| rfc9794v1.txt | rfc9794.txt | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| skipping to change at line 112 ¶ | skipping to change at line 112 ¶ | |||
| that could make the terms quantum-resistant or quantum-safe | that could make the terms quantum-resistant or quantum-safe | |||
| misleading. Similarly, some prefer to refer specifically to Shor's | misleading. Similarly, some prefer to refer specifically to Shor's | |||
| Algorithm or to the mathematical problem that is being used to | Algorithm or to the mathematical problem that is being used to | |||
| prevent attacks. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is commonly used | prevent attacks. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is commonly used | |||
| amongst the cryptography community, and so it will be used throughout | amongst the cryptography community, and so it will be used throughout | |||
| this document. Similarly, the term "traditional algorithm" will be | this document. Similarly, the term "traditional algorithm" will be | |||
| used throughout the document as, at the time of publication, it is | used throughout the document as, at the time of publication, it is | |||
| widely used in the community, though other terms, including | widely used in the community, though other terms, including | |||
| classical, pre-quantum, or quantum-vulnerable, are preferred by some. | classical, pre-quantum, or quantum-vulnerable, are preferred by some. | |||
| There may be a requirement for protocols that use both algorithm | To mitigate risks, there may be a requirement for protocols that use | |||
| types, for example, during the transition from traditional to post- | both algorithm types, either during the transition from traditional | |||
| quantum algorithms or as a general solution, to mitigate risks. When | to post-quantum algorithms or as a general solution. When the risk | |||
| the risk of deploying new algorithms is above the accepted threshold | of deploying new algorithms is above the accepted threshold for their | |||
| for their use case, a designer may combine a post-quantum algorithm | use case, a designer may combine a post-quantum algorithm with a | |||
| with a traditional algorithm, with the goal of adding protection | traditional algorithm, with the goal of adding protection against an | |||
| against an attacker with a CRQC to the security properties provided | attacker with a CRQC to the security properties provided by the | |||
| by the traditional algorithm. They may also implement a post-quantum | traditional algorithm. They may also implement a post-quantum | |||
| algorithm alongside a traditional algorithm for ease of migration | algorithm alongside a traditional algorithm for ease of migration | |||
| from an ecosystem where only traditional algorithms are implemented | from an ecosystem where only traditional algorithms are implemented | |||
| and used, to one that only uses post-quantum algorithms. Examples of | and used, to one that only uses post-quantum algorithms. Examples of | |||
| solutions that could use both types of algorithm include, but are not | solutions that could use both types of algorithm include, but are not | |||
| limited to, [RFC9370], [HYBRID-TLS], [COMPOSITE-KEM], and [RFC9763]. | limited to, [RFC9370], [HYBRID-TLS], [COMPOSITE-KEM], and [RFC9763]. | |||
| Schemes that combine post-quantum and traditional algorithms for key | Schemes that combine post-quantum and traditional algorithms for key | |||
| establishment or digital signatures are often called "hybrids". For | establishment or digital signatures are often called "hybrids". For | |||
| example: | example: | |||
| skipping to change at line 162 ¶ | skipping to change at line 162 ¶ | |||
| This document provides language for constructions that combine | This document provides language for constructions that combine | |||
| traditional and post-quantum algorithms. Specific solutions for | traditional and post-quantum algorithms. Specific solutions for | |||
| enabling the use of multiple asymmetric algorithms in cryptographic | enabling the use of multiple asymmetric algorithms in cryptographic | |||
| schemes may be more general than this, allowing the use of solely | schemes may be more general than this, allowing the use of solely | |||
| traditional or solely post-quantum algorithms. However, where | traditional or solely post-quantum algorithms. However, where | |||
| relevant, we focus on post-quantum traditional combinations as these | relevant, we focus on post-quantum traditional combinations as these | |||
| are the motivation for the wider work in the IETF. This document is | are the motivation for the wider work in the IETF. This document is | |||
| intended as a reference terminology guide for other documents, in | intended as a reference terminology guide for other documents, in | |||
| order to add clarity and consistency across different protocols, | order to add clarity and consistency across different protocols, | |||
| standards, and organisations. Additionally, this document aims to | standards, and organisations. Additionally, this document aims to | |||
| reduce misunderstanding about use of the word "hybrid" as well as | reduce misunderstandings about the use of the word "hybrid" and to | |||
| defining a shared language for different types of post-quantum and | define a shared language for different types of post-quantum and | |||
| traditional hybrid constructions. | traditional hybrid constructions. | |||
| In this document, a "cryptographic algorithm" is defined, as in | In this document, a "cryptographic algorithm" is defined, as in | |||
| [NIST_SP_800-152], to be a "well-defined computational procedure that | [NIST_SP_800-152], to be a "well-defined computational procedure that | |||
| takes variable inputs, often including a cryptographic key, and | takes variable inputs, often including a cryptographic key, and | |||
| produces an output". Examples include RSA, Elliptic Curve Diffie- | produces an output". Examples include RSA, Elliptic Curve Diffie- | |||
| Hellman (ECDH), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML- | Hellman (ECDH), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML- | |||
| KEM) (formerly known as Kyber), and Module-Lattice-Based Digital | KEM) (formerly known as Kyber), and Module-Lattice-Based Digital | |||
| Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) (formerly known as Dilithium). The | Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) (formerly known as Dilithium). The | |||
| expression "cryptographic scheme" is used to refer to a construction | expression "cryptographic scheme" is used to refer to a construction | |||
| skipping to change at line 189 ¶ | skipping to change at line 189 ¶ | |||
| Encapsulation, and Decapsulation. A cryptographic protocol | Encapsulation, and Decapsulation. A cryptographic protocol | |||
| incorporates one or more cryptographic schemes. For example, TLS | incorporates one or more cryptographic schemes. For example, TLS | |||
| [RFC8446] is a cryptographic protocol that includes schemes for key | [RFC8446] is a cryptographic protocol that includes schemes for key | |||
