Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Intended status: Informational July 2012 Expires: December 31, 2012 Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting-02 Abstract There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for doing so. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 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This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft. Bush Expires December 31, 2012 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI July 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. What to Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for doing so. An example might be when provider A allowed a child, C, to move to other provider(s) and keep their address space, either temporarily or permanently, and C's child, G, wished to stay with provider A. Or a child, C, in the process of going out of business might place their grandchildren in precarious circumstances until they can re- home. The grandparent, without disturbing the child's data, could simply issue ROAs for the grandchildren, or issue certificates for those willing to manage their own rpki data. Certification Authorities with a large number of children, e.g. very large ISPs or RIRs, might offer documented grandparenting processes and/or agreements. This might reassure grandchildren with worries about irresponsible parents. Other examples occur in administrative hierarchies, such as large organizations or military and other government hierarchies, when A's child C wishes to manage their own data but does not wish the technical or administrative burden of managing their children's, Gs', data. 2. Suggested Reading It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480], ROAs, see [RFC6482], BGPSEC Router Certificates, see [I-D.ietf-sidr- bgpsec-pki-profiles], and the operational guidance for origin validation, [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]. 3. What to Do A hypothetical example might be that A has the rights to 10.0.0.0/8, has delegated 10.42.0.0/16 to their child C, who delegated 10.42.2.0/ 23 to their child G. C has changed providers and kept, with A's consent, 10.42.0.0/16, but G wishes to stay with A and keep 10.42.2.0 /23. Bush Expires December 31, 2012 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI July 2012 Perhaps there are also AS resources involved, and G wishes to issue Router Certificates for their AS(s). Managing RPKI data in such relationships is simple, but should be done carefully. First, using whatever administrative and/or contractual procedures are appropriate in the local hierarchy, the grandparent, A, should ensure their relationship to the grandchild, G, and that G has the right to the resources which they wish to have registered. These are local matters between A and G. Although A has the rights over their child's, C's, resources, it would be prudent and polite to ensure that C agrees to A forming a relationship to G. Again, these are local matters between A, C, and G. Often, no one outside of one of these bi-lateral relationships actually knows the agreement between the parties. Then, it is trivial within the RPKI for A to certify G's data, even though it is a subset of the resources A delegated to C. A may certify G's resources, or issue one or more EE certificates and ROAs for G's resources. Which is done is a local matter between A and G. 4. Security Considerations This operational practice presents no technical security threats beyond those of the relevant RPKI specifications. There are threats of social engineering by G, lying to A about their relationship to and rights gained from C. There are also threats of social engineering by C, attempting to prevent A from giving rights to G which G legitimately deserves. 5. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA Considerations. 6. References [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M., Turner, S. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests", Internet-Draft draft-ietf- sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03, April 2012. [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-17, June 2012. [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Bush Expires December 31, 2012 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI July 2012 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Author's Address Randy Bush Internet Initiative Japan 5147 Crystal Springs Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 US Email: randy@psg.com Bush Expires December 31, 2012 [Page 4]