| rfc9837.original | rfc9837.txt | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6man R. Bonica | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bonica | |||
| Internet-Draft Juniper Networks | Request for Comments: 9837 Juniper Networks | |||
| Intended status: Experimental X. Li | Category: Experimental X. Li | |||
| Expires: 15 November 2025 CERNET Center/Tsinghua University | ISSN: 2070-1721 CERNET Center/Tsinghua University | |||
| A. Farrel | A. Farrel | |||
| Old Dog Consulting | Old Dog Consulting | |||
| Y. Kamite | Y. Kamite | |||
| NTT Communications Corporation | NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS | |||
| L. Jalil | L. Jalil | |||
| Verizon | Verizon | |||
| 14 May 2025 | August 2025 | |||
| The IPv6 VPN Service Destination Option | The IPv6 VPN Service Destination Option | |||
| draft-ietf-6man-vpn-dest-opt-11 | ||||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document describes an experiment in which VPN service | This document describes an experiment in which VPN service | |||
| information is encoded in an experimental IPv6 Destination Option. | information is encoded in an experimental IPv6 Destination Option. | |||
| The experimental IPv6 Destination Option is called the VPN Service | The experimental IPv6 Destination Option is called the VPN Service | |||
| Option. | Option. | |||
| One purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate that the VPN Service | One purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate that the VPN Service | |||
| Option can be deployed in a production network. Another purpose is | Option can be deployed in a production network. Another purpose is | |||
| to demonstrate that the security measures described in this document | to demonstrate that the security measures described in this document | |||
| are sufficient to protect a VPN. Finally, this document encourages | are sufficient to protect a VPN. Finally, this document encourages | |||
| replication of the experiment. | replication of the experiment. | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is | |||
| provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. | published for examination, experimental implementation, and | |||
| evaluation. | ||||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | ||||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | ||||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | ||||
| Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | ||||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | community. It has received public review and has been approved for | |||
| publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not | ||||
| all documents approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of | ||||
| Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841. | ||||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 November 2025. | Information about the current status of this document, any errata, | |||
| and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at | ||||
| https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9837. | ||||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
| license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
| Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
| and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | |||
| extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as | to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | |||
| described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the | |||
| provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. | Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described | |||
| in the Revised BSD License. | ||||
| Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 1. Introduction | |||
| 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 2. Conventions and Definitions | |||
| 3. The VPN Service Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 3. The VPN Service Option | |||
| 4. Forwarding Plane Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 4. Forwarding Plane Considerations | |||
| 5. Control Plane Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 5. Control Plane Considerations | |||
| 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 6. IANA Considerations | |||
| 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 7. Security Considerations | |||
| 8. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 8. Deployment Considerations | |||
| 9. Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 9. Experimental Results | |||
| 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 10. References | |||
| 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 10.1. Normative References | |||
| 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 10.2. Informative References | |||
| 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | Acknowledgements | |||
| Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | Authors' Addresses | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| Generic Packet Tunneling [RFC2473] allows a router in one network to | Generic Packet Tunneling [RFC2473] allows a router in one network to | |||
| encapsulate a packet in an IP header and send it to a router in | encapsulate a packet in an IP header and send it to a router in | |||
| another network. The receiving router removes the outer IP header | another network. The receiving router removes the outer IP header | |||
| and forwards the original packet into its own network. This | and forwards the original packet into its own network. This | |||
| facilitates connectivity between networks that share a private | facilitates connectivity between networks that share a private | |||