| agreement, record layer encryption, and server authentication. | agreement, record layer encryption, and server authentication. | |||
| 2. Primitives | 2. Primitives | |||
| This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic | This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic | |||
| algorithms and to hybrid constructions for cryptographic schemes. | algorithms and to hybrid constructions for cryptographic schemes. | |||
| *Traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithm*: | Traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithm: | |||
| An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based on integer | An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based on integer | |||
| factorisation, finite field discrete logarithms, elliptic curve | factorisation, finite field discrete logarithms, elliptic curve | |||
| discrete logarithms, or related mathematical problems. | discrete logarithms, or related mathematical problems. | |||
| A related mathematical problem is one that can be solved by | A related mathematical problem is one that can be solved by | |||
| solving the integer factorisation, finite field discrete | solving the integer factorisation, finite field discrete | |||
| logarithm, or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. | logarithm, or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. | |||
| Where there is little risk of confusion, traditional asymmetric | Where there is little risk of confusion, traditional asymmetric | |||
| cryptographic algorithms can also be referred to as "traditional | cryptographic algorithms can also be referred to as "traditional | |||
| algorithms" for brevity. Traditional algorithms can also be | algorithms" for brevity. Traditional algorithms can also be | |||
| called "classical" or "conventional" algorithms. | called "classical" or "conventional" algorithms. | |||
| *Post-quantum asymmetric cryptographic algorithm*: | Post-quantum asymmetric cryptographic algorithm: | |||
| An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that is intended to be | An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that is intended to be | |||
| secure against attacks using quantum computers as well as | secure against attacks using quantum computers as well as | |||
| classical computers. | classical computers. | |||
| Where there is little risk of confusion, post-quantum asymmetric | Where there is little risk of confusion, post-quantum asymmetric | |||
| cryptographic algorithms can also be referred to as "post-quantum | cryptographic algorithms can also be referred to as "post-quantum | |||
| algorithms" for brevity. Post-quantum algorithms can also be | algorithms" for brevity. Post-quantum algorithms can also be | |||
| called "quantum-resistant" or "quantum-safe" algorithms. | called "quantum-resistant" or "quantum-safe" algorithms. | |||
| As with all cryptography, it always remains the case that attacks, | As with all cryptography, it always remains the case that attacks, | |||
| either quantum or classical, may be found against post-quantum | either quantum or classical, may be found against post-quantum | |||
| algorithms. Therefore, it should not be assumed that just because | algorithms. Therefore, it should not be assumed that an algorithm | |||
| an algorithm is designed to provide post-quantum security that it | will not be compromised just because it is designed to provide | |||
| will not be compromised. Should an attack be found against a | post-quantum cryptography. Should an attack be found against a | |||
| post-quantum algorithm, it is commonly still referred to as a | post-quantum algorithm, it is commonly still referred to as a | |||
| "post-quantum algorithm", as they were designed to protect against | "post-quantum algorithm", as they were designed to protect against | |||
| an adversary with access to a CRQC, and the labels are referring | an adversary with access to a CRQC, and the labels are referring | |||
| to the designed or desired properties. | to the designed or desired properties. | |||
| There may be asymmetric cryptographic constructions that are neither | There may be asymmetric cryptographic constructions that are neither | |||
| post-quantum nor asymmetric traditional algorithms according to the | post-quantum nor asymmetric traditional algorithms according to the | |||
| definitions above. These are out of scope of this document. | definitions above. These are out of scope of this document. | |||
| *Component asymmetric algorithm*: | Component asymmetric algorithm: | |||
| Each cryptographic algorithm that forms part of a cryptographic | Each cryptographic algorithm that forms part of a cryptographic | |||
| scheme. | scheme. | |||
| An asymmetric component algorithm operates on the input of the | An asymmetric component algorithm operates on the input of the | |||
| cryptographic operation and produces a cryptographic output that | cryptographic operation and produces a cryptographic output that | |||
| can be used by itself or jointly to complete the operation. Where | can be used by itself or jointly to complete the operation. Where | |||
| there is little risk of confusion, component asymmetric algorithms | there is little risk of confusion, component asymmetric algorithms | |||
| can also be referred to as "component algorithms" for brevity, as | can also be referred to as "component algorithms" for brevity, as | |||
| is done in the following definitions. | is done in the following definitions. | |||
| *Single-algorithm scheme*: | Single-algorithm scheme: | |||
| A cryptographic scheme with one component algorithm. | A cryptographic scheme with one component algorithm. | |||
| A single-algorithm scheme could use either a traditional algorithm | A single-algorithm scheme could use either a traditional algorithm | |||
| or a post-quantum algorithm. | or a post-quantum algorithm. | |||
| *Multi-algorithm scheme*: | Multi-algorithm scheme: | |||
| A cryptographic scheme that incorporates more than one component | A cryptographic scheme that incorporates more than one component | |||
| algorithm, where the component algorithms have the same | algorithm, where the component algorithms have the same | |||
| cryptographic purpose as each other and as the multi-algorithm | cryptographic purpose as each other and as the multi-algorithm | |||
| scheme. | scheme. | |||
| For example, a multi-algorithm signature scheme may include | For example, a multi-algorithm signature scheme may include | |||
| multiple signature algorithms, or a multi-algorithm Public Key | multiple signature algorithms, or a multi-algorithm Public Key | |||
| Encryption (PKE) scheme may include multiple PKE algorithms. | Encryption (PKE) scheme may include multiple PKE algorithms. | |||
| Component algorithms could be all traditional, all post-quantum, | Component algorithms could be all traditional, all post-quantum, | |||
| or a mixture of the two. | or a mixture of the two. | |||
| *Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme*: | Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme: | |||
