rfc9783.original		rfc9783.txt
	Network Working Group H. Tschofenig		Independent Submission H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft		Request for Comments: 9783 H-BRS
	Intended status: Informational S. Frost		Category: Informational S. Frost
	Expires: 27 March 2025 M. Brossard		ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Brossard
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	A. Shaw		A. Shaw
	HP Labs		HP Labs
	T. Fossati		T. Fossati
	Linaro		Linaro
	23 September 2024		June 2025
	Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Token		Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Token
	draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-24
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware		Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware
	and firmware security specifications, as well as open-source		and firmware security specifications, along with open-source
	reference implementations, to help device makers and chip		reference implementations, aimed at helping device makers and chip
	manufacturers build best-practice security into products. Devices		manufacturers integrate best-practice security into their products.
	that are PSA compliant can produce attestation tokens as described in		Devices that comply with PSA can generate attestation tokens as
	this memo, which are the basis for many different protocols,		described in this document, which serve as the foundation for various
	including secure provisioning and network access control. This		protocols, including secure provisioning and network access control.
	document specifies the PSA attestation token structure and semantics.		This document specifies the structure and semantics of the PSA
			attestation token.
	The PSA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation		The PSA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation
	Token (EAT). This specification describes what claims are used in an		Token (EAT). This specification describes the claims used in an
	attestation token generated by PSA compliant systems, how these		attestation token generated by PSA-compliant systems, how these
	claims get serialized to the wire, and how they are cryptographically		claims are serialized for transmission, and how they are
	protected.		cryptographically protected.
	This informational document is published as an independent submission		This Informational document is published as an Independent Submission
	to improve interoperability with Arm's architecture. It is not a		to improve interoperability with Arm's architecture. It is not a
	standard nor a product of the IETF.		standard nor a product of the IETF.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		published for informational purposes.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
			the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard;
			see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 March 2025.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9783.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		publication of this document. Please review these documents
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			to this document.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction
	2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Conventions and Definitions
	3. PSA Attester Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. PSA Attester Model
	4. PSA Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4. PSA Claims
	4.1. Caller Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.1. Caller Claims
	4.1.1. Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.1.1. Nonce
	4.1.2. Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.1.2. Client ID
	4.2. Target Identification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.2. Target Identification Claims
	4.2.1. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.2.1. Instance ID
	4.2.2. Implementation ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.2.2. Implementation ID
	4.2.3. Certification Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.2.3. Certification Reference
	4.3. Target State Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.3. Target State Claims
	4.3.1. Security Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.3.1. Security Lifecycle
	4.3.2. Boot Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		4.3.2. Boot Seed
	4.4. Software Inventory Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		4.4. Software Inventory Claims
	4.4.1. Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		4.4.1. Software Components
	4.5. Verification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		4.5. Verification Claims
	4.5.1. Verification Service Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . 16		4.5.1. Verification Service Indicator
	4.5.2. Profile Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.5.2. Profile Definition
	4.6. Backwards Compatibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . 18		4.6. Backwards Compatibility Considerations
	5. Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		5. Profiles
	5.1. Baseline Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		5.1. Baseline Profile
	5.1.1. Token Encoding and Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		5.1.1. Token Encoding and Signing
	5.1.2. Freshness Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5.1.2. Freshness Model
	5.1.3. Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5.1.3. Synopsis
	5.2. Profile TFM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		5.2. Profile TFM
	6. Collated CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		6. Collated CDDL
	7. Scalability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		7. Scalability Considerations
	8. PSA Token Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		8. PSA Token Verification
	8.1. AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings . . . . . . . . . 28		8.1. AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings
	8.2. Endorsements, Reference Values and Verification Key		8.2. Endorsements, Reference Values, and Verification Key
	Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		Material
	9. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		9. Security and Privacy Considerations
	10. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		10. IANA Considerations
	11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		10.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
	11.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 30		10.1.1. Client ID Claim
	11.1.1. Client ID Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		10.1.2. Security Lifecycle Claim
	11.1.2. Security Lifecycle Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		10.1.3. Implementation ID Claim
	11.1.3. Implementation ID Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		10.1.4. Certification Reference Claim
	11.1.4. Certification Reference Claim . . . . . . . . . . . 31		10.1.5. Software Components Claim
	11.1.5. Software Components Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		10.1.6. Verification Service Indicator Claim
	11.1.6. Verification Service Indicator Claim . . . . . . . 31		10.2. Media Types
	11.2. Media Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		10.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration
	11.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 32		10.3.1. Registry Contents
	11.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		11. References
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		11.1. Normative References
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		11.2. Informative References
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		Appendix A. Examples
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.1. COSE Sign1 Token
	A.1. COSE Sign1 Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.2. COSE Mac0 Token
	A.2. COSE Mac0 Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		Acknowledgments
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		Contributors
	Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		Authors' Addresses
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) [PSA] is a set of hardware		The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) [PSA] is a set of hardware
	and firmware specifications, backed by reference implementations and		and firmware specifications backed by reference implementations and a
	a security certification program [PSACertified]. The security		security certification program [PSACertified]. The security
	specifications have been published by Arm, while the certification		specifications have been published by Arm, while the certification
	program and reference implementations are the result of a		program and reference implementations are the result of a
	collaborative effort by companies from multiple sectors, including		collaborative effort by companies from multiple sectors, including
	evaluation laboratories, IP semiconductor vendors and security		evaluation laboratories, IP semiconductor vendors, and security
	consultancies. The main objective of the PSA initiative is to assist		consultancies. The main objective of the PSA initiative is to assist
	device manufacturers and chip makers in incorporating best-practice		device manufacturers and chip makers in incorporating best-practice
	security measures into their products.		security measures into their products.
	Many devices now have trusted execution environments that provide a		Many devices now have Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that
	safe space for security-sensitive code, such as cryptography, secure		provide a safe space for security-sensitive code, such as
	boot, secure storage, and other essential security functions. These		cryptography, secure boot, secure storage, and other essential
	security functions are typically exposed through a narrow and well-		security functions. These security functions are typically exposed
	defined interface, and can be used by operating system libraries and		through a narrow and well-defined interface, and can be used by
	applications.		operating system libraries and applications.
	As outlined in the RATS Architecture [RFC9334], an Attester produces		As outlined in the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture
	a signed collection of Claims that constitutes Evidence about its		[RFC9334], an Attester produces a signed collection of Claims that
	target environment. This document focuses on the output provided by		constitutes Evidence about its Target Environment. This document
	PSA's Initial Attestation API [PSA-API]. This output corresponds to		focuses on the output provided by PSA's Initial Attestation API
	Evidence in [RFC9334] and, as a design decision, the PSA attestation		[PSA-API]. This output corresponds to Evidence in [RFC9334] and, as
	token is a profile of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [EAT]. Note		a design decision, the PSA attestation token is a profile of the
	that there are other profiles of EAT available, such as		Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [EAT]. Note that there are other
	[I-D.kdyxy-rats-tdx-eat-profile] and [I-D.mandyam-rats-qwestoken],		profiles of EAT available for use with different use cases and by
	for use with different use cases and by different attestation		different attestation technologies, such as [RATS-TDX] and
	technologies.		[RATS-QWESTOKEN].
	Since the PSA tokens are also consumed by services outside the		Since the PSA tokens are also consumed by services outside the
	device, there is an actual need to ensure interoperability.		device, there is an actual need to ensure interoperability.
	Interoperability needs are addressed here by describing the exact		Interoperability needs are addressed here by describing the exact
	syntax and semantics of the attestation claims, and defining the way		syntax and semantics of the attestation claims, and defining the way
	these claims are encoded and cryptographically protected.		these claims are encoded and cryptographically protected.
	Further details on concepts expressed below can be found in the PSA		Further details on concepts expressed below can be found in the PSA
	Security Model documentation [PSA-SM].		Security Model documentation [PSA-SM].
	As mentioned in the abstract, this memo documents a vendor extension		As mentioned in the abstract, this memo documents a vendor extension
	to the RATS architecture, and is not a standard.		to the RATS architecture and is not a standard.
	2. Conventions and Definitions		2. Conventions and Definitions
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	The terms Attester, Relying Party, Verifier, Attestation Result,		The terms Attester, Relying Party, Verifier, Attestation Result,
	Target Environment, Attesting Environment and Evidence are defined in		Target Environment, Attesting Environment, and Evidence are defined
	[RFC9334]. We use the term "receiver" to refer to Relying Parties		in [RFC9334]. We use the term "receiver" to refer to Relying Parties
	and Verifiers.		and Verifiers.
	We use the terms Evidence, "PSA attestation token", and "PSA token"		We use the terms Evidence, "PSA attestation token", and "PSA token"
	interchangeably. The terms "sender" and Attester are used		interchangeably. The terms "sender" and Attester are used
	interchangeably. Likewise, we use the terms Verifier and		interchangeably. Likewise, we use the terms Verifier and
	"verification service" interchangeably.		"verification service" interchangeably.
	RoT:		Root of Trust (RoT):
			The minimal set of software, hardware, and data that has to be
	Root of Trust, the minimal set of software, hardware and data that		implicitly trusted in the platform; there is no software or
	has to be implicitly trusted in the platform - there is no		hardware at a deeper level that can verify that the RoT is
	software or hardware at a deeper level that can verify that the		authentic and unmodified. An example of RoT is an initial
	Root of Trust is authentic and unmodified. An example of RoT is		bootloader in ROM, which contains cryptographic functions and
	an initial bootloader in ROM, which contains cryptographic		credentials, running on a specific hardware platform.
	functions and credentials, running on a specific hardware
	platform.
	SPE:		Secure Processing Environment (SPE):
	Secure Processing Environment, a platform's processing environment		A platform's processing environment for software that provides
	for software that provides confidentiality and integrity for its		confidentiality and integrity for its runtime state, from software
	runtime state, from software and hardware, outside of the SPE.		and hardware, outside of the SPE. Contains trusted code and
	Contains trusted code and trusted hardware. (Equivalent to		trusted hardware. (Equivalent to a TEE, "secure world", or
	Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), "secure world", or "secure		"secure enclave".)
	enclave".)