| addressing [RFC1918] [RFC4193] plan but are not connected by a direct | addressing [RFC1918] [RFC4193] plan but are not connected by a direct | |||
| link. | link. | |||
| The IETF refined this concept in a Framework For Virtual Private | The IETF refined this concept in the Framework for VPN [RFC2764]. | |||
| Networks (VPN) [RFC2764]. It also standardized the following VPN | The IETF also standardized the following VPN technologies: | |||
| technologies: | ||||
| * IPSec VPN [RFC3884]. | * IPsec VPN [RFC3884] | |||
| * Layer 3 VPN (L3VPN) [RFC4364]. | * Layer 3 VPN (L3VPN) [RFC4364] | |||
| * Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) [RFC4761][RFC4762]. | * Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) [RFC4761][RFC4762] | |||
| * Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) [RFC6624]. | * Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) [RFC6624] | |||
| * Ethernet VPN (EVPN) [RFC7432]. | * Ethernet VPN (EVPN) [RFC7432] | |||
| * Pseudowires [RFC8077]. | * Pseudowires [RFC8077] | |||
| * SRv6 [RFC8986]. | * Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) [RFC8986] | |||
| * EVPN / NVO3 [RFC9469]. | * EVPN / Network Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3) [RFC9469] | |||
| IPSec VPNs cryptographically protect all traffic from customer | IPsec VPNs cryptographically protect all traffic from customer | |||
| endpoint to customer endpoint. All of the other VPN technologies | endpoint to customer endpoint. All of the other VPN technologies | |||
| mentioned above share the following characteristics: | mentioned above share the following characteristics: | |||
| * An ingress Provider Edge (PE) router encapsulates customer data in | * An ingress Provider Edge (PE) router encapsulates customer data in | |||
| a tunnel header. The tunnel header includes service information. | a tunnel header. The tunnel header includes service information. | |||
| Service information identifies a Forwarding Information Base (FIB) | Service information identifies a Forwarding Information Base (FIB) | |||
| entry on an egress PE router. | entry on an egress PE router. | |||
| * The ingress PE router sends the encapsulated packet to the egress | * The ingress PE router sends the encapsulated packet to the egress | |||
| PE router. | PE router. | |||
| skipping to change at page 3, line 48 ¶ | skipping to change at line 139 ¶ | |||
| information is encoded in an experimental IPv6 Destination Option | information is encoded in an experimental IPv6 Destination Option | |||
| [RFC8200]. The experimental IPv6 Destination Option is called the | [RFC8200]. The experimental IPv6 Destination Option is called the | |||
| VPN Service Option. | VPN Service Option. | |||
| The solution described in this document offers the following | The solution described in this document offers the following | |||
| benefits: | benefits: | |||
| * It does not require configuration on CE devices. | * It does not require configuration on CE devices. | |||
| * It encodes service information in the IPv6 extension header. | * It encodes service information in the IPv6 extension header. | |||
| Therefore, it does not require any non-IPv6 headers (e.g., MPLS) | Therefore, it does not require any non-IPv6 headers (e.g., MPLS | |||
| to carry service information. | headers) to carry service information. | |||
| * It supports many VPNs on a single egress PE router. | * It supports many VPNs on a single egress PE router. | |||
| * When a single egress PE router supports many VPNs, it does not | * When a single egress PE router supports many VPNs, it does not | |||
| require an IP address per VPN. | require an IP address per VPN. | |||
| * It does not rely on any particular control plane. | * It does not rely on any particular control plane. | |||
| One purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate that the VPN Service | One purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate that the VPN Service | |||
| Option can be deployed in a production network. Another purpose is | Option can be deployed in a production network. Another purpose is | |||
| to demonstrate that the security measures described in Section 7 of | to demonstrate that the security measures described in Section 7 of | |||
| this document are sufficient to protect a VPN. Finally, this | this document are sufficient to protect a VPN. Finally, this | |||
| document encourages replication of the experiment, so that | document encourages replication of the experiment, so that | |||
| operational issues can be discovered. | operational issues can be discovered. | |||
| 2. Conventions and Definitions | 2. Conventions and Definitions | |||
| The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | |||
| "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and | "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and | |||
| "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in | "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in | |||
| BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all | BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all | |||
| capitals, as shown here. | capitals, as shown here. | |||
| 3. The VPN Service Option | 3. The VPN Service Option | |||
| The VPN Service Option is an IPv6 Destination Option encoded | The VPN Service Option is an IPv6 Destination Option encoded | |||
| according to rules defined in [RFC8200]. | according to rules defined in [RFC8200]. | |||
| As described in section 4.2 of [RFC8200] a IPv6 Destination Option | As described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8200], an IPv6 Destination Option | |||