| A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is | A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is | |||
| a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | |||
| algorithm. | algorithm. | |||
| Components of a PQ/T hybrid scheme operate on the same input | Components of a PQ/T hybrid scheme operate on the same input | |||
| message and their output is used together to complete the | message and their output is used together to complete the | |||
| cryptographic operation either serially or in parallel. The PQ/T | cryptographic operation either serially or in parallel. PQ/T | |||
| hybrid scheme design is aimed at requiring successful breaking of | hybrid scheme design is aimed at requiring successful breaking of | |||
| all component algorithms to break the PQ/T hybrid scheme's | all component algorithms to break the PQ/T hybrid scheme's | |||
| security properties. | security properties. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)*: | PQ/T hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM): | |||
| A multi-algorithm KEM made up of two or more component algorithms | A multi-algorithm KEM made up of two or more component algorithms | |||
| where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is | where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is | |||
| a traditional algorithm. The component algorithms could be KEMs | a traditional algorithm. The component algorithms could be KEMs | |||
| or other key establishment algorithms. | or other key establishment algorithms. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid Public Key Encryption (PKE)*: | PQ/T hybrid Public Key Encryption (PKE): | |||
| A multi-algorithm PKE scheme made up of two or more component | A multi-algorithm PKE scheme made up of two or more component | |||
| algorithms where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at | algorithms where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at | |||
| least one is a traditional algorithm. The component algorithms | least one is a traditional algorithm. The component algorithms | |||
| could be PKE algorithms or other key establishment algorithms. | could be PKE algorithms or other key establishment algorithms. | |||
| The standard security property for a PKE scheme is | The standard security property for a PKE scheme is | |||
| indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). | indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) | |||
| IND-CPA security is not sufficient for secure communication in the | [BDPR]. IND-CPA security is not sufficient for secure | |||
| presence of an active attacker. Therefore, in general, PKE | communication in the presence of an active attacker. Therefore, | |||
| schemes are not appropriate for use on the Internet, and KEMs, | in general, PKE schemes are not appropriate for use on the | |||
| which provide indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack | Internet, and KEMs, which provide indistinguishability under | |||
| (IND-CCA security), are required. | chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) [BDPR], are required. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid digital signature*: | PQ/T hybrid digital signature: | |||
| A multi-algorithm digital signature scheme made up of two or more | A multi-algorithm digital signature scheme made up of two or more | |||
| component digital signature algorithms where at least one is a | component digital signature algorithms where at least one is a | |||
| post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | |||
| algorithm. | algorithm. | |||
| Note that there are many possible ways of constructing a PQ/T | Note that there are many possible ways of constructing a PQ/T | |||
| hybrid digital signature. Examples include parallel signatures, | hybrid digital signature. Examples include parallel signatures, | |||
| composite signatures, or nested signatures. | composite signatures, or nested signatures. | |||
| PQ/T hybrid KEMs, PQ/T hybrid PKE, and PQ/T hybrid digital signatures | PQ/T hybrid KEMs, PQ/T hybrid PKE, and PQ/T hybrid digital signatures | |||
| are all examples of PQ/T hybrid schemes. | are all examples of PQ/T hybrid schemes. | |||
| *Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid composite scheme*: | Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid composite scheme: | |||
| A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is | A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is | |||
| a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | |||
| algorithm, and where the resulting composite scheme is exposed as | algorithm, and where the resulting composite scheme is exposed as | |||
| a singular interface of the same type as the component algorithms. | a singular interface of the same type as the component algorithms. | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid composite can be referred to as a "PQ/T composite". | A PQ/T hybrid composite can be referred to as a "PQ/T composite". | |||
| Examples of PQ/T hybrid composites include a single KEM algorithm | An example of a PQ/T hybrid composite is a single KEM algorithm | |||
| comprised of a PQ KEM component and a traditional KEM component, | comprised of a PQ KEM component and a traditional KEM component, | |||
| for which the result presents as a KEM output. | for which the result presents as a KEM output. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid combiner*: | PQ/T hybrid combiner: | |||
| A method that takes two or more component algorithms and combines | A method that takes two or more component algorithms and combines | |||
| them to form a PQ/T hybrid scheme. | them to form a PQ/T hybrid scheme. | |||
| *PQ/PQ hybrid scheme*: | PQ/PQ hybrid scheme: | |||
| A multi-algorithm scheme where all components are post-quantum | A multi-algorithm scheme where all components are post-quantum | |||
| algorithms. | algorithms. | |||
| The definitions for types of PQ/T hybrid schemes can be adapted to | The definitions for types of PQ/T hybrid schemes can be adapted to | |||
| define types of PQ/PQ hybrid schemes, which are multi-algorithm | define types of PQ/PQ hybrid schemes, which are multi-algorithm | |||
| schemes where all component algorithms are post-quantum | schemes where all component algorithms are post-quantum | |||
| algorithms. These are designed to mitigate risks when the two | algorithms. These are designed to mitigate risks when the two | |||
| post-quantum algorithms are based on different mathematical | post-quantum algorithms are based on different mathematical | |||
| problems. Some prefer to refer to these as PQ/PQ multi-algorithm | problems. Some prefer to refer to these as PQ/PQ multi-algorithm | |||
| schemes, and reserve the term "hybrid" for PQ/T hybrids. | schemes, and reserve the term "hybrid" for PQ/T hybrids. | |||
| In cases where there is little chance of confusion between other | In cases where there is little chance of confusion between other | |||