	NSPE:		Non-Secure Processing Environment (NSPE):
	Non Secure Processing Environment, the security domain outside of		The security domain (Application domain) outside of the SPE that
	the SPE, the Application domain, typically containing the		typically contains the application firmware, real-time operating
	application firmware, real-time operating systems, applications		systems, applications, and general hardware. (Equivalent to Rich
	and general hardware. (Equivalent to Rich Execution Environment		Execution Environment (REE), or "normal world".)
	(REE), or "normal world".)
	In this document, the structure of data is specified in Concise Data		In this document, the structure of data is specified in Concise Data
	Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610].		Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610].
	3. PSA Attester Model		3. PSA Attester Model
	Figure 1 outlines the structure of the PSA Attester according to the		Figure 1 outlines the structure of the PSA Attester according to the
	conceptual model described in Section 3.1 of [RFC9334].		conceptual model described in Section 3.1 of [RFC9334].
	.----------.		.----------.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at line 249 ¶
	R W		R W
	Figure 1: PSA Attester		Figure 1: PSA Attester
	The PSA Attester is a relatively straightforward embodiment of the		The PSA Attester is a relatively straightforward embodiment of the
	RATS Attester with exactly one Attesting Environment and one or more		RATS Attester with exactly one Attesting Environment and one or more
	Target Environments.		Target Environments.
	The Attesting Environment is responsible for collecting the		The Attesting Environment is responsible for collecting the
	information to be represented in PSA claims and to assemble them into		information to be represented in PSA claims and to assemble them into
	Evidence. It is made of two cooperating components:		Evidence. The Attesting Environment is made of two cooperating
			components:
	* The Main Bootloader, executing at boot-time, measures the Target		* Executing at boot-time, the Main Bootloader measures the Target
	Environments - i.e., loaded software components, and all the		Environments (i.e., loaded software components and all the
	relevant PSA RoT parameters -, and stores the recorded information		relevant PSA RoT parameters) and stores the recorded information
	in secure memory (Main Boot State). See Figure 2.		in secure memory (Main Boot State). See Figure 2.
	i-th Target Main Boot Main Boot		i-th Target Main Boot Main Boot
	Environment Loader State		Environment Loader State
	| | |		| | |
	.--------|-------------|-------------|----.		.--------|-------------|-------------|----.
	| loop i | | | |		| loop i | | | |
	| | measure | | |		| | measure | | |
	| |o------------+ | |		| |o------------+ | |
	| | | write | |		| | | write | |
	| | | measurement | |		| | | measurement | |
	| | +------------>| |		| | +------------>| |
	'--------|-------------|-------------|----'		'--------|-------------|-------------|----'
	| | |		| | |
	Figure 2: PSA Attester Boot Phase		Figure 2: PSA Attester Boot Phase
	* The Initial Attestation Service (executing at run-time in SPE)		* The Initial Attestation Service (executing at run-time in SPE)
	answers requests coming from NSPE via the PSA attestation API		answers requests coming from NSPE via the PSA attestation API
	[PSA-API], collects and formats the claims from Main Boot State,		[PSA-API], collects and formats the claims from Main Boot State,
	and uses the Initial Attestation Key (IAK) to sign them and		and uses the Initial Attestation Key (IAK) to sign them and
	produce Evidence. See Figure 3.		produce Evidence. See Figure 3.
	The word "Initial" in "Initial Attestation Service" refers to a		The word "Initial" in "Initial Attestation Service" refers to a
	limited set of Target Environments, namely those representing the		limited set of Target Environments, namely those representing the
	first, foundational stages establishing the chain of trust of a PSA		first foundational stages establishing the chain of trust of a PSA
	device. Collecting measurements from Target Environments after this		device. Collecting measurements from Target Environments after this
	initial phase is outside the scope of this specification. Extensions		initial phase is outside the scope of this specification. Extensions
	of this specification could collect up-to-date measurements from		of this specification could collect up-to-date measurements from
	additional Target Environments and define additional claims for use		additional Target Environments and define additional claims for use
	within those environments, but these are, by definition, custom.		within those environments, but these are, by definition, custom.
	Initial		Initial
	Main Boot Attestation		Main Boot Attestation
	State Service Verifier		State Service Verifier
	| | |		| | |
	skipping to change at page 8, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at line 304 ¶
	| | i-th Target | | |		| | i-th Target | | |
	| | Environment | | |		| | Environment | | |
	| |<---------------+ | |		| |<---------------+ | |
	'--------|----------------|-----------|----'		'--------|----------------|-----------|----'
	| .---+ |		| .---+ |
	| sign | | |		| sign | | |
	| '-->| |		| '-->| |
	| | PSA Token |		| | PSA Token |
	| +---------->|		| +---------->|
	| | |		| | |
	Figure 3: PSA Attester Run-time Phase
			Figure 3: PSA Attester Run-Time Phase
	The Target Environments can be of four types, some of which may or		The Target Environments can be of four types, some of which may or
	may not be present depending on the device architecture:		may not be present depending on the device architecture:
	* (A subset of) the PSA RoT parameters, including Instance and		* (A subset of) the PSA RoT parameters, including Instance and
	Implementation IDs.		Implementation IDs.
	* The updateable PSA RoT, including the Secure Partition Manager and		* The updateable PSA RoT, including the Secure Partition Manager and
	all PSA RoT services.		all PSA RoT services.
	* The (optional) Application RoT, that is any application-defined		* The (optional) Application RoT, that is any application-defined
	security service, possibly making use of the PSA RoT services.		security service possibly making use of the PSA RoT services.
	* The loader of the application software running in NSPE.		* The loader of the application software running in NSPE.
	A reference implementation of the PSA Attester is provided by [TF-M].		A reference implementation of the PSA Attester is provided by [TF-M].
	4. PSA Claims		4. PSA Claims
	This section describes the claims to be used in a PSA attestation		This section describes the claims to be used in a PSA attestation
	token. A more comprehensive treatment of the EAT profile(s) defined		token. A more comprehensive treatment of the EAT profiles defined by
	by PSA is found in Section 5.		PSA is found in Section 5.
	CDDL [RFC8610] along with text descriptions is used to define each		CDDL [RFC8610] along with text descriptions is used to define each
	claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL type(s) are reused		claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL types are reused
	by different claims:		by different claims:
	psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64		psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64
	Two conventions are used to encode the Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of a		Two conventions are used to encode the Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of a
	claim: the postfix -label is used for EAT-defined claims, and the		claim. The postfix -label is used for EAT-defined claims and the
	postfix -key for PSA-originated claims.		postfix -key is used for PSA-originated claims.
	4.1. Caller Claims		4.1. Caller Claims
	4.1.1. Nonce		4.1.1. Nonce
	The Nonce claim is used to carry the challenge provided by the caller		The EAT [EAT] "nonce" (claim key 10) is used to carry the challenge
	to demonstrate freshness of the generated token.		provided by the caller to demonstrate freshness of the generated
			token.
	The EAT [EAT] nonce (claim key 10) is used. Since the EAT nonce		Since the EAT nonce claim offers flexibility for different
	claim offers flexiblity for different attestation technologies, this		attestation technologies, this specification applies the following
	specifications applies the following constraints to the nonce-type:		constraints to the nonce-type:
	* The length MUST be either 32, 48, or 64 bytes.		* The length MUST be either 32, 48, or 64 bytes.
	* Only a single nonce value is conveyed. The array notation MUST		* Only a single nonce value is conveyed. The array notation MUST
	NOT be used for encoding the nonce value.		NOT be used for encoding the nonce value.
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-nonce = (		psa-nonce = (
	nonce-label => psa-hash-type		nonce-label => psa-hash-type
	skipping to change at page 9, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at line 390 ¶
	psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647		psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647
	psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type		psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type
	psa-client-id = (		psa-client-id = (
	psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type		psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type
	)		)
	4.2. Target Identification Claims		4.2. Target Identification Claims
	4.2.1. Instance ID		4.2.1. Instance ID
	The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the Initial		The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the IAK.
	Attestation Key (IAK). The full definition is in [PSA-SM].		The full definition is in [PSA-SM].
	The EAT ueid (claim key 256) of type RAND is used. The following		The EAT ueid (claim key 256) of type RAND is used. The following
	constraints apply to the ueid-type:		constraints apply to the ueid-type:
	* The length MUST be 33 bytes.		* The length MUST be 33 bytes.
	* The first byte MUST be 0x01 (RAND) followed by the 32-byte unique		* The first byte MUST be 0x01 (RAND) followed by the 32-byte unique
	identifier of the IAK. [PSA-API] provides implementation options		identifier of the IAK. [PSA-API] provides implementation options
	for deriving the IAK unique identifier from the IAK itself.		for deriving the IAK unique identifier from the IAK itself.
	skipping to change at page 10, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at line 442 ¶
	psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32		psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32
	psa-implementation-id = (		psa-implementation-id = (
	psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type		psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type
	)		)
	4.2.3. Certification Reference		4.2.3. Certification Reference
	The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip		The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip
	and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA		and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA
	Certification database. It MUST be represented as a string made of		Certification database. The Certification Reference claim MUST be
	nineteen numeric characters: a thirteen-digit [EAN-13], followed by a		represented as a string made of nineteen numeric characters: a
	dash "-", followed by the five-digit versioning information described		thirteen-digit EAN-13 [EAN-13] followed by a dash "-" and the five-
	in [PSA-Cert-Guide].		digit versioning information described in [PSA-Cert-Guide].
	Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this		Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this
	claim is not present in the token by making an association at a		claim is not present in the token by making an association at a
	Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values -		Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values,
	for example, the Implementation ID.		for example, the Implementation ID.
	This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}-[0-9]{5}"		psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}-[0-9]{5}"
	psa-certification-reference = (		psa-certification-reference = (
	? psa-certification-reference-key =>		? psa-certification-reference-key =>
	psa-certification-reference-type		psa-certification-reference-type
	)		)
	skipping to change at page 14, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at line 568 ¶
	| psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type | Recoverable PSA |		| psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type | Recoverable PSA |
	| | RoT Debug |		| | RoT Debug |
	+----------------------------------------------+-------------------+		+----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
	| psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type | Decommissioned |		| psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type | Decommissioned |
	+----------------------------------------------+-------------------+		+----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
	Table 1: Lifecycle States Mappings		Table 1: Lifecycle States Mappings
	4.3.2. Boot Seed		4.3.2. Boot Seed
	The Boot Seed claim contains a value created at system boot time that		The "bootseed" claim contains a value created at system boot time
	allows differentiation of attestation reports from different boot		that allows differentiation of attestation reports from different
	sessions of a particular entity (i.e., a certain Instance ID).		boot sessions of a particular entity (i.e., a certain Instance ID).
	The EAT bootseed (claim key 268) is used. The following constraints		The EAT "bootseed" (claim key 268) is used. The following
	apply to the binary-data type:		constraints apply to the binary-data type:
	* The length MUST be between 8 and 32 bytes.		* The length MUST be between 8 and 32 bytes.
	This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size (8..32)		psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size (8..32)
	psa-boot-seed = (		psa-boot-seed = (
	boot-seed-label => psa-boot-seed-type		boot-seed-label => psa-boot-seed-type
	)		)
	skipping to change at page 14, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at line 599 ¶
	The Software Components claim is a list of software components that		The Software Components claim is a list of software components that
	includes all the software (both code and configuration) loaded by the		includes all the software (both code and configuration) loaded by the
	PSA RoT. This claim MUST be included in attestation tokens produced		PSA RoT. This claim MUST be included in attestation tokens produced
	by an implementation conformant with [PSA-SM].		by an implementation conformant with [PSA-SM].
	Each entry in the Software Components list describes one software		Each entry in the Software Components list describes one software
	component using the attributes described in the following		component using the attributes described in the following
	subsections. Unless explicitly stated, the presence of an attribute		subsections. Unless explicitly stated, the presence of an attribute
	is OPTIONAL.		is OPTIONAL.
	Note that, as described in [RFC9334], a relying party will typically		Note that a Relying Party will typically see the result of the
	see the result of the appraisal process from the Verifier in form of		appraisal process from the Verifier in form of an Attestation Result
	an Attestation Result, rather than the PSA token from the attesting		rather than the PSA token from the attesting endpoint as described in
	endpoint. Therefore, a relying party is not expected to understand		[RFC9334]. Therefore, a Relying Party is not expected to understand
	the Software Components claim. Instead, it is for the Verifier to		the Software Components claim. Instead, it is for the Verifier to
	check this claim against the available Reference Values and provide		check this claim against the available Reference Values and provide
	an answer in form of an "high level" Attestation Result, which may or		an answer in form of a "high-level" Attestation Result, which may or
	may not include the original Software Components claim.		may not include the original Software Components claim.
	psa-software-component = {		psa-software-component = {
	? &(measurement-type: 1) => text		? &(measurement-type: 1) => text
	&(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type		&(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type
	? &(version: 4) => text		? &(version: 4) => text
	&(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type		&(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type
	? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text		? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 15, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at line 627 ¶
	psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]		psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]
	)		)
	4.4.1.1. Measurement Type		4.4.1.1. Measurement Type
	The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is a short string representing		The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is a short string representing
	the role of this software component.		the role of this software component.
	The following measurement types MAY be used for code measurements:		The following measurement types MAY be used for code measurements:
	* "BL": a Boot Loader		"BL": a Boot Loader
	* "PRoT": a component of the PSA Root of Trust		"PRoT": a component of the PSA Root of Trust
	* "ARoT": a component of the Application Root of Trust		"ARoT": a component of the Application Root of Trust
	* "App": a component of the NSPE application		"App": a component of the NSPE application
	* "TS": a component of a Trusted Subsystem		"TS": a component of a Trusted Subsystem
	The same labels with a "_CONFIG" postfix (e.g., "PRoT_CONFIG") MAY be		The same labels with a "_CONFIG" postfix (e.g., "PRoT_CONFIG") MAY be
	used for configuration measurements.		used for configuration measurements.
	This attribute SHOULD be present in a PSA software component unless		This attribute SHOULD be present in a PSA software component unless
	there is a very good reason to leave it out - for example in networks		there is a very good reason to leave it out, for example, in networks
	with severely constrained bandwidth, where sparing a few bytes really		with severely constrained bandwidth where sparing a few bytes really
	makes a difference.		makes a difference.
	4.4.1.2. Measurement Value		4.4.1.2. Measurement Value
	The Measurement Value attribute (key=2) represents a hash of the		The Measurement Value attribute (key=2) represents a hash of the
	invariant software component in memory at startup time. The value		invariant software component in memory at startup time. The value
	MUST be a cryptographic hash of 256 bits or stronger.		MUST be a cryptographic hash of 256 bits or stronger.
	This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component.		This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component.
	4.4.1.3. Version		4.4.1.3. Version
	The Version attribute (key=4) is the issued software version in the		The Version attribute (key=4) is the issued software version in the
	skipping to change at page 16, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at line 677 ¶
	This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component to be		This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component to be
	compliant with [PSA-SM].		compliant with [PSA-SM].
	4.4.1.5. Measurement Description		4.4.1.5. Measurement Description
	The Measurement Description attribute (key=6) contains a string		The Measurement Description attribute (key=6) contains a string
	identifying the hash algorithm used to compute the corresponding		identifying the hash algorithm used to compute the corresponding
	Measurement Value. The string SHOULD be encoded according to "Hash		Measurement Value. The string SHOULD be encoded according to "Hash
	Name String" in the "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry"		Name String" in the "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry"
	[IANA.named-information].		[NAMED-INFO].
	4.5. Verification Claims		4.5. Verification Claims
	The following claims are part of the PSA token (and therefore still		The following claims, although part of Evidence, do not reflect the
	Evidence) but aim to help receivers, including relying parties, with		internal state of the Attester. Instead, they aim to help receivers,
	the processing of the received attestation Evidence.		including Relying Parties, in processing the received attestation
			Evidence.
	4.5.1. Verification Service Indicator		4.5.1. Verification Service Indicator
	The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a relying		The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a Relying
	party to locate a verification service for the token. The value is a		Party to locate a verification service for the token. The value is a
	text string that can be used to locate the service (typically, a URL		text string that can be used to locate the service (typically, a URL
	specifying the address of the verification service API). A Relying		specifying the address of the verification service API). A Relying
	Party may choose to ignore this claim in favor of other information.		Party may choose to ignore this claim in favor of other information.
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text		psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text
	psa-verification-service-indicator = (		psa-verification-service-indicator = (
	? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>		? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type		psa-verification-service-indicator-type
	)		)
	It is assumed that the relying party is pre-configured with a list of
			It is assumed that the Relying Party is pre-configured with a list of
	trusted verification services and that the contents of this hint can		trusted verification services and that the contents of this hint can
	be used to look up the correct one. Under no circumstances must the		be used to look up the correct one. Under no circumstances must the
	relying party be tricked into contacting an unknown and untrusted		Relying Party be tricked into contacting an unknown and untrusted
	verification service since the returned Attestation Result cannot be		verification service since the returned Attestation Result cannot be
	relied on.		relied on.
	Note: This hint requires the relying party to parse the content of		Note: This hint requires the Relying Party to parse the content of
	the PSA token. Since the relying party may not be in possession of a		the PSA token. Since the Relying Party may not be in possession of a
	trust anchor to verify the digital signature, it uses the hint in the		trust anchor to verify the digital signature, it uses the hint in the
	same way as it would treat any other information provided by an		same way as it would treat any other information provided by an
	external party, which includes attacker-provided data.		external party, which includes attacker-provided data.
	4.5.2. Profile Definition		4.5.2. Profile Definition
	The Profile Definition claim encodes the unique identifier that		The Profile Definition claim encodes the unique identifier that
	corresponds to the EAT profile described by this document. This		corresponds to the EAT profile described by this document. This
	allows a receiver to assign the intended semantics to the rest of the		allows a receiver to assign the intended semantics to the rest of the
	claims found in the token.		claims found in the token.
	The EAT eat_profile (claim key 265) is used.		The EAT eat_profile (claim key 265) is used.
	The URI encoding MUST be used.		The URI encoding MUST be used.
	The value MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm for the profile		The value MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm for the profile
	defined in Section 5.2.		defined in Section 5.2.
	Future profiles derived from the baseline PSA profile SHALL create		Future profiles derived from the baseline PSA profile SHALL create
	their unique value, as described in Section 4.5.2.1.		their unique value as described in Section 4.5.2.1.
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	See Section 4.6, for considerations about backwards compatibility		See Section 4.6 for considerations about backwards compatibility with
	with previous versions of the PSA attestation token format.		previous versions of the PSA attestation token format.
	psa-profile-type = "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"		psa-profile-type = "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"
	psa-profile = (		psa-profile = (
	profile-label => psa-profile-type		profile-label => psa-profile-type
	)		)
	4.5.2.1. URI Structure for the Derived Profile Identifiers		4.5.2.1. URI Structure for the Derived Profile Identifiers
	A new profile is associated with a unique string.		A new profile is associated with a unique string.
	The string MUST use the URI fragment syntax defined in Section 3.5 of		The string MUST use the URI fragment syntax defined in Section 3.5 of
	[RFC3986].		[RFC3986].