| contains three fields: Option Type, Opt Data Len, and Option Data. | contains three fields: Option Type, Opt Data Len, and Option Data. | |||
| In the VPN Service Option these fields are used as follows: | In the VPN Service Option, these fields are used as follows: | |||
| * Option Type: 8-bit selector. VPN Service Option. This field MUST | * Option Type: 8-bit selector. VPN Service Option. This field MUST | |||
| be set to RFC3692-style Experiment (0x5E) [V6MSG]. See Note | be set to 0x5E (RFC3692-style Experiment) [V6MSG]. See NOTE | |||
| below. | below. | |||
| * Opt Data Len - 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the option, in | * Opt Data Len: 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the option, in | |||
| bytes, excluding the Option Type and Option Length fields. This | bytes, excluding the Option Type and Option Length fields. This | |||
| field MUST be set to 4. | field MUST be set to 4. | |||
| * Option Data - 32 bits. VPN Service Information that identifies a | * Option Data: 32 bits. VPN service information that identifies a | |||
| FIB entry on the egress PE. The FIB entry determines how the | FIB entry on the egress PE. The FIB entry determines how the | |||
| egress PE will forward customer data to a CE device. | egress PE will forward customer data to a CE device. | |||
| A single VPN Service Option MAY appear in a Destination Options | A single VPN Service Option MAY appear in a Destination Options | |||
| header that immediately precedes an upper-layer header. It MUST NOT | header that immediately precedes an upper-layer header. It MUST NOT | |||
| appear in any other extension header. If a receiver finds the VPN | appear in any other extension header. If a receiver finds the VPN | |||
| Service Option in any other extension header, it MUST NOT recognize | Service Option in any other extension header, it MUST NOT recognize | |||
| the option. The packet MUST be processed according to the setting of | the option. The packet MUST be processed according to the setting of | |||
| the two highest order bits of the Option Type (see NOTE below). | the two highest-order bits of the Option Type (see NOTE below). | |||
| NOTE: For this experiment, the Option Type is set to '01011110', | NOTE: For this experiment, the Option Type is set to '01011110', | |||
| i.e., 0x5E. The highest-order two bits are set to 01 indicating that | i.e., 0x5E. The highest-order two bits are set to 01, indicating | |||
| the required action by a destination node that does not recognize the | that the required action by a destination node that does not | |||
| option is to discard the packet. The third highest-order bit is set | recognize the option is to discard the packet. The third highest- | |||
| to 0 indicating that Option Data cannot be modified along the path | order bit is set to 0, indicating that Option Data cannot be modified | |||
| between the packet's source and its destination. The remaining low- | along the path between the packet's source and its destination. The | |||
| order bits are set to '11110' to indicate the single IPv6 Destination | remaining low-order bits are set to '11110' to indicate the single | |||
| Option Type code point available in the registry for experimentation. | IPv6 Destination Option Type code point available in the "Destination | |||
| Options and Hop-by-Hop Options" registry [V6MSG] for experimentation. | ||||
| 4. Forwarding Plane Considerations | 4. Forwarding Plane Considerations | |||
| The ingress PE encapsulates the customer data in a tunnel header. | The ingress PE encapsulates the customer data in a tunnel header. | |||
| The tunnel header MUST contain an IPv6 header and a Destination | The tunnel header MUST contain an IPv6 header and a Destination | |||
| Options header that immediately precedes the customer data. It MAY | Options header that immediately precedes the customer data. It MAY | |||
| also include any legal combination of IPv6 extension headers. | also include any legal combination of IPv6 extension headers. | |||
| The IPv6 header contains: | The IPv6 Header contains the following (all defined in [RFC8200]): | |||
| * Version - Defined in [RFC8200]. MUST be equal to 6. | * Version - MUST be equal to 6. | |||
| * Traffic Class - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Traffic Class | |||
| * Flow Label - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Flow Label | |||
| * Payload Length - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Payload Length | |||
| * Next Header - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Next Header | |||
| * Hop Limit - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Hop Limit | |||
| * Source Address - Defined in [RFC8200]. Represents an interface on | * Source Address - Represents an interface on the ingress PE router. | |||
| the ingress PE router. This address SHOULD be chosen according to | This address SHOULD be chosen according to guidance provided in | |||
| guidance provided in [RFC6724]. | [RFC6724]. | |||
| * Destination Address - Defined in [RFC8200]. Represents an | * Destination Address - Represents an interface on the egress PE | |||
| interface on the egress PE router. This address SHOULD be chosen | router. This address SHOULD be chosen according to guidance | |||
| according to guidance provided in [RFC6724]. | provided in [RFC6724]. | |||
| The IPv6 Destination Options Extension Header contains: | The IPv6 Destination Options Extension Header contains the following | |||
| (all defined in [RFC8200]): | ||||
| * Next Header - Defined in [RFC8200]. MUST identify the protocol of | * Next Header - MUST identify the protocol of the customer data. | |||