| types of hybrid cryptography (e.g., as defined in [RFC4949]) and | types of hybrid cryptography (e.g., as defined in [RFC4949]) and | |||
| where the component algorithms of a multi-algorithm scheme could be | where the component algorithms of a multi-algorithm scheme could be | |||
| either post-quantum or traditional, it may be appropriate to use the | either post-quantum or traditional, it may be appropriate to use the | |||
| phrase "hybrid scheme" without PQ/T or PQ/PQ preceding it. | phrase "hybrid scheme" without PQ/T or PQ/PQ preceding it. | |||
| *Component scheme*: | Component scheme: | |||
| Each cryptographic scheme that makes up a PQ/T hybrid scheme or | Each cryptographic scheme that makes up a PQ/T hybrid scheme or | |||
| PQ/T hybrid protocol. | PQ/T hybrid protocol. | |||
| 3. Cryptographic Elements | 3. Cryptographic Elements | |||
| This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic elements | This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic elements | |||
| and their inclusion in hybrid schemes. | and their inclusion in hybrid schemes. | |||
| *Cryptographic element*: | Cryptographic element: | |||
| Any data type (private or public) that contains an input or output | Any data type (private or public) that contains an input or output | |||
| value for a cryptographic algorithm or for a function making up a | value for a cryptographic algorithm or for a function making up a | |||
| cryptographic algorithm. | cryptographic algorithm. | |||
| Types of cryptographic elements include public keys, private keys, | Types of cryptographic elements include public keys, private keys, | |||
| plaintexts, ciphertexts, shared secrets, and signature values. | plaintexts, ciphertexts, shared secrets, and signature values. | |||
| *Component cryptographic element*: | Component cryptographic element: | |||
| A cryptographic element of a component algorithm in a multi- | A cryptographic element of a component algorithm in a multi- | |||
| algorithm scheme. | algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, in [HYBRID-TLS], the client's keyshare contains two | For example, in [HYBRID-TLS], the client's keyshare contains two | |||
| component public keys: one for a post-quantum algorithm and one | component public keys: one for a post-quantum algorithm and one | |||
| for a traditional algorithm. | for a traditional algorithm. | |||
| *Composite cryptographic element*: | Composite cryptographic element: | |||
| A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component | A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component | |||
| cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi- | cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi- | |||
| algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite cryptographic | algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite cryptographic | |||
| element is exposed as a singular interface of the same type as the | element is exposed as a singular interface of the same type as the | |||
| component cryptographic elements. | component cryptographic elements. | |||
| For example, a composite cryptographic public key is made up of | For example, a composite cryptographic public key is made up of | |||
| two component public keys. | two component public keys. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid composite cryptographic element*: | PQ/T hybrid composite cryptographic element: | |||
| A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component | A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component | |||
| cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi- | cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi- | |||
| algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite cryptographic | algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite cryptographic | |||
| element is exposed as a singular interface of the same type as the | element is exposed as a singular interface of the same type as the | |||
| component cryptographic elements, where at least one component | component cryptographic elements, where at least one component | |||
| cryptographic element is post-quantum and at least one is | cryptographic element is post-quantum and at least one is | |||
| traditional. | traditional. | |||
| *Cryptographic element combiner*: | Cryptographic element combiner: | |||
| A method that takes two or more component cryptographic elements | A method that takes two or more component cryptographic elements | |||
| of the same type and combines them to form a composite | of the same type and combines them to form a composite | |||
| cryptographic element. | cryptographic element. | |||
| A cryptographic element combiner could be concatenation, such as | A cryptographic element combiner could be concatenation, such as | |||
| where two component public keys are concatenated to form a | where two component public keys are concatenated to form a | |||
| composite public key as in [HYBRID-TLS], or something more | composite public key as in [HYBRID-TLS], or something more | |||
| involved such as the dualPRF defined in [BINDEL]. | involved such as the dualPRF defined in [BINDEL]. | |||
| 4. Protocols | 4. Protocols | |||
| This section introduces terminology related to the use of post- | This section introduces terminology related to the use of post- | |||
| quantum and traditional algorithms together in protocols. | quantum and traditional algorithms together in protocols. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol: | |||
| A protocol that uses two or more component algorithms providing | A protocol that uses two or more component algorithms providing | |||
| the same cryptographic functionality, where at least one is a | the same cryptographic functionality, where at least one is a | |||
| post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional | |||
| algorithm. | algorithm. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing confidentiality | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing confidentiality | |||
| could use a PQ/T hybrid KEM such as in [HYBRID-TLS], or it could | could use a PQ/T hybrid KEM such as in [HYBRID-TLS], or it could | |||
| combine the output of a post-quantum KEM and a traditional KEM at | combine the output of a post-quantum KEM and a traditional KEM at | |||
| the protocol level to generate a single shared secret, such as in | the protocol level to generate a single shared secret, such as in | |||
| [RFC9370]. Similarly, a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing | [RFC9370]. Similarly, a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing | |||
| authentication could use a PQ/T hybrid digital signature scheme, | authentication could use a PQ/T hybrid digital signature scheme, | |||
| or it could include both post-quantum and traditional single- | or it could include both post-quantum and traditional single- | |||
| algorithm digital signature schemes. | algorithm digital signature schemes. | |||
| A protocol that can negotiate the use of either a traditional | A protocol that can negotiate the use of either a traditional | |||
