimiting. The representation of identifiers described in <xref target="bstr-repr"/>SHALL<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used. They are sent in front of the actual EDHOC message to keep track of messages in an EDHOC session, and only the part of the body following the identifier is used for EDHOC processing. In particular, the connection identifiers within the EDHOC messages are not impacted by the prepended identifiers.</t> <t>An EDHOC message has media typeapplication/edhoc+cbor-seq,"application/edhoc+cbor-seq", whereas an EDHOC message prepended by a connection identifier has media typeapplication/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq,"application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq"; see <xref target="content-format"/>.</t> <t>To mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks, the CoAP serverMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> respond to the first POST request with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) containing an Echo option <xref target="RFC9175"/>. This forces the Initiator to demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. If message fragmentation is needed, the EDHOC messages may be fragmented using the CoAP Block-Wise Transfer mechanism <xref target="RFC7959"/>.</t> <t>EDHOC error messages need to be transported in response to a message that failed (see <xref target="error"/>). EDHOC error messages transported with CoAP are carried in the payload.</t> <t>Note that the transport over CoAP can serve as a blueprint for other client-server protocols:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The client prepends the connection identifier selected by the server (or, for message_1, the CBOR simple value <tt>true</tt>) to any request message it sends.</li> <li>The server does not send any such indicator, as responses are matched to request by the client-server protocol design.</li> </ul> <section anchor="forward"> <name>The Forward Message Flow</name> <t>In the forward messageflowflow, the CoAP client is the Initiator and the CoAP server is the Responder. This flow protects the client identity against active attackers and the server identity against passive attackers.</t> <t>In the forward message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on the Initiator (client) side, and the prepended C_R enables correlation on the Responder (server) side.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC message_1 is sent in the payload of a POST request from the client to the server's resource for EDHOC, prepended with the identifier <tt>true</tt>(0xf5)(0xf5), indicating a new EDHOC session.</li> <li>EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case with response code 2.04(Changed),(Changed) and in the latter with response code as specified in <xref target="edhoc-oscore-over-coap"/>.</li> <li>EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request, prepended withtheconnection identifier C_R.</li> <li>If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response, with response codes analogously to message_2. In case of an error message sent in response to message_4, it is sent analogously to the error message sent in response to message_2.</li> </ul> <t>An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the forward message flow is shown in <xref target="fig-coap1"/>.</t> <figure anchor="fig-coap1"> <name>Example of theforward message flow.</name>Forward Message Flow</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="352" width="496"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 496 352" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 24,48 L 24,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 112,48 L 112,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 24,64 L 104,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 32,144 L 112,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 24,208 L 104,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 32,288 L 112,288" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="112,208 100,202.4 100,213.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,104,208)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="112,64 100,58.4 100,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,104,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,288 28,282.4 28,293.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,288)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,144 28,138.4 28,149.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,144)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="28" y="36">Client</text> <text x="108" y="36">Server</text> <text x="152" y="68">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="68">POST</text> <text x="272" y="68">(Code=0.02)</text> <text x="68" y="84">POST</text> <text x="160" y="84">Uri-Path:</text> <text x="284" y="84">"/.well-known/edhoc"</text> <text x="184" y="100">Content-Format:</text> <text x="372" y="100">application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="116">Payload:</text> <text x="216" y="116">true,</text> <text x="264" y="116">EDHOC</text> <text x="328" y="116">message_1</text> <text x="152" y="148">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="148">2.04</text> <text x="256" y="148">Changed</text> <text x="68" y="164">2.04</text> <text x="184" y="164">Content-Format:</text> <text x="356" y="164">application/edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="180">Payload:</text> <text x="216" y="180">EDHOC</text> <text x="280" y="180">message_2</text> <text x="152" y="212">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="212">POST</text> <text x="272" y="212">(Code=0.02)</text> <text x="68" y="228">POST</text> <text x="160" y="228">Uri-Path:</text> <text x="284" y="228">"/.well-known/edhoc"</text> <text x="184" y="244">Content-Format:</text> <text x="372" y="244">application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="260">Payload:</text> <text x="212" y="260">C_R,</text> <text x="256" y="260">EDHOC</text> <text x="320" y="260">message_3</text> <text x="152" y="292">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="292">2.04</text> <text x="256" y="292">Changed</text> <text x="68" y="308">2.04</text> <text x="184" y="308">Content-Format:</text> <text x="356" y="308">application/edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="324">Payload:</text> <text x="216" y="324">EDHOC</text> <text x="280" y="324">message_4</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Client Server | | +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: true, EDHOC message_1 | | |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_2 | | +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: C_R, EDHOC message_3 | | |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_4 | | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> <t>The forward message flow of EDHOC can be combined with an OSCORE exchange in a total of tworound-trips,round trips; see <xref target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="reverse"> <name>The Reverse Message Flow</name> <t>In the reverse messageflowflow, the CoAP client is the Responder and the CoAP server is the Initiator. This flow protects the server identity against active attackers and the client identity against passive attackers.</t> <t>In the reverse message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on the Responder (client) side, and the prepended C_I enables correlation on the Initiator (server) side.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>To trigger a new EDHOC session, the client makes an empty POST request to the server's resource for EDHOC.</li> <li>EDHOC message_1 is sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response with response code 2.04 (Changed).</li> <li>EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request, prepended withtheconnection identifier C_I.</li> <li>EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case with response code 2.04(Changed),(Changed) and in the latter with response code as specified in <xref target="edhoc-oscore-over-coap"/>.</li> <li>If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is sent from the client to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request, prepended withtheconnection identifier C_I. In case of an error message sent in response to message_4, it is sent analogously to an error message sent in response to message_2.</li> </ul> <t>An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the reverse message flow is shown in <xref target="fig-coap2"/>.</t> <figure anchor="fig-coap2"> <name>Example of thereverse message flow.</name>Reverse Message Flow</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="320" width="496"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 496 320" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 24,48 L 24,304" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 112,48 L 112,304" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 24,64 L 104,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 32,112 L 112,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 24,176 L 104,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 32,256 L 112,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="112,176 100,170.4 100,181.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,104,176)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="112,64 100,58.4 100,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,104,64)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,256 28,250.4 28,261.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,256)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,112 28,106.4 28,117.