rfc9829.original   rfc9829.txt 
SIDROPS J. Snijders Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Snijders
Internet-Draft Request for Comments: 9829
Updates: 6487 (if approved) B. Maddison Updates: 6487 B. Maddison
Intended status: Standards Track Workonline Category: Standards Track Workonline
Expires: 23 November 2025 T. Buehler ISSN: 2070-1721 T. Buehler
OpenBSD OpenBSD
22 May 2025 July 2025
Handling of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certificate Handling of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Number Extensions Revocation List (CRL) Number Extensions
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-crl-numbers-05
Abstract Abstract
This document revises how the Resource Public Key Infrastructure This document revises how the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) handles Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Number extensions. (RPKI) handles Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Number extensions.
This document updates RFC 6487. This document updates RFC 6487.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 November 2025. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9829.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language
1.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Related Work
1.3. Changes from RFC 6487 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3. Changes from RFC 6487
2. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Summary
3. Updates to RFC 6487 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Updates to RFC 6487
3.1. Updates to Section 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Updates to Section 5
3.2. Update to Section 7.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Update to Section 7.2
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Operational Considerations
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. IANA Considerations
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE Acknowledgements
PUBLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5280] describes the value of the Certificate Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5280] describes the value of the Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Number extension as a monotonically increasing Revocation List (CRL) Number extension as a monotonically increasing
sequence number, which "allows users to easily determine when a sequence number, which "allows users to easily determine when a
particular CRL supersedes another CRL". In other words, in Public particular CRL supersedes another CRL". In other words, in Public
Key Infrastructures (PKIs) in which it is possible for Relying Key Infrastructures (PKIs) in which it is possible for Relying
Parties (RPs) to encounter multiple usable CRLs, the CRL Number Parties (RPs) to encounter multiple usable CRLs, the CRL Number
extension is a means for an RP to determine which CRLs to rely upon. extension is a means for an RP to determine which CRLs to rely upon.
In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a well-formed In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a well-formed
Manifest FileList contains exactly one entry for its associated CRL, manifest fileList contains exactly one entry for its associated CRL,
together with a collision-resistant message digest of that CRL's together with a collision-resistant message digest of that CRL's
contents (see Section 2.2 of [RFC6481] and Section 2 of [RFC9286]). contents (see Section 2.2 of [RFC6481] and Section 2 of [RFC9286]).
Additionally, the target of the CRL Distribution Points extension in Additionally, the target of the CRL Distribution Points extension in
an RPKI Resource Certificate is the same CRL object listed on the an RPKI Resource Certificate is the same CRL object listed on the
issuing Certification Authorities (CAs) current manifest (see issuing Certification Authorities (CAs) current manifest (see
Section 4.8.6 of [RFC6487]). Together, these properties guarantee Section 4.8.6 of [RFC6487]). Together, these properties guarantee
that RPKI RPs will always be able to unambiguously identify exactly that RPKI RPs will always be able to unambiguously identify exactly
one current CRL for each RPKI CA. Thus, in the RPKI, the ordering one current CRL for each RPKI CA. Thus, in the RPKI, the ordering
functionality provided by CRL Numbers is fully subsumed by functionality provided by CRL Numbers is fully subsumed by
monotonically increasing Manifest Numbers (Section 4.2.1 of monotonically increasing manifest numbers (Section 4.2.1 of
[RFC9286]), thereby obviating the need for RPKI RPs to process CRL [RFC9286]), thereby obviating the need for RPKI RPs to process CRL
Number extensions at all. Number extensions at all.
Therefore, although the CRL Number extension is mandatory in RPKI Therefore, although the CRL Number extension is mandatory in RPKI
CRLs for compliance with the X.509 v2 CRL Profile (Section 5 of CRLs for compliance with the X.509 v2 CRL Profile (Section 5 of
[RFC5280]), any use of this extension by RPKI RPs merely adds [RFC5280]), any use of this extension by RPKI RPs merely adds
complexity and fragility to RPKI Resource Certificate path complexity and fragility to RPKI Resource Certificate path
validation. This document mandates that RPKI RPs ignore the CRL validation. This document mandates that RPKI RPs ignore the CRL
Number extension. Number extension.
skipping to change at page 3, line 31 skipping to change at line 112
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Related Work 1.2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "A Profile and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "A Profile
for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481], and for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481], and
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)"
[RFC9286]. [RFC9286].
1.3. Changes from RFC 6487 1.3. Changes from RFC 6487
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6487] and This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6487] and
this document. this document.
* Revision of CRL Number handling. * Revision of CRL Number handling.
* Adjustment of step 5 of the Resource Certification Path * Adjustment of step 5 of the Resource Certification Path
Validation. Validation.
* Integration of RFC 6487 Errata 3205. * Integration of Errata 3205 [Err3205].