| algorithm or a post-quantum algorithm, but not both types of | algorithm or a post-quantum algorithm, but not the use of both | |||
| algorithm, is not a PQ/T hybrid protocol. Protocols that use two | types of algorithm, is not a PQ/T hybrid protocol. Protocols that | |||
| or more component algorithms but with different cryptographic | use two or more component algorithms but with different | |||
| functionalities, for example, a post-quantum KEM and a Pre-Shared | cryptographic functionalities, for example, a post-quantum KEM and | |||
| Key (PSK), are also not PQ/T hybrid protocols. | a Pre-Shared Key (PSK), are also not PQ/T hybrid protocols. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key establishment*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key establishment: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | |||
| scheme to achieve key establishment, in such a way that the | scheme to achieve key establishment, in such a way that the | |||
| protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | |||
| version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key | |||
| establishment could include a single PQ/T hybrid KEM, such as in | establishment could include a single PQ/T hybrid KEM, such as in | |||
| [HYBRID-TLS]. | [HYBRID-TLS]. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite data authentication*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite data authentication: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | |||
| scheme to achieve data authentication, in such a way that the | scheme to achieve data authentication, in such a way that the | |||
| protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | |||
| version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite data | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite data | |||
| authentication could include data authentication through the use | authentication could include data authentication through the use | |||
| of a PQ/T composite hybrid digital signature, exposed as a single | of a PQ/T composite hybrid digital signature, exposed as a single | |||
| interface for PQ signature and traditional signature components. | interface for PQ signature and traditional signature components. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite entity authentication*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite entity authentication: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid composite | |||
| scheme to achieve entity authentication, in such a way that the | scheme to achieve entity authentication, in such a way that the | |||
| protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | protocol fields and message flow are the same as those in a | |||
| version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | version of the protocol that uses a single-algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite entity | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite entity | |||
| authentication could include entity authentication through the use | authentication could include entity authentication through the use | |||
| of PQ/T Composite Hybrid certificates. | of PQ/T Composite Hybrid certificates. | |||
| In a PQ/T hybrid protocol with a composite construction, changes are | In a PQ/T hybrid protocol with a composite construction, changes are | |||
| primarily made to the formats of the cryptographic elements, while | primarily made to the formats of the cryptographic elements, while | |||
| the protocol fields and message flow remain largely unchanged. In | the protocol fields and message flow remain largely unchanged. In | |||
| implementations, most changes are likely to be made to the | implementations, most changes are likely to be made to the | |||
| cryptographic libraries, with minimal changes to the protocol | cryptographic libraries, with minimal changes to the protocol | |||
| libraries. | libraries. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite key establishment*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite key establishment: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm | |||
| schemes to achieve key establishment, where at least one uses a | schemes to achieve key establishment, where at least one uses a | |||
| post-quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional | post-quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional | |||
| algorithm, in such a way that the formats of the component | algorithm, in such a way that the formats of the component | |||
| cryptographic elements are the same as when they are used as a | cryptographic elements are the same as when they are used as a | |||
| part of a single-algorithm scheme. | part of a single-algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite key | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite key | |||
| establishment could include a traditional key exchange scheme and | establishment could include a traditional key exchange scheme and | |||
| a post-quantum KEM. A construction like this for the Internet Key | a post-quantum KEM. A construction like this for the Internet Key | |||
| Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) is enabled by [RFC9370]. | Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) is enabled by [RFC9370]. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite authentication*: | PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite authentication: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm | |||
| schemes to achieve authentication, where at least one uses a post- | schemes to achieve authentication, where at least one uses a post- | |||
| quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional algorithm, | quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional algorithm, | |||
| in such a way that the formats of the component cryptographic | in such a way that the formats of the component cryptographic | |||
| elements are the same as when they are used as part of a single- | elements are the same as when they are used as part of a single- | |||
| algorithm scheme. | algorithm scheme. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite | |||
| authentication could use a PQ/T parallel PKI with one traditional | authentication could use a PQ/T parallel PKI with one traditional | |||
| certificate chain and one post-quantum certificate chain. | certificate chain and one post-quantum certificate chain. | |||
| skipping to change at line 497 ¶ | skipping to change at line 497 ¶ | |||
| composite key agreement and non-composite authentication. Similarly, | composite key agreement and non-composite authentication. Similarly, | |||
| it is possible for a PQ/T hybrid protocol to achieve certain | it is possible for a PQ/T hybrid protocol to achieve certain | |||
| cryptographic outcomes in a non-hybrid manner. For example, | cryptographic outcomes in a non-hybrid manner. For example, | |||
| [HYBRID-TLS] describes a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key | [HYBRID-TLS] describes a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key | |||