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,112)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="28" y="36">Client</text> <text x="108" y="36">Server</text> <text x="152" y="68">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="68">POST</text> <text x="272" y="68">(Code=0.02)</text> <text x="68" y="84">POST</text> <text x="160" y="84">Uri-Path:</text> <text x="284" y="84">"/.well-known/edhoc"</text> <text x="152" y="116">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="116">2.04</text> <text x="256" y="116">Changed</text> <text x="68" y="132">2.04</text> <text x="184" y="132">Content-Format:</text> <text x="356" y="132">application/edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="148">Payload:</text> <text x="216" y="148">EDHOC</text> <text x="280" y="148">message_1</text> <text x="152" y="180">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="180">POST</text> <text x="272" y="180">(Code=0.02)</text> <text x="68" y="196">POST</text> <text x="160" y="196">Uri-Path:</text> <text x="284" y="196">"/.well-known/edhoc"</text> <text x="184" y="212">Content-Format:</text> <text x="372" y="212">application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="228">Payload:</text> <text x="212" y="228">C_I,</text> <text x="256" y="228">EDHOC</text> <text x="320" y="228">message_2</text> <text x="152" y="260">Header:</text> <text x="204" y="260">2.04</text> <text x="256" y="260">Changed</text> <text x="68" y="276">2.04</text> <text x="184" y="276">Content-Format:</text> <text x="356" y="276">application/edhoc+cbor-seq</text> <text x="156" y="292">Payload:</text> <text x="216" y="292">EDHOC</text> <text x="280" y="292">message_3</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Client Server | | +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_1 | | +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: C_I, EDHOC message_2 | | |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_3 | | ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> </section> <section anchor="edhoc-oscore-over-coap"> <name>Errors in EDHOC over CoAP</name> <t>When using EDHOC over CoAP, EDHOC error messages sent as CoAP responsesMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent in the payload of error responses, i.e., theyMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify a CoAP error response code. In particular, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that such error responses have response code either 4.00 (Bad Request) in case of client error (e.g., due to a malformed EDHOCmessage),message) or 5.00 (Internal Server Error) in case of server error (e.g., due to failure in deriving EDHOC keying material). The Content-Format of the error responseMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set toapplication/edhoc+cbor-seq,"application/edhoc+cbor-seq"; see <xref target="content-format"/>.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="comrep"> <name>Compact Representation</name> <t>This section defines a format for compact representation based on the Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String Conversion defined in Section 2.3.3 of <xref target="SECG"/>.</t> <t>As described inSection 4.2 of<xreftarget="RFC6090"/>target="RFC6090" section="4.2" sectionFormat="of"/>, the x-coordinate of an elliptic curve public key is a suitable representative for the entire point whenever scalar multiplication is used as a one-way function. One example is ECDH with compact output, where only the x-coordinate of the computed value is used as the shared secret.</t> <t>In EDHOC, compact representation is used for the ephemeral public keys (G_X andG_Y),G_Y); see <xref target="cose_key"/>. Using the notation from <xref target="SECG"/>, the output is an octet string of length ceil( (log2 q) / 8 ), where ceil(x) is the smallest integer not less than x. See <xref target="SECG"/> for a definition of q, M, X, xp, and ~yp. The steps in Section 2.3.3 of <xref target="SECG"/> are replacedby:</t>with the following steps:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Convert the field element xp to an octet string X of length ceil( (log2 q) / 8 ) octets using the conversion routine specified in Section 2.3.5 of <xref target="SECG"/>.</li> <li>Output M =X</li>X.</li> </ol> <t>The encoding of the point at infinity is not supported.</t> <t>Compact representation does not change any requirements onvalidation,validation; see <xref target="crypto"/>. Using compact representation has some security benefits. An implementation does not need to check that the point is not the point at infinity (the identity element). Similarly, as not even the sign of the y-coordinate is encoded, compact representation trivially avoids so-called "benign malleability" attacks where an attacker changes thesign,sign; see <xref target="SECG"/>.</t> <t>The following may be needed for validation or compatibility with APIs that do not support compact representation or do not support the full <xref target="SECG"/> format:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>If a compressed y-coordinate is required, then the value ~yp set to zero can be used.TheIn such a case, the compact representation described above canin such a casebe transformed into theSECG point compressedStandards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) point-compressed format by prepending it with the single byte 0x02 (i.e., M = 0x02 || X).</li> <li>If an uncompressed y-coordinate is required, then a y-coordinate has to be calculated following Section 2.3.4 of <xref target="SECG"/> orAppendix C of<xreftarget="RFC6090"/>.target="RFC6090" sectionFormat="of" section="C"/>. Any of the square roots (see <xref target="SECG"/> or <xref target="RFC6090"/>) can be used. The uncompressed SECG format is M = 0x04 || X || Y.</li> </ul> <t>For example: The curve P-256 has the parameters (using the notation in <xreftarget="RFC6090"/>)</t>target="RFC6090"/>):</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>p = 2<sup>256</sup>−- 2<sup>224</sup> + 2<sup>192</sup> + 2<sup>96</sup>−- 1</li> <li>a = -3</li> <li>b = 410583637251521421293261297800472684091144410159937255 54835256314039467401291</li> </ul> <t>Given an example x:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>x = 115792089183396302095546807154740558443406795108653336 398970697772788799766525</li> </ul><t>we<t>We can calculate y as the square root w = (x<sup>3</sup> + a<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ x + b)<sup>((p + 1)/4)</sup> (modp)</t>p).</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>y = 834387180070192806820075864918626005281451259964015754 16632522940595860276856</li> </ul> <t>Note that this does not guarantee that (x, y) is on the correct elliptic curve. A full validation according to Section 5.6.2.3.3 of <xref target="SP-800-56A"/>can be achievedis done by also checking that 0<contact fullname="≤"/>≤ x < p and that y<sup>2</sup><contact fullname="≡"/>≡ x<sup>3</sup> + a<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ x + b (mod p).</t> </section> <section anchor="CBORandCOSE"> <name>Use of CBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC</name> <t>ThisAppendixappendix is intended to help implementors not familiar with CBOR <xref target="RFC8949"/>, CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/>, COSE <xref target="RFC9052"/>, and HKDF <xref target="RFC5869"/>.</t> <section anchor="CBOR"> <name>CBOR and CDDL</name> <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) <xref target="RFC8949"/> is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR builds on the JSON data model but extends itbyby, e.g., encoding binary data directly without base64 conversion. In addition to the binary CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a diagnostic notation that is readable and editable by humans. The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) <xref target="RFC8610"/> provides a way to express structures for protocol messages and APIs that use CBOR. <xref target="RFC8610"/> also extends the diagnostic notation.</t> <t>CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits of the initial byte contain information about the major type. CBOR supports several types of data items,in addition tointegers (int, uint), simple values, byte strings (bstr), and text strings(tstr),(tstr). CBOR also supports arrays [] of data items, maps {} of pairs of data items, and sequences <xref target="RFC8742"/> of data items. Some examples are given below.</t> <t>The EDHOC specification sometimes use CDDL names in CBOR diagnostic notation asinin, e.g., << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >>. This means that EAD_2 is optional and that ID_CRED_R and EAD_2 should be substituted with their values before evaluation.I.e.,That is, if ID_CRED_R = { 4 : h'' } and EAD_2 isomittedomitted, then << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> = << { 4 : h'' } >>, which encodes to 0x43a10440. We also make use of the occurrence symbol "*", likeinin, e.g., 2* int, meaning two or more CBOR integers.</t> <t>For a complete specification and more examples, see <xref target="RFC8949"/> and <xref target="RFC8610"/>. We recommend implementors get used to CBOR by using the CBOR playground <xref target="CborMe"/>.</t><figure anchor="fig-cbor-examples"><table anchor="tab-cbor-examples"> <name>Examples ofuseUse of CBOR andCDDL.