| the customer data. | ||||
| * Hdr Ext Len - Defined in [RFC8200]. | * Hdr Ext Len | |||
| * Options - Defined in [RFC8200]. In this experiment, the Options | * Options - In this experiment, the Options field MUST contain | |||
| field MUST contain exactly one VPN Service Option as defined in | exactly one VPN Service Option as defined in Section 3 of this | |||
| Section 3 of this document. It MAY also contain any legal | document. It MAY also contain any legal combination of other | |||
| combination of other Destination Options. | Destination Options. | |||
| 5. Control Plane Considerations | 5. Control Plane Considerations | |||
| The FIB can be populated: | The FIB can be populated by: | |||
| * By an operator, using a Command Line Interface (CLI). | * An operator, using a Command-Line Interface (CLI) | |||
| * By a controller, using the Path Computation Element (PCE) | * A controller, using the Path Computation Element Communication | |||
| Communication Protocol (PCEP) [RFC5440] or the Network | Protocol (PCEP) [RFC5440] or the Network Configuration Protocol | |||
| Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241]. | (NETCONF) [RFC6241] | |||
| * By a routing protocol. | * A routing protocol | |||
| Routing protocol extensions that support the IPv6 VPN Service | Routing protocol extensions that support the VPN Service Option are | |||
| Destination Option are beyond the scope of this document. | beyond the scope of this document. | |||
| 6. IANA Considerations | 6. IANA Considerations | |||
| This document does not make any IANA requests. | This document has no IANA actions. | |||
| 7. Security Considerations | 7. Security Considerations | |||
| A VPN is characterized by the following security policy: | A VPN is characterized by the following security policy: | |||
| * Nodes outside of a VPN cannot inject traffic into the VPN. | * Nodes outside of a VPN cannot inject traffic into the VPN. | |||
| * Nodes inside a VPN cannot send traffic outside of the VPN. | * Nodes inside a VPN cannot send traffic outside of the VPN. | |||
| A set of PE routers cooperate to enforce this security policy. If a | A set of PE routers cooperate to enforce this security policy. If a | |||
| device outside of that set could impersonate a device inside of the | device outside of that set could impersonate a device inside of the | |||
| set, it would be possible for that device to subvert security policy. | set, it would be possible for that device to subvert security policy. | |||
| Therefore, impersonation must not be possible. The following | Therefore, impersonation must not be possible. The following | |||
| paragraphs describe procedures that prevent impersonation. | paragraphs describe procedures that prevent impersonation. | |||
| The IPv6 VPN Service Destination Option can be deployed: | The VPN Service Option can be deployed: | |||
| * On the global Internet | * On the global Internet | |||
| * Inside of a limited domain | * Inside of a limited domain | |||
| When IPv6 VPN Service Destination Option is deployed on the global | When the VPN Service Option is deployed on the global Internet, the | |||
| Internet, the tunnel that connects the ingress PE to the egress PE | tunnel that connects the ingress PE to the egress PE MUST be | |||
| MUST be cryptographically protected by one of the following: | cryptographically protected by one of the following: | |||
| * The IPv6 Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] | * The IPv6 Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] | |||
| * The IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header [RFC4303]. | * The IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header [RFC4303] | |||
| When IPv6 VPN Service Destination Option is deployed in a limited | When the VPN Service Option is deployed in a limited domain, all | |||
| domain, all nodes at the edge of limited domain MUST maintain Access | nodes at the edge of limited domain MUST maintain Access Control | |||
| Control Lists (ACLs). These ACL's MUST discard packets that satisfy | Lists (ACLs). These ACLs MUST discard packets that satisfy the | |||
| the following criteria: | following criteria: | |||
| * Contain an IPv6 VPN Service option. | * Contain a VPN Service Option | |||
| * Contain an IPv6 Destination Address that represents an interface | * Contain an IPv6 Destination Address that represents an interface | |||
| inside of the limited domain. | inside of the limited domain | |||
| The mitigation techniques mentioned above operate in fail-open mode. | The mitigation techniques mentioned above operate in fail-open mode. | |||
| That is, they require explicit configuration in order to ensure that | That is, they require explicit configuration in order to ensure that | |||
| packets using the approach described in this document do not leak out | packets using the approach described in this document do not leak out | |||
| of a domain. See [I-D.wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains] for a | of a domain. See [SAFE-LIM-DOMAINS] for a discussion of fail-open | |||
| discussion of fail-open and fail-closed modes. | and fail-closed modes. | |||
| For further information on the security concerns related to IP | For further information on the security concerns related to IP | |||
| tunnels and the recommended mitigation techniques, please see | tunnels and the recommended mitigation techniques, please see | |||
| [RFC6169]. | [RFC6169]. | |||
| 8. Deployment Considerations | 8. Deployment Considerations | |||
| The VPN Service Option is imposed by an ingress PE and processed by | The VPN Service Option is imposed by an ingress PE and processed by | |||