2. Summary 2. Summary
This document clarifies that, in the RPKI, there is exactly one CRL This document clarifies that, in the RPKI, there is exactly one CRL
appropriate and relevant for determining the revocation status of a that is appropriate and relevant for determining the revocation
given resource certificate. It is the unique CRL object that is status of a given resource certificate. It is the unique CRL object
simultaneously: that is simultaneously:
* the target of the certificate's CRL Distribution Points extension, * the target of the certificate's CRL Distribution Points extension,
and and
* listed in the issuing CA's current Manifest FileList and has * listed in the issuing CA's current manifest fileList and has a
matching hash (see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9286]). matching hash (see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9286]).
In particular, a resource certificate cannot be validated without In particular, a resource certificate cannot be validated without
recourse to the current Manifest of the certificate's issuer. consulting the current manifest of the certificate's issuer.
3. Updates to RFC 6487 3. Updates to RFC 6487
3.1. Updates to Section 5 3.1. Updates to Section 5
This section updates Section 5 of [RFC6487] as follows: This section updates Section 5 of [RFC6487] as follows:
* First change: * First change:
OLD OLD
| Where two or more CRLs are issued by the same CA, the CRL with | Where two or more CRLs are issued by the same CA, the CRL with
| the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all | the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all
| other CRLs issued by this CA. | other CRLs issued by this CA.
NEW NEW
| Per Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5280], CAs issue new CRLs using a | Per Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5280], CAs issue new CRLs using a
| monotonically increasing sequence number in the "CRL Number" | monotonically increasing sequence number in the "CRL Number"
| extension. It is RECOMMENDED that the "CRL Number" matches the | extension. It is RECOMMENDED that the "CRL Number" match the
| "manifestNumber" of the manifest that will include this CRL | "manifestNumber" of the manifest that will include this CRL
| (see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9286]). | (see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9286]).
* Second change: * Second change:
OLD OLD
| An RPKI CA MUST include the two extensions, Authority Key | An RPKI CA MUST include the two extensions, Authority Key
| Identifier and CRL Number, in every CRL that it issues. RPs | Identifier and CRL Number, in every CRL that it issues. RPs
| MUST be prepared to process CRLs with these extensions. No | MUST be prepared to process CRLs with these extensions. No
skipping to change at page 5, line 32 skipping to change at line 208
| being listed on the issuer's current CRL, as identified by the | being listed on the issuer's current CRL, as identified by the
| CRLDP of the certificate, the CRL is itself valid, and the | CRLDP of the certificate, the CRL is itself valid, and the
| public key used to verify the signature on the CRL is the same | public key used to verify the signature on the CRL is the same
| public key used to verify the certificate itself. | public key used to verify the certificate itself.
NEW NEW
| 5. The issuer has not revoked the certificate. A revoked | 5. The issuer has not revoked the certificate. A revoked
| certificate is identified by the certificate's serial number | certificate is identified by the certificate's serial number
| being listed on the issuer's current CRL, as identified by the | being listed on the issuer's current CRL, as identified by the
| issuer's current Manifest and the CRLDP of the certificate. | issuer's current manifest and the CRLDP of the certificate.
| The CRL is itself valid and the public key used to verify the | The CRL is itself valid and the public key used to verify the
| signature on the CRL is the same public key used to verify the | signature on the CRL is the same public key used to verify the
| certificate itself. | certificate itself.
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
This document has no additional operational considerations compared This document has no additional operational considerations beyond
to Section 9 of [RFC6487]. those described in Section 9 of [RFC6487].
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3779], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487] The Security Considerations of [RFC3779], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487]
apply to Resource Certificates and CRLs. apply to Resource Certificates and CRLs.
This document explicates that, in the RPKI, the CRL listed on the This document explicates that, in the RPKI, the CRL listed on the
certificate issuer's current Manifest is the one relevant and certificate issuer's current manifest is the one relevant and
appropriate for determining the revocation status of a resource appropriate for determining the revocation status of a resource
certificate. By way of the hash in the manifest's FileList this certificate. The hash in the manifest's fileList provides a
provides a cryptographic guarantee on the Certification Authority's cryptographic guarantee on the Certification Authority's intent that
intent that this is the most recent CRL and removes possible replay this is the most recent CRL and removes possible replay vectors.
vectors.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. This document has no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 6, line 47 skipping to change at line 264
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022, (RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[FORT] Leiva, A., "FORT validator", [Err3205] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 3205, RFC 6487,
<https://fortproject.net/en/validator>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid3205>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[routinator]
NLnetLabs, "Routinator",
<https://github.com/NLnetLabs/routinator>.
[rpki-client]
Jeker, C., Snijders, J., Dzonsons, K., and T. Buehler,
"rpki-client", June 2024, <https://www.rpki-client.org/>.
Appendix A. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE
PUBLICATION
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* OpenBSD [rpki-client]
* [FORT]
* [routinator]
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Tom Harrison whose observations prompted The authors wish to thank Tom Harrison whose observations prompted
this document, Alberto Leiva, Tim Bruijnzeels, Mohamed Boucadair, this document, Alberto Leiva, Tim Bruijnzeels, Mohamed Boucadair,
Geoff Huston, and the IESG for their valuable comments and feedback. Geoff Huston, and the IESG for their valuable comments and feedback.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders Job Snijders
Amsterdam Amsterdam
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