	The string SHOULD be short to avoid unnecessary overhead.		The string SHOULD be short to avoid unnecessary overhead.
	To avoid collisions, profile authors SHOULD communicate upfront their		To avoid collisions, profile authors SHOULD communicate their intent
	intent to use a certain string using the enquiry form on the		upfront to use a certain string that uses the inquiry form on the
	[PSACertified] website.		website [PSACertified].
	To derive the value to be used for the eat_profile claim, the string		To derive the value to be used for the eat_profile claim, the string
	is added as a fragment to the tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa tag URI		is added as a fragment to the tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa tag URI
	[RFC4151].		[RFC4151].
	For example, an hypothetical profile using only COSE_Mac0 with the		For example, a hypothetical profile using only COSE_Mac0 with the AES
	AES Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC) may decide to use the		Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC) may decide to use the string
	string "aes-mac". The eat_profile value would then be:		"aes-mac". The eat_profile value would then be
	tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#aes-mac.		tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#aes-mac.
	4.6. Backwards Compatibility Considerations		4.6. Backwards Compatibility Considerations
	A previous version of this specification [PSA-OLD], identified by the		An earlier draft of this document [PSA-OLD] identified by the
	PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 profile, used claim key values from the "private		PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 profile, used claim key values from the "private
	use range" of the CWT Claims registry. These claim keys have now		use range" of the CWT Claims registry. These claim keys have now
	been deprecated.		been deprecated.
	Table 2 provides the mappings between the deprecated and new claim		Table 2 provides the mappings between the deprecated and new claim
	keys.		keys.
	+==============+=================+=================================+		+==============+=================+=================================+
	| |PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1|tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm|		| |PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1|tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm|
	+==============+=================+=================================+		+==============+=================+=================================+
	skipping to change at page 19, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at line 809 ¶
	+--------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+		+--------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+
	|Verification |-75010 |2400 |		|Verification |-75010 |2400 |
	|Service | | |		|Service | | |
	|Indicator | | |		|Indicator | | |
	+--------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+		+--------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+
	Table 2: Claim Key Mappings		Table 2: Claim Key Mappings
	The new profile introduces three further changes:		The new profile introduces three further changes:
	* the "Boot Seed" claim is now optional and of variable length (see		* The "bootseed" claim is now optional and of variable length (see
	Section 4.3.2),		Section 4.3.2).
	* the "No Software Measurements" claim has been retired,		* The "No Software Measurements" claim has been retired.
	* the "Certification Reference" claim syntax changed from EAN-13 to		* The "Certification Reference" claim syntax changed from EAN-13 to
	EAN-13+5 (see Section 4.2.3).		EAN-13+5 (see Section 4.2.3).
	To simplify the transition to the token format described in this		To simplify the transition to the token format described in this
	document it is RECOMMENDED that Verifiers accept tokens encoded		document, it is RECOMMENDED that Verifiers accept tokens encoded
	according to the old profile (PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1) as well as to the		according to the old profile (PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1) as well as to the
	profile defined in this document (tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm),		profile defined in this document (tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm),
	at least for the time needed to their devices to upgrade.		at least for the time needed to their devices to upgrade.
	5. Profiles		5. Profiles
	This document defines a baseline with common requirements that all		This document defines a baseline with common requirements that all
	PSA profiles must satisfy. (Note that this does not apply to		PSA profiles must satisfy. (Note that this does not apply to
	[PSA-OLD].)		[PSA-OLD].)
	This document also defines a "TFM" profile (Section 5.2) that builds		This document also defines a "TFM" profile (Section 5.2) that builds
	on the baseline while constraining the use of COSE algorithms to		on the baseline while constraining the use of COSE algorithms to
	improve interoperability between Attesters and Verifiers.		improve interoperability between Attesters and Verifiers.
	Baseline and TFM are what EAT calls a "partial" and "full" profile,		Baseline and TFM are what the EAT calls a "partial" and "full"
	respectively. See Section 6.2 of [EAT] for further details regarding		profile, respectively. See Section 6.2 of [EAT] for further details
	profiles.		regarding profiles.
	5.1. Baseline Profile		5.1. Baseline Profile
	5.1.1. Token Encoding and Signing		5.1.1. Token Encoding and Signing
	The PSA attestation token is encoded in CBOR [STD94] format. The		The PSA attestation token is encoded in CBOR [STD94] format. The
	CBOR representation of a PSA token MUST be "valid" according to the		CBOR representation of a PSA token MUST be "valid" according to the
	definition in Section 1.2 of [STD94]. Besides, only definite-length		definition in Section 1.2 of RFC 8949 [STD94]. Besides, only
	string, arrays, and maps are allowed. Given that a PSA Attester is		definite-length string, arrays, and maps are allowed. Given that a
	typically found in a constrained device, it MAY NOT emit CBOR		PSA Attester is typically found in a constrained device, it MAY NOT
	preferred serializations (Section 4.1 of [STD94]). Therefore, the		emit CBOR preferred serializations (Section 4.1 of RFC 8949 [STD94]).
	Verifier MUST be a variation-tolerant CBOR decoder.		Therefore, the Verifier MUST be a variation-tolerant CBOR decoder.
	Cryptographic protection is obtained by wrapping the psa-token		Cryptographic protection is obtained by wrapping the psa-token claims
	claims-set in a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392]. For asymmetric key		set in a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392]. For asymmetric key
	algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (18) COSE_Sign1.		algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (18) COSE_Sign1.
	For symmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a		For symmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a
	tagged (17) COSE_Mac0.		tagged (17) COSE_Mac0.
	Acknowledging the variety of markets, regulations and use cases in		Acknowledging the variety of markets, regulations, and use cases in
	which the PSA attestation token can be used, the baseline profile		which the PSA attestation token can be used, the baseline profile
	does not impose any strong requirement on the cryptographic		does not impose any strong requirement on the cryptographic
	algorithms that need to be supported by Attesters and Verifiers. The		algorithms that need to be supported by Attesters and Verifiers. The
	flexibility provided by the COSE format should be sufficient to deal		flexibility provided by the COSE format should be sufficient to deal
	with the level of cryptographic agility needed to adapt to specific		with the level of cryptographic agility needed to adapt to specific
	use cases. It is RECOMMENDED that commonly adopted algorithms are		use cases. It is RECOMMENDED that commonly adopted algorithms are
	used, such as those discussed in [COSE-ALGS]. It is expected that		used, such as those discussed in [COSE-ALGS]. It is expected that
	receivers will accept a wider range of algorithms, while Attesters		receivers will accept a wider range of algorithms while Attesters
	would produce PSA tokens using only one such algorithm.		would produce PSA tokens using only one such algorithm.
	The CWT CBOR tag (61) is not used. An application that needs to		The CWT CBOR tag (61) is not used. An application that needs to
	exchange PSA attestation tokens can wrap the serialised COSE_Sign1 or		exchange PSA attestation tokens can wrap the serialized COSE_Sign1 or
	COSE_Mac0 in the media type defined in Section 11.2 or the CoAP		COSE_Mac0 in the media type defined in Section 10.2 or the CoAP
	Content-Format defined in Section 11.3.		Content-Format defined in Section 10.3.
	A PSA token is always directly signed by the PSA RoT. Therefore, a		A PSA token is always directly signed by the PSA RoT. Therefore, a
	PSA claims-set (Section 4) is never carried in a Detached EAT bundle		PSA-token claims set (Section 4) is never carried in a Detached EAT
	(Section 5 of [EAT]).		bundle (Section 5 of [EAT]).
	5.1.2. Freshness Model		5.1.2. Freshness Model
	The PSA token supports the freshness models for attestation Evidence		The PSA token supports the freshness models for attestation Evidence
	based on nonces and epoch handles (Section 10.2 and Section 10.3 of		based on nonces and epoch handles (Section 10.2 and Section 10.3 of
	[RFC9334]) using the nonce claim to convey the nonce or epoch handle		[RFC9334]) using the "nonce" claim to convey the nonce or epoch
	supplied by the Verifier. No further assumption on the specific		handle supplied by the Verifier. No further assumption on the
	remote attestation protocol is made.		specific remote attestation protocol is made.
	Note that use of epoch handles is constrained by the type		Note that use of epoch handles is constrained by the type
	restrictions imposed by the eat_nonce syntax. For use in PSA tokens,		restrictions imposed by the eat_nonce syntax. For use in PSA tokens,
	it must be possible to encode the epoch handle as an opaque binary		it must be possible to encode the epoch handle as an opaque binary
	string between 8 and 64 octets.		string between 8 and 64 octets.
	5.1.3. Synopsis		5.1.3. Synopsis
	Table 3 presents a concise view of the requirements described in the		Table 3 presents a concise view of the requirements described in the
	preceding sections.		preceding sections.