</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="304" width="480" viewBox="0 0 480 304" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 8,48 L 472,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 8,288 L 472,288" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <g class="text"> <text x="52" y="36">Diagnostic</text> <text x="200" y="36">Encoded</text> <text x="356" y="36">Type</text> <text x="16" y="68">1</text> <text x="188" y="68">0x01</text> <text x="372" y="68">unsigned</text> <text x="440" y="68">integer</text> <text x="20" y="84">24</text> <text x="196" y="84">0x1818</text> <text x="372" y="84">unsigned</text> <text x="440" y="84">integer</text> <text x="24" y="100">-24</text> <text x="188" y="100">0x37</text> <text x="372" y="100">negative</text> <text x="440" y="100">integer</text> <text x="24" y="116">-25</text> <text x="196" y="116">0x3818</text> <text x="372" y="116">negative</text> <text x="440" y="116">integer</text> <text x="28" y="132">true</text> <text x="188" y="132">0xf5</text> <text x="364" y="132">simple</text> <text x="416" y="132">value</text> <text x="24" y="148">h''</text> <text x="188" y="148">0x40</text> <text x="356" y="148">byte</text> <text x="404" y="148">string</text> <text x="40" y="164">h'12cd'</text> <text x="204" y="164">0x4212cd</text> <text x="356" y="164">byte</text> <text x="404" y="164">string</text> <text x="36" y="180">'12cd'</text> <text x="220" y="180">0x4431326364</text> <text x="356" y="180">byte</text> <text x="404" y="180">string</text> <text x="36" y="196">"12cd"</text> <text x="220" y="196">0x6431326364</text> <text x="356" y="196">text</text> <text x="404" y="196">string</text> <text x="16" y="212">{</text> <text x="32" y="212">4</text> <text x="48" y="212">:</text> <text x="80" y="212">h'cd'</text> <text x="112" y="212">}</text> <text x="212" y="212">0xa10441cd</text> <text x="352" y="212">map</text> <text x="20" y="228"><<</text> <text x="44" y="228">1,</text> <text x="68" y="228">2,</text> <text x="100" y="228">true</text> <text x="132" y="228">>></text> <text x="212" y="228">0x430102f5</text> <text x="356" y="228">byte</text> <text x="404" y="228">string</text> <text x="16" y="244">[</text> <text x="36" y="244">1,</text> <text x="60" y="244">2,</text> <text x="92" y="244">true</text> <text x="120" y="244">]</text> <text x="212" y="244">0x830102f5</text> <text x="360" y="244">array</text> <text x="16" y="260">(</text> <text x="36" y="260">1,</text> <text x="60" y="260">2,</text> <text x="92" y="260">true</text> <text x="120" y="260">)</text> <text x="204" y="260">0x0102f5</text> <text x="372" y="260">sequence</text> <text x="20" y="276">1,</text> <text x="44" y="276">2,</text> <text x="76" y="276">true</text> <text x="204" y="276">0x0102f5</text> <text x="372" y="276">sequence</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ Diagnostic Encoded Type ----------------------------------------------------------- 1 0x01 unsigned integer 24 0x1818 unsigned integer -24 0x37 negative integer -25 0x3818 negative integer true 0xf5 simple value h'' 0x40 byte string h'12cd' 0x4212cd byte string '12cd' 0x4431326364 byte string "12cd" 0x6431326364 text string {CDDL</name> <thead> <tr> <th>Diagnostic</th> <th>Encoded</th> <th>Type</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0x01</td> <td>unsigned integer</td> </tr><tr> <td>24</td> <td>0x1818</td> <td>unsigned integer</td> </tr><tr> <td>-24</td> <td>0x37</td> <td>negative integer</td> </tr><tr> <td>-25</td> <td>0x3818</td> <td>negative integer</td> </tr><tr> <td>true</td> <td>0xf5</td> <td>simple value</td> </tr><tr> <td>h''</td> <td>0x40</td> <td>byte string</td> </tr><tr> <td>h'12cd'</td> <td>0x4212cd</td> <td>byte string</td> </tr><tr> <td>'12cd'</td> <td>0x4431326364</td> <td>byte string</td> </tr><tr> <td>"12cd"</td> <td>0x6431326364</td> <td>text string</td> </tr><tr> <td>{ 4 : h'cd'} 0xa10441cd map <<}</td> <td>0xa10441cd</td> <td>map</td> </tr><tr> <td><< 1, 2, true>> 0x430102f5 byte string [>></td> <td>0x430102f5</td> <td>byte string</td> </tr><tr> <td>[ 1, 2, true] 0x830102f5 array (]</td> <td>0x830102f5</td> <td>array</td> </tr><tr> <td>( 1, 2, true) 0x0102f5 sequence)</td> <td>0x0102f5</td> <td>sequence</td> </tr><tr> <td> 1, 2,true 0x0102f5 sequence ----------------------------------------------------------- ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure>true</td> <td>0x0102f5</td> <td>sequence</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section anchor="CDDL"> <name>CDDL Definitions</name> <t>This section compiles the CDDL definitions for ease of reference.</t> <sourcecode type="CDDL"><![CDATA[ suites = [ 2* int ] / int ead = ( ead_label : int, ? ead_value : bstr, ) EAD_1 = 1* ead EAD_2 = 1* ead EAD_3 = 1* ead EAD_4 = 1* ead message_1 = ( METHOD : int, SUITES_I : suites, G_X : bstr, C_I : bstr / -24..23, ? EAD_1, ) message_2 = ( G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 : bstr, ) PLAINTEXT_2 = ( C_R, ID_CRED_R : map / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_2 : bstr, ? EAD_2, ) message_3 = ( CIPHERTEXT_3 : bstr, ) PLAINTEXT_3 = ( ID_CRED_I : map / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3 : bstr, ? EAD_3, ) message_4 = ( CIPHERTEXT_4 : bstr, ) PLAINTEXT_4 = ( ? EAD_4, ) error = ( ERR_CODE : int, ERR_INFO : any, ) info = ( info_label : int, context : bstr, length : uint, ) ]]></sourcecode> </section> <section anchor="COSE"> <name>COSE</name> <t>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) <xref target="RFC9052"/> describes how to create and process signatures,message authentication codes,MACs, andencryptionencryptions using CBOR. COSE builds onJOSE,JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) but is adapted to allow more efficient processing in constrained devices. EDHOC makes use of COSE_Key, COSE_Encrypt0, and COSE_Sign1 objects in the message processing:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ECDH ephemeral public keys of type EC2 or OKP in message_1 and message_2 consist of the COSE_Key parameter named'x','x'; seeSection 7.1Sections <xref target="RFC9053" section="7.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and7.2<xref target="RFC9053" section="7.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xreftarget="RFC9053"/></li>target="RFC9053"/>.</li> <li> <t>The ciphertexts in message_3 and message_4 consist of a subset of the single recipient encrypted data object COSE_Encrypt0, which is described in Sections5.2-5.3<xref target="RFC9052" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.2"/> and <xref target="RFC9052" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.3"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>. The ciphertext is computed over the plaintext and associated data, using an encryption key and an initialization vector. The associated data is an Enc_structure consisting of protected headers and externally supplied data (external_aad). COSE constructs the input to the AEAD <xref target="RFC5116"/> for message_i (i = 3 or4,4; see Sections <xreftarget="m3"/>target="m3" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="m4"/>,target="m4" format="counter"/>, respectively) as follows: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Secret key K = K_i</li> <li>Nonce N = IV_i</li> <li>Plaintext P for message_i</li> <li>Associated Data A = [ "Encrypt0", h'', TH_i ]</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Signatures in message_2 of method 0 and 2, and in message_3 of method 0 and 1, consist of a subset of the single signer data object COSE_Sign1, which is described in Sections4.2-4.4<xref target="RFC9052" sectionFormat="bare" section="4.2"/> and <xref target="RFC9052" sectionFormat="bare" section="4.4"/> of <xref target="RFC9052"/>. The signature is computed over a Sig_structure containing payload, protected headers and externally supplied data (external_aad) using a private signaturekeykey, and verified using the corresponding public signature key. For COSE_Sign1, the message to be signed is: </t> <artwork><![CDATA[ [ "Signature1", protected, external_aad, payload ] ]]></artwork> <t> where protected,external_aadexternal_aad, and payload are specified in Sections <xreftarget="m2"/>target="m2" format="counter"/> and <xreftarget="m3"/>.</t>target="m3" format="counter"/>.</t> </li> </ul> <t>Different header parameters to identify X.509 or C509 certificates by reference are defined in <xref target="RFC9360"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>by a hash value with the 'x5t' or 'c5t' parameters, respectively: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I orR,</li>R and</li> <li>ID_CRED_x = {TBD322 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I orR;</li>R,</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>or by a URI with the 'x5u' or 'c5u' parameters, respectively: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_x = { 35 : uri }, for x = I orR,</li>R, and</li> <li>ID_CRED_x = {TBD423 : uri }, for x = I or R.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <t>When ID_CRED_x does not contain the actual credential, it may be very short, e.g., if the endpoints have agreed to use a key identifier parameter 'kid':</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I or R. For further optimization, see <xref target="id_cred"/>.</li> </ul> <t>Note that ID_CRED_x can contain several header parameters, forexampleexample, { x5u, x5t } or { kid, kid_context }.</t> <t>ID_CRED_xMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also identify the credential by value. For example, a certificate chain can be transported in an ID_CRED field with COSE header parameter c5c or x5chain, as defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/> and <xreftarget="RFC9360"/> and credentialstarget="RFC9360"/>. Credentials of type CWT and CCS can be transported with the COSE header parameters registered in <xref target="cwt-header-param"/>.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="auth-validation"><name>Authentication Related<name>Authentication-Related Verifications</name> <t>EDHOC performs certainauthentication related operations, seeauthentication-related operations (see <xreftarget="auth-key-id"/>,target="auth-key-id"/>), but ingeneralgeneral, it is necessary to make additional verifications beyond EDHOC message processing. Which verifications that are needed depend on the deployment, inparticularparticular, the trust model and the security policies, but mostcommonlycommonly, it can be expressed in terms of verifications of credential content.