| agreement, but with single-algorithm authentication. | agreement, but with single-algorithm authentication. | |||
| PQ/T hybrid protocols may not specify non-composite aspects, but can | PQ/T hybrid protocols may not specify non-composite aspects, but can | |||
| choose to do so for clarity, in particular, if including both | choose to do so for clarity, in particular, if including both | |||
| composite and non-composite aspects. | composite and non-composite aspects. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid composite protocol*: | PQ/T hybrid composite protocol: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that only uses composite constructions can | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that only uses composite constructions can | |||
| be referred to as a "PQ/T hybrid composite protocol". | be referred to as a "PQ/T hybrid composite protocol". | |||
| An example of this is a protocol that only provides entity | An example of this is a protocol that only provides entity | |||
| authentication, and achieves this using PQ/T hybrid composite | authentication, and achieves this using PQ/T hybrid composite | |||
| entity authentication. Similarly, another example is a protocol | entity authentication. Similarly, another example is a protocol | |||
| that offers both key establishment and data authentication, and | that offers both key establishment and data authentication, and | |||
| achieves this using both PQ/T hybrid composite key establishment | achieves this using both PQ/T hybrid composite key establishment | |||
| and PQ/T hybrid composite data authentication. | and PQ/T hybrid composite data authentication. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid non-composite protocol*: | PQ/T hybrid non-composite protocol: | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid protocol that does not use only composite | A PQ/T hybrid protocol that does not use only composite | |||
| constructions can be referred to as a "PQ/T hybrid non-composite | constructions can be referred to as a "PQ/T hybrid non-composite | |||
| protocol". | protocol". | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol that offers both | For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol that offers both | |||
| confidentiality and authentication and uses composite key | confidentiality and authentication and uses composite key | |||
| agreement and non-composite authentication would be referred to as | agreement and non-composite authentication would be referred to as | |||
| a "PQ/T hybrid non-composite protocol". | a "PQ/T hybrid non-composite protocol". | |||
| 5. Properties | 5. Properties | |||
| skipping to change at line 535 ¶ | skipping to change at line 535 ¶ | |||
| properties. | properties. | |||
| It is not possible for one PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol | It is not possible for one PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol | |||
| to achieve all of the properties in this section. To understand what | to achieve all of the properties in this section. To understand what | |||
| properties are required, a designer or implementer will think about | properties are required, a designer or implementer will think about | |||
| why they are using a PQ/T hybrid scheme. For example, a scheme that | why they are using a PQ/T hybrid scheme. For example, a scheme that | |||
| is designed for implementation security will likely require PQ/T | is designed for implementation security will likely require PQ/T | |||
| hybrid confidentiality or PQ/T hybrid authentication, while a scheme | hybrid confidentiality or PQ/T hybrid authentication, while a scheme | |||
| for interoperability will require PQ/T hybrid interoperability. | for interoperability will require PQ/T hybrid interoperability. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid confidentiality*: | PQ/T hybrid confidentiality: | |||
| The property that confidentiality is achieved by a PQ/T hybrid | The property that confidentiality is achieved by a PQ/T hybrid | |||
| scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol as long as at least one component | scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol as long as at least one component | |||
| algorithm that aims to provide this property remains secure. | algorithm that aims to provide this property remains secure. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid authentication*: | PQ/T hybrid authentication: | |||
| The property that authentication is achieved by a PQ/T hybrid | The property that authentication is achieved by a PQ/T hybrid | |||
| scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol as long as at least one component | scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol as long as at least one component | |||
| algorithm that aims to provide this property remains secure. | algorithm that aims to provide this property remains secure. | |||
| The security properties of a PQ/T hybrid scheme or protocol depend on | The security properties of a PQ/T hybrid scheme or protocol depend on | |||
| the security of its component algorithms, the choice of PQ/T hybrid | the security of its component algorithms, the choice of PQ/T hybrid | |||
| combiner, and the capability of an attacker. Changes to the security | combiner, and the capability of an attacker. Changes to the security | |||
| of a component algorithm can impact the security properties of a PQ/T | of a component algorithm can impact the security properties of a PQ/T | |||
| hybrid scheme providing hybrid confidentiality or hybrid | hybrid scheme providing hybrid confidentiality or hybrid | |||
| authentication. For example, if the post-quantum component algorithm | authentication. For example, if the post-quantum component algorithm | |||
| skipping to change at line 563 ¶ | skipping to change at line 563 ¶ | |||
| to an attacker with a CRQC. | to an attacker with a CRQC. | |||
| PQ/T hybrid protocols that offer both confidentiality and | PQ/T hybrid protocols that offer both confidentiality and | |||
| authentication do not necessarily offer both hybrid confidentiality | authentication do not necessarily offer both hybrid confidentiality | |||
| and hybrid authentication. For example, [HYBRID-TLS] provides hybrid | and hybrid authentication. For example, [HYBRID-TLS] provides hybrid | |||
| confidentiality but does not address hybrid authentication. | confidentiality but does not address hybrid authentication. | |||
| Therefore, if the design in [HYBRID-TLS] is used with single- | Therefore, if the design in [HYBRID-TLS] is used with single- | |||
| algorithm X.509 certificates as defined in [RFC5280], only | algorithm X.509 certificates as defined in [RFC5280], only | |||
| authentication with a single algorithm is achieved. | authentication with a single algorithm is achieved. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid interoperability*: | PQ/T hybrid interoperability: | |||
| The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | |||
| can be completed successfully provided that both parties share | can be completed successfully provided that both parties share | |||
