ROLL Applicability Statement Template
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This document is a template applicability statement for the Routing over Low-power and Lossy Networks (ROLL) WG.
Hello.
References/Overview of requirements documents, both
IETF and industry group. (two pages maximum. This text
should be (very) technical, should be aimed at IETF *participants*,
not industry group participants, and should explain this
industries' specific issues)
This should list other documents (if any) which deal with
situations where things are not in scope for this document.
(For instance, the AMI document tries to cover both line-powered
urban metering networks, and energy-constrained metering networks,
and also tries to deal with rural requirements. This should
be three or four documents, so this section should list the
limits of what this document covers)
describe a single scenario, with possibly
multiple topologies that a single utility would employ.
Explain what kind of traffic is being transmitted, where it is
initiated, and what kinds of protocols (CoAP, multicast, HTTPS, etc.)
are being used. Explain what assumptions are being made about
authentication and authorization in those protocols.
Explain what layer-2 technologies this statement applies to, and
if there are options, they should be listed generally here, and
specifically in section 4.2.
This should explain in general terms how RPL is going to be used
in this network topology. If trees that are multiple
layers deep are expected, then this should be described so that the fan
out is understood.
Some sample topologies (from simulations) should be explained, perhaps
with images references from other publications.
This section should tell an *implementer* in a lab, having a simulation
tool or a building/city/etc. to use as a testbed, how to construct
an LLN of sufficient complexity (but not too much) to validate an
implementation.
This section should list the various features of RPL plus other layers
of the LLN, and how they will be used.
(This section explains how nodes get their initial trust anchors,
initial network keys. It explains if this happens at the factory,
in a deployment truck, if it is done in the field, perhaps
like
http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/SmartObjectSecurity/papers/CullenJennings.pdf)
(This section explains how that replaces a failed node takes
on the dead nodes' identity, or not. How are nodes retired.
How are nodes removed if they are compromised)