| an egress PE. It is not processed by any other nodes along the | an egress PE. It is not processed by any other nodes along the | |||
| delivery path between the ingress PE and egress PE. | delivery path between the ingress PE and egress PE. | |||
| However, some networks discard packets that include IPv6 Destination | However, some networks discard packets that include IPv6 Destination | |||
| Options. This is an impediment to deployment. | Options. This is an impediment to deployment. | |||
| Because the VPN Service Option uses an experimental code point, there | Because the VPN Service Option uses an experimental code point, there | |||
| is a risk of collisions with other experiments. Specifically, the | is a risk of collisions with other experiments. Specifically, the | |||
| egress PE may process packets from another experiment that uses the | egress PE may process packets from another experiment that uses the | |||
| same code point. | same code point. | |||
| It is expected that, as with all experiments with IETF protocols, | As with all experiments with IETF protocols, it is expected that care | |||
| care is taken by the operator to ensure that all nodes participating | is taken by the operator to ensure that all nodes participating in an | |||
| in an experiment are carefully configured. | experiment are carefully configured. | |||
| Because the VPN Service Destination Option uses an experimental code | Because the VPN Service Destination Option uses an experimental code | |||
| point, processing of this option MUST be disabled by default. | point, processing of this option MUST be disabled by default. | |||
| Explicit configuration is required to enable processing of the | Explicit configuration is required to enable processing of the | |||
| option. | option. | |||
| 9. Experimental Results | 9. Experimental Results | |||
| Parties participating in this experiment should publish experimental | Parties participating in this experiment should publish experimental | |||
| results within one year of the publication of this document. | results within one year of the publication of this document. | |||
| Experimental results should address the following: | Experimental results should address the following: | |||
| * Effort required to deploy | * Effort required to deploy | |||
| - Was deployment incremental or network-wide? | - Was deployment incremental or network-wide? | |||
| - Was there a need to synchronize configurations at each node or | - Was there a need to synchronize configurations at each node, or | |||
| could nodes be configured independently? | could nodes be configured independently? | |||
| - Did the deployment require hardware upgrade? | - Did the deployment require a hardware upgrade? | |||
| * Effort required to secure | * Effort required to secure | |||
| - Performance impact | - Performance impact | |||
| - Effectiveness of risk mitigation with ACLs | - Effectiveness of risk mitigation with ACLs | |||
| - Cost of risk mitigation with ACLs | - Cost of risk mitigation with ACLs | |||
| * Mechanism used to populate the FIB | * Mechanism used to populate the FIB | |||
| * Scale of deployment | * Scale of deployment | |||
| * Interoperability | * Interoperability | |||
| - Did you deploy two interoperable implementations? | - Did you deploy two interoperable implementations? | |||
| - Did you experience interoperability problems? | - Did you experience interoperability problems? | |||
| * Effectiveness and sufficiency of OAM mechanisms | * Effectiveness and sufficiency of Operations, Administration, and | |||
| Maintenance (OAM) mechanisms | ||||
| - Did PING work? | - Did PING work? | |||
| - Did TRACEROUTE work? | - Did TRACEROUTE work? | |||
| - Did Wireshark work? | - Did Wireshark work? | |||
| - Did TCPDUMP work? | - Did TCPDUMP work? | |||
| 10. Acknowledgements | 10. References | |||
| Thanks to Gorry Fairhurst, Antoine Fressancourt, Eliot Lear and Mark | ||||
| Smith for their reviews and contributions to this document. | ||||
| 11. References | ||||
| 11.1. Normative References | 10.1. Normative References | |||
| [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | |||
| Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, | Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, | DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. | |||
| [RFC6169] Krishnan, S., Thaler, D., and J. Hoagland, "Security | [RFC6169] Krishnan, S., Thaler, D., and J. Hoagland, "Security | |||
| Concerns with IP Tunneling", RFC 6169, | Concerns with IP Tunneling", RFC 6169, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC6169, April 2011, | DOI 10.17487/RFC6169, April 2011, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6169>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6169>. | |||
| [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, | [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, | |||
| "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 | "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 | |||
| (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, | (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6724>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>. | |||
| [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC | [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC | |||
| 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, | 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, | |||
| May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. | May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. | |||