| support for at least one component algorithm. | support for at least one component algorithm. | |||
| For example, a PQ/T hybrid digital signature might achieve hybrid | For example, a PQ/T hybrid digital signature might achieve hybrid | |||
| interoperability if the signature can be verified by either | interoperability if the signature can be verified by either | |||
| verifying the traditional or the post-quantum component, such as | verifying the traditional or the post-quantum component, such as | |||
| the approach defined in Section 7.2.2 of [ITU-T-X509-2019]. In | the approach defined in Section 7.2.2 of [ITU-T-X509-2019]. In | |||
| this example, a verifier that has migrated to support post-quantum | this example, a verifier that has migrated to support post-quantum | |||
| algorithms is required to verify only the post-quantum signature, | algorithms is required to verify only the post-quantum signature, | |||
| skipping to change at line 603 ¶ | skipping to change at line 603 ¶ | |||
| protected using TLS's existing downgrade protection, so it achieves | protected using TLS's existing downgrade protection, so it achieves | |||
| PQ/T hybrid confidentiality, but the connection can still be made if | PQ/T hybrid confidentiality, but the connection can still be made if | |||
| either the client or server does not support the PQ/T hybrid scheme, | either the client or server does not support the PQ/T hybrid scheme, | |||
| so PQ/T hybrid interoperability is achieved. | so PQ/T hybrid interoperability is achieved. | |||
| The same is true for PQ/T hybrid interoperability and PQ/T hybrid | The same is true for PQ/T hybrid interoperability and PQ/T hybrid | |||
| authentication. It is not possible to achieve both with a PQ/T | authentication. It is not possible to achieve both with a PQ/T | |||
| hybrid scheme alone, but it is possible with a PQ/T hybrid protocol | hybrid scheme alone, but it is possible with a PQ/T hybrid protocol | |||
| that has appropriate downgrade protection. | that has appropriate downgrade protection. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid backwards compatibility*: | PQ/T hybrid backwards compatibility: | |||
| The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | |||
| can be completed successfully provided that both parties support | can be completed successfully provided that both parties support | |||
| the traditional component algorithm, while also using both | the traditional component algorithm, while also using both | |||
| algorithms if both are supported by both parties. | algorithms if both are supported by both parties. | |||
| *PQ/T Hybrid Forwards Compatibility*: | PQ/T hybrid forwards compatibility: | |||
| The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | The property that a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol | |||
| can be completed successfully using a post-quantum component | can be completed successfully using a post-quantum component | |||
| algorithm provided that both parties support it, while also having | algorithm provided that both parties support it, while also having | |||
| the option to use both post-quantum and traditional algorithms if | the option to use both post-quantum and traditional algorithms if | |||
| both are supported by both parties. | both are supported by both parties. | |||
| Note that PQ/T hybrid forwards compatibility is a protocol or | Note that PQ/T hybrid forwards compatibility is a protocol or | |||
| scheme property only. | scheme property only. | |||
| 6. Certificates | 6. Certificates | |||
| This section introduces terminology related to the use of | This section introduces terminology related to the use of | |||
| certificates in hybrid schemes. | certificates in hybrid schemes. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid certificate*: | PQ/T hybrid certificate: | |||
| A digital certificate that contains public keys for two or more | A digital certificate that contains public keys for two or more | |||
| component algorithms where at least one is a traditional algorithm | component algorithms where at least one is a traditional algorithm | |||
| and at least one is a post-quantum algorithm. | and at least one is a post-quantum algorithm. | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid certificate could be used to facilitate a PQ/T | A PQ/T hybrid certificate could be used to facilitate a PQ/T | |||
| hybrid authentication protocol. However, a PQ/T hybrid | hybrid authentication protocol. However, a PQ/T hybrid | |||
| authentication protocol does not need to use a PQ/T hybrid | authentication protocol does not need to use a PQ/T hybrid | |||
| certificate; separate certificates could be used for individual | certificate; separate certificates could be used for individual | |||
| component algorithms. | component algorithms. | |||
| skipping to change at line 648 ¶ | skipping to change at line 648 ¶ | |||
| The use of a PQ/T hybrid certificate does not necessarily achieve | The use of a PQ/T hybrid certificate does not necessarily achieve | |||
| hybrid authentication of the identity of the sender; this is | hybrid authentication of the identity of the sender; this is | |||
| determined by properties of the chain of trust. For example, an | determined by properties of the chain of trust. For example, an | |||
| end-entity certificate that contains a composite public key, but | end-entity certificate that contains a composite public key, but | |||
| which is signed using a single-algorithm digital signature scheme, | which is signed using a single-algorithm digital signature scheme, | |||
| could be used to provide hybrid authentication of the source of a | could be used to provide hybrid authentication of the source of a | |||
| message, but would not achieve hybrid authentication of the | message, but would not achieve hybrid authentication of the | |||
| identity of the sender. | identity of the sender. | |||
| *Post-quantum certificate*: | Post-quantum certificate: | |||
| A digital certificate that contains a single public key for a | A digital certificate that contains a single public key for a | |||
| post-quantum digital signature algorithm. | post-quantum digital signature algorithm. | |||
| *Traditional certificate*: | Traditional certificate: | |||
| A digital certificate that contains a single public key for a | A digital certificate that contains a single public key for a | |||
| traditional digital signature algorithm. | traditional digital signature algorithm. | |||
| X.509 certificates as defined in [RFC5280] could be either | X.509 certificates as defined in [RFC5280] could be either | |||
| traditional or post-quantum certificates depending on the algorithm | traditional or post-quantum certificates depending on the algorithm | |||
| in the Subject Public Key Info. For example, a certificate | in the Subject Public Key Info. For example, a certificate | |||
| containing a ML-DSA public key, as defined in [ML-DSA], would be a | containing a ML-DSA public key, as defined in [ML-DSA], would be a | |||
| post-quantum certificate. | post-quantum certificate. | |||