</t> <t>EDHOC assumes the existence of mechanisms (certification authority or other trusted third party, pre-provisioning, etc.) for generating and distributing authentication credentials and other credentials, as well as the existence of trust anchors (CA certificates, trusted public keys, etc.). For example, a public key certificate or CWT may rely on a trusted third party whose public key is pre-provisioned, whereas a CCS or a self-signedcertificate/CWTcertificate / CWT may be used when trust in the public key can be achieved by other means, or in the case ofTrusttrust on first use, see <xref target="tofu"/>.</t> <t>In thissectionsection, we provide some examples of such verifications. These verifications are the responsibility of the application but may be implemented as part of an EDHOC library.</t> <section anchor="validating-auth-credential"> <name>Validating the Authentication Credential</name><t>The authentication credential may contain, in<t>In addition to the authentication key, the authentication credential may contain other parameters thatneedsneed to be verified. For example:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>In X.509 and C509 certificates, signature keys typically have key usage"digitalSignature""digitalSignature", and Diffie-Hellman public keys typically have key usage "keyAgreement" <xreftarget="RFC3279"/><xreftarget="RFC3279"/> <xref target="RFC8410"/>.</li> <li>In X.509 and C509certificatescertificates, validity is expressed using Not After and Not Before. In CWT and CCS, the“exp”"exp" and“nbf”"nbf" claims have similar meanings.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="identities"> <name>Identities</name> <t>The application must decide on allowing a connection ornotnot, depending on the intended endpoint, and in particular whether it is a specific identity or in a set of identities. To prevent misbinding attacks, the identity of the endpoint is included in a MAC verified through the protocol. More details and examples are provided in this section.</t> <t>Policies for what connections to allow are typically set based on the identity of the other endpoint, and endpoints typically only allow connections from a specific identity or a small restricted set of identities. For example, in the case of a device connecting to a network, the network may only allow connections from deviceswhichthat authenticate with certificates having a particular range of serial numbers and signed by a particular CA. Conversely, a device may only be allowed to connect to a networkwhichthat authenticates with a particular public key.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates, the identity is the subject whose unique name, e.g., a domain name, a Network Access Identifier (NAI), or an Extended Unique Identifier (EUI), is included in the endpoint's certificate.</li> <li>Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, the identity is the subject identified by the relevant claim(s), such as 'sub' (subject).</li> <li>When PKI is not used (e.g., CCS, self-signedcertificate/CWT)certificate / CWT), the identity is typically directly associated with the authentication key of the other party. For example, if identities can be expressed in the form of unique subject names assigned to public keys, then a binding to identity is achieved by including both the public key and associated subject name in the authenticationcredential:credential. CRED_I or CRED_R may be a self-signedcertificate/CWTcertificate / CWT or CCS containing the authentication key and the subjectname,name; see <xref target="auth-cred"/>.EachThus, each endpointthusneeds to know the specific authenticationkey/uniquekey / unique associated subjectname,name or set of public authenticationkeys/uniquekeys / unique associated subject names, which it is allowed to communicate with.</li> </ul> <t>To prevent misbinding attacks in systems where an attacker can register public keys without proving knowledge of the private key, SIGMA <xref target="SIGMA"/> enforces a MAC to be calculated over the "identity". EDHOC follows SIGMA by calculating a MAC over the whole authentication credential, which in case of an X.509 or C509certificatecertificate, includes the "subject" and "subjectAltName"fields, andfields and, in the case of CWT orCCSCCS, includes the "sub" claim.</t> <t>(While the SIGMA paper only focuses on the identity, the same principle is true for other information such as policies associated with the public key.)</t> </section> <section anchor="cert-path"> <name>Certification Path and Trust Anchors</name> <t>When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates, the trust anchor is aCertification Authoritycertification authority (CA) certificate. Each party needs at least one CA public keycertificate,certificate or just the CA public key. The certification path contains proof that the subject of the certificate owns the public key in the certificate. Only validatedpublic-keypublic key certificates are to be accepted.</t> <t>Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, each party needs to have at least one trustedthird partythird-party public key as a trust anchor to verify the end entity CWTs. The trustedthird partythird-party public key can, e.g., be stored in a self-signed CWT or in a CCS.</t> <t>The signature of the authentication credential needs to be verified with the public key of the issuer. X.509 and C509 certificates includes the“Issuer”"Issuer" field. In CWT and CCS, the“iss”"iss" claim has a similar meaning. The public key is either a trust anchor or the public key in another valid and trusted credential in a certification path from the trust anchor to the authentication credential.</t> <t>Similar verifications as made with the authentication credential (see <xref target="validating-auth-credential"/>) are also needed for the other credentials in the certification path.</t> <t>When PKI is not used(CCS,(CCS and self-signedcertificate/CWT),certificate / CWT), the trust anchor is the authentication key of the otherparty,party; in whichcasecase, there is no certification path.</t> </section> <section anchor="revocation"> <name>Revocation Status</name> <t>The application may need to verify that the credentials are notrevoked,revoked; see <xref target="impl-cons"/>. Some use cases may be served by short-lived credentials, for example, where the validity of the credential is on par with the interval between revocation checks. But, in general, credential lifetime and revocation checking are complementary measures to control credential status. Revocation information may be transported as ExternalAuthenticationAuthorization Data(EAD),(EAD); see <xref target="ead-appendix"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="tofu"> <name>Unauthenticated Operation</name> <t>EDHOC might be used without authentication by allowing the Initiator or Responder to communicate with any identity except its own. Note that EDHOC without mutual authentication is vulnerable to active on-path attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is possible to later establish a trust relationship with an unknown or not-yet-trusted endpoint. Someexamples:</t>examples are listed below:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The EDHOC authentication credential can be verified out-of-band at a later stage.</li> <li>The EDHOC session key can be bound to an identity out-of-band at a later stage.</li> <li>Trust on first use (TOFU) can be used to verify that several EDHOC connections are made to the same identity. TOFU combined with proximity is a common IoT deployment modelwhichthat provides good security if done correctly. Note that secure proximity based on short range wireless technology requires very low signal strength or very low latency.</li> </ul> </section> </section> <section anchor="ead-appendix"> <name>Use of External Authorization Data</name> <t>In order to reduce the number of messages and round trips, or to simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated into EDHOC by transporting related external authorization data (EAD) in the messages.</t> <t>The EAD format is specified in <xreftarget="AD"/>, thistarget="AD"/>. This section contains examples and further details of how EAD may be used with an appropriate accompanying specification.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>One example isthird party assistedthird-party-assisted authorization, requested with EAD_1, and an authorization artifact(“voucher”,("voucher", cf. <xref target="RFC8366"/>) returned inEAD_2,EAD_2; see <xreftarget="I-D.selander-lake-authz"/>.</li>target="I-D.ietf-lake-authz"/>.</li> <li>Another example is remote attestation, requested in EAD_2, and an Entity Attestation Token(EAT,(EAT) <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-rats-eat"/>)target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat"/> returned in EAD_3.</li> <li>A third example is certificateenrolment,enrollment, where a Certificate Signing Request(CSR,(CSR) <xreftarget="RFC2986"/>)target="RFC2986"/> is included in EAD_3, and the issued public key certificate (X.509 <xreftarget="RFC5280"/>,target="RFC5280"/> and C509 <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>) or a reference thereof is returned in EAD_4.</li> </ul> <t>External authorization data should be considered unprotected by EDHOC, and the protection of EAD is the responsibility of the security application(third party(third-party authorization, remote attestation, certificateenrolment,enrollment, etc.). The security properties of the EAD fields (after EDHOC processing) are discussed in <xref target="sec-prop"/>.