| [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 | [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 | |||
| (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, | (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, | DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8200>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>. | |||
| 11.2. Informative References | ||||
| [I-D.wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains] | 10.2. Informative References | |||
| Kumari, W., Alston, A., Vyncke, E., Krishnan, S., and D. | ||||
| E. Eastlake, "Safe(r) Limited Domains", Work in Progress, | ||||
| Internet-Draft, draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited- | ||||
| domains-04, 3 March 2025, | ||||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wkumari- | ||||
| intarea-safe-limited-domains-04>. | ||||
| [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. | [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. | |||
| J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private | J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private | |||
| Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, | Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, | |||
| February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1918>. | February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. | |||
| [RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in | [RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in | |||
| IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473, | IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473, | |||
| December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2473>. | December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2473>. | |||
| [RFC2764] Gleeson, B., Lin, A., Heinanen, J., Armitage, G., and A. | [RFC2764] Gleeson, B., Lin, A., Heinanen, J., Armitage, G., and A. | |||
| Malis, "A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private | Malis, "A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private | |||
| Networks", RFC 2764, DOI 10.17487/RFC2764, February 2000, | Networks", RFC 2764, DOI 10.17487/RFC2764, February 2000, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2764>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2764>. | |||
| [RFC3884] Touch, J., Eggert, L., and Y. Wang, "Use of IPsec | [RFC3884] Touch, J., Eggert, L., and Y. Wang, "Use of IPsec | |||
| Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing", RFC 3884, | Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing", RFC 3884, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC3884, September 2004, | DOI 10.17487/RFC3884, September 2004, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3884>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3884>. | |||
| [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast | [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast | |||
| Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, | Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4193>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. | |||
| [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, | [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005, | DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4302>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>. | |||
| [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", | [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", | |||
| RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, | RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4303>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>. | |||
| [RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private | [RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private | |||
| Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February | Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February | |||
| 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4364>. | 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>. | |||
| [RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private | [RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private | |||
| LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and | LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and | |||
| Signaling", RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/RFC4761, January 2007, | Signaling", RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/RFC4761, January 2007, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4761>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4761>. | |||
| [RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private | [RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private | |||
| LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) | LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) | |||
| Signaling", RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/RFC4762, January 2007, | Signaling", RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/RFC4762, January 2007, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4762>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4762>. | |||
| [RFC5440] Vasseur, JP., Ed. and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation | [RFC5440] Vasseur, JP., Ed. and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation | |||
| Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440, | Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009, | DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5440>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5440>. | |||
| [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., | [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., | |||