| *Post-quantum certificate chain*: | Post-quantum certificate chain: | |||
| A certificate chain where all certificates include a public key | A certificate chain where all certificates include a public key | |||
| for a post-quantum algorithm and are signed using a post-quantum | for a post-quantum algorithm and are signed using a post-quantum | |||
| digital signature scheme. | digital signature scheme. | |||
| *Traditional certificate chain*: | Traditional certificate chain: | |||
| A certificate chain where all certificates include a public key | A certificate chain where all certificates include a public key | |||
| for a traditional algorithm and are signed using a traditional | for a traditional algorithm and are signed using a traditional | |||
| digital signature scheme. | digital signature scheme. | |||
| *PQ/T hybrid certificate chain*: | PQ/T hybrid certificate chain: | |||
| A certificate chain where all certificates are PQ/T hybrid | A certificate chain where all certificates are PQ/T hybrid | |||
| certificates and each certificate is signed with two or more | certificates and each certificate is signed with two or more | |||
| component algorithms with at least one being a traditional | component algorithms with at least one being a traditional | |||
| algorithm and at least one being a post-quantum algorithm. | algorithm and at least one being a post-quantum algorithm. | |||
| A PQ/T hybrid certificate chain is one way of achieving hybrid | A PQ/T hybrid certificate chain is one way of achieving hybrid | |||
| authentication of the identity of a sender in a protocol, but it is | authentication of the identity of a sender in a protocol, but it is | |||
| not the only way. An alternative is to use a PQ/T parallel PKI as | not the only way. An alternative is to use a PQ/T parallel PKI as | |||
| defined below. | defined below. | |||
| *PQ/T mixed certificate chain*: | PQ/T mixed certificate chain: | |||
| A certificate chain containing at least two of the three | A certificate chain containing at least two of the three | |||
| certificate types defined in this document (PQ/T hybrid | certificate types defined in this document (PQ/T hybrid | |||
| certificates, post-quantum certificates, and traditional | certificates, post-quantum certificates, and traditional | |||
| certificates). | certificates). | |||
| For example, a traditional end-entity certificate could be signed | For example, a traditional end-entity certificate could be signed | |||
| by a post-quantum intermediate certificate, which in turn could be | by a post-quantum intermediate certificate, which in turn could be | |||
| signed by a post-quantum root certificate. This may be desirable | signed by a post-quantum root certificate. This may be desirable | |||
| due to the lifetimes of the certificates, the relative difficulty | due to the lifetimes of the certificates, the relative difficulty | |||
| of rotating keys, or for efficiency reasons. The security | of rotating keys, or for efficiency reasons. The security | |||
| properties of a certificate chain that mixes post-quantum and | properties of a certificate chain that mixes post-quantum and | |||
| traditional algorithms would need to be analysed on a case-by-case | traditional algorithms would need to be analysed on a case-by-case | |||
| basis. | basis. | |||
| *PQ/T parallel PKI*: | PQ/T parallel PKI: | |||
| Two certificate chains, one that is a post-quantum certificate | Two certificate chains, one that is a post-quantum certificate | |||
| chain and one that is a traditional certificate chain, and that | chain and one that is a traditional certificate chain, and that | |||
| are used together in a protocol. | are used together in a protocol. | |||
| A PQ/T parallel PKI might be used to achieve hybrid authentication | A PQ/T parallel PKI might be used to achieve hybrid authentication | |||
| or hybrid interoperability depending on the protocol | or hybrid interoperability depending on the protocol | |||
| implementation. | implementation. | |||
| *Multi-certificate authentication*: | Multi-certificate authentication: | |||
| Authentication that uses two or more end-entity certificates. | Authentication that uses two or more end-entity certificates. | |||
| For example, multi-certificate authentication may be achieved | For example, multi-certificate authentication may be achieved | |||
| using a PQ/T parallel PKI. | using a PQ/T parallel PKI. | |||
| 7. Security Considerations | 7. Security Considerations | |||
| This document defines security-relevant terminology to be used in | This document defines security-relevant terminology to be used in | |||
| documents specifying PQ/T hybrid protocols and schemes. However, the | documents specifying PQ/T hybrid protocols and schemes. However, the | |||
| document itself does not have a security impact on Internet | document itself does not have a security impact on Internet | |||
| skipping to change at line 730 ¶ | skipping to change at line 730 ¶ | |||
| specification documents. More general guidance about the security | specification documents. More general guidance about the security | |||
| considerations, timelines, and benefits and drawbacks of the use of | considerations, timelines, and benefits and drawbacks of the use of | |||
| PQ/T hybrids is also out of scope of this document. | PQ/T hybrids is also out of scope of this document. | |||
| 8. IANA Considerations | 8. IANA Considerations | |||
| This document has no IANA actions. | This document has no IANA actions. | |||
| 9. Informative References | 9. Informative References | |||
| [BDPR] Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., and P. Rogaway, | ||||
| "Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key | ||||
| Encryption Schemes", June 2001, | ||||
| <https://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ | ||||
| relations.pdf>. | ||||
| [BINDEL] Bindel, N., Brendel, J., Fischlin, M., Goncalves, B., and | [BINDEL] Bindel, N., Brendel, J., Fischlin, M., Goncalves, B., and | |||
| D. Stebila, "Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and | D. Stebila, "Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and | |||
| Authenticated Key Exchange", Post-Quantum Cryptography, | Authenticated Key Exchange", Post-Quantum Cryptography, | |||
| PQCrypto 2019, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. | PQCrypto 2019, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. | |||
| 11505, pp. 206-226, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12, July | 11505, pp. 206-226, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12, July | |||
| 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12>. | 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12>. | |||
| [BINDELHALE] | [BINDELHALE] | |||
| Bindel, N. and B. Hale, "A Note on Hybrid Signature | Bindel, N. and B. Hale, "A Note on Hybrid Signature | |||
| Schemes", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/423, 23 | Schemes", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/423, 23 | |||
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