</t> <t>The content of the EAD field may be used in the EDHOC processing of the message in which they are contained. For example,authentication related informationauthentication-related information, like assertions and revocation information, transported in EAD fields may provide input about trust anchors or validity of credentials relevant to the authentication processing. The EAD fields (like ID_CRED fields) are therefore made available to the application before the message isverified,verified; see details of message processing in <xref target="asym"/>. In the first example above, a voucher in EAD_2 made available to the application can enable the Initiator to verify the identity or the public key of the Responder before verifying the signature. An application allowing EAD fields containing authentication information thus may need to handleauthentication relatedauthentication-related verifications associated with EAD processing.</t> <t>Conversely, the security application may need to wait for EDHOC message verification to complete. In the third example above, the validation of a CSR carried in EAD_3 is not started by the Responder before EDHOC has successfully verified message_3 and proven the possession of the private key of the Initiator.</t> <t>The security application may reuse EDHOC protocol fieldswhichthat therefore need to be available to the application. For example, the security application may use the same crypto algorithms as in the EDHOC session and therefore needs access to the selected cipher suite (or the whole SUITES_I). The application may use the ephemeral public keys G_X andG_Y,G_Y as ephemeral keys or asnonces,nonces; see <xreftarget="I-D.selander-lake-authz"/>.</t>target="I-D.ietf-lake-authz"/>.</t> <t>The processing of the EAD item (ead_label, ? ead_value) by the security application needs to be described in the specification where the ead_label isregistered, seeregistered (see <xreftarget="iana-ead"/>,target="iana-ead"/>), including the optional ead_value for each message and actions in case of errors. An application may support multiple security applications that make use of EAD, which may result in multiple EAD items in one EADfield,field; see <xref target="AD"/>. Any dependencies on security applications with previously registered EAD itemsneedsneed to be documented, and the processing needs to consider their simultaneous use.</t> <t>Since data carried in EAD may not be protected, orbeprocessed by the application before the EDHOC message is verified, special considerations need to be made such that it does not violate security and privacy requirements of the servicewhichthat uses thisdata,data; see <xref target="unprot-data"/>. The content in an EAD item may impact the security properties provided by EDHOC. Security applications making use of the EAD items must perform the necessary security analysis.</t> </section> <section anchor="appl-temp"> <name>Application Profile Example</name> <t>This appendix contains a rudimentary example of an applicationprofile,profile; see <xref target="applicability"/>.</t> <t>For use of EDHOC with applicationXX, the following assumptions are made:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Transfer in CoAP as specified in <xref target="coap"/> with requests expected by the CoAP server (= Responder) at /app1-edh, no Content-Format needed.</li> <li>METHOD = 1 (I uses signaturekey,key; R uses static DH key.)</li> <li> <t>CRED_I is an IEEE 802.1ARIDevIDInitial Device Identifier (IDevID) encoded as a C509 certificate of type 0 <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/>. </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>R acquires CRED_I out-of-band, indicated in EAD_1.</li> <li>ID_CRED_I = {4: h''} is a 'kid' with the value of the empty CBOR byte string.</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>CRED_R is a CCS of type OKP as specified in <xref target="auth-cred"/>. </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>The CBOR map has parameters 1 (kty), -1 (crv), and -2 (x-coordinate).</li> <li>ID_CRED_R is{TBD2{14 :CCS}. Editor's note: TBD2 is the COSE header parameter value of 'kccs', see <xref target="cwt-header-param"/></li>CCS}.</li> </ul> </li> <li>External authorization data is defined and processed as specified in <xreftarget="I-D.selander-lake-authz"/>.</li>target="I-D.ietf-lake-authz"/>.</li> <li>EUI-64 is used as the identity of the endpoint (see an example in <xref target="auth-cred"/>).</li> <li>No use ofmessage_4: themessage_4. The application sends protected messages from R to I.</li> </ol> </section> <section anchor="large-plaintext_2"> <name>Long PLAINTEXT_2</name> <t>By the definition of encryption of PLAINTEXT_2 with KEYSTREAM_2, it is limited to lengths of PLAINTEXT_2 not exceeding the output ofEDHOC_KDF,EDHOC_KDF; see <xref target="expand"/>. If the EDHOC hash algorithm isSHA-2SHA-2, then HKDF-Expand is used, which limits the length of the EDHOC_KDF output to 255<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the length of the output of the EDHOC hash algorithm given by the cipher suite. For example, with SHA-256 as the EDHOC hash algorithm, the length of the hash output is 32 bytes and the maximum length of PLAINTEXT_2 is 255<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ 32 = 8160 bytes.</t> <t>While PLAINTEXT_2 is expected to be much shorter than 8 kB for the intended use cases, it seems nevertheless prudent to specify a solution for the event that this should turn out to be a limitation.</t> <t>A potential work-around is to use a cipher suite with a different hash function. In particular, the use of KMAC removes all practical limitations in this respect.</t> <t>This section specifies a solutionwhichthat works with any hashfunction,function by making use of multiple invocations of HKDF-Expand and negative values of info_label.</t> <t>Consider the PLAINTEXT_2 partitioned in parts P(i) of length equal to M = 255<contact fullname="⋅"/>⋅ hash_length, except possibly the last partP(last)P(last), which has 0 < length<contact fullname="≤"/>≤ M.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ PLAINTEXT_2 = P(0) | P(1) | ... | P(last) ]]></artwork> <t>where|"|" indicates concatenation.</t> <t>The object is to define a matching KEYSTREAM_2 of the same length and perform the encryption in the same way as defined in <xref target="asym-msg2-proc"/>:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2 ]]></artwork> <t>Define the keystream as:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) | OKM(1) | ... | OKM(last) ]]></artwork><t>where</t><t>where:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ OKM(i) = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, -i, TH_2, length(P(i)) ) ]]></artwork> <t>Note that if length(PLAINTEXT_2)<contact fullname="≤"/> M≤ M, then P(0) = PLAINTEXT_2 and the definition of KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) coincides with <xref target="fig-edhoc-kdf"/>.</t> <t>This describes the processing of the Responder when sending message_2. The Initiator makes the same calculations when receivingmessage_2,message_2 but interchanging PLAINTEXT_2 and CIPHERTEXT_2.</t> <t>An application profile may specify if it supports or does not support the method described in this appendix.</t> </section> <section anchor="keyupdate"> <name>EDHOC_KeyUpdate</name> <t>To provide forward secrecy in an even more efficient way than re-running EDHOC, this section specifies the optional function EDHOC_KeyUpdate in terms of EDHOC_KDF and PRK_out.</t> <t>When EDHOC_KeyUpdate is called, a new PRK_out is calculated asa "hash" oftheold PRK_out usingoutput of the EDHOC_Expand functionas illustrated bywith thefollowing pseudocode.old PRK_out as input. The change of PRK_out causes a change toPRK_exporterPRK_exporter, which enables the derivation of new application keys superseding the old ones, usingEDHOC_Exporter,EDHOC_Exporter; see <xreftarget="exporter"/>.</t>target="exporter"/>. The process is illustrated by the following pseudocode.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ EDHOC_KeyUpdate( context ): new PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( old PRK_out, 11, context, hash_length ) new PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( new PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length ) ]]></artwork> <t>where hash_lengthdenotes thedenotes the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite.</t><t>The<t> The EDHOC_KeyUpdate takes a context as input to enable binding of the updated PRK_out to some event that triggered the key update. The Initiator andtheResponder need to agree on the context, which can, e.g., be a counter, a pseudorandom number, or a hash. To provide forwardsecrecysecrecy, the old PRK_out and keys derived from it (old PRK_exporter and old application keys) must be deleted as soon as they are not needed. When to delete the old keys and how to verify that they are not needed is up to theapplication.</t>application. Note that the security properties depend on the type of context and the number of KeyUpdate iterations.</t> <t>An application using EDHOC_KeyUpdate needs to store PRK_out. Compromise of PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material derived with the EDHOC_Exporter since the last invocation of the EDHOC_KeyUpdate function.</t> <t>While this key update method provides forwardsecrecysecrecy, it does not give as strong security properties as re-running EDHOC. EDHOC_KeyUpdate can be used to meet cryptographic limits and provide partial protection against key leakage, but it provides significantly weaker security properties than re-running EDHOC with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. Even with frequent use of EDHOC_KeyUpdate, compromise of one session key compromises all future session keys, and an attacker therefore only needs to perform static key exfiltration <xref target="RFC7624"/>, which is less complicated and has a lower risk profile than the dynamiccase,case; see <xref target="sec-prop"/>.</t> <t>A similar method to do a key update for OSCORE isKUDOS,KUDOS; see <xref target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="example-protocol-state-machine"> <name>Example Protocol State Machine</name> <t>This appendix describes an example protocol state machine for the Initiator andfor theResponder. States are denoted in allcapitalscapitals, and parentheses denote actions taken only in some circumstances.