rfc9654.original   rfc9654.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force H. Sharma, Ed. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Sharma, Ed.
Internet-Draft Netskope Inc Request for Comments: 9654 Netskope Inc
Obsoletes: 8954 (if approved) 22 May 2024 Obsoletes: 8954 August 2024
Updates: 6960 (if approved) Updates: 6960
Intended status: Standards Track Category: Standards Track
Expires: 23 November 2024 ISSN: 2070-1721
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-11
Abstract Abstract
RFC 8954 imposed the size constraints on the optional Nonce extension RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for
for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used to check
checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to
to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP
OCSP request message. request message.
Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce
value that is longer than 32 octets. This document updates the value that is longer than 32 octets. This document also modifies the
maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets. This document also "Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the
modifies Nonce section to clearly define the encoding format and encoding format and values for easier implementation and
values distinctively for an easier implementation and understanding. understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes
This document obsoletes RFC 8954 and provides updated ASN.1 modules updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.
for OCSP, updates RFC 6960.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 November 2024. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Language
2. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. OCSP Extensions
2.1. Nonce Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Nonce Extension
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Security Considerations
3.1. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Replay Attack
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IANA Considerations
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. References
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Normative References
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.2. Informative References
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Acknowledgements
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Author's Address
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960]. The Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of
The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a response. It [RFC6960]. The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a
guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and to avoid replay response. It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids
attacks. This extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954] limits replay attacks. This extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954]
the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support cryptographic limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support
algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32
document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets. octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce
In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP requester and to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP
responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets. requester and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32
octets.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. OCSP Extensions 2. OCSP Extensions
The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
[RFC6960] and Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC6960] [RFC6960] and the Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954].
also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages
extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates
[RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces this section to limit the minimum and (see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] to
maximum length for the Nonce value. This document extends the limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This
maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and
specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in does not change the specifications of any of the other extensions
[RFC6960]. defined in [RFC6960].
2.1. Nonce Extension 2.1. Nonce Extension
The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the
requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it would be included as requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as one of
one of the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the
the Nonce will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp- Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce,
nonce, while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce. If the while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce. If the Nonce
Nonce extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
least 1 octet and can be up to 128 octets. [RFC8954] compliant octet and can be up to 128 octets. Implementations compliant with
implementations will be unable to process nonces generated per the [RFC8954] will not be able to process nonces generated per the new
new specification with sizes in excess of the limit of 32 octets that specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified
was specified in [RFC8954]. in [RFC8954].
An OCSP requester that implements this document MUST use a minimum An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document MUST
length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension. use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.
An OCSP responder , supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept Nonce An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension MUST accept Nonce
lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. A
Responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for
requests where the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and 15 requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and
octets or 33 octets and 128 octets. 15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.
Responders, that implements this document MUST reject any OCSP Responders that implement the extension in this document MUST reject
request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or more any OCSP request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or
than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus as greater than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus
described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960]. as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum
Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
with older OCSP requester that follow [RFC6960]. with older OCSP requesters that follow [RFC6960].
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
Example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with 32 octet Nonce in
hexadecimal format.
30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04 The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a
20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe 32-octet Nonce in hexadecimal format.
db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
c8
Here is the decoded version of the above example. 30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
Offset, Length and Object Identifier are in decimal. 20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
c8
Offset Length Here is the decoded version of the above example. Offset, Length,
0 47 : SEQUENCE { and Object Identifier are in decimal.
2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates { Offset Length
15 32 : OCTET STRING 0 47 : SEQUENCE {
: DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB 2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
: E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
: } 13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
: } 15 32 : OCTET STRING
: DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
: E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
: }
: }
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
[RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid. to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that
that the response is the latest response from the server and not an the response is the most recent response from the server and not an
old copy. old copy.
3.1. Replay Attack 3.1. Replay Attack
The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP
responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the
request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
and respond with an earlier response from the server without the and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
fields in the OCSP response. fields in the OCSP response.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.1, IANA is requested to assign an For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes A.1 and A.2, IANA has assigned
object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD1. the following object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX
The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the
Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-88".
For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.2, IANA is requested to assign an
object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD2.
The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the
Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-08".
Acknowledgements
The authors of this document wish to thank Mohit Sahni for his work +=======+=====================+
to produce [RFC8954]. | Value | Description |
+=======+=====================+
| 111 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-88 |
+-------+---------------------+
| 112 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-08 |
+-------+---------------------+
The authors wish to thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael Table 1
StJohns and Carl Wallace for the feedback and suggestions.