| and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol | and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol | |||
| (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, | (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. | |||
| [RFC6624] Kompella, K., Kothari, B., and R. Cherukuri, "Layer 2 | [RFC6624] Kompella, K., Kothari, B., and R. Cherukuri, "Layer 2 | |||
| Virtual Private Networks Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and | Virtual Private Networks Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and | |||
| Signaling", RFC 6624, DOI 10.17487/RFC6624, May 2012, | Signaling", RFC 6624, DOI 10.17487/RFC6624, May 2012, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6624>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6624>. | |||
| [RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A., | [RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A., | |||
| Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based | Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based | |||
| Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February | Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February | |||
| 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7432>. | 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>. | |||
| [RFC8077] Martini, L., Ed. and G. Heron, Ed., "Pseudowire Setup and | [RFC8077] Martini, L., Ed. and G. Heron, Ed., "Pseudowire Setup and | |||
| Maintenance Using the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)", | Maintenance Using the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)", | |||
| STD 84, RFC 8077, DOI 10.17487/RFC8077, February 2017, | STD 84, RFC 8077, DOI 10.17487/RFC8077, February 2017, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8077>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8077>. | |||
| [RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer, | [RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer, | |||
| D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6 | D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6 | |||
| (SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986, | (SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021, | DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8986>. | |||
| [RFC9469] Rabadan, J., Ed., Bocci, M., Boutros, S., and A. Sajassi, | [RFC9469] Rabadan, J., Ed., Bocci, M., Boutros, S., and A. Sajassi, | |||
| "Applicability of Ethernet Virtual Private Network (EVPN) | "Applicability of Ethernet Virtual Private Network (EVPN) | |||
| to Network Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3) Networks", | to Network Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3) Networks", | |||
| RFC 9469, DOI 10.17487/RFC9469, September 2023, | RFC 9469, DOI 10.17487/RFC9469, September 2023, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9469>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9469>. | |||
| [V6MSG] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Internet | [SAFE-LIM-DOMAINS] | |||
| Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters: Destination Options | Kumari, W., Alston, A., Vyncke, É., Krishnan, S., and D. | |||
| and Hop-by-Hop Options", Web | Eastlake, "Safe(r) Limited Domains", Work in Progress, | |||
| https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ | Internet-Draft, draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited- | |||
| ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2. | domains-04, 3 March 2025, | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wkumari- | ||||
| intarea-safe-limited-domains-04>. | ||||
| [V6MSG] IANA, "Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options", | ||||
| <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters>. | ||||
| Acknowledgements | ||||
| Thanks to Gorry Fairhurst, Antoine Fressancourt, Eliot Lear, and Mark | ||||
| Smith for their reviews and contributions to this document. | ||||
| Authors' Addresses | Authors' Addresses | |||
| Ron Bonica | Ron Bonica | |||
| Juniper Networks | Juniper Networks | |||
| Herndon, Virginia | Herndon, Virginia | |||
| United States of America | United States of America | |||
| Email: rbonica@juniper.net | Email: rbonica@juniper.net | |||
| Xing Li | Xing Li | |||
| skipping to change at page 12, line 4 ¶ | skipping to change at line 518 ¶ | |||
| Juniper Networks | Juniper Networks | |||
| Herndon, Virginia | Herndon, Virginia | |||
| United States of America | United States of America | |||
| Email: rbonica@juniper.net | Email: rbonica@juniper.net | |||
| Xing Li | Xing Li | |||
| CERNET Center/Tsinghua University | CERNET Center/Tsinghua University | |||
| Beijing | Beijing | |||
| China | China | |||
| Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn | Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn | |||
| Adrian Farrel | Adrian Farrel | |||
| Old Dog Consulting | Old Dog Consulting | |||
| United Kingdom | United Kingdom | |||
| Email: adrian@olddog.co.uk | Email: adrian@olddog.co.uk | |||
| Yuji Kamite | Yuji Kamite | |||
| NTT Communications Corporation | NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS | |||
| Minato-ku | Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo | |||
| Japan | Japan | |||
| Email: y.kamite@ntt.com | Email: y.kamite@ntt.com | |||
| Luay Jalil | Luay Jalil | |||
| Verizon | Verizon | |||
| Richardson, Texas | Richardson, Texas | |||
| United States of America | United States of America | |||
| Email: luay.jalil@one.verizon.com | Email: luay.jalil@one.verizon.com | |||
| End of changes. 86 change blocks. | ||||
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