</t> <t>Note that this state machine is just an example, and that details of processing areomitted, foromitted. For example:</t> <ul spacing="normal"><li>When<li>when error messages are being sent (with oneexception)</li> <li>Howexception);</li> <li>how credentials and EAD are processed by EDHOC and the application in the RCVDstate</li> <li>Whatstate; and</li> <li>what verifications are made, which includes not only MACs andsignatures</li>signatures.</li> </ul> <section anchor="initiator-state-machine"> <name>Initiator State Machine</name> <t>The Initiator sends message_1, triggering the state machine to transition from START to WAIT_M2, and waits for message_2.</t> <t>If the incoming message is an errormessagemessage, then the Initiator transitions from WAIT_M2 to ABORTED. In case of error code 2 (Wrong Selected Cipher Suite), the Initiator remembers the supported cipher suites for this particular Responder and transitions from ABORTED to START. The message_1 that the Initiator subsequently sends takes into account the cipher suites supported by the Responder.</t> <t>Upon receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from WAIT_M2 to RCVD_M2 and processes the message. If a processing error occurs on message_2, then the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to ABORTED. In case of successful processing of message_2, the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to VRFD_M2.</t> <t>The Initiator prepares and processes message_3 for sending. If any processing error is encountered, the Initiator transitions from VRFD_M2 to ABORTED. If message_3 is successfully sent, the Initiator transitions from VRFD_M2 to COMPLETED.</t> <t>If the application profile includes message_4, then the Initiator waits for message_4. If the incoming message is an errormessagemessage, then the Initiator transitions from COMPLETED to ABORTED. Upon receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from COMPLETED (="WAIT_M4") to RCVD_M4 and processes the message. If a processing error occurs on message_4, then the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M4 to ABORTED. In case of successful processing of message_4, the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M4 to PERSISTED (="VRFD_M4").</t> <t>If the application profile does not include message_4, then the Initiator waits for an incoming application message. 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- - - - - - - -> START | | | Send message_1 | | Receive error v ABORTED <---------------- WAIT_M2 ^ | | | Receive message_2 | | | Processing error v +-------------------- RCVD_M2 ^ | | | Verify message_2 | | | Processing error v +-------------------- VRFD_M2 ^ | | | Send message_3 | | | (Receive error) v +-------------------- COMPLETED ----------------+ ^ | | | | (Receive message_4) | | | | | (Processing error) v | (Verify +------------------- (RCVD_M4) | application | | message) | (Verify message_4) | | | v | PERSISTED <---------------+ ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> </section> <section anchor="responder-state-machine"> <name>Responder State Machine</name> <t>Upon receiving message_1, the Responder transitions from START to RCVD_M1.</t> <t>If a processing error occurs on message_1, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M1 to ABORTED. This includes sending an error message with error code 2 (Wrong Selected Cipher Suite) if the selected cipher suite in message_1 is not supported. In case of successful processing of message_1, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M1 to VRFD_M1.</t> <t>The Responder prepares and processes message_2 for sending. If any processing error is encountered, the Responder transitions from VRFD_M1 to ABORTED. If message_2 is successfully sent, the Initiator transitions from VRFD_M2 toWAIT_M3,WAIT_M3 and waits for message_3.</t> <t>If the incoming message is an errormessagemessage, then the Responder transitions from WAIT_M3 to ABORTED.</t> <t>Upon receiving message_3, the Responder transitions from WAIT_M3 to RCVD_M3. If a processing error occurs on message_3, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M3 to ABORTED. In case of successful processing of message_3, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M3 to COMPLETED (="VRFD_M3").</t> <t>If the application profile includes message_4, the Responder prepares and processes message_4 for sending. If any processing error is encountered, the Responder transitions from COMPLETED to ABORTED.</t> <t>If message_4 is successfully sent, or if the application profile does not include message_4, the Responder transitions from COMPLETED to PERSISTED.</t> <figure> <name>Responder State Machine</name> <artset> <artwork type="svg" align="center"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1"height="528" width="384"height="" width="" viewBox="0 0 384 528" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round"> <path d="M 40,128 L 40,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,48 L 232,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,128 L 232,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,208 L 232,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,288 L 232,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,368 L 232,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 232,448 L 232,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 72,112 L 200,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 40,192 L 200,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 40,272 L 200,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 40,352 L 200,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <path d="M 40,432 L 192,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,496 228,490.4 228,501.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,496)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,416 228,410.4 228,421.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,416)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,336 228,330.4 228,341.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,336)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,256 228,250.4 228,261.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,256)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,176 228,170.4 228,181.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,176)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="240,96 228,90.4 228,101.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,232,96)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="80,112 68,106.4 68,117.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,72,112)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="48,360 36,354.4 36,365.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(270,40,360)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="48,280 36,274.4 36,285.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(270,40,280)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="48,200 36,194.4 36,205.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(270,40,200)"/> <polygon class="arrowhead" points="48,128 36,122.4 36,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(270,40,128)"/> <g class="text"> <text x="232" y="36">START</text> <text x="272" y="68">Receive</text> <text x="344" y="68">message_1</text> <text x="116" y="100">Processing</text> <text x="184" y="100">error</text> <text x="32" y="116">ABORTED</text> <text x="240" y="116">RCVD_M1</text> <text x="268" y="148">Verify</text> <text x="336" y="148">message_1</text> <text x="116" y="180">Processing</text> <text x="184" y="180">error</text> <text x="240" y="196">VRFD_M1</text> <text x="260" y="228">Send</text> <text x="320" y="228">message_2</text> <text x="112" y="260">Receive</text> <text x="168" y="260">error</text> <text x="240" y="276">WAIT_M3</text> <text x="272" y="308">Receive</text> <text x="344" y="308">message_3</text> <text x="116" y="340">Processing</text> <text x="184" y="340">error</text> <text x="240" y="356">RCVD_M3</text> <text x="268" y="388">Verify</text> <text x="336" y="388">message_3</text> <text x="112" y="420">(Processing</text> <text x="188" y="420">error)</text> <text x="240" y="436">COMPLETED</text> <text x="264" y="468">(Send</text> <text x="332" y="468">message_4)</text> <text x="240" y="516">PERSISTED</text> </g> </svg> </artwork> <artwork type="ascii-art" align="center"><![CDATA[ START | | Receive message_1 | Processing error v ABORTED <---------------- RCVD_M1 ^ | | | Verify message_1 | | | Processing error v +-------------------- VRFD_M1 ^ | | | Send message_2 | | | Receive error v +-------------------- WAIT_M3 ^ | | | Receive message_3 | | | Processing error v +-------------------- RCVD_M3 ^ | | | Verify message_3 | | | (Processing error) v +------------------- COMPLETED | | (Send message_4) | v PERSISTED ]]></artwork> </artset> </figure> </section> </section> <sectionanchor="change-log"> <name>Change Log</name> <t>RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix.</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>From -21 to -22 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Normative text on transport capabilities.