	+==================+=============================================+		+==================+=============================================+
	| Issue | Profile Definition |		| Issue | Profile Definition |
	+==================+=============================================+		+==================+=============================================+
	| CBOR/JSON | CBOR MUST be used |		| CBOR/JSON | CBOR MUST be used. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR Encoding | Definite length maps and arrays MUST be |		| CBOR Encoding | Definite length maps and arrays MUST be |
	| | used |		| | used. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR Encoding | Definite length strings MUST be used |		| CBOR Encoding | Definite length strings MUST be used. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR | Variant serialization MAY be used |		| CBOR | Variant serialization MAY be used. |
	| Serialization | |		| Serialization | |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| COSE Protection | COSE_Sign1 and/or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used |		| COSE Protection | COSE_Sign1 and/or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Algorithms | [COSE-ALGS] SHOULD be used |		| Algorithms | [COSE-ALGS] SHOULD be used. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Detached EAT | Detached EAT bundles MUST NOT be sent |		| Detached EAT | Detached EAT bundles MUST NOT be sent. |
	| Bundle Usage | |		| Bundle Usage | |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Verification Key | Any identification method listed in |		| Verification Key | Any identification method listed in |
	| Identification | Appendix F.1 of [EAT] |		| Identification | Appendix F.1 of [EAT]. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Endorsements | See Section 8.2 |		| Endorsements | See Section 8.2. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Freshness | nonce or epoch ID based |		| Freshness | Nonce or epoch ID-based. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	| Claims | Those defined in Section 4. As per general |		| Claims | Those defined in Section 4. As per general |
	| | EAT rules, the receiver MUST NOT error out |		| | EAT rules, the receiver MUST NOT error out |
	| | on claims it does not understand. |		| | on claims it does not understand. |
	+------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+------------------+---------------------------------------------+
	Table 3: Baseline Profile		Table 3: Baseline Profile
	5.2. Profile TFM		5.2. Profile TFM
	This profile is appropriate for the code base implemented in [TF-M]		The TFM profile is appropriate for the code base implemented in
	and should apply for most derivative implementations. If an		[TF-M] and should apply for most derivative implementations. If an
	implementation changes the requirements described below then, to		implementation changes the requirements described below, then a
	ensure interoperability, a different profile value should be used		different profile value should be used (Section 4.5.2.1) to ensure
	(Section 4.5.2.1). This includes a restriction of the profile to a		interoperability. This includes a restriction of the profile to a
	subset of the COSE Protection scheme requirements.		subset of the COSE Protection scheme requirements.
	Table 4 presents a concise view of the requirements.		Table 4 presents a concise view of the requirements.
	The value of the eat_profile MUST be		The value of the eat_profile MUST be
	tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm.		tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm.
	+================+=============================================+		+================+==============================================+
	| Issue | Profile Definition |		| Issue | Profile Definition |
	+================+=============================================+		+================+==============================================+
	| CBOR/JSON | See Section 5.1 |		| CBOR/JSON | See Section 5.1. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR Encoding | See Section 5.1 |		| CBOR Encoding | See Section 5.1. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR Encoding | See Section 5.1 |		| CBOR Encoding | See Section 5.1. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| CBOR | See Section 5.1 |		| CBOR | See Section 5.1. |
	| Serialization | |		| Serialization | |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| COSE | COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used |		| COSE | COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used. |
	| Protection | |		| Protection | |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Algorithms | The receiver MUST accept ES256, ES384 and |		| Algorithms | The receiver MUST accept ES256, ES384, and |
	| | ES512 with COSE_Sign1 and HMAC256/256, |		| | ES512 with COSE_Sign1 and HMAC256/256, |
	| | HMAC384/384 and HMAC512/512 with COSE_Mac0; |		| | HMAC384/384, and HMAC512/512 with COSE_Mac0; |
	| | the sender MUST send one of these |		| | the sender MUST send one of these. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Detached EAT | See Section 5.1 |		| Detached EAT | See Section 5.1. |
	| Bundle Usage | |		| Bundle Usage | |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Verification | Claim-Based Key Identification |		| Verification | Claim-Based Key Identification |
	| Key | (Appendix F.1.4 of [EAT]) using Instance ID |		| Key | (Appendix F.1.4 of [EAT]) using Instance ID. |
	| Identification | |		| Identification | |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Endorsements | See Section 8.2 |		| Endorsements | See Section 8.2. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Freshness | See Section 5.1 |		| Freshness | See Section 5.1. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	| Claims | See Section 5.1 |		| Claims | See Section 5.1. |
	+----------------+---------------------------------------------+		+----------------+----------------------------------------------+
	Table 4: TF-M Profile		Table 4: TF-M Profile
	6. Collated CDDL		6. Collated CDDL
	psa-token = {		psa-token = {
	psa-nonce		psa-nonce
	psa-instance-id		psa-instance-id
	psa-verification-service-indicator		psa-verification-service-indicator
	psa-profile		psa-profile
	psa-implementation-id		psa-implementation-id
	psa-client-id		psa-client-id
	skipping to change at page 26, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at line 1084 ¶
	? &(version: 4) => text		? &(version: 4) => text
	&(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type		&(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type
	? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text		? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text
	}		}
	psa-software-components = (		psa-software-components = (
	psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]		psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]
	)		)
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text		psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text
	psa-verification-service-indicator = (		psa-verification-service-indicator = (
	? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>		? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type		psa-verification-service-indicator-type
	)		)
	7. Scalability Considerations		7. Scalability Considerations
	IAKs (see Section 3) can be either raw public keys or certified		IAKs (see Section 3) can be either raw public keys or certified
	public keys.		public keys.
	Certified public keys require the manufacturer to run the		Certified public keys require the manufacturer to run the
	certification authority (CA) that issues X.509 certs for the IAKs.		certification authority (CA) that issues X.509 certificates for the
	(Note that operating a CA is a complex and expensive task that may be		IAKs. (Note that operating a CA is a complex and expensive task that
	unaffordable to certain manufacturers.)		may be unaffordable to certain manufacturers.)
	Using certified public keys offers better scalability properties when		Using certified public keys offers better scalability properties when
	compared to using raw public keys, namely:		compared to using raw public keys, namely:
	* storage requirements for the Verifier are minimised - the same		* Storage requirements for the Verifier are minimized; the same
	manufacturer's trust anchor is used for any number of devices,		manufacturer's trust anchor is used for any number of devices.
	* the provisioning model is simpler and more robust since there is		* The provisioning model is simpler and more robust since there is
	no need to notify the Verifier about each newly manufactured		no need to notify the Verifier about each newly manufactured
	device,		device.
	Furthermore, existing and well-understood revocation mechanisms can		Furthermore, existing and well-understood revocation mechanisms can
	be readily used.		be readily used.
	The IAK's X.509 cert can be inlined in the PSA token using the		The IAK's X.509 certificates can be inlined in the PSA token using
	x5chain COSE header parameter [COSE-X509] at the cost of an increase		the x5chain COSE header parameter [COSE-X509] at the cost of an
	in the PSA token size. Section 4.4 of [TLS12-IoT] and Section 15 of		increase in the PSA token size. Section 4.4 of [TLS12-IoT] and
	[TLS13-IoT] provide guidance for profiling X.509 certs used in IoT		Section 15 of [TLS13-IoT] provide guidance for profiling X.509
	deployments. Note that the exact split between pre-provisioned and		certificates used in IoT deployments. Note that the exact split
	inlined certs may vary depending on the specific deployment. In that		between pre-provisioned and inlined certificates may vary depending
	respect, x5chain is quite flexible: it can contain the end-entity		on the specific deployment. In that respect, x5chain is quite
	(EE) cert only, the EE and a partial chain, or the EE and the full		flexible. It can contain the end entity (EE) certification only, the
	chain up to the trust anchor (see Section 2 of [COSE-X509] for the		EE and a partial chain, or the EE and the full chain up to the trust
	details). Constraints around network bandwidth and computing		anchor (see Section 2 of [COSE-X509] for the details). Constraints
	resources available to endpoints, such as network buffers, may		around network bandwidth and computing resources available to
	dictate a reasonable split point.		endpoints, such as network buffers, may dictate a reasonable split
			point.
	8. PSA Token Verification		8. PSA Token Verification
	To verify the token, the primary need is to check correct encoding		To verify the token, the primary need is to check correct encoding
	and signing as detailed in Section 5.1.1. The key used for		and signing as detailed in Section 5.1.1. The key used for
	verification is either supplied to the Verifier by an authorized		verification is either supplied to the Verifier by an authorized
	Endorser along with the corresponding Attester's Instance ID or		Endorser along with the corresponding Attester's Instance ID or
	inlined in the token using the x5chain header parameter as described		inlined in the token using the x5chain header parameter as described
	in Section 7. If the IAK is a raw public key, the Instance ID claim		in Section 7. If the IAK is a raw public key and the Instance ID
	is used to assist in locating the key used to verify the signature		claim is used to assist in locating the key used to verify the
	covering the CWT token. If the IAK is a certified public key, X.509		signature covering the CWT token. If the IAK is a certified public
	path construction and validation (Section 6 of [X509]) up to a		key, X.509 path construction and validation (Section 6 of [X509]) up
	trusted CA MUST be successful before the key is used to verify the		to a trusted CA MUST be successful before the key is used to verify
	token signature. This also includes revocation checking.		the token signature. This also includes revocation checking.
	In addition, the Verifier will typically operate a policy where		The Verifier typically has a policy where it compares some claims in
	values of some of the claims in this profile can be compared to		this profile to reference values registered with it for a given
	reference values, registered with the Verifier for a given		deployment. This verification process serves to confirm that the
	deployment, in order to confirm that the device is endorsed by the		device is endorsed by the manufacturer supply chain. The policy may
	manufacturer supply chain. The policy may require that the relevant		require that the relevant claims must have a match to a registered
	claims must have a match to a registered reference value. All claims		reference value. All claims may be worthy of additional appraisal.
	may be worthy of additional appraisal. It is likely that most		It is likely that most deployments would include a policy with
	deployments would include a policy with appraisal for the following		appraisal for the following claims:
	claims:
	* Implementation ID - the value of the Implementation ID can be used		* Implementation ID: The value of the Implementation ID can be used
	to identify the verification requirements of the deployment.		to identify the verification requirements of the deployment.
	* Software Component, Measurement Value - this value can uniquely		* Software Component, Measurement Value: This value can uniquely
	identify a firmware release from the supply chain. In some cases,		identify a firmware release from the supply chain. In some cases,
	a Verifier may maintain a record for a series of firmware		a Verifier may maintain a record for a series of firmware releases
	releases, being patches to an original baseline release. A		being patches to an original baseline release. A verification
	verification policy may then allow this value to match any point		policy may then allow this value to match any point on that
	on that release sequence or expect some minimum level of maturity		release sequence or expect some minimum level of maturity related
	related to the sequence.		to the sequence.