References 5. References
Normative References 5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
skipping to change at page 6, line 19 skipping to change at line 242
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>. 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.
Informative References 5.2. Informative References
[Err5891] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[Errata5891]
RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the
entirity of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata id 5891 entirety of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata ID 5891
[Errata5891] as well. [Err5891] as well.
Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998 Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module
replaces the modules Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960]. replaces the module in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].
Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module
present in A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1. This present in Appendix A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.
module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and
Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided,
the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module as per the the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module per the
policy of the PKIX working group. policy of the PKIX Working Group.
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
OCSP-2024-88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(TBD1)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= <CODE BEGINS>
OCSP-2024-88
BEGIN { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }
IMPORTS DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- PKIX Certificate Extensions IMPORTS
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) } internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions, Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) }; internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest, tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL, requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request, requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE { Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING, signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
Request ::= SEQUENCE { Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID, reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE { CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used -- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
} }
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
response OCTET STRING } response OCTET STRING }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData, tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING, signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID, responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime, -- The format for producedAt GeneralizedTime,
-- GeneralizedTime is as -- The format for GeneralizedTime is
-- specified in Section -- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
-- 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280] -- [RFC5280]
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse, responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE { ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name, byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash } byKey [2] KeyHash }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
-- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
-- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding -- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
-- the tag, length, and number of unused -- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
-- bits] in the responder's certificate) -- number of unused bits] in the responder's
-- certificate)
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID, certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus, certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE { CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL, good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo, revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo } unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime, revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL } revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL UnknownInfo ::= NULL
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name, issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax } locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE { PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL } certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }
-- Object Identifiers
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 } id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 } id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 } id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 } id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 } id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 } id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 } id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 } id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END END
<CODE ENDS>
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
OCSP-2024-08 <CODE BEGINS>
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) OCSP-2024-08
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(TBD2)} security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
BEGIN IMPORTS
Extensions{}, EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
IMPORTS AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
Extensions{}, EXTENSION AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912] CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912] id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912] sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;
Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912] tbsRequest TBSRequest,
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1 TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912] version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}; requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
... }} OPTIONAL }
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce |
re-ocsp-response, ...,
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms}} OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE { Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
... }} OPTIONAL }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
Request ::= SEQUENCE { OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID, responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
{ {re-ocsp-service-locator,
...}} OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE { OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key tryLater (3), -- Try again later
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } -- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType RESPONSE.&id ({ResponseSet}),
response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
&Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}
ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...} basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
{ BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType RESPONSE. tbsResponseData ResponseData,
&id ({ResponseSet}), signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE. { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
&Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))} { sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithMD5 |
sa-rsaWithMD2,
... }},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
basicResponse RESPONSE ::= ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
{ BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic } version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce |
re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
... }} OPTIONAL }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData, byName [1] Name,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, byKey [2] KeyHash }
{sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
responderID ResponderID, -- (excluding the tag and length and number
producedAt GeneralizedTime, -- of unused bits)
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{re-ocsp-nonce, ...,
re-ocsp-extended-revoke}} OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE { SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
byName [1] Name, certID CertID,
byKey [2] KeyHash } certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-crl |
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
CrlEntryExtensions,
... }} OPTIONAL }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
-- (excluding the tag and length fields) good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID, revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
certStatus CertStatus, revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl |
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
CrlEntryExtensions, ...}
} OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE { UnknownInfo ::= NULL
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet}) CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
issuer Name, PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm -- Certificate Extensions
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE { ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}}, SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}} OPTIONAL
}
-- Request Extensions
ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck } SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }
re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-response }
re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Nonce re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce } SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
BY id-pkix-ocsp-response } SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator -- Response Extensions
IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= { re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }
IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
id-pkix-ocsp-crl } SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff -- Object Identifiers
IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END
<CODE ENDS>
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } Acknowledgements
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END The authors of this document thank Mohit Sahni for his work to
produce [RFC8954].
The authors also thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns,
Tomas Gustavsson, and Carl Wallace for their feedback and
suggestions.
Author's Address Author's Address
Himanshu Sharma (editor) Himanshu Sharma (editor)
Netskope Inc Netskope Inc
2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor 2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
Santa Clara, California 95054 Santa Clara, California 95054
United States of America United States of America
Email: himanshu@netskope.com Email: himanshu@netskope.com
URI: www.netskope.com URI: www.netskope.com
 End of changes. 116 change blocks. 
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