</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -20 to -21 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Recommendation to use chain instead of bag</li> <li> <t>Improved text about </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>denial-of-service</li> <li>deriving secret and non-secret randomness from the same KDF instance</li> <li>practical security against quantum computers</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Clarifications, including </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>several updates section 3.4. Transport</li> <li>descriptions in COSE IANA registration</li> <li>encoding in Figure 5, reading of Figure 17</li> </ul> </li> <li>Removed term "dummy"</li> <li>Harmonizing captions</li> <li>Updated references</li> <li>Acknowledgments</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -19 to -20 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>C_R encrypted in message_2</li> <li>C_R removed from TH_2</li> <li>Error code for unknown referenced credential</li> <li>Error code 0 (success) explicitly reserved</li> <li>Message deduplication section moved from appendix to body</li> <li> <t>Terminology </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>discontinued -> aborted</li> <li>protocol run / exchange -> session</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Clarifications, in particular </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>when to derive application keys</li> <li>the role of the application for authentication</li> </ul> </li> <li>Security considerations for kccs and kcwt</li> <li>Updated references</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -18 to -19 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Clarifications: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Relation to SIGMA</li> <li>Role of Static DH</li> <li>Initiator and Responder roles</li> <li>Transport properties</li> <li>Construction of SUITES_I</li> <li>Message correlation, new subsection 3.4.1, replacing former appendix H</li> <li>Role of description about long PLAINTEXT_2</li> <li>ead_label and ead_value</li> <li>Message processing (Section 5)</li> <li>Padding</li> <li>Cipher suite negotiation example</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Other updates: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Improved and stricter normative text in Appendix A</li> <li>Naming and separate sections for the two message flows in Appendix A: Forward/Reverse message flow,</li> <li>Table index style captions</li> <li>Aligning with COSE terminology: header map -> header_map</li> <li>Aligning terminology, use of "_" instead of "-"</li> <li>Prefixing "EDHOC_" to functions</li> <li>Updated list of security analysis papers</li> <li>New appendix with example state machine</li> <li>Acknowledgements</li> <li>Language improvements by native English speakers</li> <li>Updated IANA section with registration procedures</li> <li>New and updated references</li> <li>Removed appendix H</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -17 to -18 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Padding realised as EAD with ead_label = 0, PAD fields removed</li> <li>Revised EAD syntax; ead is now EAD item; ead_value is now optional</li> <li> <t>Clarifications of </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Identifier representation</li> <li>Authentication credentials</li> <li>RPK</li> <li>Encoding of ID_CRED with kid</li> <li>Representation of public keys, y-coordinate of ephemeral keys and validation</li> <li>Processing after completed protocol</li> <li>Making verifications available to the application</li> <li>Relation between EDHOC and OSCORE identifiers</li> </ul> </li> <li>Terminology alignment in particular session / protocol; discontinue / terminate</li> <li>Updated CDDL</li> <li>Additional unicode encodings</li> <li>Large number of nits from WGLC</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -16 to -17 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC-KeyUpdate moved to appendix</li> <li>Updated peer awareness properties based on SIGMA</li> <li>Clarify use of random connection identifiers</li> <li>Editorials related to appendix about messages with long PLAINTEXT_2</li> <li>Updated acknowledgments (have we forgotten someone else? please send email)</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -15 to -16 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>TH_2 used as salt in the derivation of PRK_2e</li> <li>CRED_R/CRED_I included in TH_3/TH_4</li> <li>Distinguish label used in info, exporter or elsewhere</li> <li> <t>New appendix for optional handling arbitrarily large message_2 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>info_label type changed to int to support this</li> </ul> </li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> <li>Implementation note about identifiers which are bstr/int</li> <li>Clarifications, especifically about compact representation</li> <li>Type bug fix in CDDL section</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -14 to -15 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Connection identifiers and key identifiers are now byte strings </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Represented as CBOR bstr in the EDHOC message </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Unless they happen to encode a one-byte CBOR int</li> </ul> </li> <li>More examples</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>EAD updates and details </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Definition of EAD item</li> <li>Definition of critical / non-critical EAD item</li> </ul> </li> <li>New section in Appendix D: Unauthenticated Operation</li> <li> <t>Clarifications </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Lengths used in EDHOC-KDF</li> <li> <t>Key derivation from PRK_out </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC-KeyUpdate and EDHOC-Exporter</li> </ul> </li> <li>Padding</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Security considerations </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>When a change in a message is detected</li> <li>Confidentiality in case of active attacks</li> <li>Connection identifiers should be unpredictable</li> <li>Maximum length of message_2</li> </ul> </li> <li>Minor bugs</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -13 to -14 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Merge of section 1.1 and 1.2</li> <li>Connection and key identifiers restricted to be byte strings</li> <li>Representation of byte strings as one-byte CBOR ints (-24..23)</li> <li>Simplified mapping between EDHOC and OSCORE identifiers</li> <li> <t>Rewrite of 3.5 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Clarification of authentication related operations performed by EDHOC</li> <li>Authentication related verifications, including old section 3.5.1, moved to new appendix D</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Rewrite of 3.8 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Move content about use of EAD to new appendix E</li> <li>ead_value changed to bstr</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>EDHOC-KDF updated </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>transcript_hash argument removed</li> <li>TH included in context argument</li> <li>label argument is now type uint, all labels replaced</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>Key schedule updated </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>New salts derived to avoid reuse of same key with expand and extract</li> <li>PRK_4x3m renamed PRK_4e3m</li> <li>K_4 and IV_4 derived from PRK_4e3m</li> <li>New PRK: PRK_out derived from PRK_4e3m and TH_4</li> <li>Clarified main output of EDHOC is the shared secret PRK_out</li> <li>Exporter defined by EDHOC-KDF and new PRK PRK_exporter derived from PRK_out</li> <li>Key update defined by Expand instead of Extract</li> </ul> </li> <li>All applications of EDHOC-KDF in one place</li> <li> <t>Update of processing </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EAD and ID_CRED passed to application when available</li> <li>identity verification and credential retrieval omitted in protocol description</li> <li>Transcript hash defined by plaintext messages instead of ciphertext</li> <li>Changed order of input to TH_2</li> <li>Removed general G_X checking against selfie-attacks</li> </ul> </li> <li>Support for padding of plaintext</li> <li>Updated compliance requirements</li> <li> <t>Updated security considerations </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated and more clear requirements on MAC length</li> <li>Clarification of key confirmation</li> <li>Forbid use of same key for signature and static DH</li> </ul> </li> <li>Updated appendix on message deduplication</li> <li> <t>Clarifications of </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>connection identifiers</li> <li>cipher suites, including negotiation</li> <li>EAD</li> <li>Error messages</li> </ul> </li> <li>Updated media types</li> <li>Applicability template renamed application profile</li> <li>Editorials</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -12 to -13 </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>no changes</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -12: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Shortened labels to derive OSCORE key and salt</li> <li>ead_value changed to bstr</li> <li>Removed general G_X checking against selfie-attacks</li> <li>Updated and more clear requirements on MAC length</li> <li>Clarifications from Kathleen, Stephen, Marco, Sean, Stefan,</li> <li>Authentication Related Verifications moved to appendix</li> <li>Updated MTI section and cipher suite</li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -11 to -12: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Clarified applicability to KEMs</li> <li>Clarified use of COSE header parameters</li> <li>Updates on MTI</li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> <li>New section on PQC</li> <li>Removed duplicate definition of cipher suites</li> <li>Explanations of use of COSE moved to Appendix C.3</li> <li>Updated internal references</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -10 to -11: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Restructured section on authentication parameters</li> <li>Changed UCCS to CCS</li> <li>Changed names and description of COSE header parameters for