	* Software Component, Signer ID - where present in a deployment,		* Software Component, Signer ID: Where present in a deployment, this
	this could allow a Verifier to operate a more general policy than		could allow a Verifier to operate a more general policy than that
	that for Measurement Value as above, by allowing a token to		for Measurement Value as above by allowing a token to contain any
	contain any firmware entries signed by a known Signer ID, without		firmware entries signed by a known Signer ID without checking for
	checking for a uniquely registered version.		a uniquely registered version.
	* Certification Reference - if present, this value could be used as		* Certification Reference: If present, this value could be used as a
	a hint to locate security certification information associated		hint to locate security certification information associated with
	with the attesting device. An example could be a reference to a		the attesting device. An example could be a reference to a
	[PSACertified] certificate.		[PSACertified] certificate.
	8.1. AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings		8.1. AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings
	[RATS-AR4SI] defines an information model that Verifiers can employ		[RATS-AR4SI] defines an information model that Verifiers can employ
	to produce Attestation Results. AR4SI provides a set of standardized		to produce Attestation Results. AR4SI provides a set of standardized
	appraisal categories and tiers that greatly simplifies the task of		appraisal categories and tiers that greatly simplifies the task of
	writing Relying Party policies in multi-attester environments.		writing Relying Party policies in Multi-Attester environments.
	The contents of Table 5 are intended as guidance for implementing a		The contents of Table 5 are intended as guidance for implementing a
	PSA Verifier that computes its results using AR4SI. The table		PSA Verifier that computes its results using AR4SI. The table
	describes which PSA Evidence claims (if any) are related to which		describes which PSA Evidence claims (if any) are related to which
	AR4SI trustworthiness claim, and therefore what the Verifier must		AR4SI trustworthiness claim, and therefore what the Verifier must
	consider when deciding if and how to appraise a certain feature		consider when deciding if and how to appraise a certain feature
	associated with the PSA Attester.		associated with the PSA Attester.
	+===================+=============================================+		+=====================+===========================================+
	| Trustworthiness | Related PSA claims |		| Trustworthiness | Related PSA claims |
	| Vector claims | |		| Vector claims | |
	+===================+=============================================+		+=====================+===========================================+
	| configuration | Software Components (Section 4.4.1) |		| "configuration" | Software Components (Section 4.4.1) |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| executables | ditto |		| "executables" | ditto |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| file-system | N/A |		| "file-system" | N/A |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| hardware | Implementation ID (Section 4.2.2) |		| "hardware" | Implementation ID (Section 4.2.2) |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| instance-identity | Instance ID (Section 4.2.1). The Security |		| "instance-identity" | Instance ID (Section 4.2.1). The |
	| | Lifecycle (Section 4.3.1) can also impact |		| | Security Lifecycle (Section 4.3.1) can |
	| | the derived identity. |		| | also impact the derived identity. |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| runtime-opaque | Indirectly derived from executables, |		| "runtime-opaque" | Indirectly derived from "executables", |
	| | hardware, and instance-identity. The |		| | "hardware", and "instance-identity". The |
	| | Security Lifecycle (Section 4.3.1) can also |		| | Security Lifecycle (Section 4.3.1) can |
	| | be relevant: for example, any debug state |		| | also be relevant, e.g., any debug state |
	| | will expose otherwise protected memory. |		| | will expose otherwise protected memory. |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| sourced-data | N/A |		| "sourced-data" | N/A |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	| storage-opaque | Indirectly derived from executables, |		| "storage-opaque" | Indirectly derived from "executables", |
	| | hardware, and instance-identity. |		| | "hardware", and "instance-identity". |
	+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+		+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
	Table 5: AR4SI Claims mappings		Table 5: AR4SI Claims mappings
	This document does not prescribe what value must be chosen based on		This document does not prescribe what value must be chosen based on
	each possible situation: when assigning specific Trustworthiness		each possible situation. When assigning specific Trustworthiness
	Claim values, an implementation is expected to follow the algorithm		Claim values, an implementation is expected to follow the algorithm
	described in Section 2.3.3 of [RATS-AR4SI].		described in Section 2.3.3 of [RATS-AR4SI].
	8.2. Endorsements, Reference Values and Verification Key Material		8.2. Endorsements, Reference Values, and Verification Key Material
	[PSA-Endorsements] defines a protocol based on the [RATS-CoRIM] data		[PSA-Endorsements] defines a protocol based on the [RATS-CoRIM] data
	model that can be used to convey PSA Endorsements, Reference Values		model that can be used to convey PSA Endorsements, Reference Values,
	and verification key material to the Verifier.		and verification key material to the Verifier.
	9. Implementation Status		9. Security and Privacy Considerations
	// RFC Editor: please remove this section before pubblication.
	Implementations of this specification are provided by the Trusted
	Firmware-M project [TF-M], [IAT-VERIFIER], the Veraison project
	[Veraison], and the Xclaim [Xclaim] library. All four
	implementations are released as open-source software.
	10. Security and Privacy Considerations
	This specification re-uses the EAT specification and therefore the		This specification reuses the EAT specification and therefore the CWT
	CWT specification. Hence, the security and privacy considerations of		specification. Hence, the security and privacy considerations of
	those specifications apply here as well.		those specifications apply here as well.
	Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this		Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this
	specification profiles those options and allows signatures using		specification profiles those options and allows signatures using
	public key cryptography as well as message authentication codes		public key cryptography as well as message authentication codes
	(MACs). COSE_Sign1 is used for digital signatures and COSE_Mac0 for		(MACs). COSE_Sign1 is used for digital signatures and COSE_Mac0 for
	MACs, as defined in the COSE specification [STD96]. Note, however,		MACs as defined in the COSE specification [STD96]. Note, however,
	that the use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the		that the use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the
	associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol		associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol
	complexities.		complexities.
	A PSA Attester MUST NOT provide Evidence to an untrusted challenger,		A PSA Attester MUST NOT provide Evidence to an untrusted challenger,
	as it may allow attackers to interpose and trick the Verifier into		as it may allow attackers to interpose and trick the Verifier into
	believing the attacker is a legitimate Attester. This is especially		believing the attacker is a legitimate Attester. This is especially
	relevant to protocols that use PSA attestation tokens to authenticate		relevant to protocols that use PSA attestation tokens to authenticate
	the attester to a relying party.		the attester to a Relying Party.
	Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a device
	and therefore they may allow to single out an individual device for
	tracking purposes. Deployments that have privacy requirements must
	take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used to
	provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.
	11. IANA Considerations
	11.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
	IANA is requested to make permanent the following claims that have
	been assigned via early allocation in the "CBOR Web Token (CWT)
	Claims" registry [IANA-CWT].
	11.1.1. Client ID Claim
	* Claim Name: psa-client-id
	* Claim Description: PSA Client ID
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A
	* Claim Key: 2394
	* Claim Value Type(s): signed integer
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of RFCthis
	11.1.2. Security Lifecycle Claim
	* Claim Name: psa-security-lifecycle
	* Claim Description: PSA Security Lifecycle
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A
	* Claim Key: 2395
	* Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.3.1 of RFCthis
	11.1.3. Implementation ID Claim
	* Claim Name: psa-implementation-id
	* Claim Description: PSA Implementation ID
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A
	* Claim Key: 2396
	* Claim Value Type(s): byte string
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.2 of RFCthis
	11.1.4. Certification Reference Claim
	* Claim Name: psa-certification-reference
	* Claim Description: PSA Certification Reference
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A
	* Claim Key: 2398
	* Claim Value Type(s): text string
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.3 of RFCthis		Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a
			device. Therefore, they may allow to single out an individual device
			for tracking purposes. Deployments that have privacy requirements
			must take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used
			to provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.
	11.1.5. Software Components Claim		10. IANA Considerations
	* Claim Name: psa-software-components		10.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
	* Claim Description: PSA Software Components		IANA has registered the following claims in the "CBOR Web Token (CWT)
			Claims" registry [CWT].
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A		10.1.1. Client ID Claim
	* Claim Key: 2399		Claim Name: psa-client-id
			Claim Description: PSA Client ID
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2394
			Claim Value Type(s): signed integer
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of RFC 9783
	* Claim Value Type(s): array		10.1.2. Security Lifecycle Claim
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig		Claim Name: psa-security-lifecycle
			Claim Description: PSA Security Lifecycle
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2395
			Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.3.1 of RFC 9783
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.4.1 of RFCthis		10.1.3. Implementation ID Claim
	11.1.6. Verification Service Indicator Claim		Claim Name: psa-implementation-id
			Claim Description: PSA Implementation ID
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2396
			Claim Value Type(s): byte string
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.2 of RFC 9783
	* Claim Name: psa-verification-service-indicator		10.1.4. Certification Reference Claim
	* Claim Description: PSA Verification Service Indicator		Claim Name: psa-certification-reference
			Claim Description: PSA Certification Reference
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2398
			Claim Value Type(s): text string
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.3 of RFC 9783
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A		10.1.5. Software Components Claim
	* Claim Key: 2400		Claim Name: psa-software-components
	* Claim Value Type(s): text string		Claim Description: PSA Software Components
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2399
			Claim Value Type(s): array
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.4.1 of RFC 9783
	* Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig		10.1.6. Verification Service Indicator Claim
	* Specification Document(s): Section 4.5.1 of RFCthis		Claim Name: psa-verification-service-indicator
			Claim Description: PSA Verification Service Indicator
			JWT Claim Name: N/A
			Claim Key: 2400
			Claim Value Type(s): text string
			Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
			Specification Document(s): Section 4.5.1 of RFC 9783
	11.2. Media Types		10.2. Media Types
	No new media type registration is requested. To indicate that the		This document does not register any new media types. To indicate
	transmitted content is a PSA attestation token, applications can use		that the transmitted content is a PSA attestation token, applications
	the application/eat+cwt media type defined in [EAT-MEDIATYPES] with		can use the application/eat+cwt media type defined in
	the eat_profile parameter set to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm		[EAT-MEDIATYPES] with the eat_profile parameter set to
	(or tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy if the token is encoded		tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm (or
	according to the old profile, see Section 4.6).		tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy if the token is encoded
			according to the old profile; see Section 4.6).