CWT/CCS</li> <li>Changed several of the KDF and Exporter labels</li> <li>Removed edhoc_aead_id from info (already in transcript_hash)</li> <li>Added MTI section</li> <li>EAD: changed CDDL names and added value type to registry</li> <li>Updated Figures 1, 2, and 3</li> <li>Some correction and clarifications</li> <li>Added core.edhoc to CoRE Resource Type registry</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -09 to -10: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>SUITES_I simplified to only contain the selected and more preferred suites</li> <li>Info is a CBOR sequence and context is a bstr</li> <li>Added kid to UCCS example</li> <li>Separate header parameters for CWT and UCCS</li> <li>CWT Confirmation Method kid extended to bstr / int</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -08 to -09: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>G_Y and CIPHERTEXT_2 are now included in one CBOR bstr</li> <li>MAC_2 and MAC_3 are now generated with EDHOC-KDF</li> <li>Info field “context” is now general and explicit in EDHOC-KDF</li> <li>Restructured Section 4, Key Derivation</li> <li>Added EDHOC MAC length to cipher suite for use with static DH</li> <li>More details on the use of CWT and UCCS</li> <li>Restructured and clarified Section 3.5, Authentication Parameters</li> <li>Replaced 'kid2' with extension of 'kid'</li> <li>EAD encoding now supports multiple ead types in one message</li> <li>Clarified EAD type</li> <li>Updated message sizes</li> <li>Replaced “perfect forward secrecy” with “forward secrecy”</li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> <li>Replaced prepended 'null' with 'true' in the CoAP transport of message_1</li> <li>Updated CDDL definitions</li> <li>Expanded on the use of COSE</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -07 to -08: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Prepended C_x moved from the EDHOC protocol itself to the transport mapping</li> <li>METHOD_CORR renamed to METHOD, corr removed</li> <li>Removed bstr_identifier and use bstr / int instead; C_x can now be int without any implied bstr semantics</li> <li>Defined COSE header parameter 'kid2' with value type bstr / int for use with ID_CRED_x</li> <li>Updated message sizes</li> <li>New cipher suites with AES-GCM and ChaCha20 / Poly1305</li> <li>Changed from one- to two-byte identifier of CNSA compliant suite</li> <li>Separate sections on transport and connection id with further sub-structure</li> <li>Moved back key derivation for OSCORE from draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc</li> <li>OSCORE and CoAP specific processing moved to new appendix</li> <li>Message 4 section moved to message processing section</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -06 to -07: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Changed transcript hash definition for TH_2 and TH_3</li> <li>Removed "EDHOC signature algorithm curve" from cipher suite</li> <li>New IANA registry "EDHOC Exporter Label"</li> <li>New application defined parameter "context" in EDHOC-Exporter</li> <li>Changed normative language for failure from MUST to SHOULD send error</li> <li>Made error codes non-negative and 0 for success</li> <li>Added detail on success error code</li> <li>Aligned terminology "protocol instance" -> "session"</li> <li>New appendix on compact EC point representation</li> <li>Added detail on use of ephemeral public keys</li> <li>Moved key derivation for OSCORE to draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc</li> <li>Additional security considerations</li> <li>Renamed "Auxililary Data" as "External Authorization Data"</li> <li>Added encrypted EAD_4 to message_4</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -05 to -06: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>New section 5.2 "Message Processing Outline"</li> <li>Optional inital byte C_1 = null in message_1</li> <li>New format of error messages, table of error codes, IANA registry</li> <li>Change of recommendation transport of error in CoAP</li> <li>Merge of content in 3.7 and appendix C into new section 3.7 "Applicability Statement"</li> <li>Requiring use of deterministic CBOR</li> <li>New section on message deduplication</li> <li>New appendix containin all CDDL definitions</li> <li>New appendix with change log</li> <li>Removed section "Other Documents Referencing EDHOC"</li> <li>Clarifications based on review comments</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -04 to -05: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>EDHOC-Rekey-FS -> EDHOC-KeyUpdate</li> <li>Clarification of cipher suite negotiation</li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> <li>Updated test vectors</li> <li>Updated applicability statement template</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -03 to -04: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Restructure of section 1</li> <li>Added references to C509 Certificates</li> <li>Change in CIPHERTEXT_2 -> plaintext XOR KEYSTREAM_2 (test vector not updated)</li> <li>"K_2e", "IV_2e" -> KEYSTREAM_2</li> <li>Specified optional message 4</li> <li>EDHOC-Exporter-FS -> EDHOC-Rekey-FS</li> <li>Less constrained devices SHOULD implement both suite 0 and 2</li> <li>Clarification of error message</li> <li>Added exporter interface test vector</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -02 to -03: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Rearrangements of section 3 and beginning of section 4</li> <li>Key derivation new section 4</li> <li>Cipher suites 4 and 5 added</li> <li>EDHOC-EXPORTER-FS - generate a new PRK_4x3m from an old one</li> <li>Change in CIPHERTEXT_2 -> COSE_Encrypt0 without tag (no change to test vector)</li> <li>Clarification of error message</li> <li>New appendix C applicability statement</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -01 to -02: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>New section 1.2 Use of EDHOC</li> <li>Clarification of identities</li> <li>New section 4.3 clarifying bstr_identifier</li> <li>Updated security considerations</li> <li>Updated text on cipher suite negotiation and key confirmation</li> <li>Test vector for static DH</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>From -00 to -01: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Removed PSK method</li> <li>Removed references to certificate by value</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </section> <sectionnumbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"> <name>Acknowledgments</name> <t>The authors want to thank <contact fullname="Christian Amsüss"/>, <contactfullname="Alessandro Bruni"/>, <contactfullname="Karthikeyan Bhargavan"/>, <contact fullname="Carsten Bormann"/>, <contact fullname="Alessandro Bruni"/>, <contact fullname="Timothy Claeys"/>, <contact fullname="Baptiste Cottier"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Disch"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Duke"/>, <contact fullname="DonaldEastlake"/>,Eastlake 3rd"/>, <contact fullname="Lars Eggert"/>, <contact fullname="Stephen Farrell"/>, <contact fullname="Loïc Ferreira"/>, <contact fullname="Theis Grønbech Petersen"/>, <contact fullname="Felix Günther"/>, <contact fullname="Dan Harkins"/>, <contact fullname="Klaus Hartke"/>, <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Stefan Hristozov"/>, <contact fullname="Marc Ilunga"/>, <contact fullname="Charlie Jacomme"/>, <contact fullname="Elise Klein"/>, <contact fullname="Erik Kline"/>, <contact fullname="Steve Kremer"/>, <contact fullname="Alexandros Krontiris"/>, <contact fullname="Ilari Liusvaara"/>, <contact fullname="Rafa Marín-López"/>, <contact fullname="Kathleen Moriarty"/>, <contact fullname="David Navarro"/>, <contact fullname="Karl Norrman"/>, <contact fullname="Salvador Pérez"/>, <contact fullname="Radia Perlman"/>, <contact fullname="David Pointcheval"/>, <contact fullname="Maïwenn Racouchot"/>, <contact fullname="Eric Rescorla"/>, <contact fullname="Michael Richardson"/>, <contact fullname="Thorvald Sahl Jørgensen"/>, <contact fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker"/>, <contact fullname="Jim Schaad"/>, <contact fullname="Michael Scharf"/>, <contact fullname="Carsten Schürmann"/>, <contact fullname="John Scudder"/>, <contact fullname="Ludwig Seitz"/>, <contact fullname="Brian Sipos"/>, <contact fullname="Stanislav Smyshlyaev"/>, <contact fullname="Valery Smyslov"/>, <contact fullname="Peter van der Stok"/>, <contact fullname="Rene Struik"/>, <contact fullname="Vaishnavi Sundararajan"/>, <contact fullname="Erik Thormarker"/>, <contact fullname="Marco Tiloca"/>, <contact fullname="Sean Turner"/>, <contact fullname="Michel Veillette"/>, <contact fullname="Mališa Vučinić"/>, <contact fullname="Paul Wouters"/>, and <contact fullname="Lei Yan"/> for reviewing and commenting on intermediate draft versions ofthe draft. Wethis document.</t> <t>We are especially indebted to the late <contact fullname="Jim Schaad"/> for his continuousreviewingreview and implementation ofearlydraft versions of thisanddocument, as well as his work on otherdrafts.</t>technologies such as COSE and OSCORE without which EDHOC would not have been.</t> <t>Work on this document has in part been supported by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home (grant agreement 952652).</t> </section> </back><!-- ##markdown-source: H4sIAAAAAAAAA9y9y3Yb2ZUoOOdXxJUGAtMARACkRMlOVzNJKkVLSskk7cxc VbVUQSBAhgVEwBEBUrQye/WkR/0FPer+il53cEftP7lf0vt5zj7xAKl8uFzN cilJIOI89tlnvx+DwWCrSqtF8jw6Xl0ly6SIF9FROp+nyeBlslgs4yx6e50U 0eHbs+Ood3z08u3h9tYsn2bxEt6ZFfG8GqRJNR8s4g/JIJld5dPBeLwVX1wU yTUMii9sbaWr4nlUFeuyGu/sPNuB74skfh6dHR9u3eTFh8siX6+eR68PXh1H 38LfaXYZfY2fbU3j6nlUVrOtcn2xTMsyzbPqdgUznxyfv9ia5lmZZOW6pMGT LfhgBu8+j9awoP2tVfo8ehhNYQvrMonioohvo146j+LFIrpNyu0oL6KruLyK rpIi2YqiKp8+xy/g1zIvqiKZl+7v26X9E56cJavq6nk03tqK19VVXjzfGkQM 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