	11.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration		10.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration
	IANA is requested to register two CoAP Content-Format IDs in the		IANA has registered two CoAP Content-Format IDs in the First Come
	"CoAP Content-Formats" registry [IANA-CoAP-Content-Formats]:		First Served range of the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry
			[Content-Formats]:
	* One for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile		* One for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile
	parameter equal to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm		parameter equal to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm.
	* Another for the application/eat+cwt media type with the		* Another for the application/eat+cwt media type with the
	eat_profile parameter equal to		eat_profile parameter equal to
	tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy		tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy.
	The Content-Formats should be allocated from the First Come First
	Served range (10000-64999).
	11.3.1. Registry Contents		10.3.1. Registry Contents
	* Media Type: application/eat+cwt;		Media Type: application/eat+cwt;
	eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"		eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"
			Encoding: -
			ID: 10003
			Reference: RFC 9783
	* Encoding: -		Media Type: application/eat+cwt;
	* Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
	* Reference: RFCthis
	* Media Type: application/eat+cwt;
	eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy"		eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2019:psa#legacy"
			Encoding: -
			ID: 10004
			Reference: RFC 9783
	* Encoding: -		11. References
	* Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
	* Reference: RFCthis
	12. References
	12.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[COSE-ALGS]		[COSE-ALGS]
	Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):		Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
	Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,		Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
	August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.		August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053>.
	[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",		[CWT] IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
	2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
			[EAN-13] GS1, "EAN/UPC barcodes",
			<https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.
	[EAT] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.		[EAT] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
	Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in		Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711,
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-31, 6		DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025,
	September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9711>.
	draft-ietf-rats-eat-31>.
	[EAT-MEDIATYPES]		[EAT-MEDIATYPES]
	Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "EAT Media		Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "Entity
	Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-		Attestation Token (EAT) Media Types", RFC 9782,
	eat-media-type-09, 21 August 2024,		DOI 10.17487/RFC9782, May 2025,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9782>.
	eat-media-type-09>.
	[IANA-CWT] IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", 2022,
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml#claims-
	registry>.
	[IANA.named-information]		[NAMED-INFO]
	IANA, "Named Information",		IANA, "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry",
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information>.		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information>.
	[PSA-Cert-Guide]		[PSA-Cert-Guide]
	PSA Certified, "PSA Certified Level 2 Step by Step Guide		PSA Certified, "PSA Certified Level 2 Step by Step Guide
	Version 1.1", 2020,		Version 1.1", April 2020,
	<https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2020/07/		<https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2020/07/
	JSADEN011-PSA_Certified_Level_2_Step-by-Step-		JSADEN011-PSA_Certified_Level_2_Step-by-Step-
	1.1-20200403.pdf>.		1.1-20200403.pdf>.
	[PSA-FF] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework		[PSA-FF] Arm, "Arm PSA Firmware Framework 1.0",
	1.0 (PSA-FF)", February 2019,
	<https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0063/a>.		<https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0063/a>.
	[PSA-SM] Arm, "Platform Security Model 1.1", December 2021,		[PSA-SM] Arm, "Platform Security Model 1.1", December 2021,
	<https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/		<https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/
	JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM_V1.1_BET0.pdf>.		JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM_V1.1_BET0.pdf>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
	RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,		RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	[RFC4151] Kindberg, T. and S. Hawke, "The 'tag' URI Scheme",		[RFC4151] Kindberg, T. and S. Hawke, "The 'tag' URI Scheme",
	RFC 4151, DOI 10.17487/RFC4151, October 2005,		RFC 4151, DOI 10.17487/RFC4151, October 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4151>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4151>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,		[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,		"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
	May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392>.		May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
	[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data		[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
	Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to		Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
	Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and		Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
	JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,		JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
	June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.		June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	[STD94] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[STD94] Internet Standard 94,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94>.
			At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
			Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,		Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,		DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
	[STD96] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):		[STD96] Internet Standard 96,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96>.
			At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
			Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
	Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,		Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,		DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
			Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
			Countersignatures", STD 96, RFC 9338,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC9338, December 2022,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338>.
	[X509] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[X509] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
	12.2. Informative References		11.2. Informative References
			[Content-Formats]
			IANA, "CoAP Content-Formats",
			<https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
	[COSE-X509]		[COSE-X509]
	Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):		Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
	Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509		Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
	Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February		Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February
	2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9360>.		2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9360>.
	[I-D.kdyxy-rats-tdx-eat-profile]
	Kostal, G., Dittakavi, S., Yeluri, R., Xia, H., and J. Yu,
	"EAT profile for Intel® Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
	attestation result", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
	draft-kdyxy-rats-tdx-eat-profile-01, 23 April 2024,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kdyxy-rats-
	tdx-eat-profile-01>.
	[I-D.mandyam-rats-qwestoken]
	Mandyam, G., Sekhar, V., and S. Mohammed, "The Qualcomm
	Wireless Edge Services (QWES) Attestation Token", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mandyam-rats-qwestoken-00,
	1 November 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
	draft-mandyam-rats-qwestoken-00>.
	[IANA-CoAP-Content-Formats]
	IANA, "CoAP Content-Formats", 2022,
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
	[IAT-VERIFIER]		[IAT-VERIFIER]
	Linaro, "iat-verifier", 2023,		Trusted Firmware, "iat-verifier", commit:
	<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/tf-m-tools.git/tree/		0b49b00195b7733d6fe74e8f42ed4d7b81242801, 18 August 2023,
	iat-verifier>.		<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/tf-
			m-tools/+/refs/heads/main/iat-verifier/>.
	[PSA] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Resources", 2022,		[PSA] Arm, "Security - Platform Security Architecture",
	<https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-		<https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101892/0100/
	architectures/platform-security-architecture/		Security---Platform-Security-Architecture?lang=en>.
	documentation>.
	[PSA-API] Arm, "PSA Attestation API 1.0.3", 2022, <https://arm-		[PSA-API] Arm, "PSA Certified Attestation API 1.0", October 2022,
	software.github.io/psa-api/attestation/1.0/IHI0085-		<https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/attestation/1.0/
	PSA_Certified_Attestation_API-1.0.3.pdf>.		IHI0085-PSA_Certified_Attestation_API-1.0.3.pdf>.
	[PSA-Endorsements]		[PSA-Endorsements]
	Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., and H. Birkholz, "Arm's		Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., and H. Birkholz, "A CoRIM
	Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Verifier		Profile for Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA)",
	Endorsements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-		Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fdb-rats-psa-
	fdb-rats-psa-endorsements-05, 30 August 2024,		endorsements-06, 3 March 2025,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fdb-rats-psa-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fdb-rats-psa-
	endorsements-05>.		endorsements-06>.
	[PSA-OLD] Tschofenig, H., Frost, S., Brossard, M., Shaw, A. L., and		[PSA-OLD] Tschofenig, H., Frost, S., Brossard, M., Shaw, A. L., and
	T. Fossati, "Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA)		T. Fossati, "Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA)
	Attestation Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,		Attestation Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
	draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-07, 1 February 2021,		draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-07, 1 February 2021,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-
	rats-psa-token-07>.		rats-psa-token-07>.
	[PSACertified]		[PSACertified]
	PSA Certified, "PSA Certified IoT Security Framework",		PSA Certified, "PSA Certified: IoT Security Framework and
	2022, <https://psacertified.org>.		Certification", <https://psacertified.org>.
	[RATS-AR4SI]		[RATS-AR4SI]
	Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V.		Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V.
	Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions",		Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions",
	Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-		Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-
	07, 2 September 2024,		08, 6 February 2025,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
	ar4si-07>.		ar4si-08>.
	[RATS-CoRIM]		[RATS-CoRIM]
	Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and		Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and
	W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in		W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-05, 8 July		Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-07, 3
	2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-		March 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
	rats-corim-05>.		ietf-rats-corim-07>.
			[RATS-QWESTOKEN]
			Mandyam, G., Sekhar, V., and S. Mohammed, "The Qualcomm
			Wireless Edge Services (QWES) Attestation Token", Work in
			Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mandyam-rats-qwestoken-00,
			1 November 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
			draft-mandyam-rats-qwestoken-00>.
			[RATS-TDX] Kostal, G., Dittakavi, S., Yeluri, R., Xia, H., and J. Yu,
			"EAT profile for Intel(r) Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
			attestation result", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
			draft-kdyxy-rats-tdx-eat-profile-02, 13 December 2024,
			<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kdyxy-rats-
			tdx-eat-profile-02>.
	[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and		[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
	W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)		W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
	Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January		Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
	2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.		2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
	[TF-M] Linaro, "Trusted Firmware-M", 2022,		[TF-M] Trusted Firmware, "Trusted Firmware-M",
	<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/>.		<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/>.
	[TLS12-IoT]		[TLS12-IoT]
	Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer		Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)		Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
	Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,		Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7925>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
	[TLS13-IoT]		[TLS13-IoT]
	Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and M. Richardson, "TLS/DTLS		Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and M. Richardson, "TLS/DTLS
	1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things", Work in		1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-		Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-
	profile-09, 3 March 2024,		profile-14, 5 May 2025,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-
	tls13-iot-profile-09>.		tls13-iot-profile-14>.
	[Veraison] The Veraison Project, "Veraison psatoken package", 2022,
	<https://github.com/veraison/psatoken>.
	[Xclaim] Lundblade, L., "Xclaim", 2022,
	<https://github.com/laurencelundblade/xclaim>.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	The following examples show PSA attestation tokens for an		The following examples show PSA attestation tokens for a hypothetical
	hypothetical system comprising a single measured software component.		system comprising a single measured software component. The
	The attesting device is in a lifecycle state (Section 4.3.1) of		attesting device is in a lifecycle state (Section 4.3.1) of SECURED.
	SECURED. The attestation has been requested from a client residing		The attestation has been requested from a client residing in the SPE.
	in the SPE.
	The example in Appendix A.1 illustrates the case where the IAK is an		The example in Appendix A.1 illustrates the case where the IAK is an
	asymmetric key. A COSE Sign1 envelope is used to wrap the PSA		asymmetric key. A COSE Sign1 envelope is used to wrap the PSA-token
	claims-set.		claims set.
	Appendix A.2 illustrates the case where the IAK is a symmetric key		Appendix A.2 illustrates the case where the IAK is a symmetric key
	and a COSE Mac0 envelope is used instead.		and a COSE Mac0 envelope is used instead.
	The claims sets are identical, except for the Instance ID which is		The claims sets are identical, except for the Instance ID which is
	synthesized from the key material.		synthesized from the key material.
	The examples have been created using the iat-verifier tool		The examples have been created using the iat-verifier tool
	[IAT-VERIFIER].		[IAT-VERIFIER].
	A.1. COSE Sign1 Token		A.1. COSE Sign1 Token
	{
	/ ueid / 256: h'01020202020202020202020202		{
	0202020202020202020202020202020202020202',		/ ueid / 256: h'01020202020202020202020202
	/ psa-implementation-id / 2396: h'00000000000000000000000000		0202020202020202020202020202020202020202',
	00000000000000000000000000000000000000',		/ psa-implementation-id / 2396: h'00000000000000000000000000
	/ eat_nonce / 10: h'01010101010101010101010101		00000000000000000000000000000000000000',
	01010101010101010101010101010101010101',		/ eat_nonce / 10: h'01010101010101010101010101
	/ psa-client-id / 2394: 2147483647,		01010101010101010101010101010101010101',
	/ psa-security-lifecycle / 2395: 12288,		/ psa-client-id / 2394: 2147483647,
	/ eat_profile / 265: "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm",		/ psa-security-lifecycle / 2395: 12288,
	/ bootseed / 268: h'0000000000000000',		/ eat_profile / 265: "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm",
	/ psa-software-components / 2399: [		/ bootseed / 268: h'0000000000000000',
	{		/ psa-software-components / 2399: [
	/ signer ID / 5: h'0404040404040404040404040404040		{
	404040404040404040404040404040404',		/ signer ID / 5: h'0404040404040404040404040404040
	/ measurement value / 2: h'0303030303030303030303030303030		404040404040404040404040404040404',
	303030303030303030303030303030303',		/ measurement value / 2: h'0303030303030303030303030303030
	/ measurement type / 1: "PRoT"		303030303030303030303030303030303',
	}		/ measurement type / 1: "PRoT"
	]		}
	}		]
			}
	The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Sign1		The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Sign1
	signature over the PSA token is:		signature over the PSA token is:
	{		{
	"kty": "EC",		"kty": "EC",
	"crv": "P-256",		"crv": "P-256",
	"alg": "ES256",		"alg": "ES256",
	"x": "Tl4iCZ47zrRbRG0TVf0dw7VFlHtv18HInYhnmMNybo8",		"x": "Tl4iCZ47zrRbRG0TVf0dw7VFlHtv18HInYhnmMNybo8",
	"y": "gNcLhAslaqw0pi7eEEM2TwRAlfADR0uR4Bggkq-xPy4",		"y": "gNcLhAslaqw0pi7eEEM2TwRAlfADR0uR4Bggkq-xPy4",
	skipping to change at page 40, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at line 1647 ¶
	0119095a1a7fffffff19095b19300019010978217461673a707361636572		0119095a1a7fffffff19095b19300019010978217461673a707361636572
	7469666965642e6f72672c323032333a7073612374666d19010c48000000		7469666965642e6f72672c323032333a7073612374666d19010c48000000
	000000000019095f81a30558200404040404040404040404040404040404		000000000019095f81a30558200404040404040404040404040404040404
	040404040404040404040404040404025820030303030303030303030303		040404040404040404040404040404025820030303030303030303030303
	0303030303030303030303030303030303030303016450526f545840786e		0303030303030303030303030303030303030303016450526f545840786e
	937a4c42667af3847399319ca95c7e7dbabdc9b50fdb8de3f6bff4ab82ff		937a4c42667af3847399319ca95c7e7dbabdc9b50fdb8de3f6bff4ab82ff
	80c42140e2a488000219e3e10663193da69c75f52b798ea10b2f7041a90e		80c42140e2a488000219e3e10663193da69c75f52b798ea10b2f7041a90e
	8e5a		8e5a
	A.2. COSE Mac0 Token		A.2. COSE Mac0 Token
	{
	/ ueid / 256: h'01C557BD4FADC83F756FCA2CD5		{
	EA2DCC8B82159BB4E7453D6A744D4EECD6D0AC60',		/ ueid / 256: h'01C557BD4FADC83F756FCA2CD5
	/ psa-implementation-id / 2396: h'00000000000000000000000000		EA2DCC8B82159BB4E7453D6A744D4EECD6D0AC60',
	00000000000000000000000000000000000000',		/ psa-implementation-id / 2396: h'00000000000000000000000000
	/ eat_nonce / 10: h'01010101010101010101010101		00000000000000000000000000000000000000',
	01010101010101010101010101010101010101',		/ eat_nonce / 10: h'01010101010101010101010101
	/ psa-client-id / 2394: 2147483647,		01010101010101010101010101010101010101',
	/ psa-security-lifecycle / 2395: 12288,		/ psa-client-id / 2394: 2147483647,
	/ eat_profile / 265: "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm",		/ psa-security-lifecycle / 2395: 12288,
	/ psa-boot-seed / 268: h'0000000000000000',		/ eat_profile / 265: "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm",
	/ psa-software-components / 2399: [		/ psa-boot-seed / 268: h'0000000000000000',
	{		/ psa-software-components / 2399: [
	/ signer ID / 5: h'0404040404040404040404040404040		{
	404040404040404040404040404040404',		/ signer ID / 5: h'0404040404040404040404040404040
	/ measurement value / 2: h'0303030303030303030303030303030		404040404040404040404040404040404',
	303030303030303030303030303030303',		/ measurement value / 2: h'0303030303030303030303030303030
	/ measurement type / 1: "PRoT"		303030303030303030303030303030303',
	}		/ measurement type / 1: "PRoT"
	]		}
	}		]
			}
	The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Mac0		The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Mac0
	signature over the PSA token is:		signature over the PSA token is:
	========== NOTE: '\\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ==========		========== NOTE: '\\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ==========
	{		{
	"kty": "oct",		"kty": "oct",
	"alg": "HS256",		"alg": "HS256",
	"k": "3gOLNKyhJXaMXjNXq40Gs2e5qw1-i-Ek7cpH_gM6W7epPTB_8imqNv8k\		"k": "3gOLNKyhJXaMXjNXq40Gs2e5qw1-i-Ek7cpH_gM6W7epPTB_8imqNv8k\
	skipping to change at page 41, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at line 1716 ¶
	0119095a1a7fffffff19095b19300019010978217461673a707361636572		0119095a1a7fffffff19095b19300019010978217461673a707361636572
	7469666965642e6f72672c323032333a7073612374666d19010c48000000		7469666965642e6f72672c323032333a7073612374666d19010c48000000
	000000000019095f81a30558200404040404040404040404040404040404		000000000019095f81a30558200404040404040404040404040404040404
	040404040404040404040404040404025820030303030303030303030303		040404040404040404040404040404025820030303030303030303030303
	0303030303030303030303030303030303030303016450526f545820cf88		0303030303030303030303030303030303030303016450526f545820cf88
	d330e7a5366a95cf744a4dbf0d50304d405edd8b2530e243eddbd3177820		d330e7a5366a95cf744a4dbf0d50304d405edd8b2530e243eddbd3177820
	Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
	Thank you Carsten Bormann for help with the CDDL. Thanks to Nicholas		Thank you Carsten Bormann for help with the CDDL. Thanks to Nicholas
	Wood, Eliot Lear, Yaron Sheffer, Kathleen Moriarty and Ned Smith for		Wood, Eliot Lear, Yaron Sheffer, Kathleen Moriarty, and Ned Smith for
	ideas, comments and suggestions.		ideas, comments, and suggestions.
	Contributors		Contributors
	Laurence Lundblade		Laurence Lundblade
	Security Theory LLC		Security Theory LLC
	Email: lgl@securitytheory.com		Email: lgl@securitytheory.com
	Tamas Ban		Tamas Ban
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	Email: Tamas.Ban@arm.com		Email: Tamas.Ban@arm.com
	skipping to change at page 42, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at line 1728 ¶
	Contributors		Contributors
	Laurence Lundblade		Laurence Lundblade
	Security Theory LLC		Security Theory LLC
	Email: lgl@securitytheory.com		Email: lgl@securitytheory.com
	Tamas Ban		Tamas Ban
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	Email: Tamas.Ban@arm.com		Email: Tamas.Ban@arm.com
	Sergei Trofimov		Sergei Trofimov
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	Email: Sergei.Trofimov@arm.com		Email: Sergei.Trofimov@arm.com
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
			University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg
			Germany
	Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
	Simon Frost		Simon Frost
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	Email: Simon.Frost@arm.com		Email: Simon.Frost@arm.com
	Mathias Brossard		Mathias Brossard
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	Email: Mathias.Brossard@arm.com		Email: Mathias.Brossard@arm.com
End of changes. 179 change blocks.
	641 lines changed or deleted		599 lines changed or added
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